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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and rationale 
The Ethiopian economy has been expanding at a relatively high pace through most of the 2000s. 
The rapid growth of the wage-working labour force is a major aspect of this. Over the last half-
decade, the number of people engaged in paid employment has more than doubled1. As of recently, 
the government has made structural transformation through the rapid development of a labour 
intensive manufacturing sector – a sector that has been stagnant at around 5 percent of GDP for 
many decades (World Bank 2015) – a top priority2. This has created much buzz in both scholarly 
and policy circles. The Ethiopian economy is discussed in terms of ‘a continental manufacturing 
hub’, a budding ‘new China’ and ‘an African lion’ ready to transform into an industrial economy 
with a manufacturing workforce numbering in the millions (Gelb et al. 2017; Kushkush 2015; 
Mills 2016; MoFED 2016;  Wuilbercq 2017).  
The key feature making the Ethiopian economy attractive to manufacturing development – readily 
noted in each of the above mentioned upbeat accounts of its potentials – is the low cost of labour 
in the country. Official and authoritative accounts demonstrate that the government views this state 
of things as the central component of its strategy to develop the manufacturing sector (MoFED 
2016; Mills 2016). Moreover, when labour is the subject of state attention, it is treated merely as 
a factor of production3. The problem of labour, whenever it is posed, is neither related to social 
justice nor betterment of conditions, but to increasing surpluses through, on the one hand, raising 
productivity, and, on the other, assuring that costs – i.e. wages – remain low. However, the position 
of labour in the Ethiopian political economy and the level of real wages have not always been 
characterised by the poverty they contemporarily are. As will be made evident, there have been 
 
1 See Admasie (2015) for a discussion of these figures. 
2 Industrialisation is considered an important task for several reasons. One is that manufacturing enables higher levels 
of value addition and the export of higher-priced goods that can close the catastrophic gap in the balance of trade. In 
a 2016 report to parliament, Prime Minister Hailemariam Dessalegn acknowledged that export volume accounted to 
only 16 percent of imports (Dawit 2016). This has aggravated the chronic scarcity of foreign exchange to an acute 
level, among other things leading to the most recent devaluation of the Ethiopian Birr, in October 2017. Also 
important, however, is the dynamic quality of the sector that allows it to absorb large amounts of labour. This task is 
an urgent one, as the Ethiopian economy is subject to an annual entry of over one million new job-seekers (UNCTAD 
2013). 
3 Senior government official Arkebe Oqubay's (2015) account of industrial policy in Ethiopia is a perfect illustration 
of this view. 
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times when Ethiopian labour carried significant socio-political clout and when it was compensated 
considerably better for its efforts. The current situation, celebrated as it may be by profiteers, is 
thus not a natural state of things, but the outcome of a historical process of contestation. That 
process is the subject of this dissertation. 
Effective contestation, however, is not likely to be achieved by atomised workers operating in 
isolation, but requires the compounded leverage and force that comes with an organised purposeful 
collectivity. Workers organise collectively in order to offset the structural power of capital which 
is overwhelming when confronted on an individual basis, and to enhance their own collective 
leverage. While this is the general logic and purpose of trade unionism, the strategic orientation – 
the precise goals and the manners in which those goals are thought to be achieved – that unions 
adopt is subject to contention. Trade unions thus constitute an instrument and an arena of struggle, 
and they occupy a central place within labour movements. However, as collective organisation and 
action takes place outside the formal structures of trade unions as much as within them, labour 
movements are not reducible to trade unions alone. Contention over orientation also takes place 
across the broader movement. There is ample evidence in the literature that the level of 
assertiveness of labour movements has a positive correlation with improvements in working 
conditions and wage levels4. When workers organise autonomously, actively engage in struggle 
over labour rights and wages, and adopt an assertive strategy backed by militant practices to 
achieve this, the outcomes can generally be expected to be more beneficial than when co-opted 
structures and deferential strategies are imposed over a dormant workforce. A large body of 
scholarly literature has explored the factors that condition the adoption of different orientations 
within labour movements. Taxonomies that separate business unionism from radical political 
unionism, and trade union consciousness from revolutionary class consciousness, have been 
developed within this body of literature, and a host of categories and models have been proposed 
to explain varying outcomes. While much of this discussion has taken place among scholars based 
in industrialised economies, analytical insights have also been drawn from the experience of labour 
movements in Africa, particularly when it comes to the explicit political aspects of labour 
movements. Despite the positive achievements of assertive strategies on the part of labour 
movements, a number of factors that work to limit assertiveness have been identified. These 
 
4 See, for instance, Silver (2003) for a global and historical analysis of the correlation between wages and strikes. 
3 
 
pertain to issues such as internal bureaucratisation and the effects of confining political-economic 
structures, as well as external pressures from capital and the state. In several African settings, the 
literature has demonstrated how such pressures have been enhanced by the relatively minor size 
of the wage working population, the weak economic base and poor finances of the labour 
movement, its historical links to ruling parties, and national/ethnic divisions that have been viewed 
as undermining class solidarities. 
In the context of Ethiopia, however, these discussions have remained largely unexplored. There 
are reasons to assume that many of the factors that have produced weak and co-opted labour 
movements in general, and in Africa in particular, should also pertain in Ethiopia. In light of this, 
historical manifestations of an assertive labour movement that engage in militant practices and 
adopt strategies of confrontation rather than co-option call for an explanation. At the same time, 
there is evidence indicating a correlation between the shifting orientation of the labour movement 
and the structural position of labour: real wages and labour rights peaked with the most assertive 
phase of Ethiopian labour movement history, and wages have since fallen sharply, while labour 
rights have significantly deteriorated, as the labour movement has taken on a more deferential, 
timid and co-opted outlook5. This observation calls for a more complete investigation of the 
determinants that have enabled such assertiveness, and the linkage between the collective agency 
of workers and the position of labour in the Ethiopian context. 
A key issue that emerges here is that of the orientation of the labour movement: the goals, strategies 
and methods that are adopted and the degree to which such goals, strategies and methods are 
underlined by militant practices. As the orientation is likely to have a significant impact on 
outcomes, a crucial element in examining the outcomes of workers' agency consists of identifying 
the factors and dynamics that determine this orientation. The task of analysing these dynamics is 
thus one of central importance, when concerned with the position and conditions of labour. In the 
context of Ethiopia, that importance is magnified in the contemporary conjuncture, where an 
increasing part of the population is becoming reliant on waged labour. 
Despite this, the Ethiopian labour movement has drawn little serious scholarly interest. When not 
ignored altogether, the importance of the movement has tended to be dismissed. Scholars have 
 
5 Although indications of this wage movement for a limited time period can be found in the literature (Mulatu and 
Yohannis 1988: 108-109), more conclusive evidence of this assertion can be found in chapter six of this dissertation. 
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characterised the movement as too miniscule and weak to have any meaningful influence, or so 
controlled and/or co-opted as to render it a mere transmission belt of the state (Dessalegn 2002: 
114; Paulos 2006, Sisay 2002). This contrasts with the key role the movement has played at 
important conjunctures in the recent past, and with the consistent attention paid to it by the state 
under three consecutive governments, as well as by other political actors, indicating a high 
importance attributed to it by such actors6. It also raises the question of whether these actors display 
an irrational level of concern or whether it is the scholarly community that is overlooking the 
importance of a potentially powerful social force.  Despite claims of its irrelevance in terms of 
size, the movement arguably constitutes the country's largest organised social force7, which has 
survived prolonged periods of suppression and repression. In this observation lays a clear 
indication that, to workers, collective organisation remains a compelling strategy that is unlikely 
to lessen in attractiveness as the wage working proportion of the population grows. On another 
level, the claims of external control and co-option has repeatedly been contradicted by a movement 
that has, at key conjunctures, autonomously adopted a strategy of confrontation, articulated 
alternative political-economic programmes, and asserted itself vis-à-vis the state and employers 
(Kiflu 1998; Praeg 2006: 185-196). This would imply that despite the appearance of control and 
co-option, such control and co-option is conditional and qualified at most, and that intense and 
continuous state attention is motivated by the potential of the movement. As the scarce research 
that has been conducted on the movement has tended to focus on the trade union leadership and 
its relation to the state alone, little is known about the broader dynamics that propel the movement 
and determine its outlook. Equally little is known about its historical effects on the political 
economy and labour regime that it operates within and exerts pressures upon. The ability to say 
anything conclusive about the potential of the movement is thus severely restricted. 
When considered by social scientists and historians, the assertive phases of the Ethiopian labour 
movement have been subsumed under the broad contexts of the Ethiopian revolution in the 1970s 
or the politics of transition, in the early 1990s. This constitutes a grave simplification – the 
orientation of the labour movement is subject to more complex dynamics than merely a 
determinant influence of whatever political conjuncture.  In a similar manner, changes in the labour 
 
6 For a discussion on the importance the current ruling party attaches to the exercise of control over the unions, see 
EPRDF (1996: 27). 
7 Total union membership was estimated to be 350 00 in 2010, and rapidly growing (ILO 2013). 
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regime – in the rare instances they are discussed – have been treated as direct outcomes of statal 
edicts, subject only to the whims of different administrations. This too constitutes a most severe 
simplification. The Ethiopian labour movement and labour regime have evolved in an interlinked 
manner over the past many decades with both secular trends and cyclical movements, both glaring 
continuities and sharp discontinuities, discernible. The impact of state policy constitute only one 
out of many factors that have influenced this conjoined evolution, and cannot be treated as the 
simple mechanical determinant of these outcomes. Neither can the position of labour within the 
Ethiopian political economy be reduced to the outcome of economistic8 factors alone. Rather, a 
more complex mode of explanation must be attempted. In analysing the determination of the 
position of labour, the orientation and force of the labour movement must be taken into 
consideration, and vice versa. This involves examining both structural factors residing within the 
political-economic configuration and the collective agency of workers, expressed in the movement 
of labour and conditioned by orientation of this movement. For it is when, where and how the 
collective agency of workers is pitted against adversarial categories and classes, within and against 
constraining structures in which that agency is formed, that these structures are reproduced or 
altered – and it is at the moment of reproduction or alteration of those structures that the position 
of labour is determined9. 
Not only, then, has the orientation of the Ethiopian labour movement been treated as externally 
and mechanically determined, but so has the nature of the labour regime. No substantial discussion 
on the forces that have determined wage levels, labour conditions, and rights can be found in the 
literature, only separate discussions which assume that one factor or another – be it productivity 
levels or the repressive inclinations of various governments – has been decisive. However, the 
determination of the nature of the labour regime – including wages and labour rights – takes place 
within complex socio-historical processes that cannot be reduced to one external or contextual 
factor or another. In the Ethiopian context, where this issue has so consistently been ignored or 
 
8 Meaning a narrow focus on economic aspects, which are in turn reduced to reified and fetishised markets, and 
conceived of as autonomous of other social phenomena. 
9 The view, articulated by Nicos Poulantzas (1978), of the relation between social structure and agency is a compelling 
and relevant one: it is the class struggle that mediates between the two and, in the final instance, determines the 
reproduction or alteration of those social structures. Since the subject of this dissertation is constituent of class struggle, 
it has obvious bearings on this dissertation. 
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treated in a reductionist manner, a more comprehensive treatment of the problem is therefore 
necessary. 
The rationale of this research project can thus be found in the paucity of literature on the Ethiopian 
labour movement, on the determinants of its shifting orientation and force, and on its impact on 
the political economy and labour regime in which it operates. To this extent, this research project 
aims to highlight the complex relationship of determinants of the orientation of the movement of 
labour and the evolving labour regime by locating them within the broad socio-historical processes 
that shape them, and thereby pose questions about the validity of reductionist state-centred 
explanations. The omissions in the literature that have resulted both from a singular reductionist 
focus on the relationship between trade unions and the state, and a dismissive attitude towards the 
achievements and potentials of the Ethiopian labour movement, can in this manner be overcome. 
This is a particularly urgent task within a conjuncture in which the Ethiopian wage labour 
population is growing exponentially whereas the conditions of labour remain wanting. Finally, this 
project also goes some length towards examining the validity of categories and theoretical models 
inherited from quite different historical, social and political-economic settings, within the setting 
of an African multinational political economy, in the midst of a renewed push towards capitalist 
industrialisation. 
1.2 Objective 
The central objective of this dissertation is to examine the interplay between the orientation of the 
Ethiopian labour movement and the shifting position of wage labour within the Ethiopian political 
economy. This includes the examination of the factors that have determined the orientation of the 
Ethiopian labour movement at key conjunctures – that has contributed to the growth and the 
decline in assertiveness of the movement – by investigating the relation between internal and 
external aspects in the process by which this orientation is established. These external aspects 
crucially include the effects of the movement on the position of labour within the political-
economic context and the labour regime, as these structures condition the movement and as its 
impact on them affect the appeal of different orientations in light of the effects registered. It is 
assumed that this facilitates a better understanding of the conditions under which autonomous and 
assertive labour movementism becomes possible – in general, but in Ethiopia in particular – and 
what the effects of such autonomous and assertive labour movementism may entail. 
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1.3 Focus and scope 
The key conjunctures that are examined are the cycles of advances and retreats; and of shifting 
orientation in terms of growth and decline in assertiveness of the Ethiopian labour movement over 
the last six decades or so. This corresponds to the period in which organised labour has been legal 
in the country and in which the labour movement has existed as a country-wide phenomenon. Two 
consummated cycles have been identified: the first spanning from the early 1960s to the late 1970s 
and the second from the late-1980s to mid-1990s. Special focus is given to the conjunctures that 
stand out in terms of labour assertiveness and unrest.  Meanwhile, the evolving position of labour, 
as well as the levels of industrial unrest and strike activity, is mapped over the full period. 
The main organisational frame of labour over this period has been the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Labour Unions (CELU) and its successor organisations the All-Ethiopian Trade Union (AETU), 
the Ethiopian Trade Union (ETU), and the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU). This 
organisation has a central place in the research. However, since all consecutive legislations have 
made it nearly impossible for unions to call strikes – indeed, no strike has yet been considered 
legal by concerned authorities – and since transgressions have come with punitive sanctions, 
including the threat of dissolution of the offending union, strikes and unrest have throughout the 
history of the Ethiopian labour movement had to be organised largely outside the formal structures 
of the trade unions. Moreover, as the state has repeatedly clamped down on the labour movement 
and brought its force to bear on the formal structures of the trade unions, opposition, militancy and 
resistance has been forced to relocate to external formal and informal structures. Such structures, 
being part and parcel of the broader labour movement, are also covered in the research. This, 
however, is only so to the extent that operations are directly related to labour – such as in terms of 
the struggle over the movement's orientation or the labour regime. More specifically political 
dynamics have been covered in detail elsewhere, and are here only discussed to the extent to which 
they are directly relevant to the subject area. 
1.4 Research problem and questions 
The literature has outlined a number of internal and external constraints that tend to limit the 
assertiveness and moderate the outlook and practices of labour and trade union movements. Such 
constraints have been considered subject to enhancement by a number of factors pertaining 
specifically to labour movements in African contexts. Several of these have obvious relevance to 
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the Ethiopian context, and the scholarly impression has indeed been that the Ethiopian labour 
movement has been small, weak, controlled and co-opted. It is in light of these constraints and 
impressions that the reoccurrence of an assertive labour movementism calls for explanation. 
The first question to guide the research is the following: 
What factors explain the orientation of the Ethiopian labour movement? 
It is assumed that while the agency of workers – exercised through the labour movement – affects 
the position of labour, the nature of this agency is dependent on the orientation of the labour 
movement. This calls attention to the precise nature of this relation. A second question is therefore 
posed as follows: 
In what manner does the orientation of the labour movement affect the position of labour within 
the Ethiopian political economy? 
It is moreover assumed that the effects of the movement on the position of labour reflect back on 
the orientation of the movement in terms of what strategies that are made possible and viable, and 
what appeal different strategies assert in light of those effects. Since the answers to the two 
questions above then impinge and depend on one another, the overarching question of this research 
is the following: 
What characterises the interplay between the orientation of the Ethiopian labour movement and 
the shifting position of wage labour in the Ethiopian political economy? 
1.5 Research design, methods and sources 
Different sources and types of data, both qualitative and quantitative, are required to answer the 
questions posed. First, an outline of the social and political-economic context in which the subject 
of the study – the Ethiopian labour movement – has emerged and evolved is required. This 
discussion is based primarily on qualitative data gathered from the literature, but also from grey 
material and archival sources. 
Once the context has been set, the evolution of the Ethiopian labour movement is discussed. Here, 
the aim is to analyse periods of diverging orientation and shifting clout of the movement, and 
identify the factors and dynamics that have determined this. The discussion is broken into two 
chapters dealing with two separately identifiable cycles of growth and decline in assertiveness of 
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the movement. Factors such as bureaucratisation; rank-and-file pressure; the impact of the social, 
political and economic context; the operation of different entities within the movement; and the 
role of the state are discussed. This section – which, in combination with the subsequent one, 
constitutes the centre of the dissertation around which the remaining sections pivot – relies on 
primary and secondary qualitative data gathered from a host of sources consulted. The primary 
sources include documentation from the archives of the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, 
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
the International Labour Organisation, and the Tom Killion Papers at the Hoover Institution; as 
well as interviews with key informants who have participated in or interacted with the labour 
movement over the past 60 years. A database of digitised files of the archival material collected, 
ranging between 20 000 – 30 000 pages has been established to draw upon, and the interviews 
have been transcribed resulting in some 300 pages of transcripts. Secondary sources include the 
literature available on the movement, grey material from the archives and libraries consulted, 
theses and dissertations, and bulletins and pamphlets aligned to political movements10. In addition 
to this, two sources that have been drawn upon should be mentioned. The first one is a database of 
newspaper labour-related articles from the government owned daily Ethiopian Herald, which was 
established in the process of the research and contains some 500 articles. Another source that 
warrants mention is the Public Library of US Diplomacy published online by the whistle-blower 
organisation WikiLeaks. This database contains around 100 cables from the US embassy in Addis 
Ababa pertaining to the Ethiopian labour movement in the years here concerned with.  
In order to establish the manner in which the movement's orientation and the position of labour are 
connected, the next step is to analyse – in relation to one another – two factors that are taken as 
indicators of these: levels of labour unrest and real wages11. It is presumed that the former indicates 
the assertiveness and level of militant activity of the labour movement – its orientation and force 
– while the latter is an indication of a central aspect of the labour regime as defined in the below: 
the distribution of surpluses, and would therefore indicate the position of labour within the political 
economy. Data on unrest has been compiled from a range of sources. This includes all mention of 
strikes found in the secondary literature, reports, interviews, newspapers, and archival sources. 
 
10 A large number such publications, have been collected for and under the auspices of the International Institute of 
Social History in Amsterdam during the early phases of this research project. 
11 In terms of wages as an indicator of position, it is indeed the case, as Cohn (1993: 4) has stated, that ‘wages are the 
single greatest issue in industrial conflict’. 
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Additionally it includes what little statistics and fragmented time-series that are available on 
number of labour disputes and court cases registered by the authorities. Since no comprehensive 
statistics have been compiled on unrest, strike activity or labour disputes – neither in a published 
form nor as existing in the archives – this entails a degree of qualitative description, and the 
measurement a number of incomplete sources against each other in order to establish an impression 
of general levels. The level of real wages is then measured over the last five decades using Central 
Statistical Agency data that has been deflated by the price index of Addis Ababa. The data only 
pertains to wages in the manufacturing sector. While the part of the workforce engaged within this 
sector has certainly been, and currently is, a relatively small part of the wage working population, 
it can be argued that measuring the wages of this section of the workforce alone corresponds to 
the aims of this research project. This is because manufacturing workers were among the first to 
be permitted to unionise – as workers in the agrarian sector and civil servants, for example, were 
subject to restrictions – and for a long periods have had the highest level of union density. As 
measuring the potential impact of the labour movement is most conducively conducted where its 
presence is most conspicuous, it therefore makes good sense to focus on the manufacturing sector. 
Another reason for this focus, however, is pragmatic and pertains to the availability of data, which, 
save civil servants, is not readily available in other sectors. In the manufacturing sector, CSA data 
on aggregate wages has been compiled, and such data can be complemented by data from digitised 
factory archives, which contain individual wages. That is not the case for wage workers in the 
agrarian and service sectors. Nevertheless, by reference to the literature and reports from the 
archives consulted, estimations of non-manufacturing wages is also discussed.  
When the shifting historical levels of unrest and real wages have been mapped, a discussion on the 
prevalence and nature of relationship between them is conducted. But in order to test the quality 
of CSA macro-data and the schematic periodisation of unrest drawn up, in order to permit the 
disaggregation of the macro-data data found in CSA statistics, and in order to illustrate local 
variances, two case studies precedes this discussion. The case studies, moreover, contribute to a 
better understanding of the labour movement at the level which contestation generally plays out: 
that of the workplace.  
The first and most expansive case study is that of the Bahir Dar Textile Factory. The context of 
the factory and its union is discussed. This discussion relies on qualitative data drawn from 
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repeated research stays in Bahir Dar, interviews with key participants, material from the CETU 
and ICFTU archives, and from the digitised personnel archive of the factory. Data gathered from 
a sample of workers' personnel files is thereafter used to measure shifting wage levels at the 
factory. They are then examined against national statistics and disaggregated wages and unrest 
levels for managerial and non-managerial employees, as well as for female and male employees. 
A second case study is drawn from the archives of the Ethio-Djibouti Railway12. Here, more robust 
sources of literature can be drawn upon, including Tom Killion's (1985; 1992) work on the subject. 
Additionally, the archives of CETU and ICFTU contain ample information on this historically 
important union. Interviews and repeated visits to Dire Dawa, where the railway headquarters are 
located, have complemented this. While it would have been ideal to include a larger number of 
case studies here, the limits imposed by time and resource constraints have meant that two such 
case studies must suffice. The archives of the particular case studies benefited from being the 
objects of two digitisation projects conducted by the International Institute of Social History13 
(IISH) in collaboration with Bahir Dar University, the Bahir Dar Textile Share Company, Dire 
Dawa University and the Ethio-Djibouti Railway Corporation. The resources required to execute 
these projects were significant, and it took over a year for three project staff members to complete 
the former, and nine months for two project staff members to complete a sample of the latter. The 
digitised collection of 4221 workers' files from the Bahir Dar Textile Factory that are the outcome 
of the first project constitutes a unique resource of Ethiopian labour history. In Dire Dawa, only a 
pilot project has been completed to date14, and as a result the number of digitised files drawn upon 
is more limited. Nevertheless, data from a randomised sample of 850 files from Bahir Dar and 300 
from the railways have been entered into two databases, organised and analysed using the SPSS 
software. 
The data drawn upon, analysed and presented, it is argued, allows, first, for the identification of 
the factors – internal and external – that has contributed to growth and decline in labour 
assertiveness over the years, and the examination of the relation and dynamics between these 
factors. Second, it allows for the identification of various outcomes in terms of the shifting position 
of labour, and the examination of the factors behind these outcomes. From this discussion, the 
 
12 These consist only of workers employed on the Ethiopian stretch of the railway. The workers on the Djibouti stretch 
have consistently been separately administered. 
13 In which I was involved as the IISH's regional representative. 
14 In late 2017 the French Centre of Ethiopian Studies joined the project, assuring its revival for 2018. 
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interplay between the orientation of the labour movement and the position of labour can be 
examined in more detail. The findings are discussed and interpreted with reference to labour 
movement theorisation, theorisation on the link between workers' agency and the position of 
labour, and the literature on the Ethiopian labour movement. 
1.6 Structure 
This first chapter consists of a general introduction to the study. The aim is to set the stage for the 
study that follows. 
In the second chapter two important tasks are addressed. The first consists of reviewing the 
literature pertaining to the theoretical field. Here, conceptualisations and relevant theoretical 
discussions are fleshed out and assessed. The second task consists of reviewing and assessing the 
literature on the concrete subject area: that of the Ethiopian labour movement. Discussions on the 
conditions and position of Ethiopian wage workers are also addressed here.  
The third chapter aims to set the context of the specific inquiry. First, this entails a discussion of 
the social and historical context. The second part of this chapter, aims to zoom in on the problem 
of economic surpluses – their production, distribution and appropriation – and how this relates to 
the evolving labour regime. This part includes a discussion on the changing legal regime and the 
conditions of labour. Finally, the processes of development of the manufacturing sector of Ethiopia 
– including the ambitions placed onto it, and the strategies and plans meant to achieve those 
ambitions – and of the wage working population are discussed. This enables a contextualisation of 
wage labour within the broader political economy and labour regime – the structural contexts in 
which its movement takes place, and the structural setting that it aims to affect. 
As noted, the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters can be thought of as the core of the dissertation. The 
fourth chapter describes and analyses the first cycle of growth and decrease in assertiveness; of 
advance and retreat, ranging from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, and its aftermath. This chapter 
includes a discussion on the formation of the labour movement, before attention is shifted to the 
process that produced a groundswell of militant energies, and the eventual reversal of this process. 
Factors that were conducive to the growth of assertiveness and factors that constrained this 
assertiveness are fleshed out. The fifth chapter discusses a second cycle of growth and decrease in 
assertiveness in a similar manner. Chronologically, this chapter covers the period from the late 
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1980s to mid-1990s. Here too, the process is described before conducive and constraining factors 
are examined. 
The sixth chapter is concerned with mapping historical levels of unrest and real wages over the 
full period of both cycles. The two variables are first measured separately, before a discussion on 
their relation is conducted. This chapter also examines the two case studies: the Bahir Dar Textile 
Factory and the Ethio-Djibouti Railway.  
In chapter seven, the discussion of the previous chapters are brought together and findings are 
discussed. Determinants of the shifting orientation of the labour movement are fleshed out, as are 
its effects. This sets the stage for a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between the orientation 
and position of labour. Finally, the implications of the findings for the context-specific and the 
theoretically oriented literature are discussed. 
1.7 Point of departure 
My own interest in understanding the Ethiopian labour movement follows from a couple of factors. 
On the one hand, having spent part of my formative years and education in and on Ethiopia had 
made me appreciative of the social and historical terrain and instilled in me an interest in 
understanding it. Secondly, my experiences as an organised member of the Swedish labour 
movement and the political left, and the ideational imprint of those experiences, has generated an 
interest in the struggles of wage workers. My interest in the Ethiopian labour movement in general, 
and its assertive phases in particular follows from this. This having been stated, it ought to be noted 
that my normative position going into this research project was that organised labour on an 
assertive footing is a positive thing in itself, and that demands for a greater share of surpluses from 
labour, whenever such demands are articulated, are – per definition – justified. 
With regards then to my positioning within the field/s of social sciences and history, my early 
engagement with Marxist literature has left a strong impression on me. First, this has meant that 
the separation between social scientific disciplines and between those disciplines and history has 
always appeared artificial and alien. The novelty of multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary 
approaches and the necessity to stress the merits of such approaches has therefore escaped me. 
Instead, I find my views more resonant with what Wallerstein (2008) called the Historical Social 
Science, which is based on a rejection of the intellectual relevance of disciplinary borders within 
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and among the social sciences and history altogether. This being a dissertation produced under the 
joint supervision of two universities, within two different disciplines – those of History and African 
Studies – I believe that this approach to social scientific and historical scholarship is not only most 
convincing, but also most suitable for the project at hand. 
A second, and related, manner in which my engagement with Marxism has imprinted itself is in 
terms of an attention to the material grounding of social phenomena. That approach which most 
strongly emphasises this aspect is Historical Materialism. But in order to avoid conflation with 
some of the cruder characterisations of this approach, and some of the caricatures of it, it is 
probably necessary to spell out precisely what is meant by the term within this research project. 
The idea that historical materialism consists of merely an analytical reduction to the economic 
level is a crude simplification. Rather, as Blackledge (2006: 22) has explained, it is the process of 
production ‘understood as a social, political and historical process’ that is at the centre of historical 
materialist analysis. Historical materialism then constitutes ‘a rejection of the reification of the 
concepts of the economic, the political and the sociological’ as independent levels susceptible to 
analytical separation (Blackledge 2006: 22). Yet, the insistence on the analytical primacy of the 
social process of production – which includes the distribution and appropriation of the social 
produce – is the foundation for a materialist conception and analysis of history. In the sense that 
the concern here is with categories rooted in the process of production and that the notion of 
struggle over surpluses originating from social production – which constitutes both the logic for 
labour organisation and an aspect of the outcome of the movement of labour – shoots through this 
research project, it can be stated that the project is placed within the historical materialist tradition. 
Historical materialism, much as radical and critical history in general, is, despite its name, future- 
and change-oriented. In the historical materialist tradition, this commitment is made most explicit 
in Marx's claim that the point is to change the world, rather than merely interpreting it. But more 
generally, it has been stated about history that its sword ‘has two edges’; one which ‘cuts through 
the noise, contradictions, and lies of the past’, but another one ‘that cuts open new possibilities in 
the future’ (Guldi and Armstrong 2014: 13). The nature of this exercise, then, despite reaching into 
the past, is not purely historical. Rather, by looking back, the aim is to analyse the present 
conjuncture in a critical manner, the relations, dynamics and trajectories that explain the coming 
of this conjuncture and are likely to stretch into the future, with a mind towards identifying the 
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possibilities of future transformations. The commitment to change can be expressed in a desire to 
interrogate and potentially destabilise inherited knowledge. Such knowledge, in this case, may 
express itself in perceptions of an unchanging timidity of Ethiopian workers and an equally 
unchanging docility of their movement, about a mechanic determination of wages as outcomes of 
productivity, or about the illegitimacy of labour unrest and militancy. In all cases, attention to the 
past may hold the keys to describing variations over time, explaining such variances in a more 
multifaceted manner, and thus point to the alternative paths potentially open. 
Another concern relates to the geographical boundaries of this inquiry. Within the field of labour 
history, the prevalence methodological nationalism has been criticised. Van der Linden and Roth 
(2014:13-14) have claimed that methodological nationalists treat nation-states as natural entities 
with trans-historic qualities and conflate society with the state. This critique is certainly both valid 
and warranted. As the subject of this study is defined by state-territorial boundaries – although 
conditioning processes certainly are not – a justification may be prudent in light of this critique. 
Although no contention can be made about the potential drawbacks of methodological nationalism, 
state boundaries cannot be ignored. Within the contours of states – however transitory they are – 
political-economic processes are conditioned, advanced and sometimes curtailed or halted. Some 
phenomena actually begin or end precisely where a territorial border appears. With regards to 
certain aspects of labour movements this frequently tends to be the case, not the least in the manner 
in which those movements define themselves. While, in this dissertation, it is considered how 
transnational processes helped create and shaped the Ethiopian labour movement, it is nonetheless 
a fact that this movement emerged within, and was defined by, the contours of the Ethiopian 
political economy and polity. 
Something similar can be said about the focus on wage labour. Indeed, recent labour history has 
moved in the direction of recognising the importance of a plethora of different labour relations, 
and away from a preferential focus on wage labour. Here too, the intention is not to advocate the 
analytical centrality of one form of labour relations. The focus on wage labour, in this case, is the 
result of contextual considerations. Wage labourers were the first workers to organise in Ethiopia 
on a mass-scale, and it was subsequently wage labouring sectors that were opened to legal 
organisation. As a natural result, wage labourers have played the most prominent role in the 
Ethiopian labour movement. This is not to deny that non-wage labourers have organised in 
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important movements of their own. Recurrent peasant movements are prime examples of this15. 
Neither is it to deny that non-wage labourers have been participants in the labour movement and 
may have an important role to play in the future. However, it can safely be asserted that while the 
movements of Ethiopian peasants have been the subject of extensive academic interest, the 
movement of Ethiopian wage workers has not. 
1.8 Research process, evolution and revisions 
The design of this research has been revised since its inception in order to overcome both 
limitations of the initial design of the project and obstacles of more practical nature. Initially, this 
project was conceived of as locating the dynamics that determine orientation exclusively within 
the formal structures of the trade unions. This scope has since been broadened in two ways. First, 
I have found it problematic to focus on the formal structures of trade unions alone. This is because 
in due course of the research, I found that key actors and processes that operate within the trade 
unions often simultaneously operate across and outside these formal boundaries. This is especially 
so with regards to contestation and in times where such contestation is high: key phenomenon and 
conjunctures for this research, in other words. As noted, legal restrictions on the right to strike has 
meant that strike action has consistently had to be organised outside the formal sphere of the trade 
unions. It seems reductionist and highly formalistic, in a dynamic context where processes and 
actors span across the formal boundaries of the unions, and where some of the defining practices 
are, at the very least in the formal sense, external to the unions, to excessively focus on such formal 
boundaries, especially in times when they lose much of their significance. This is the reason for 
shifting the scope of this research, from a narrow focus on trade unions alone, to a broader view 
of the labour movement of which they are part. It should, however, be noted that as trade unions 
occupy a central position within the labour movement, they remain central in this research. 
When it comes to the shift of focus from the internal dynamics of the trade unions to broader social 
dynamics – internal and external – of which the labour movement is subject to, and the reciprocal 
interplay between cause and effect, there are three justifications. The first relates to the point 
mentioned above. The internal dynamics would again have been confined to the formal boundaries 
of the trade union, and would have similarly failed to capture important dynamics that cuts across, 
or operates outside of, those formal boundaries. A second justification has to do with the tentative 
 
15 See, for example, Gebru (1996) 
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findings. In due course of the research I found indications that that periods of unrest and heightened 
labour assertiveness have been linked with periods of rising real wages and vice versa – that the 
more assertive phases of labour movement seemed to go together with important positive change 
in the position of labour, while those changes only seemed to increase the assertiveness of labour 
rather than to reduce it. A similar reciprocal interplay seemed to prevail in periods of significant 
worsening of the conditions and position of labour, which counter-intuitively did not seem to spark 
any assertive reaction. This led me to ponder over the direction of cause and effect, the degree to 
which the changing position of labour imprinted itself on the orientation of the labour movement 
and vice versa, and the degree to which the process of establishing orientation of the labour 
movement is conditioned by the perceived success of prior strategies. It seemed increasingly 
difficult to separate these two aspects, and while examining how the labour movement affected the 
position of labour and vice versa, I became increasingly convinced that they were in fact too 
closely interrelated to be analytically separated – that the causes can probably never be entirely 
distinguished from the effects. This notion features importantly in what follows. A third reason for 
broadening the scope from the internal dynamics alone was pragmatic: in due course of the 
research it became apparent that local union archives were rare, limited in scope, and generally 
only reached back to the immediate past. While central trade union archives were available, and 
thoroughly consulted, the original structure of the research was premised on the availability of a 
rich amount of local workplace trade union archives. When this proved a problematic proposition, 
it also undermined the viability of a narrowly conceived research project that focused on one aspect 
of dynamics of assertiveness alone. All in all, this is probably not a drawback, since, in the manner 
explained above, a broadening of scope is indeed both analytically defensible and prudent. From 
the original design, it is argued that it remains conducive not to singularly focus on, and thereby 
reduce dynamics to, one-dimensional state-union relations alone, as the tendency has been in the 
past. However, it is simultaneously argued that another form of reductionism – reducing the 
dynamics in which orientation is established to the internal relations of trade unions alone – would 
be just as problematic. 
Over the course of this research, prolonged periods have been spent in the archives of the 
Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, the Ethiopian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, 
the Bahir Dar Textile Factory, the Dire Dawa railway office, the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions hosted at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, the 
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International Labour Organisation in Geneva, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. 
In addition to this, research stays at a number of libraries have been conducted. These include the 
libraries of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian Central Statistical 
Agency in Addis Ababa, the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London, the International 
Institute of Social History in Amsterdam and the African Studies Centre in Leiden. Meanwhile, a 
number of in-depth interviews with key participants have been held. These interviews have taken 
place in Addis Ababa, Bahir Dar, Kampala, Geneva, Amsterdam, and over the internet. 
1.9 Definitions, assumptions and propositions 
The primary subject of this study is the Ethiopian labour movement. A labour movement can be 
considered to include two things. First it includes all those organisational constellations based on 
membership of workers operating with the explicit aim of advancing the position of the workers. 
Second, it includes all those collective practices undertaken by workers – formally organised or 
not – that aims to affect change of this position, whether on a local, national or international level. 
To the extent that the category includes the practices of workers, it must also be considered to 
include an ideational aspect: the aims, strategies and methods deemed most prudent and therefore 
adopted in the collective effort, or, put in another way, their orientation. Essentially, this describes 
the dialectical unity of ideas and practice in the category of praxis. 
A central component of labour movements is the organisations that are established in order to 
increase the collective leverage of the workers. This form of organisation goes under different 
names, but is most frequently referred to as trade unions. As is discussed in the following chapter, 
functional definitions that restrict and limit the legitimate areas of activity of unions ought to be 
avoided. In this dissertation, a broader conception of trade unions is upheld. Hyman (1975:64-65) 
defines trade unions in the following manner: 
A trade union is, first and foremost, an agency and a medium of power. Its central 
purpose is to permit workers to exert, collectively, the control over their conditions 
of employment which they cannot hope to possess as individuals; and to do so 
largely by compelling the employer to take account, in policy- and decision-making, 
of interests and priorities contrary to his own. As the vehicle of workers' interests 
against those of the employer, the union is involved in external relationships of 
control. (Such relationships are essentially two-way; as unions seek to affect the 
decisions of employers and governments they are themselves subject to influence 
and pressure from a range of external agencies.) But at the same time, process of 
control pervade the internal relationships of the unions. 
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This makes a good starting point for a broad conceptualisation of trade unionism, but it is subject 
to a slight modification here. The term ‘conditions of employment’ seems excessively restrictive 
in terms of scope of control.  Beatrice and Sidney Webb (1920: 1) made this point when they 
changed the definition of trade unionism between the first and second edition of their hugely 
influential work The History of Trade Unionism. While the first definition had referred to 
‘maintaining and improving the condition of their employment’, the second edition, in response to 
criticism raised on the grounds mentioned above, instead referred to working lives – a significantly 
broader term. Allowing for such a broader conceptualisation that takes into account the dualism of 
trade unionism, it is here defined as a collective organisation of workers that serves as an agency 
and a medium of power that permit workers to exert collective control as well as an agency and 
medium of power that permit the exercise of control over workers. 
The category of workers is conceived of inclusively but context-specific, as comprising all non-
managerial employees working for a wage16. Labour unrest is likewise conceived broadly17 as 
including all those practical expressions that workers' disaffection may take, including foot-
dragging, unpermitted absence, indiscipline and petitioning, but also sabotage, destruction of 
property and organised strikes. 
Assertiveness is taken to mean the readiness of workers and representatives to act, in the face of 
probable opposition, to exert pressure on external entities – through a range of means and practices, 
in both the industrial and the broader socio-political sphere – in order to improve conditions, to 
maximise work- and wage-related concessions, to gain influence over broader political-economic 
processes, and to achieve structural aims18. In this sense it is intimately related to militancy, which 
accentuates the adversarial and confrontational aspects of workers' practices. It is militant practices 
and assertive strategies that animates the movement, and breathes life into structures that, in their 
absence, risk fossilising and succumbing to bureaucratisation. Ample research has demonstrated 
the stultifying effects of, and the self-serving interests that is generated by, such bureaucratisation, 
 
16 This is not to suggest that only wage workers are workers, but only to avoid repetitious mention of wage workers. 
17 See Scott (1985) for a discussion on the basis of including such ‘lesser’ expressions of resistance. 
18 The pursuit of structurally and qualitatively transformative aims is juxtaposed with that of a quantitative – and as 
the evidence seems to suggest, in the long-term absence of social structural change, futile – strategy of singularly 
pursuing incremental income redistribution based on collective bargaining (Allen 1967: 242-244). Structural change, 
according to Allen (1967: 148), refers to the transfer of economic decision-making powers. 
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but also the manner in, and conditions under which, labour movements burst to life again under 
new bouts of militancy and re-gain an offensive footing. Assertiveness, finally, is not just studied 
as a phenomenon important in its own right, but it has repeatedly been posited that such it is 
conducive to improvements in the conditions and position of labour. 
The usage of the term labour regime here is slightly different from its usage in much of the 
literature. The term has been used to describe a number of different phenomena. On the one hand, 
it has been used to refer to the rules that determine the mobilisation/recruitment of labour and the 
organisation of the labour process (Ciccia 2015; Mezzadri and Srivastava 2015). In this 
dissertation, however, the term is treated as a political-economic category as much as a sociological 
one. That is, as a category as much relevant to the analysis of the production, distribution and 
appropriation of surpluses as with the organisation of the labour process. The difference here can 
be understood as one between what Burawoy (1985: 13-14) has described as the relations in 
production and the relations of production. While the former refers to the organisation of tasks, the 
latter include both the appropriation and distribution of surpluses. Reflecting this way of 
conceptualising the term, Bortz (2008: 16-17) has written that ‘the labour regime is the set of 
relationships, organisations, and institutions that define the appropriation of labour and its 
products, the parameters of the workplace rules, concepts, and behaviours’. In a slightly different 
manner, the term has been treated as synonymous with the mode or mechanism of surplus 
extraction from labour19, through wage or non-wage mechanisms. Such a conceptualisation is 
strikingly narrow and does not significantly differ from the concept of mode of exploitation – or, 
to be more precise, that component of the mode of exploitation constituted by the 
mechanism/technique of exploitation20. Since the degree of exploitation/surplus extraction may 
likely, for the individual worker as well as for the analyst of the broader political-economic 
configuration, appear just as important as the mode, it can be argued that any conceptualisation 
that does not include this aspect is inherently limited.  Something similar can be stated of the 
conditions and rights of labour. A broadest conceptualisation of labour regime would have it refer 
to the configuration of the full set of labour relations in play. While this is certainly the most 
conducive way of thinking of it in the abstract, its operationalisation becomes a difficult 
 
19 See, for instance, Brass (2011). 
20 The techniques of exploitation have been defined as ‘the precise instrumentalities through which economic surplus 
is pumped out of the direct producers’ (Ruyle 1975). 
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proposition. In this dissertation a broad but yet delimited conceptualisation of the category of 
labour regime is employed. It is conceived of as subsuming three variables: the conditions of 
labour, including the collective rights of labour; the mode of surplus extraction from labour, 
pertaining to wage or non-wage mechanisms; and the degree of surplus extraction, indicating the 
level of remuneration. Labour regimes, viewed in this broad manner, are in perpetual motion and 
change over time in reaction to a number of variables. 
The degree of leverage that labour exerts, the rights it enjoys, the conditions of labour and the 
degree to which value created is compensated can be said to define the position of labour. This 
position is simultaneously a structural quality of the political-economic configuration and the 
result of agency exercised in past contestations and struggles. Since it is deeply interlinked with 
the character of the labour regime, a change in the labour regime is likely to imply a change in the 
position of labour and vice versa. 
A key assumption that underlies this research is that the impact of the labour movement cannot 
readily be separated from factors that determine the orientation of the movement. This is so 
because the labour regime, as defined here, is simultaneously subject to pressure from the 
movement and a force that conditions it. It is also so because the effects of labour movement 
become a central factor in the future orientation of the movement: a strategy of confrontation 
appears appealing when it has resulted in desirable changes, and the opposite is equally true. 
An analytical sketch, illustrating the principal factors that determine the relationship between the 
strategic orientation of the labour movement and the position of labour – as are identified in the 
literature, and which are covered in more detail in the following chapter – is presented below. 
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1.10 Scientific importance and impact 
The justification for this project can be found on three levels. Most immediately, the research 
generates knowledge on the dynamics that determine the orientation of the Ethiopian labour 
movements, and how, in turn, it is linked to the broader development of the labour regime. Such 
knowledge contributes towards filling the conspicuous knowledge gaps on what is arguably one 
of the most important social forces in the country. The importance of the labour movement in 
Ethiopia stem from a number of factors. Size is one. For even if the Ethiopian labour movement 
has been derided as miniscule (Dessalegn 2002: 114), such a characterisation can only stem from 
a crude comparison with an ‘ideal’ state of organised labour derived from specific historical 
conjunctures in industrial economies. For with a membership numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands and growing (Assefa, 2003: 27-28; ILO 2013), the labour movement is a rare example 
of a mass-based organisation, unsurpassed in size in contemporary Ethiopia. Potential is another 
factor, for whenever the labour movement has broken with the control regime imposed by the state, 
it has been able to play an important role on a country-wide level. There are theoretical 
explanations, accounted for in the below, for the powerful potential of labour movements in 
general, and in African contexts in particular. However, for the Ethiopian labour movement to be 
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able to exercise its potential weight, a certain level of assertiveness and autonomy is required. This 
research contributes to enhancing our understanding of the conditions under which assertiveness 
and autonomy can be acquired. 
On another level, the knowledge generated by this research goes some way towards 
contextualising general debates on labour movement and trade union dynamics in African settings, 
and provides some new insights on aspects of such dynamics. The debate on the relationship 
between labour bureaucracy and rank-and-file membership in determining strategic orientation, 
for example, has largely been conducted with examples from industrial economies. Analysing such 
dynamics in an alternative setting has the potential of revealing features that not only enrichen, but 
potentially alter, our understanding of them. The explicitly political side of labour and trade union 
movementism in Africa, and the regime of control that states frequently attempt to impose over 
unions, furthermore, has often simply been registered or assumed. This research goes some way 
towards revealing the dynamics and factors that explain politicisation of African labour 
movements and the conditions under which they may gain autonomy. 
Moreover, the research project sheds light on a phenomenon that is often neglected in discussions 
on African labour movements: the agency of workers in shaping the labour regime under which 
they work, organise and struggle. Wage levels and working conditions are far too often simply 
taken as given, or viewed as the mechanical outcomes of contextual factors alone. Here, the impact 
of workers' agency – in the form of organisation and unrest – on wage levels and labour regime 
changes is brought to the forefront. To this end, the research presented here provides a historical 
account of how the present Ethiopian labour regime has evolved, and insights into how it may be 
changed. 
Finally, the research brings an aspect of reciprocal determination to the fore that is hitherto under-
theorised. This is the interplay between causes and effects – how the effects of the orientation of 
the labour movement on the position of labour is reciprocated, in the impact of those changes, on 
the orientation of the labour movement. Testing this proposition constitutes what is potentially the 
theoretically novel aspect of this research.  
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2. Theoretical considerations and assessment of the literature 
2.1 Conceptualising labour movements 
In the previous chapter the key concepts that are used in this research were discussed and defined. 
Labour movements, it is to be recalled, were said to include two aspects. The first aspect was 
institutional, while the second referred to activities: movements as organised collectives and 
movements as sets of practices. There is a certain tension between these two aspects, but there is 
also a complementary logic to the two aspects. Van der Linden (2008: 179) has observed that while 
‘unions cannot exist without (the ultimate threat of) the strike weapon, the converse is not true’. 
However, even if unrest, including strikes, often take place in the absence of unions, some form of 
organised constellations are eventually required in order articulate demands, coordinate efforts, 
negotiate agreements, and safeguard them. This must not necessarily take the form of a trade union, 
but in the absence of any organised constellations, it is unlikely that durable concessions can be 
extracted. 
The tension and complementarities between the two aspects of labour movements is reflected in 
the literature. The literature on social movements, for example, has grappled with the relation 
between movement and organisation. To a certain extent, labour movements operate within the 
fields covered by both social movement theory and organisational theory. As a social movement, 
a labour movements can be considered a ‘process aimed at challenging and destabilising 
established organisations and/or institutions’, to the extent that these institutions generally reflect 
the interests of employers over labour. Organisationally, labour movements include ‘formal units 
governed by institutionalised authority’ (Davis et al. 2005: 2). But a labour movement is a specific 
and particular form of social movement, and trade unions constitute a particular form of 
organisations that are not only subject to the general logics of social movements and organisations, 
but to specific dynamics. These particular forms of movements and organisations, furthermore, 
have generated an extensive field of specialised literature quite distinguishable from that of social 
movement and organisational theory. As this literature is more specific to the type of movement 
that is the subject of this study, and to the particular problematic that is the concern here – that of 
the causes and effects of shifting orientation of labour movements – it is deemed appropriate to 
focus on this particular strand of literature. 
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The literature on labour movements, however, is generally split between the two aspects identified 
above – theoretical literature on trade unions and on labour unrest is often somewhat disjointed. 
For this reason the exposition that follows is separated into sections discussing the literature on 
the two aspects of the labour movement, and includes discussion of causes and effects of shifting 
orientation. That does not mean that labour organisations and practices should be thought of as 
separate – in fact the opposite is probably true. In many cases, to be sure, it is organisational 
constellations themselves – or at the very least actors within such constellations – that are directly 
responsible for organising or coordinating the practices, and in other cases the practices result in 
the emergence of such constellations. Neither is it meant to imply that there are no overlaps in the 
literature, or accounts that treats the subject in a more unified manner. However, in light of how 
the predominant part of the literature in the field is currently structured, this is thought of as a 
pragmatic manner in which to structure this initial engagement with the field. 
2.2 Dynamics of organised labour 
2.2.1 Functions 
Theorisation on organised labour has, for historical reasons, predominantly been based on 
experience in Europe and North America. It was in these regions that the first batch of trade union 
and labour movements developed, in close historical connection to the development of industrial 
capitalism. The social, political and economic context of the emergence of labour movements not 
only shaped the commonalities that we now associate with the term, but also the variances between 
them. The essential features of labour movements can thus be distinguished from its particular 
forms only by taking these contexts into account. 
The labour movement in Europe came to develop into mass forces at a time of heightened social 
contradictions. The trade union movement developed in symbiosis with the explicitly political side 
of the labour movement in a context of militant activity and radicalism. Legal and workplace 
recognition often had to be fought for and unions were deeply involved in the struggle for wider 
political and social rights, some of which are now intimately associated with bourgeois democracy, 
but visions of radically restructuring the capitalist economy served as an important aspect of 
organised labour too. Through the twentieth century, however, militancy and radicalism generally 
and gradually gave way to moderation of policies and practices. Meanwhile, different contexts, 
often national in character, triggered differences in strategic choices and outlook of union 
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leaderships. Business unionism – a type of unionism which is functionally limited to economic 
struggle – has frequently been counterpoised with political unionism, or revolutionary unionism 
at the other end of the continuum (Hyman 2001; Lipset 1969: 389-392). Practices of West 
European unions have frequently tended to fall somewhere in between, within the broad outlines 
of what Hyman (2001) terms political economism, but there is a scholarly recognition of union 
radicalism that goes beyond the confines of economistic21 aims. One recent discussion on such 
phenomena is that on contemporary radical political unionism - a term referring to a type of 
unionism that combines militant action with explicitly left-wing political goals (Upchurch and 
Mathers 2011; Connolly and Darlington 2012; Gordon and Upchurch 2012). 
As much of this taxonomic discussion pertains to what is perceived as the ‘legitimate’ functions 
and purposes of trade unions, it is unavoidable that it tends to be biased by normative factors and 
political preferences. To conceptualise organised labour in a manner that can serve analytical 
rather than normative and political purposes, it is therefore necessary to look at the actual history 
of practices of trade unions. From a brief review of the literature, it is clear that collective 
bargaining over wage and working conditions is generally accepted as taking a place of central 
importance (Allen 1954: 15; 1960: 241; Webb and Webb 1920). Such bargaining includes, but is 
not confined to, issues of wages and working conditions. It also frequently include areas of control 
over the processes of work, an area of potentially very high stakes (Mann 1973). Where bargaining 
is not deemed possible, desirable or where it fails, it falls upon trade unions to organise industrial 
action. As according to the reference to van der Linden (2008: 179) above, the strike threat is the 
ultimate foundation of unions, in the absence of which irrelevance is all but guaranteed. Although 
definitions of trade unions have been drawn from the central location of the efforts to improve 
wages and working conditions (Allen 1954: 15), it would be premature to limit trade unionism to 
this set of functions, for even the most ‘business’-oriented unions are forced in one way or another 
to engage with the broader forces that shape the meaning and outcome of collective bargaining. 
At the very minimum, ‘unions engage in politics most directly by intervening in political processes 
and institutions that regulate and control labour relations and the price of labour’, such as ‘labour 
legislation, labour courts, [and] government labour departments’ (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010: 
3). Equally, unions must engage in areas that pertain to the social wage in totality, as opposed to 
 
21 Economism refers to the singular pursuit of better terms for the sale of labour (Clements 1978: 318). 
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the relative nominal wage alone, because ‘conditions of work are fundamentally affected by the 
supply of reasonably priced water, energy, transport etc., [and] value of wages depends on price-
levels, health care, education [and] social policies’ (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010: 3). This also 
calls attention to the importance of measuring and bargaining over real wages, adjusted for 
inflation, as opposed to nominal wages, which have little independent value. 
It follows from these points that ‘in contemporary industrial relations, the state cannot escape a 
central and visible position’ (Hyman 1975: 120). But the state does not take on the character of an 
independent and neutral interlocutor, for in a capitalist context the state facilitates, ‘through a 
variety of institutional arrangements... the routine exploitation of wage-labour by capital; and on 
rare occasions when the routine [is] seriously disrupted, [it intervenes] brutally and decisively’ 
(Hyman 1975: 136). ‘The ostensibly neutral functions of mediation and conciliation’ Hyman 
(1975: 136) has written, ‘in fact serve the essential purpose, for both employers and the state, of 
stabilising the existing mode of production’. What strategies the state employs to achieve these 
aims vary according to context. Restrictions in the rights to unionise and to take industrial action 
remain important prerogatives of most states, and sanctions and/or repression are regularly 
deployed when unions fail to respect the parameters of permissible practices. But in general, a 
degree of accommodation and legal recognition is preferable to outright criminalisation, if only to 
reduce militancy and the economic disruptions resultant from industrial contestation, and to enable 
control and co-option mechanisms to be deployed (Hyman 1975: 140-143). 
The state, to be sure, does not only relate to organised labour as an external source of influence 
and pressure, but also as an object of contention. Unions have often proclaimed radical socially 
transformative aims which relate not only to state policy – in terms of questions of ownership, 
control and distribution – but to the very nature of state power itself (Hyman 1975: 87; Webb and 
Webb 1920: 1). While on a basic level, the political nature of organised labour emanate from the 
fact that ‘all industrial action is “political” in the sense that it involves struggle, conflict and power 
relations’ (Hain 1986: 20)22,  it is the pursuit of aims of the type mentioned above that imbues it 
with an explicitly political character. Attempts to restrict the legitimate aims and practices of 
 
22 Or, bluntly put, from the ‘truism’ that the class struggle is always political (Cohen 2006: 172-173). ‘Objectively’, 
Cohen (2006: 175) writes, ‘working-class resistance challenges the rule of capital, and prevents it imposing its agenda 
in the unfettered way that it would like’. Put in this way, the political side of even the most economistic unionism is 
apparent. 
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unionism – whether legally or scholarly – serves the interests of counterparts that do not wish to 
see the established patterns of power, ownership and control upset, and thus carry political 
connotations in themselves. A narrowly confined conception of unionism that excludes the pursuit 
of explicitly political and radical aims must therefore be rejected. 
2.2.2 Establishing orientation 
The literature has identified pressures from a number of factors that discourage unions from 
adopting a radical assertive outlook. These pressures emanate from internal as well as external 
sources. Whether framed as a process of maturation or of bureaucratisation, the institutionalisation 
of unionism has been found to tend to entail a moderation of aims and a waning of militant 
practices. Viewed as a process of maturation, this results from an increasing conviction among 
union officials that benefits can accrue to all parties through a peaceful and moderated process of 
bargaining, leading to a decline in militant activity (Lester 1958). Efficiency in achieving desirable 
outcomes is here counter-posed to internal democracy as union officialdom becomes ‘guardians 
of organisational efficiency’ that take a strategic view which the membership is deemed unable to 
do (Hyman 1975: 74). The professionalisation of the officialdom permits it to develop a degree of 
specialised knowledge deemed unattainable to the mass membership. This separation is reinforced 
by the development of political skills and a level of control over the organisational machinery that 
allows the officialdom to fortify its position to a degree where tenure becomes near-permanent. In 
this process, the mass membership's response is characterised by lethargy, combined with trust in 
the specialised skills and awe of the status of the officialdom (Lipset 1969) – Michel's (1915) ‘iron 
law of oligarchy’ operates in full swing. 
But this process of moderation has also been discussed in terms of bureaucratisation. In engaging 
in collective bargaining, unionism develops a dual character which casts the union official as not 
only an agent of workers' interests, but also an agent of control over workers: a ‘manager of 
discontent’ (Mills 1948: 8-9). Since collective bargaining only is effective to the extent that 
concerted action is possible and agreements are adhered to, enforcing workers' adherence to 
established agreements and minimising unauthorised industrial action become important concerns 
for union officials (Hyman 1975: 65) – ‘it is only through the power over its members which is 
vested in the trade union that it is able to exert power for them’, as Hyman (1975: 64) eloquently 
puts it. Within this context of hierarchic and functional separation of officials from the rank-and-
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file, the process of bureaucratisation is reinforced by factors that materially and socially separate 
the union officials from the rank-and-file, and vest the former with a strong interest in preserving 
industrial peace and legality23. The labour bureaucracy comes to compose ‘a distinct social layer 
that is neither proletarian nor capitalist, but lies in socioeconomic and political terms between the 
employers and employees’ (Brenner 2010: 41). This layer has, through the unions, escaped ‘the 
miseries of work under the aegis of capital in the factory’ (Brenner 2010: 41), acquired for itself a 
source of income often incommensurate with that of the rank-and-file, and advanced in terms of 
social standing. It thus occupies a privileged socio-economic position separate from that of the 
rank-and-file that it is loath to surrender. But in safeguarding this position, every confrontation 
with the employer or the state becomes an undesirably risky proposition for the labour 
bureaucracy. Its material and social conditions are better guarded by the establishment and 
preservation of amicable and peaceful industrial relations. The preservation of tranquillity at all 
costs is frequently framed in terms of ‘institutional needs’ – a requirement for preserving the 
movement, strengthening it, and/or defending its achievements – and the defence of the 
organisation is often conflated with and superordinated to the defence of the interests of the 
membership (Brenner 2010: 41). Yet, institutional needs, as defined by a particular layer of 
officialdom, cannot be taken at face value. For not only might the material and social separation 
of the officialdom from the rank-and-file give rise to divergence of interests, but it is moreover 
precisely at the higher organisational levels that external pressures are focused. 
External moderating pressures emanate principally from employers and the state. Such pressures 
entail both the promise of rewards – in terms of recognition and accommodation – and the threat 
of punishments – up to and including full assault on and potential destruction of the trade union 
movement24 (van der Linden 2008: 239-241). Where outright suppression is not attempted, the 
goals of such carrot-and-stick policies are to define and subvert goals (Hyman 1975: 67). Internal 
 
23A caveat is required here. While bureaucratisation entails the process of functional, material and social separation 
of the layer of officialdom, it is for Hyman (2012: 156) meaningful essentially as ‘a social relation as well as in terms 
of a stratum of personnel’. Darlington and Upchurch (2012) summarise this conception by stating that ‘“bureaucracy” 
within trade unionism is comprised of three sets of social relations: a separation of representation from mobilisation, 
a hierarchy of control and activism, and the detachment of formal mechanisms of policy and decision-making from 
the experience of members’. This is contrasted with ‘the term “trade union bureaucracy”’, which ‘can be taken to refer 
more specifically to FTOs who are the paid professional functionaries of unions and act as specialist representatives 
of the broader membership’. 
24 For the leadership, the rewards of collaboration and moderation would be enhanced by potential career 
opportunities, and threats would be aggravated by the spectre of personal accountability for any union activity deemed 
illicit.  
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relations of control are thus interacting with external relations of control in the nexus described by 
Hyman in the above25.   
While moderation is seen as emanating from this interaction between internal and external 
pressures, militancy, where applicable, has been viewed as originating in pressures from the rank-
and-file (Brenner 2010; Cohen 2006). This would imply that there generally is a co-relation 
between more democratic intra-union relations and greater union militancy (Herding 1978: 269-
272). ‘It is the exploitative social relations at the heart of capitalist society’, Darlington and 
Upchurch (2012: 88) argue ‘to which the mass of rank-and-file union members are subject that 
provides the material basis for collective workers´ struggles which distinguish them from [full-
time officials]’26. The disposition of the rank-and-file here becomes of key importance. 
In Marxist theory, trade unions, workplace struggles and strike activity serve to radicalise and 
make the rank-and-file conscious of antagonistic class contradictions – as ‘schools of war’ (Engels 
2009; Lenin 1964) readying the workers for explicitly political struggles. This is not meant to 
imply that such activity alone will be sufficient to do so. In Leninist theory, moderate and 
economistic trade union consciousness requires the intervention of an organised vanguard force 
among the workers to give way to explicitly political and revolutionary consciousness (Lenin 
1970). The logic of political vanguardism has eloquently been explained by Anderson (1967: 265): 
while trade unions by themselves ‘take on the natural hue of the closed, capital-dominated 
environment of the factory itself’ and thus become a ‘passive reflection of the organisation of the 
workforce’, it is only the vanguardist party - ‘a voluntarist contractual collective’ - that can effect 
a rupture with this environment and restructure the social contours that unions adhere to. The 
vanguard party requires – at minimum – the uptake of parts of the intelligentsia, who share no 
obvious material interests with the working class, but whose allegiance has been created by the 
work of the political vanguard ‘against the grain of the social structure’. In this manner, Perry 
 
25 See citation on page 18. 
26 This, however, does not mean that degrees of militancy is a direct function of degrees of exploitation. Ideational 
aspect and awareness of relative conditions are key mediating factors here. Levels of education are frequently higher 
at the upper levels of the pay scale, potentially offsetting, but also possibly reinforcing, the moderating effect of a 
relatively higher pay – as is the awareness that key skills required for white-collar jobs entail a higher degree of 
leverage. Partly as a result, Coates (1967:77) notes that ‘the most militant and aggressive section of the trade union 
movement in almost every advanced country are the better paid ones’. 
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Anderson writes, a ‘political party alone can incarnate a true negation of existing society’ – ‘it 
alone is negativity in history’.  
While other Marxist theoreticians have expressed more confidence in the prospects of trade unions 
operating relatively autonomously – albeit in reciprocity with broader political movements – to 
overcome narrow economism (Luxemburg 1986), it is generally agreed that in times of contextual 
social and political-economic stability and in the absence of internal crises, the pressure from rank-
and-file militancy is usually containable (Hyman 2012: 157; Lipset 1969). This, however, calls to 
attention the crucial importance of taking into consideration not only the construction of political 
attitudes among workers, but also the social, political and economic environmental factors in 
which labour movements operate. 
To sum up, in broad strokes, two central factors can be seen as pressuring organised labour towards 
moderation of aims and practices27: the internal process of maturation/bureaucratisation interacting 
with external pressures from employers and the state directed principally towards the higher levels 
of the union organisation. Against these pressures three forces have been identified that may push 
the movement in the opposite direction: rank-and-file militancy; the operation within the 
movement of a political vanguard; and the prevalence of social, political, economic and/or 
organisational instability. This is not to say that the mentioned factors determine the outcome in a 
conclusive or mechanical manner, but only that they may be useful in analysing the dynamics of 
the process of radicalisation/moderation within its full context. In the end, unions are mass-based 
organisations, and however influenced, constrained or spurred by these factor and the context in 
which they operate, it is the praxis28 of the mass membership that must serve as the focal point of 
analysis. 
2.3 Practices: labour unrest 
According to Silver (2003: 184), labour unrest consists of ‘resistance by human beings to being 
turned into and/or treated as commodities’. Its origin thus lies in the same capitalist-generated 
dynamics that gives rise to trade unionism. Central forms of labour unrest consists of the overt acts 
in which the workers ‘openly declare that their purpose is to challenge and/or contain exploitation’ 
(Silver 2003: 184). These include strikes, boycotts, riots and demonstrations. They constitute the 
 
27 See sketch in the previous chapter for an illustration of these forces. 
28 Praxis refers to the dialectical unity of consciousness and action. 
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actions most readily recognisable as labour unrest, which most scholarly studies have focused on. 
Indeed, strikes have aptly been described as ‘representing the most direct and unmediated action 
of workers collectively’ (Waterman 1976: 331). But important as they may be, overt and openly 
declared forms of unrest constitute only the tip of the iceberg of options – although arguably the 
most powerful ones – available to workers seeking to resist the commodification of their labour 
and the effects of this process. James Scott (1985) has pointed attention to the many manners in 
which subordinate classes resist domination and exploitation in more subtle ways. Cohen (1980) 
has found similar practices prevailing among industrial workers in Africa in particular. Examples 
of everyday forms of resistance identified in this context include desertion, withdrawal, foot 
dragging, absenteeism, theft, sabotage, wastage, accidents, illness, petitions, lobbies, collective 
appeal and insubordination (Cohen 1980; Burawoy 1985; Kelly 2002: 37-38). Everyday forms of 
resistance may – according to the conjuncture – be every much as efficient as large scale acts of 
collective resistance. They have the advantages of requiring little coordination, planning, or formal 
organisation – as ‘they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks’, and they 
‘typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority’ (Scott 1985: 29). Such everyday 
forms of resistance are treated seriously and meticulously by employers, but they also allow the 
latter to make use of the power asymmetry prevalent between themselves and individual 
employees in a manner which is not always possible when confronted with a coordinated challenge 
by an organised collective of workers. 
2.3.2 Outcomes of unrest 
Although the outcome of unrest are highly contingent – upon factors that include, but are not 
limited to the associational and strategic aspects of power of workers29; context; and the relative 
power of adversaries – some general observations and trends have been observed. Generally, there 
appears to be a strong connection between the prevalence, strength, and militancy of a labour 
movement, on the one hand, and wage outcomes on the other. Cohn (1993: 1), for example, has 
stated that ‘there is now a very large econometric literature … all of which show a positive union 
wage effect’. He (1993: 50) has also argued that frequent striking, regardless of whether strikes 
are won or not, is ‘an optimal strategy for raising wages’30, since it ‘gives a union a reputation for 
 
29 See Olin Wright (2000) and Silver (2003) for a discussion of these aspects of workers' power.  
30 Indeed, it is emphatically stated that ‘workers should strike frequently [:] wages will be maximized by maintaining 
a high level of pressure on management’ (Cohn 1993: 27). 
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militancy, which in turn intimidates employers into making relatively generous settlements’. But, 
he, cautions, ‘an exception occurs when the labour movement is divided into radical and moderate 
factions’, in which cases ‘militancy is often punished by a shifting of benefits toward more strike 
averse workers’. Another exception, in which Cohn (1993: 28) considers striking irrational, is 
cases where ‘workers are so weak that they lack any capacity for forcing premium wages on 
management’, or, inversely, where their strength threatens the viability of the enterprise. 
Silver (2003), meanwhile, has outlined the broader historical dynamics of the movement of wages 
and unrest on a global scale: while capital tends to respond to the lure of cheap and domicile labour 
and relocate production to exploit such opportunities, this generally results in a process that 
strengthens the labour movement and shifts the balance of forces between labour and capital. 
Strong labour movements engaging in sustained strike activity have, in turn, generally ‘succeeded 
in raising wages, improving working conditions, and strengthening workers' rights’ (2003: 168). 
This general conclusion of Silver's is reinforced by her findings in specific contexts such as those 
of auto workers in Western Europe (2003: 52), Brazil (2003: 56) and South Africa (2003: 58). A 
number of scholarly accounts, such as Cohn's (1993) research on strikes among coalminers in 
France31 and Franzosi's (2006) on Italy, largely corroborate these findings. However, it is 
noteworthy that Silver found a greater propensity of capital in early starters of a specific industry 
to accept salary increments (2003: 79). Late developers did not benefit from the same monopolistic 
profit margin and thus tended to be more resistant to have this margin pressed by increasing labour 
costs. For this and other32 reasons, textile workers, despite high levels of unrest within the industry, 
have not been as successful in obtaining wage concessions as, for example, auto workers (2003: 
81, 89). While unrest can thus be said to generally support and/or advance the position of labour, 
it does not always result in real wage gains. This contingent character of the relationship is 
illustrated in Brenner et al (2010). While labour radicalism and unrest helped to fuel a significant 
wage hike through the second half of 1940s and the 1950s in the United states (2010: 45-47), and 
another round of unrest contributed to a new period of real wage growth on continental Europe in 
 
31 For Cohn, the casual relation between militant practices and wage gains, has implications on how bureaucratisation 
is viewed: ‘the centralised control of strikes by union bureaucracies risks gutting the effectiveness of organised labour’, 
he (1993: 219) has written. ‘Unions benefit from maximising their militancy. Any union structure that increases the 
strike rate should be encouraged; any structure that pacifies unions is more suspect’. 
32 Silver (2003: 92-93) argues that the relative vertical disintegration of the textile industry results in low workplace 
bargaining power for textile workers, and that this position has generally been further weakened by a relatively weak 
labour market bargaining power.  
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the 1970s (2010: xvii), a contemporaneous strike wave in the United States failed to achieve any 
similar real wage gains. In all cases, the effect on wages cannot be determined solely by the agency 
of the workers, but the responses and actions of capital and the state, and the qualities of the broader 
political economy in which they take place, must be taken into consideration. 
With regards to effects of unrest on the structures of organised labour, it has been observed that 
militancy, expressed in an assertive strategy and collective action, may not only energise existing 
structures but result in sharp increases of membership (Kelly 2002: 60-64). Franzosi (2006: 344) 
has noted how union membership and ‘the expansion of working-class organisational resources 
seem to have followed intense periods of industrial conflict [and] strike waves in particular’ in 
Italy. This affected not only membership numbers, but ‘the full political organisation of the 
working class and its political position in the national power structure’ (Franzosi 2006: 344) was 
also altered by strike waves.  Upsurges in membership may, as Cohn (1993: 213) suggests, be an 
outcome of the demonstrated success of a strategy of confrontation. Such a strategy convinces 
employers that the ‘workers [are] interested in striking for its own sake’, and, in doing so ‘[induces] 
employers to provide them with extra wages as a peace payment’. ‘Where unions have visibly 
demonstrated their effectiveness in pursuing, and winning, employee claims and grievances 
through strike action’, Kelly (2002: 62) writes, corroborating this point, ‘non-union workers have 
been encouraged to join in unusually large numbers’. This, Kelly (2002: 101) has argued, may set 
‘a virtuous circle of effectiveness and membership’ in motion, as it did in early 20th century United 
Kingdom: ‘as the scale of strike activity increased, so did the win rate, and as the win rate 
increased, bargaining coverage rose, more workers perceived unions to be effective and joined 
them, which in turn enabled more strikes to be called… and so on’. The obvious corollary here is 
that the reverse may also hold true: that a cycle of defeat, ineffectiveness and reduced membership 
may also be set in motion.  
2.3.1 Causes of unrest 
If, as claimed in the above, it is the commodification of labour and concomitant exploitation that 
constitutes the fundamental source of friction generating labour unrest, certain factors more 
directly conditions – either in a conducive or restraining manner – its prevalence. As Kelly (2002: 
25) has pointed out, ‘the conflict of interest that lies at the heart of the capitalist employment 
relationship does not necessarily give rise to conflict behaviour’. Perhaps curiously, research has 
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failed to establish a firm a correlation between changes in union density and wages on the one 
hand and strikes on the other: low wages and powerful unions do not by themselves seem to result 
in militant practices and assertive strategies (Armstrong et al. 1977; Kelly 2002: 10). This, 
however, can be attributed to the fact that the prevalence of strikes is conditioned by a host of other 
factors including strategic consideration, the countervailing power of capital and the state, and – 
with reference to the discussion above – that ‘workers can use sanctions other than strikes’ (Kelly 
2002: 10). For strikes to become the sanction of choice, other factors, such as high levels of 
employment, the availability of sufficient strike funds, and, crucially, the memories of past 
victorious strikes, have been found conducive (Brown 1983). For Kelly (2002: 1), workers 
collectivism, including strikes, ‘is an effective and situationally specific response to injustice’. 
Following Tilly (1987), Kelly (2002) argues that for collective action to be viable, a number of 
aspects need to be considered. These encompass the social construction and definition of collective 
interests; collective mobilisation which transforms individual workers into collective actors; 
collective organisation; and opportunity, which includes considerations regarding the relative 
balance of power, the costs of repressions, and contingent opportunities available. Here, it is the 
sense of injustice, rather than absolute levels of deprivation or affluence, that is the starting point 
of any viable action. Having acquired a sense of injustice workers also require ‘a sense of common 
identity’ and a sense of common interest vis-à-vis the employer. This aspect is considered ‘heavily 
dependent on the actions of small numbers of leaders or activists’ (2002: 44). For that reason, 
demobilisation may very well result from the repression and removal of leading activists. But 
repression may also be effective in reducing unrest when ‘raising the costs of collective 
organisation and action’ (2002: 52). Employers and the state generally undertake counter-
mobilisation which is ‘likely to target all of the dimensions of collectivism’ (2002: 128). In other 
words, attempts will be made to restrict opportunities and impose higher costs on collective action, 
overturn goals and leaders, rearticulate interests, undermine organisations, and demobilise 
workers. 
The key dynamic identified by Kelly (2002: 1), however, is related to the long waves of capitalist 
development. Not only occurrences of unrest, but the full ‘fluctuating fortunes of national labour 
movements’, in fact, is said to ‘follow predictable patterns that are closely synchronised with the 
rhythms of the capitalist economy’. The characteristics of the relationship is said to be as follows 
(Kelly 2002: 86): 
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Each turning point between upswing and downswing is associated with an upsurge 
of worker mobilisation, epitomised by heightened strike activity. This in turn 
triggers off a period of counter-mobilisation by employers and the state, and out of 
this intensified period of class struggle emerges a more or less far reaching 
reconstruction of the relations between labour, capital and the state. Once the new 
phase of the long wave (upswing or downswing) gets under way, new patterns of 
industrial relations are gradually, if unevenly, consolidated until the next 
transition. During long downswings these patterns are likely to reflect the interests 
of employers as they exploit slack labour markets in order to consolidate their 
power and hegemony, but the situation during long upswings is not so clear cut. 
For long wave theorists it is the regular and periodic ruptures in labour-capital 
relations that lay the foundations for the intervening periods of relative stability.  
It is, in other words, at the turning points of the economic conjuncture that the highest levels of 
strikes and unrest tend to occur. The reasons for this is traced to how ‘employers, particularly in 
manufacturing, experience declining rates of profit towards the tail end of a long upswing and 
attempt to restore profitability in ways that impinge either directly on workers' living standards 
(through wage controls or wage cuts, intensification of labour or labour shedding) or indirectly, by 
raising prices to customers’. This, in turn, generates a growing sense of injustice among workers 
that sets a process of mobilisation in motion (Kelly 2002: 98). The economic restructuring that 
takes place during these periods – including crucially the downward adjustments of wages –  in 
turn creates the conditions for a new cycle of mobilisation. The factors that produce a repetition of 
the cycle are thus built into the process. The argument is not far removed from Franzosi's (2006: 
345, 356), who argues that while ‘strikes flare up during booms and die out during busts’, ‘the 
business cycle itself can be viewed as a product of class conflict, as the by-product of employers' 
actions and state actions aimed at curbing labour militancy by thwarting workers' bargaining power 
in the labour market’. 
Screpanti (1984) also makes a contribution to this field of scholarship, concerned with the 
correlation between explosions in class conflict and long economic waves – a causative correlation 
that is deemed to work in both directions.  This discussion takes place within a field, however, that 
assigns to purely objective and economic conditions – the business cycle, or the long economic 
waves – the determinant role behind the orientation of labour movements. Although important in 
drawing attention to the manner in which economic downturns often trigger class conflict and 
unrest, the explanatory framework is limited in scope when explaining the concrete dynamics 
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behind surges of such unrest, termed proletarian insurgencies33. At the very least, broad economic 
changes are subject to the mediation on a number of levels before generating the subjective force 
that result in proletarian insurgencies. Screpanti (1984: 524) acknowledges as much when he states 
that ‘a dependent relationship [between determinant economic parameters and the intensity of class 
struggle] however is mediated by a psycho-sociological variable’, prior to which, ‘there are 
obviously a number of constraining and contingent forces that may very well determine and result 
in a lesser outcome’. Unfortunately, he restricts his discussion on such mediation to essentially 
one variable; and a broad, not entirely empirically unproblematic, one at that: class consciousness. 
This is not a category that is deployed within this research, since it is not measurable outside of, 
and can only be displayed in, the collective practices of the workers. Because its operationalisation, 
or its expression, requires the measurement of the very same phenomena as is the objective of this 
research to measure in any way, it would add only an intermediary category which is not separately 
measurable in any case. For this reason, the category of class consciousness is not thought to add 
any clarity at this point, although it may very well be argued that the findings generated here has 
implications on that level of abstraction. 
2.3.3 Reciprocities 
Somewhat relating to the above discussion on a virtuous cycle of effectiveness and membership 
growth, Screpanti (1984: 530) too suggest that a virtuous cycle can be generated – this time 
between achievements and assertiveness. Crucially, however, he firmly anchors this possibility in 
the broader economy, and in fact reduces it to an outcome of, again, the business cycle. ‘Any 
consolidated increase in [wage growth] achievements induces expectations of further increases’, 
he writes:  
When a high growth rate has sustained substantial increases in achievements for a 
long time, workers become acquainted with high and increasing levels of welfare, 
while at the same time they become aware of the existence of a persistent gap 
between claims and achievements. They could, quite correctly, consider the first 
fact as an effect of the second, in which case they will aim still higher. In other 
words, there is a positive cumulative effect of past experience in relation to actual 
claims. 
 
 
33 Proletarian insurgencies can be thought of as ‘unusual explosions in social strife’ marked by exceptionally high 
levels of strike activity and industrial unrest. They can be global or localised. The most recent global proletarian 
insurgency, according to Screpanti, occurred between 1967 and 1973. 
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If it is assumed, however, that not only economic conjunctures, but also the agency of workers can 
produce such ‘substantial increases in achievements’, then, the above would lead to the conclusion 
that effective agency too can make workers ‘aim still higher’. In other words, a virtuous, and 
somewhat path-dependent, cycle of increasing assertiveness, unrest and achievements would be 
created. Meanwhile, Screpanti (1984:531) notes that an equally vicious cycle can be generated: 
When the rate of growth has for a long time been so low that it brings about 
substantial and long-lasting decrease in the levels of employment and workers 
welfare, claims will subside and gradually adapt to a decreasing level of 
achievements. In this case too, a cumulative effect of past experience will be at 
work. The adaptation will be resisted with decreasing strength as time goes on, and 
the gap between claims and achievements will narrow at a faster and faster pace. 
 
Again, the determinant role of the business cycle must be suspended for this theorisation to be of 
importance here. As soon as that is done, it is apparent that the account of ‘decreasing level of 
achievement’, leading to claims subsiding and a ‘decreasing strength’ of resistance, is very 
relevant. Summing up, Screpanti's (1984:531) general hypothesis that ‘claims will change in time 
in the same direction as achievements, and in such a way that the rate of change of the gap between 
them will increase (or decrease) as achievements themselves increase (or decrease)’, can be taken 
as a valuable proposition. Not only is it useful – when the element of business-cycle-determinism 
is dropped – but it moreover highlights the degree to which causes and effects merge and refuse to 
readily lend themselves to disentanglement. 
2.3.4 Establishing position: alternative determinants of wages 
In the above, the element of workers' agency in wage determination – here measured both as a 
proxy for the broader position of labour, and, in its own right, a most important aspect of 
contestation – has been discussed. However, for the relative importance of this agency to be 
assessed, a number of conditioning factors and alternative explanations for overall wage 
movements need to be briefly touched upon. In broad strokes, a number of key factors have been 
identified in wage determination, the prominence of which are arranged differently according to 
the theoretical terrain. 
There is broad agreement that wages are – to different degrees – affected by productivity levels. 
In the currently dominant strand of neoclassical oriented economics, it is the marginal productivity 
of labour rather than the overall productivity that determines wages. However, attendant market 
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factors and political ‘distortions’ of price also exercise influence. The supply and demand of labour 
is the most important market factor upheld in classical and Keynesian theory, as a higher supply 
of labour requires the price to fall in order for the market to ‘clear’, and a decrease of supply has 
the reverse effect. For the same reason, full employment restricts the supply of available labour 
and thus makes it costlier. High labour costs, moreover, is considered a problem since the nominal 
rigidity – or ‘stickiness’ – of wages, it is argued, prevents them from falling in order for the market 
to ‘clear’ when the conjuncture shifts downwards. This is a most important aspect of Keynesian 
wage theory. 
Collective bargaining, and the effect of trade unions, meanwhile, constitutes an additional factor 
affecting price of labour: ‘few’, indeed, ‘if any would deny bargaining power effect on wages’, 
Dobb (1946: 131) has written. In the bargaining theory of wages, this aspect is dominant. For 
neoclassically inclined economists this effect distorts the labour market, ‘artificially’ setting a 
higher price than that which would allow supply to meet demand, and thus preventing the market 
from ‘clearing’. The result, in other words, is unemployment. But it is not only collective 
bargaining and the implied collective refusal by workers to work for ‘market’ wages which is seen 
as causing distortions, but also other forms of wage regulation, including the establishment of a 
minimum pay.  
In classical Ricardian theory, wages are unlikely to move too far away from subsistence costs. A 
similar view has frequently been ascribed to Marx, although this interpretation has been rejected 
by Marxian scholars (Harvey 2006; Mann 2007). While Marx (1977; 1985) stated that the price of 
commodified labour was subject to similar forces as other commodities, and that one level of 
determination was therefore the cost of its reproduction, he also pointed out that labour was a 
peculiar commodity whose value was socially and historically contingent34. If wages are thus, in 
the final instance, underpinned by ‘the price of the necessary means of subsistence’ (Marx 1977: 
209), this cost is in itself determined by needs which are socially and historically constructed, and 
can therefore not be reduced to the cost of any fixed basket of commodities or the likes. Moreover, 
other factors, such as the level of productivity and the relationship between supply and demand, 
impinges on this process, and the generation of super-profits – resultant from higher-than-average 
 
34 ‘By comparing the standard wages or values of labour in different countries, and by comparing them in different 
historical epochs of the same country’ Marx (1985: 145) wrote, ‘you will find that the value of labour itself is not a 
fixed but a variable magnitude, even supposing the values of all other commodities to remain constant’. 
40 
 
productivity, the prevalence of monopoly pricing, or by means of unequal exchange – may enable 
higher wages in a particular enterprise, sector, or economy, without squeezing the rate of profit. 
But the relation between these factors and wages may not appear straightforward, as any given 
outcome is the product of particular social and historical processes, which crucially include class 
struggle35. 
Over the short and medium-term, at least, and within cyclical phases, wage share36 gains can be 
achieved by collectively organised and struggling workers. Pressing in the opposite direction, the 
logic of accumulation and competition compels capital to encroach on the wage share, occasionally 
and temporarily even driving wages below the cost of reproduction of labour. In Marx' (1985: 146) 
words, ‘the fixation of [the] actual degree [of profits, and hence, wages] is only settled by the 
continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages 
to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the 
working man constantly presses in the opposite direction’. ‘The matter’, he wrote, ‘resolves itself 
into a question of the respective powers of the combatants’. But within a capitalist mode of 
production, the outcome cannot be entirely open-ended. As is the case for any commodity, prices 
cannot be set independent of demand and supply37. On the one hand, increasing labour costs lead 
to a drop in capitalist demand and, on the other, a reserve supply of labour – which constitutes an 
integral component of the capitalist labour market – exercises pressure on wages. Moreover, the 
centrality of the profit motive and accumulation to the logic of capitalism imposes an outer limit. 
Wages are unlikely to reach and remain at levels where they fundamentally alter the share of value 
that accrues to labour and interfered with accumulation over the long run. Only the abolition of 
the wage system altogether, Marx (1985) argued, could achieve that.  
As Samir Amin (1977: 197-199) has noted, wage determination models developed in one context 
may not always transfer well to significantly different contexts: while in general a higher level of 
productivity not only enables, but makes necessary higher wages, this is not necessarily so in 
 
35 Mann (2007:45-46) has made this point in cogent terms, stating that ‘wage rates have no straightforward market-
determined level; they vary enormously and are always influenced by the agency of workers, capitalists and the state… 
determination in the purely “economic” sense is impossible, for it posits a wage outside lived history’. 
36 Which represents that part of the total value of output that accrues to labour in wages and thus, unlike the individual 
wage rate, denotes the relative degree of compensation/exploitation. 
37 ‘The necessity of debating their price with the capitalist’, Marx (1985: 148) wrote about wage labour, ‘is inherent 
to their condition of having to sell themselves as commodities’ – it cannot be independently set. 
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economies dominated by a peasant-based agrarian sector. In those economies, where wage labour 
covers only a small percentage of the population, Amin has found the ‘political dimension’ to wage 
setting differing from that in industrial economies in which wage labour is the norm38. In this case, 
there is according to Amin ‘no obvious relation’ between wage movements and the performance 
of the economy. A low pace of growth can be accompanied by sharp wage increments, while rapid 
growth may sometimes not result in any wage gains at all, he observed. In fact, in some cases, 
‘there is not the slightest correlation between the movement of wages and the pace of 
industrialisation, or even the movements of profits’. The full range of explanations for this 
phenomenon, Amin admits, are not simply identified. However, one key and compelling 
explanation is offered: ‘elastic behaviour, upward or downward, in real terms, is only possible, of 
course, because the problem of wages does not constitute the main axis of income distribution’. In 
other words, it is because of the relative unimportance of surpluses generated in the waged sectors 
that the movement of wages appears as largely autonomous from the performance of the larger 
economy. Should this be the case, it would logically follow that one should expect this elastic 
autonomy of wages to decline in degree whenever the relative importance and share of the waged 
sector in producing and distributing surpluses increases. 
2.4 Labour and trade union movements in Africa 
In African economies, the historical context of the emergence of the labour movement diverged 
from that in Europe. Trade unions often came into being in a colonial context where the struggle 
for national liberation created conditions conducive to an alliance between labour and nationalist 
movements. With independence and the coming to power of the nationalist movements, organised 
labour was frequently drawn into the close orbit of the state. Trade unions in Africa thus, from the 
very outset, came to be explicitly associated with the high politics of state power (Buhlungu 2010; 
Freund 1988: 94-96). ‘At every turn’, it has been claimed, ‘African unions [found] themselves 
deeply involved in politics’ (Davies 1966: 11-12).Yet, in aligning themselves with nationalist 
 
38 An explanation often suggested for relatively high wages in African economies have been that high wages are paid 
in the public sector for political reasons. Because of the generally large share of public employment in total wage 
employment, these wages ‘spill over’ into the private sector as well. A version of this argument was offered by Kilby 
(1967), who claimed that trade unions in Nigeria had been generating wage increases. This, however, was not because 
of collective bargaining, or because of the wielding of the strike threat, but rather because of the electoral threat unions 
had wielded against the government. Kilby's account led to the Kilby/Weeks-debate, where the latter (Weeks 1968; 
1971) claimed that while political pressure on the government had been important, wage gains had been unrelated to 
the operation of the unions. 
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movements, the notion of conflict between capital and labour – central to the development of trade 
unionism elsewhere – was suppressed in favour of national liberation and, with the dawn of 
independence, of developmentalism39 (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010: 2-3; Buhlungu 2010; Lynd 
1968: 33). The rhetoric of common national interests, however, did not abolish the prevalence of 
conflicting classed interests, nor did it alter the interest of the state in creating a stable environment 
conducive to capitalist growth. As a result, organised labour came to be seen as a threat over which 
‘a tight rein’ had to be exercised ‘through surveillance, co-option and/or coercion’ (Buhlungu 
2010: 202). In virtually all post-colonial societies, Buhlungu (2010: 193) writes, ‘nationalist 
regimes sought to integrate or subordinate trade unions to the ruling party’. Measures aimed at 
reducing the autonomous strength of the unions included ‘compulsory arbitration, registration of 
unions, granting and withholding of patronage, surveillance and inspection, government approval 
of international alignments and of acceptance of foreign assistance, party control over union 
leadership, and the co-opting of labour leaders into the political and administrative apparatuses of 
government’. The relationship between state and unions came to constrain the unions rather than 
empower them, as a result it has been argued that the latter failed both to remain representative of 
its membership and to effectively influence state policy (Koçer and Hayter 2011: 26). 
In addition to the general pressures that constrain unions discussed in the section above, it has been 
proposed that unions operating in African contexts have been subject to a number of additional 
obstacles and limitations. While state control, co-option and repression provide formidable 
obstacles, it may be argued that this is rather an outcome of a position of weakness than a factor 
explaining it. A number of factors have been proposed as explaining the perceived weakness of 
African unions that do not directly attribute it to a subservient relationship to the state. First, it has 
been argued that the small relative size of the wage labouring population, in combination with the 
proportionally large size of the informal sector, has tended to reduce the leverage of organised 
labour. Yet, it may be argued that the absolute size of the wage labouring population40, its central 
strategic location – economically as well as geographically – and its capacity to organise, more 
than makes up for its limited size (Beckman and Sachikonye 2010: 8-11; Koçer and Hayter 2011; 
Kraus 2007a). The centrality of wage labour to capitalism, Beckman and Sachikonye (2010: 20-
 
39It should be noted that it is not suggested that all political alignment entails full co-option. For Beckman and 
Sachikonye (2010: 12) the crucial question is on whose behalf unions are intervening politically – is it ‘to serve narrow 
self-interests of leaders/careerists, or spear-heading another social order?’, they ask. 
40Estimated to over 100 million continent-wide (Koçer and Hayter, 2011: 9). 
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21) argue, underlines this strategic leverage. Second, however, it is clear that African unions in 
general has had to work under conditions of considerable financial difficulties. These difficulties 
have reduced the ability of unions to operate autonomously and augmented moderating external 
pressures by making unions financially reliant on international ties or even on the state itself (Berg 
and Butler 1964: 375-376). Third, it has been proposed that the make-up of the workforce has 
inhibited the formation of solidarities required to act in concert. African workforces often consist 
of large pools of migrant and temporary workers that may retain land and connections to the 
agricultural sector, implying that their stakes in wage employment are lower (Berg and Butler 
1964: 375, 378-379). Ethnic/national divisions, furthermore, has been identified as a potential 
source of disunity. Yet, as Lynd (1968: 35-36) has stated, ‘trade unions almost always are the most 
detribalised [sic] organisational groups in the newly emerging African social structures’. Finally, 
it has been noted that patrimonial structures have tended to reinforce the process of 
bureaucratisation by legitimising a ‘personalisation’ of office and the resources that office 
commands (Berg and Butler 1964: 379; Lynd 28-29). 
Despite the factors discussed above, however, African labour movements have repeatedly been 
able to create a space for relative autonomous action and play a key role in important political 
processes, such as campaigns against authoritarian governments and austerity programmes (Koçer 
and Hayter 2011; Kraus 2007a: 21; 2007c; Beckman and Sachikonye 2010: 5). In doing so the 
unions have often punched far above their perceived political weight. ‘During the entire post war 
period’, Koçer and Hayter (2011: 25) have written, ‘[African] trade unions have been crucial actors 
whose influence exceeded beyond the realm of industrial relations and whose attitude and demands 
always surprised the ruling elite’. This has been the experience of relatively small as well as large 
movements (Kraus 2007a: 25), dispelling the notion that clout is a direct function of size. 
Nevertheless, a number of variables that condition relative strength have been identified by Kraus 
(2007b: 87). These include, in addition to size, strategic location; collective cohesion and 
capabilities; capability to mobilise support; intra-union relations; and linkages to other collective 
actors and political parties. Kraus considers autonomy from the state to be an additional source of 
strength. Yet, as discussed above, it is not obvious whether this is a source or an outcome of 
strength. Summing up the discussion on the potential clout of African unions, the following 
explanation, offered by Kraus (2007a: 21), is illuminating: 
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Trade unions have a greater capacity for extensive mobilisation of protest than almost any 
other social group at critical times, given their existing network of unions and branches. 
These can potentially be mobilised for protests, demonstrations, and strikes.... A union's 
mass base tends to have some common interests, and it may have developed a conscious 
identity on the basis of its lived labour and protest experiences…Unlike any other social 
group, unions are comprised of members who are strategically located to disrupt the 
economy – and often government as well – and, hence, challenge the operations of the 
incumbent regime directly. 
On a more abstract level, it has been argued that the most important aspect of unions in African 
contexts can be found elsewhere – in that they constitutes ‘the largest, and sometimes only, 
significant organisational force that represents the interests of the popular classes, the non-elite’ 
(Kraus 2007c: 283). This is particularly important ‘in elite-dominated polities’, according to Kraus 
(2007b: 83), where, as ‘virtually the only group representing the popular classes that has continuing 
organisational influence at the national level’, it can pose ‘challenging questions about rights of 
mass access to public resources’ (Kraus 2007c: 256). In this sense, the labour movement takes on 
a larger purpose that, while class-based, does not merely correspond to the corporate interests of 
the membership. 
2.5 The Ethiopian labour movement in the literature 
The Ethiopian labour movement has largely escaped serious scholarly attention. Although leftist-
inspired scholarship on Ethiopia showed some curiosity towards the wage labouring population 
and organised labour in the 1970s and early 1980s, such curiosity was generally eclipsed by the 
attention paid to agrarian relations and to questions of state power. This is not to say that valuable 
contributions cannot be found in the literature, but rather that they generally consist of rare, 
fragmented and scattered references within discussions on other topics. Nevertheless, by revisiting 
these references it is possible to assemble, at the very least, a general picture of how the Ethiopian 
labour movement has been depicted in the scholarly literature. 
One major and outstanding exception to what has been stated above is Tom Killion's 1985 PhD 
dissertation Workers, Capital and the State in the Ethiopian Region, 1919-1974. Killion's 
dissertation focuses on the interrelation between a ‘modernising’ imperial state, capital, and an 
emerging regional working class in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, focusing on organised labour. 
It describes, in broad strokes how workers throughout the region came to organise in ever more 
advanced constellations. The regional characterisation of the emerging working class is derived 
from Killion's theorisation of the integrated nature of the political economy spanning the Horn of 
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Africa. This regional working class was, it is argued, fractured into national working classes 
beginning with the political-economic shifts that started with the build-up to the Italian invasion 
of Ethiopia in the 1930s, and the concomitant emergence of a separate Eritrean political economy. 
From this point on, much of Killion's attention is shifted to the manner in which the Eritrean labour 
movement became a harbinger of the Eritrean nationalist movement. But alongside this, valuable 
insights into the process of formation and development of the Ethiopian labour movement are 
produced.  
For Killion, the ‘incipient’ (Killion 1985: 4) and ‘incomplete’ (ibid: 2) process of working class 
formation began with the emergence of capitalist relations of production and of wage labour and 
it culminated in the ‘CELU decade’ of 1963-1973, as well the ‘denouement’ (Ibid: 545) of the 
labour movement in the Ethiopian revolution that followed. Killion describes how, from the first 
formations, the workers in the region came to develop more advanced forms of organisations, and 
how this combined with occasional instances of state facilitation, more consistent attempts at 
containment, and intermittent repression. Despite this, the ideas and practices of organised labour 
continued to be disseminated throughout the workforce, and in light of surging levels of agitation 
and unrest among the workers, it became increasingly difficult for the state to contain the 
movement while continuing to deny recognition. These pressures, according to Killion, played an 
important role in forcing the imperial state to formally legalise unionism in the early 1960s and 
permit the formation of CELU. Yet, in Killion's interpretation the labour movement was always, 
and remained, subordinated to the state. Despite Killion recognising that by the time of the 1974 
Ethiopian revolution parts of the labour movement had gained a certain degree of autonomy, that 
a radical strand had emerged and was gathering force, and that this allowed workers to have a 
‘significant impact’ (ibid: 2) on the revolution, he insists that subordination always persisted. 
A source of strength of Killion's analysis can be found in his deciphering of the interlinked manner 
in which the process of working class formation within ‘the Ethiopian region’ took place. This is 
an important insight, which is convincingly argued. The conclusion pertaining to the alleged 
subordination of Ethiopian workers to the state is more tenuous, and does not sit comfortably with 
the evidence presented – if ‘subordination’ is to mean anything more than a mechanical outcome 
of the legal-political sovereignty of the state. In Killion's understanding, this ‘subordination’ is 
partly an outcome of a ‘false consciousness’ that equated the interests of the state with that of the 
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workers (ibid: 12). Not only, however, is the question of establishing the validity of consciousness 
problematic, but Killion, more importantly, himself demonstrates that Ethiopian workers 
repeatedly displayed an orientation more autonomous, adversarial and confrontational than 
Killion's characterisation of ‘false consciousness’ and ‘subordination’ would allow for. Despite 
such qualifications, however, Killion's dissertation constitutes the essential point of departure for 
any serious engagement with the history of the Ethiopian labour movement. No other source 
provides any comparable depth or level of engagement with the topic at hand, although a number 
of texts deserve mention.  
An account of the early development of the Ethiopian labour movement is presented in Stutz's 
(1967) paper The Developing Industrial Relations System in Ethiopia. Stutz's history of the 
emergence of the movement and imperial labour relations is descriptively rich, if analytically 
relatively limited in scope. Another early and largely descriptive study is Syoum Gebregziabher's 
The Rise of CELU and EFE41 under Haile Selassie's Regime (200542). From roughly the same 
period of time, Lynn Morehous' Ethiopian Labour Relations: Attitudes, Practice and Law (1969) 
provides a more analytically informed account. Morehous' concluding chapter – classified as 
confidential at the time of publication – points to the degree to which workers and local unionists 
had begun to see employers, the state, and even the central union leadership as inimical to their 
interests by the late 1960s. This is a rare observation from a time when Ethiopian industrial 
relations where generally perceived to be relatively amicable. 
John Markakis' work on Ethiopian state-society relations have spanned over the last five decades, 
and have incorporated a number of observations pertaining to the labour movement. In his first 
volume (1974), the focus is on agrarian class relations and the labour movement appears only as a 
peripheral phenomenon, whose ‘weakness’ is identified as one of the reasons for the depressed 
level of wages (1974: 174-177). Markakis is by no means alone in characterising the Ethiopian 
labour movement at that time as weak, or to play down its importance. ‘Since union membership 
was small and workplace-based, the unions were far less significant than the local neighbourhood 
associations, known as iddir’, Clapham (1990: 35) has opined, while, according to Keller (1991: 
149) the movement ‘was never able to present a serious militant challenge to the status quo in the 
 
41 Employers' Federation of Ethiopia – more frequently referred to as the Federation of Employers of Ethiopia (FEE). 
42 This is a reprint of a text written in 1969. 
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industrial sector’. According to Lefort (1983: 27), the labour movement ‘was apolitical, 
heterogeneous and atomised’, while Gebru Tareke (2009: 23) has dismissed the emerging working 
class in toto as ‘small, factional, and inconsequential, both qualitatively and quantitatively’. 
Markakis' understanding of the nature and potential of the labour movement, however,  was more 
nuanced than what the above would indicate, and he had noted that sporadic strikes and an upward 
momentum of ‘the tempo of labour activity’ had preceded the 1962 Labour Relations Decree and 
had ‘force[d] itself on the attention of a distrustful government’ (1974: 174).  In his and Nega 
Ayele's (1978) Class and Revolution in Ethiopia – written in the most forcefully contested phase 
of the revolution – the conditions of workers and the role of the labour movement discussed in 
more detail. Working class formation in Ethiopia was traced to the imperial ‘modernisation’ efforts 
of the 1950s and early 1960s. Working conditions were characterised as poor and pay levels as 
low. ‘Strikes’, they noted, ‘were plenty’ through the years following the 1962 labour relations 
decree and the establishment of CELU, ‘but few were successful’. Mass dismissals were said to 
have been more common than employers conceding to workers' demand. To make things worse, 
they claimed, ‘the position of labour deteriorated further in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to 
growing urban unemployment and the ravages of inflation’. 
In general, almost all scholarly accounts of the pre-revolutionary position of labour tend to lend 
support to the view that working conditions were poor, pay levels were low, and collective rights 
negligible. This corroborates Killion's (1985: 429; 7) description of manufacturing wages in the 
1960s as ‘extremely low’, being ‘depressed by a virtually limitless “reserve army” of unskilled 
rural labour’. One prominent account, however, stands out as an exception here: Andargachew 
Tiruneh (1993: 309) has claimed that ‘in the context of Ethiopia, to be a worker [was] not to be 
exploited so much as to be privileged: it [was] to have a regular income, however little, and to 
have access to health services and schools which were not, on the whole, available to the 
unemployed or to the peasants’. 
In terms of industrial contestation, Markakis and Nega noted that the 1960s and early 1970s was a 
time of relatively frequent industrial unrest – a point almost entirely neglected elsewhere in the 
literature. In their reading of events, poor and deteriorating conditions, furthermore, combined with 
the obvious partiality of the state to produce an increasingly militant and politically conscious 
labour movement that eventually took the offensive in the context of the 1974 revolution. In this 
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account the working class was an enthusiastic participant in a spontaneous alliance of popular 
classes that propelled the revolution. As the incoming military rulers halted and reversed the 
revolutionary movement, labour and its allies ventured into militant opposition.  This so-called 
‘stolen revolution’ thesis has been criticised for not taking the transformative role of the incoming 
government into consideration (Messay 2011; Halliday and Molyneux 1981), and while the 
discussion of the workers' role in the revolution sheds light on a neglected aspect of the revolution, 
it remains sketchy, abstract and incomplete. In more recent works (2011; 2012), Markakis has 
moved towards a focus on other social forces and dynamics. 
Several other works have discussed the labour movement within the specific context of the 
Ethiopian revolution. What these accounts have in common is that they completely subsume labour 
radicalism under the broader revolutionary process and treat it as a novel phenomenon having 
appeared suddenly in 1974, and lasted only briefly within the revolutionary upsurge. Bahru (2002: 
231), for example, has written that prior to March 1974, ‘CELU had been notable for its lethargy 
rather than its militancy’, while Gebru Tareke (2009: 23) has claimed it was ‘relatively placid and 
dormant throughout the 1960s’ and that ‘the torpor was shattered only amid the dramatic 
circumstances of the 1970s’. Ottaway (1976), meanwhile, was openly dismissive of labour's role, 
playing down what radicalism the movement displayed as mere pretension. The labour movement, 
she claimed, functioned as a vehicle for petty-bourgeois and white-collar interests, and opposed 
the incoming military government from a conservative position dressed in radical rhetoric. 
This is a view that Marina and David Ottaway would reassert in their 1978 volume Ethiopia: 
Empire in Revolution. The Ottaways note with approval organised labour's participation in the 
early stages of revolution. When later events pitted the movement against the military rulers, 
however, their approval is withdrawn and replaced with scolding: the labour movement is 
characterised as a vehicle for narrow and moderate corporate interests of a privileged segment of 
the workforce. It is accused of being unable to compromise (ibid: 101-105), and its leadership is 
labelled ‘incompetent’, ‘confused’ and ‘opportunist’ (ibid: 106-107). But this account is not alone 
in treating the labour opposition as inauthentic and illegitimate. The process of radicalisation of 
the labour movement and CELU's opposition to the incoming military government, hinted to 
above, has frequently been characterised as the outcome of ‘infiltration’ by radicals in general 
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(Lefort 1983: 30), or, more frequently, the EPRP43 in particular (Andargachew 1993: 141, 175; 
Negussay 1990: 20; Mengistu 1982: 31; Teferra 2011: 134). Not only does the concept of 
infiltration denote a mechanical and external form of control, but it also indicates illegitimacy. 
Even CELU's ability to expand its membership by a full third in the aftermath of its 1974 general 
strike is belittling to the Ottaways, who scornfully note that it ‘shows how great was its past failure 
to fully organise the working class’. The same authors' characterisation of CELU as largely 
representing white-collar and petty bourgeois interests (1978: 23) is echoed by Schwab (1985: 62-
63), Halliday and Molyneux (1981: 81), and Lefort (1983: 26-27). Yet, in none of the instances is 
any evidence offered to substantiate the allegation. The assertion may be challenged on both 
empirical grounds – with most of the largest and dominant unions being constituted 
overwhelmingly by blue-collar workers44 – and on conceptual grounds: the division implied is a 
rather artificial one, as the proletarian condition is premised on the compulsion to engage in wage 
labour rather than on pay grades and levels of education. 
A more nuanced treatment of the labour movement in the early stages of the revolution is found in 
Emmanuel Fayessa Negassa's (1977) MA thesis on the 1974 general strike and its background. 
Emmanuel, a former CELU employee, delivers a rich account of the causes and immediate effects 
of the 1974 general strike. He concludes that its success enabled the previously divided movement 
to re-establish a certain sense of coherence and emerge larger and stronger. Seleshi Sisaye (1986; 
1977), meanwhile, provides a rare empirical investigation of attitudes within the labour movement 
conducted in the immediate aftermath of the general strike. Intriguingly he records that while 
workers generally tended to view the strike in positive terms, respondents were divided on the 
causes and effects of the strike. While ‘blue-collar’ workers and workers from ‘non-dominant 
nationalities’ tended to be comparatively more prone to consider the cause and effect of the strike 
to be economic in nature, ‘white-collar workers’ and workers from ‘dominant nationalities’ 
generally tended to emphasise the political causes and effects of the general strike. 
 
43 Andargachew Tiruneh (1993: 142), who applies the idea of ‘infiltration’ with the greatest vigour, insists that the 
EPRP's rival leftist group MEISON too ‘infiltrated’ CELU. 
44 Examples of such large and influential blue-collar unions are those of the HVA Shoa-Wonji and Metahara sugar 
plantations and factories, the Indo-Ethiopian Textile Factory, the Dire Dawa cement and textile factories, the Bahir 
Dar textile factory and the Ethio-Djiboutian Railroad, while Ethiopian Airlines provides one of few examples of larger 
and influential white-collar unions.  
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The period of high PMAC rule saw a number of publications that included discussions on the 
position of the labour movement. Schwab (1985), in a text shamelessly apologetic of the military 
rulers of the time, imparts a positive image of labour organised along ‘socialist’ principles. The 
reorganised All-Ethiopia Trade Union and subsequent Ethiopian Trade Union, he claims, may 
have been constituted as a ‘political organ of the state’, but it had nevertheless allegedly ‘achieved 
improvements in wages and benefits for its members, and [ensured] that unfair practices [were] 
dealt with’ (1985: 63). Clapham (1990), on the other hand, displayed a larger dose of scepticism. 
He too understood the ETU as a primarily political structure, but was more pessimistic with regards 
to its ability to secure better conditions for its members. ‘In the absence of pay rises’, Clapham 
(1990: 137) writes, ‘the unions have to encourage their membership with symbolic rewards’. 
Clapham also noted that although the ETU was represented within the Central Committee of the 
ruling Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), its political clout, or even relevance, was severely 
curtailed: ‘there is nothing to indicate that either [the union representatives], or the organisation 
they represent, have any policy-making role; they are seldom referred to in the press, save for their 
appearance at official functions’. 
More recent scholarly discussions on the Ethiopian labour movement are fewer in number and 
generally more limited in scope. Assefa Bersoufekad's (2003) account of trade unionism in 
Ethiopia is based on official sources and entirely descriptive. Mehari's, (2013) on the other hand, 
is an account of the legal framework of unionism in Ethiopia through three regimes. He describes 
the main contours of the evolution of Ethiopian labour law, and notes the inability of each of the 
three regimes to uphold a legal framework consistent with the International Labour Organisation's 
standards. Paulos (2006), meanwhile, accounts for how state control is achieved through non-legal 
and informal measures. Such allegations have been echoed by ILO (2012), and the concerns are 
reflected in Dessalegn Rahmato's (2002) account of civil society in Ethiopia. The trade union 
movement, Dessalegn argues, ‘has been kept as a docile instrument of state policy by successive 
governments since the 1960s’. But Dessalegn cannot find any valid reasons for the state's 
continuous attention and attempts to achieve control over organised labour.  Rather, it is interpreted 
as an irrational over-reaction which gives ‘the trade union movement a significance and power far 
beyond its actual potential’ (2002: 114). Ethiopian trade union history, he claims, is ‘the result of 
false perceptions and an exaggerated sense of worth’ (ibid: 114).  
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Praeg (2006) provides a substantial and informative discussion on the process by which a re-
emergent relatively autonomous trade union confederation was re-subjugated in the mid-1990s. A 
similar discussion is found in Melakou (2013: 154), who points to the manner in which the current 
ruling party, with no official attachments to the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions, leads 
the latter ‘from behind’, through a party ‘proletarian committee’. The role of this committee in 
exercising control over CETU is also mentioned by Markakis (2011: 251). Melakou, furthermore 
discusses how, in the context of the lead-up to the national elections of 2005, a televised debate on 
trade unions was interrupted by angry workers who claimed not to be represented by the pro-
government leadership of CETU, and how the issue of low wages came to gather importance 
before the same elections. 
Contemporary wages and working conditions are issues also raised in a recent paper by economists 
Blattman and Dercon (2016). Conducting another rare empirical survey of wage workers at five 
industrial and agro-industrial enterprises, they found that taking up manufacturing employment in 
contemporary Ethiopia did not appear to affect the income of job seekers positively at all. While 
working time tended to increase, this increase was offset by hourly wages that were significantly 
lower than the incomes that informal opportunities tended to generate45. Since they also found 
working conditions in the manufacturing sector to be hazardous, unemployed urbanites in 
contemporary Ethiopia appear to have little to gain by taking up manufacturing employment even 
where the alternative is unemployment. This, in turn, was manifested in high personnel turnover 
rates: over three quarters of the fresh employees included in the survey had quit within a year. 
Blattman and Dercon, moreover, described the position of organised labour in terms of outcomes 
in each workplace. The general picture was one of generally ‘semi-active’ or dormant unions 
concerned mostly with petitioning for changes in specific conditions and mediating disputes, rather 
than engaging in collective bargaining or industrial conflict. However, it is notable that at those 
workplaces where labour activity was described as unusually high, or where strikes and unrest had 
been occurring, workers had been successful in forcing management to make wage and non-wage 
concessions alike. 
 
45 ‘We see no evidence of an industrial wage premium in these five firms. A simple (non-experimental) wage 
comparison adjusting for baseline characteristics suggests that industrial jobs seemed to pay almost a quarter lower 
wages than informal opportunities.’ (Blattman and Dercon 2016: 4) 
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Finally, a number of documentary, biographical, and semi-biographical sources require mention. 
The first is an ambitious attempt to write the history of the Ethiopian labour movement organised 
by AETU and conducted by a committee working under its auspices (AETU 1984a; 1984b). The 
two-volume text is a sterile documentary history which maps key moments in the movements' 
history but contains little analysis. It suffers from having been produced under the period of high 
PMAC/WPE rule, and under a structure completely under its control. As a result, it cannot but sing 
the praise of the contemporaneous configuration in a highly politicised way and judge past 
struggles in light of this fidelity. A superior critical distance is achieved in Kiflu Tadesse's46 two 
books on the history of the EPRP (1993; 1998) and his most recent work on Ethiopian history 
(2016). Kiflu's books include a detailed treatment of events within the labour movement and 
constitutes an important source of information on struggles of and within the labour movement, in 
the context of the revolution. Another source is Beyene Solomon's47 autobiography and his account 
of the history of the Ethiopian labour movement (2010; 2012). While Kiflu's constitutes a defence 
of the oppositional and revolutionary labour movement, Beyene's is a defence of the moderate 
leadership that ruled CELU through the 1960s and was overthrown by the radicals in the mid-
1970s. 
  
 
46 A former politburo member of the EPRP and a central committee member of the EPRP's labour front ELAMA. 
47 Former CELU president. 
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3. Setting the context 
In this chapter, the structural context in which the Ethiopian labour movement has developed is 
outlined. This includes aspects of the social, political, economic and historical setting. Initially, 
the process of state formation and evolution, and the problems it has entailed, is discussed. The 
social composition of the Ethiopian population, and the diverging manner in which different 
populations came to be integrated into the Ethiopian social formation are matters of concern here, 
as is the evolution of the country's political structures. In the second part of the chapter the evolving 
Ethiopian political economy is the focus of closer attention. The problem of economic surpluses – 
their production, appropriation and distribution over time – and the concurrent evolving labour 
regime is discussed. The manner in, and conditions under which labour has been mobilised to 
produce surpluses, how, and by whom these surpluses have been used, constitutes the core 
concerns of this inquiry. Finally, the development of the manufacturing sector of Ethiopia and the 
concomitant development of a wage labouring population is discussed. The aim is to enable an 
understanding of the evolving position of labour within the broader political economy and labour 
regime, which constitute the structural context in which the labour movement operates, and aims 
to effect change upon. 
3.1 Social and historical setting 
The contemporary Ethiopian polity is largely the product of a twin process of internal 
consolidation and external expansion that commenced in the second half of the 19th century. After 
a prolonged period of political disintegration and competing centres of power, central state 
authority began to re-emerge around the mid-19th century. Over a period extending into the first 
decades of the 20th century, coinciding with and not unrelated to the colonial scramble for Africa, 
the territorial reach of the Ethiopian state was extended far south, west and east from its original 
northern core. In this process, new populations were forcefully incorporated into the Ethiopian 
empire. Despite its changing demographic base, the state retained its pronounced ‘northern’ socio-
political features and biases. Incorporation took the shape of compelled assimilation. The process 
described above has been interpreted in a number of ways. Merera (2003) has helpfully 
distinguished between what he calls the ‘nation-building’, the ‘national oppression’ and the 
‘colonial’ theses. For proponents of the former, territorial expansion is seen as a historical 
achievement, a process of national unification. Proponents of the ‘national oppression’ thesis, on 
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the other hand, acknowledge the injustices of the process and the national inequalities that it has 
created. They assign a prominent role to material inequalities, and the intersection of class and 
national oppression which is reflected in socio-cultural inequalities, and they argue that with the 
economic base reformed, the preconditions for the creation of just and equal national relations can 
be met. For proponents of the last thesis, however, no such reforms can be sufficient. Since the 
process of territorial expansion is conceived of as a process of colonisation, any acceptable solution 
must begin with decolonisation.  
Whatever the merits of the different interpretations, the process of expansion created an Ethiopia 
with modified social and geographic characteristics. Spatially, the territorial reach of the expanded 
Ethiopian empire stretched southwards from the northern highland core, over the rift valley that 
cuts across it, onto a smaller south-eastern plateau, and into the surrounding lowlands. The main 
plateau is inhabited by agriculturalists belonging to the Amhara and Tigray in the north, the Oromo 
in the west and south, and a number of smaller populations – the Gurage, Welayta, Sidama, Hadiya, 
Gedeo and Kambata being the most populous – in the fertile south. In the northern and central 
parts of the plateau the majority of the population profess Orthodox Christianity. The south-eastern 
plateau is largely populated by Muslim Oromo. The two densely populated plateaus are surrounded 
by sparsely populated lowland peripheries inhabited by a number of nationalities practicing 
pastoralism and shifting agriculture. These nationalities are, unlike those inhabiting the main 
plateau, largely constituted by practitioners of Islam. The two largest populations of pastoralist 
communities in the lowlands are the Somali and the Afar. 
Territorial expansion and consolidation was conjoined with a process of centralisation. From the 
mid-19th century onwards, powerful regional nobles and lords experienced a continuous and 
incremental rebalancing of power and authority in favour of the imperial centre. With the coming 
to power of Haile Selassie in the second decade of the 20th century, this process was accelerated 
through the institution of a professional bureaucracy and army. Other measures undertaken under 
the broad conception of ‘modernisation’ further contributed to the changing dynamics48. The 
institution of formal and higher education, the emergence and growth of an urban economy, 
 
48 Modernisation, while a problematic concept whose usage in the Ethiopianist literature has rightly been criticised 
(Bahru 2008: 98-100), is used here because it has become the conventional word for the process of politically 
instigated renewal and reform that the Ethiopian state embarked upon, which sought to emulate a number of 
institutions as found in Europe (Tsegaye 1996).  
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infrastructural expansion, and the emergence of national and standardised fiscal, financial and 
monetary systems all constitute complementary aspects of this process. The brief Italian 
occupation between 1936 and 1941 only served to accelerate this process. But below the surface, 
the contradictions generated by imperial modernisation, grafted on top of a basically absolutist and 
landlordist configuration, sharpened rapidly. Changes in the economy, and the demands for 
heightened surplus extraction from a slowly developing economic base, generated tensions.  New 
urban educated categories, meanwhile, were alienated by the prevalence of a seemingly archaic 
absolutist system, and marginalised nationalities were becoming increasingly resentful towards 
discriminatory treatment. Despite a number of warning signs – regional revolts, peasant uprisings, 
rebellions among the nobility, assassination attempts, and a near-successful 1960 coup attempt – 
the imperial centre refused to yield to demands of fundamental reform. In 1974, the imperial 
regime was overthrown in a popular uprising, out of which a military body eventually seized power 
– the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), known simply as Derg in Amharic49. 
The post-revolutionary state – dominated as it was by the military – embarked upon a programme 
of extensive socio-economic reform. While it encouraged pluralism on a socio-cultural level – 
non-Amharic languages and cultural expressions were no longer supressed, and the state was 
separated from the church – it retained a hard-headed insistence on political centralism and 
territorial indivisibility50. Seventeen years of war with regionalist and nationalist forces followed, 
before Ethiopia was reconstituted as a federal state under the leadership of the victorious Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Nominally, Ethiopia had come full circle with 
regards to addressing the national question: assimilation and centralism had been replaced by the 
celebration of multinational diversity and national/ethnic self-determination. In the process, the 
coastal region of Eritrea, which had only become federated with Ethiopia in 1952 and incorporated 
 
49 This body operated under different names reflecting the evolution of its position. Initially, its name was the 
Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial Army; and after seizing state power it was 
renamed PMAC. It spawned and dominated the Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia (PMGE), that later 
became the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (PMGSE); as well as, indirectly, the Workers' Party 
of Ethiopia (WPE), which in turn was preceded by the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of 
Ethiopia (COPWE). Due to the striking continuity of policies and leading personas in these bodies, the PMAC/WPE 
period of rule is treated as an undivided sequence. The PMAC/WPE ruled the state known as Socialist Ethiopia after 
the toppling of the imperial regime, and its successor state the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) from 
its foundation in 1987 to its downfall in May 1991. 
50 The constitution of the PDRE, adopted in 1987, introduced five autonomous regions in order to undercut the lure 
insurgent movements that operated at the time. This formal concession, however, never accounted to any measure of 
self-determination, as the ‘autonomous’ status came without any constitutional powers or provisions whatsoever. The 
constitution, furthermore, explicitly stipulated that the PDRE remained a unitary state (Andargachew 1993: 282). 
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into the Ethiopian empire in 1962, had become independent. However, the dominance of a single 
ruling party and its affiliated parties at each level of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE) has done much to short-circuit the exercise of genuine self-determination (Markakis 2011; 
Merera 2003). While socio-culturally, the policy of assimilation may have been abandoned, and 
while nominally the major nationalities have been given equal recognition, socio-regional 
inequalities continue to loom large. In the political sphere, this is illustrated in continued regional 
imbalances51. It is, however, in the political economy that the inequalities and hierarchies are most 
obvious. 
3.2 Surpluses and labour regimes in evolution 
The concept of surpluses, in the Marxian sense, constitutes an analytical category which provides 
a key to the analysis of changing political economies. Surpluses are extracted from that part of 
production for which the labourer is not compensated. This may take the form of extra-economic 
coercion, as in the case of the serf bound to the land. Or it may be extracted through economic 
coercion, when the primary producers have been separated from the means of production and have 
no choice but to avail their labour to those in control of the means of production for incomplete 
compensation. Surplus extraction can take place in an unconcealed manner, such as in the case of 
the sharecropping farmer who is compelled to surrender a part of his product to a landlord for no 
immediate compensation. But it can also be concealed, and a most effective mechanism of 
concealing surplus extraction has proven to be that of the wage. 
Wage labourers are compensated for only part of the time they sell their labour. If they were to be 
compensated for the full workday, no profits could be generated, as the Marxian conception of 
surpluses is premised on the notion that value is the product of labour52. For that part of the working 
day for which the labourer is not compensated, surplus labour is extracted53. Surplus labour results 
 
51 Take, for example, the fact that only parties from the Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Southern Nation, Nationalities 
and Peoples' Regional States are included in the EPRDF. Ruling parties of the peripheral and largely lowland regional 
states figure only as ‘affiliates’ of the EPRDF without voting rights. Another example of political imbalances is the 
lingering pre-eminence of the original core party – the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front – within the front, and the 
key offices of the federal state. 
52 Fixed capital, in the labour theory of value, is conceived of as the product of past labour. In this sense the ‘dead 
labour’ of fixed capital is combined with the living labour of the worker in the process of production. 
53 Surpluses may be generated from other economic activities than those actually performed by the contracted labourer. 
When, for example, wages are too low to actually fund the cost of the social reproduction of labour, wage labour needs 
to be subsidised from other sectors. This may take the shape of transfer of surpluses generated by non-compensated 
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in surplus product, which, when sold, results in the generation of surplus value. The wage 
mechanism mystifies and conceals the exploitative relations by which the extraction of surplus 
takes place to a greater extent than extra-economic coercion and unconcealed forms of surplus 
extraction allow for, but it is nevertheless essential that the accumulation of surpluses, in this way, 
is the accumulation of surplus labour. Surplus accumulation – capital formation – is essential to 
economic development, especially when this takes a capitalist form. In this way, the process of 
surplus accumulation simultaneously constitutes the sine qua non of capitalist development, and 
an exploitative practice that generates social contradictions. It is a contested process that showcase 
changing features over time, but it is the bedrock on which the development of capitalism must be 
understood. As labour regimes, according to the conceptualisation formulated in the above, 
constitute the structural qualities of the process in which surplus is extracted, the conjoined 
development of the labour regimes also requires a developed understanding. 
3.2.1 Surpluses in Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, surpluses have overwhelmingly been generated by and extracted from peasant 
producers54. This process took different institutional forms in different areas and over time, but the 
basic premise on which it rested was, broadly speaking, that of landlordism. In the northern ‘core’ 
provinces the institutional scaffolding of agrarian surplus extraction was the time-worn system of 
rist and gult. The peasantry enjoyed rist rights, which entailed an inheritable tenure right to a 
certain plot of land. But it came with obligations. That obligation took the form of gult which was 
superimposed over the rist-held land. The gult-holder was entitled to a share of the produce of the 
rist-holder, most often paid in kind, of which some part was either passed on to the state or not. 
The gult-holder was furthermore entitled to requisition free labour from the rist-holding peasant 
to construct houses and fences, conduct odd jobs, or, importantly, to cultivate the gult-holder's 
private land. The land of the gult-holder was furthermore generally exempted from taxation while 
that of the rist-holder was subject to a number of taxes. The surplus extracted through these 
mechanisms was in the early 20th century sufficient to fund a rudimentary state machinery, its 
 
subsistence forms of labour taking place within the household, which is necessary for the wage labourer to sell his/her 
labour at such low wages. The transfer of surpluses generated by unpaid forms of labour within the household or 
community is an important aspect of exploitative relations. Despite this, the exact manner in which such surplus value 
can be calculated remains a practical difficulty (Komlosy 2016). 
54 The exposition on agrarian surplus extraction in imperial times that follows is based on Dessalegn 2009; Bahru 
2002; Gebru 1995; Addis 1975; Markakis 1974; and Markakis and Nega 1978. 
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rulers and auxiliaries, and the traditional lords. Meanwhile, however, the peasantry was 
condemned to destitute conditions. 
While this system changed over the 20th century leading up to the fall of the imperial regime – 
more taxes and central control over the mechanisms were imposed, while landlord autonomy was 
progressively eroded – it retained its central feature of agrarian surplus extraction from peasant 
agriculture. In the newly conquered southern provinces too, this feature constituted the central 
component of the system, but the manner in which it was put into operation was significantly 
harsher. Here, conquest had been followed by land alienation, as the state confiscated two-thirds 
of the land. The confiscated land was generally subdivided to the functionaries of the state, 
including the commanders and soldiers of the victorious armies, the administrators and retainers 
that followed, and the church. This system led to greater and more obvious contradictions as the 
exploitation lacked the veil of tradition and the communal embeddedness that was the case in the 
north (Markakis 1974).  The newly imposed category of landlords were most frequently from an 
alien nationality, and were often absent as they generally preferred to take up residence in their 
home regions or in the emerging towns in the south. Class contradictions thus became reinforced 
by national, linguistic, religious and cultural aspects. The degree of surplus extraction – tenants 
were forced to relinquish up to 75 percent of their produce (Gebru 1995: 213) – only served to 
sharpen such contradictions, as did the reform agenda that was embarked upon during late imperial 
times. When the state began to issue title deeds and thus privatised ownership of land, the extent 
of the alienation and the condition of tenancy became apparent. The landlords were now free to 
expel the tenants.  
The class structure generated by these relations was a fairly basic one consisting of an upper 
landlord class and a surplus-generating peasant class, subdivided between a rist-holding strata and 
a tenant one. In addition to this general division, a not insignificant number of landless agrarian 
labourers and a number of intermediary categories, sustained by the surpluses extracted from 
agrarian labour, including traders, prevailed. A newer sector, employing wage labour in mostly 
urban areas, complemented this. Additional – significantly lesser in degree – forms of surplus 
extraction took place through bandit activity and slave trade, prior to a ban on slave trade in 1924, 
and the total abolishment of slavery in 1942 (Fernyhough 2010; Pankhurst 1968). War-making, 
which was perennial through the first decades of the 20th century, also functioned as a means to 
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extract surpluses and redistribute resources (Tsegaye 1996). In the lowlands, where a pastoral 
economy prevailed, occasional incursions, in terms of raids, tribute demands, and the 
establishment of check-posts, substituted for a systematic process of extraction. 
What, then, came of the surpluses extracted? The first conditioning factor to be noted is that 
surpluses, albeit relatively large, were quite minor in absolute terms. This was not the least so 
because of the neglect of investments in peasant agriculture. The state, when engaging with 
agriculture at all, was to focus on mechanised agriculture and commercial farms. The heavy surplus 
levees, furthermore, served to inhibit attempts by the peasantry to raise productivity – by reducing 
investible capital available, by lessening the incentives for output growth as increasing production 
resulted in increasing rent, and, in regions where tenancy was dominant, by linking increased 
productivity to increasing risk of eviction55. As for the landlord class, it has been claimed that its 
‘entrenched interests… thwarted the “modernisation” of agriculture’ (Gebru 1995: 213), and that 
they ‘were mostly eager to skim off as much of the peasant surplus as quick as possible’ (Dessalegn 
2009: 313) rather than reinvesting in peasant agriculture. The landlords, were in Gebru Mersha's 
(1995: 213) words, ‘a very wasteful class which never understood the language of accumulation 
and hence never bothered to invest in agriculture to raise productivity’. A trickle of surpluses, 
made way into the emerging sectors of the economy and real estate, but mostly the landlord class 
‘frittered away the surplus it appropriated in conspicuous consumption and state administration’ 
(Gebru 1995: 213).  
Instead then, the newer sectors of the economy could only be developed by other actors. Mostly, 
this task was taken up by foreigners and the state, but in domestic trade and commercial agriculture 
a segment of local propertied actors had begun to emerge. Capitalist relations of production were 
emerging through the development of a number of new sectors. But this process was cut short by 
the 1974 revolution. 
As land was nationalised and parcelled out to the peasantry in the aftermath of the revolution, 
landlordism was abolished altogether. ‘The immediate impact’ of the land reform, Dessalegn 
(2009: 321) has written, ‘was to remove all classes from the countryside, except the labouring 
 
55 Where farmers were successful in increasing productivity through improved seeds and technology, the result was 
frequently that the private owner evicted the farmer and took over operation himself. This was also the unintentional 
outcome of a number of aid-financed schemes to raise agrarian productivity (Dessalegn 2009). 
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peasant, and to create a homogenous social structure consisting of a mass of poverty-stricken 
micro-holders’. Commercial farms were turned into state farms, and private manufacturing and 
financial establishments became state-owned enterprises. Surplus extraction was initially relaxed, 
but by the end of the 1970s a new regime of agrarian surplus extraction had been put in place. This 
centred on the imposition of quotas of agrarian output to be sold to the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation for well-below-market prices. The commandist and state capitalist relations56 that 
emerged in the new sectors put to test any notion of popular socialism. An expanding category of 
bureaucrats were put in charge of the economy, and ran it with iron-fist authoritarianism, albeit 
with little efficiency. Profitability in manufacturing started declining, and the state farms turned 
out to be financially disastrous57. Peasant agriculture, furthermore, became ensnared in an ever-
worsening crisis, and in the mid-1980s, famine occurred. The war with insurgent forces that 
persisted unabated for the seventeen years reign of the first-post revolutionary regime, 
furthermore, squandered a major share of surpluses generated. 
The PMAC-generated Workers' Party of Ethiopia itself gave up its pretension of ‘building 
socialism’ when it declared its intention to liberalise the economy in the late 1980s58. However, as 
it was by then teetering on the brink of collapse – which followed in 1991 – it was left to the 
incoming EPRDF government to complete the transition to private capitalism. The EPRDF's 
strategy was initially based on boosting peasant production and relieving the agrarian crisis. This 
strategy was one of inward-oriented ‘agricultural development led-industrialisation’59. However, 
over the years, this has shifted to an outward led export-oriented strategy focused on attracting 
foreign capital and boosting manufacturing, supplemented with a newfound intention to develop 
commercial farming. This latter aspect of the strategy has led to what Fouad (2014) has described 
as an enclosure movement, where peasants, pastoralists, and populations of the peripheral regions 
again face land alienation60. Another result is that agrarian wage labour – manifested in the 
commercial farms of imperial times and state farms of the PMAC/WPE years – is again on the 
 
56 See Girma (1987) and Kelemen (1984), for discussions on Ethiopian state capitalism. 
57 However, while incurring financial losses, it could be argued that the state farms made greater surpluses possible in 
other sectors, as they contributed to lowering agricultural prices.  
58 In 1988 the WPE embarked on a path of reform towards private capitalism which, among other things, included a 
reembrace of private ownership in key sectors and deregulation. This process culminated in the March 1990 
announcement of a new economic policy intended to introduce a ‘mixed economy’.  
59 Demessie (2006) provides an analytical account of this strategy. 
60 See Dessalegn (2011); and Fouad (2014) for a discussion of this process. Tsegaye (2015), meanwhile, discusses the 
emerging patterns of resistance to this process. 
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rise. However, with regards to surplus extraction from the peasant agrarian sector, it can probably 
be concluded that the relative degree of such extraction has been continuously relaxed over the 
past five decades. First, the 1975 land reform and the emergence of an agrarian regime which, 
despite entailing exploitative features – such as the role of AMC mentioned in the above – 
nevertheless relieved the peasantry from some exactions. Second, the dismantlement of the AMC 
in the last years of WPE rule and the EPRDF's subsequent efforts to promote peasant agricultural 
development – which included an appreciation of the relative prices of agricultural goods – further 
reduced the level of extraction. Dessalegn (2009: 335-336) estimates that surplus extraction from 
peasant agriculture has decreased from around 60 percent of produce during the imperial regime; 
to 33 to 50 percent during the PMAC/WPE; and to a ‘slightly lesser degree’ in the contemporary 
period. The agrarian structure of a mass of micro-holders described above remains a defining 
feature of the Ethiopian political economy (Dessalegn 2009: 321), even if recent studies have noted 
trends towards increasing rural differentiation61. 
The degree and means of surplus extraction in the agrarian sector has thus tended to lessen over 
the past century. However, in the face of massive investment needs and accumulation 
requirements, what surplus requirements are relaxed in one sector, must inevitable be compensated 
for by greater surplus demands on other sectors. In the waged sectors, there have also been 
important labour regime changes. Because the level of surpluses/wages require more detailed 
analysis – found in chapter six of this dissertation – this point is not elaborated upon here. Rather, 
by looking at the evolution of the position of labour in terms of labour law, practices, and 
conditions, some patterns and trajectories of these aspects of the evolving wage labour regime can 
be outlined. 
3.2.2 The legal regime 
Ethiopia has had four general labour laws since the first labour relations proclamation came into 
force in 1963 (IEG 1962; 1963a; PMGE 1975; TGEE 1993; FDRE 2003). These are subject to a 
number of additional enactments that directly regulates different spheres of wage labour and 
organised labour. A number of generalities are observable across the evolving legal framework, as 
is a general trajectory. First, the stipulations relating to individual rights of workers have been 
fairly stable. While no Ethiopian labour law has included any minimum wage, they have all 
 
61 See for instance Lefort (2012). 
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established a 48 hours work-week. Similar provisions for overtime, annual, maternity and sick 
leave have been included, although substantial improvements have been registered as from the 
1975 labour law onwards. Similarly, the 1975 labour proclamation saw a strengthening of 
provisions for job tenure security, and all subsequent editions have retained similar provisions62. 
Second, trade unions have remained dependent on registration – which has always come with 
certain preconditions – and they have persistently been subject to de-registration in case of falling 
out of favour. This has proved the most effective legally sanctioned mechanism by which to 
exercise everyday control. Third, all editions of the labour law have made it nearly impossible for 
workers to legally call a strike. Typically they have included provisions that only a registered trade 
union may call a strike, that more than a simple majority is required to vote for a strike call for it 
to be valid, and, most importantly, that such a strike cannot be called before a workplace trade 
dispute commission and/or and intermediate conciliator or body has failed to resolve the dispute. 
After such conciliation has failed, a time period – usually thirty days – has been required for a 
court or a labour relations board to review the case. The verdict of these bodies, furthermore, on 
whether a strike is permissible or not, has come with legal force. Not only has this route been 
arduous and time-consuming, but the likelihood that a labour relations board or labour court would 
ever sanction a strike – which its legality has depended on – is a dubious proposition to state the 
least. So far, in over five decades of practice, it is yet to occur. Fourth, all labour laws have made 
‘unfair labour practices’, such as solidarity striking and attendant activities, illegal and subjected 
offending unions to sanctions. The penalties for illegal practices have included prison terms. 
Finally, the legal framework has consistently excluded significant parts of the workforce – notably 
civil servants and domestic workers – from the right to unionise, and they have denied workers 
engaged in the provision of ‘essential services’ even the curtailed hypothetical right to strike. 
While all Ethiopian general labour laws thus include provisions for the exercise of control over 
trade unions, the PMAC's Labour Proclamation of 1975 and Trade Union Organisation 
Proclamation of 1982 went the furthest in emphasising this aspect, and carried the greatest 
sanctions. A centralising and hierarchic logic was imposed in the 1975 act, which stipulated that 
‘lower trade unions shall be subordinate to higher ones’ and ‘shall be obliged to accept and 
implement the decisions of higher trade unions’. The top leadership of the AETU, was assigned 
 
62 It appears, however, that the labour law currently under discussion will break this pattern and significantly 
undermine job security if adopted. See, for example, Dawit (2017b). 
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the function of overall control and to ‘issue directives to unions to ensure their functioning in line 
with socialist principles’. Basic unions, meanwhile, were to ‘encourage and stimulate workers to 
increase production, and to participate and render services to voluntary community activities’ – a 
euphemism for the requisition of free labour. Meanwhile, illegal strikes, ‘lack of good faith in a 
collective negotiation’, failure to immediately execute ‘an agreement, decision or order given at 
any level’, or ‘to obstruct or be the cause of a delay of the speedy settlement of a trade dispute’, 
were all considered criminal acts punishable with one year in prison. The 1982 act reinforced the 
top-down logic of the 1975 proclamation, but also included a provision protecting leaders of the 
state-approved unions. It banned dismissals for disciplinary reasons, or transfer of any trade union 
leader without the prior approval of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. While the two 
similar labour acts of 1993 and 2003 retracted a number of the most centralising aspects of the 
code, they also removed this provision protecting trade union leaders. This was not coincidental. 
The government admitted that the legal reform was motivated by a perception that safeguards in 
previous legislation – however harsh elsewise – constituted a ‘disincentive to private investors’ 
whom the government was attempting to attract, and that it stifled productivity (CoR 1993: 49). 
With regards to patterns of change, the legal framework has gradually opened the way for more 
workers to organise. This has meant that a minimum requirement for basic unions to be formed 
has decreased from a workplace labour force size of 50 to 10. It has also meant an expanded 
franchise in the type of workers that are permitted to unionise. While early labour legislation 
excluded seasonal workers – a form of employment that was dominant in the commercial farming 
economy – they have since been permitted to unionise.  Finally, the first labour proclamation's ban 
on unions engaging in ‘any political activity whatsoever’ and the 1982 proclamation's reverse 
insistence on a certain type of politics – that of vulgarised ‘socialism’ – have been dropped. 
In 2017, a new draft labour law was submitted to the Council of Ministers for review. This draft 
law entails significant curtailments of labour rights. Among other features, it entails stipulation 
that would double in length the period of probation and quadruple it in certain sectors, reduce 
annual leave, and lower compensation payments for workplace accidents. It would also allow the 
dismissal of workers who report late for work for two days in a one-month period, or five days 
during a six-months-period, or who are absent for a single day without medical certification. 
Obviously, this entails a considerable worsening of the legal labour regime, and another assault on 
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the position on labour. This has led the CETU to, in October 2017, issue a historical general strike 
threat, should the draft bill not be amended (Addis Fortune 2017; Dawit 2017a; 2017b). 
3.2.3 Attendant practices 
A consistent pattern of state practice is to ignore labour legislation when deemed incommensurate 
with state priorities. This takes place in addition to the extensive powers and the room for 
arbitrariness awarded to state institutions in the mentioned legislation in the first place. The state 
has allowed for extensive harassment of workers aspiring to organise, and of trade unions officials 
even in those sectors where the workers' rights to organise has been granted. This tendency is 
particularly common in industries and workplaces considered of strategic value, or where owners 
enjoy preferential access to high state officials63. The result has been to hamper the organisation 
of large parts of the wage-working population, as well as to discourage unions from operating in 
the interests of its members. There is, however, less evidence of everyday harassment of trade 
unionists during the high period of stable PMAC/WPE rule – for officials of the state-sanctioned 
trade unions structures, after they had been purged of oppositional and radical labour activists that 
is64 – than during the preceding and succeeding regimes. There is a sound logic to this, as 
PMAC/WPE labour legislation invested official unions with the explicit function of operating as 
a political instrument directly subordinated to the state, as noted in the above. A certain level of 
protection came with falling in line behind this. Despite the retarding influence this had on the 
labour movement, it played a part in the surging number of organised workers during this period.  
3.2.4 Labour conditions 
Labour conditions in much of Ethiopia's waged sector have generally been regarded as poor 
throughout the recent past. The issue is too vast and diverse – both in spatial and temporal terms – 
for any detailed analysis to be undertaken here. Nevertheless, a number of different but typical 
observations may serve to illustrate the problem. Killion (1985: 427, 459) has described working 
conditions in the industries that emerged in the 1950s in general as ‘harsh’, with subsequent 
 
63 References abound in the literature on the systematic level of similar harassment in the past and in the present. See, 
for instance, Morehous 1969: 60, 69; Killion 1985; Tewodros 2010; Hanan 2011; ITUC 2011; 2014.  
64 Not only is this reflected in the scarcity of references to such harassment, but as will be made evident in Chapter 5, 
archival data suggests a sharp increase in harassment in connection with the fall of the government. This, however, is 
not to suggest that trade unions could operate freely during the PMAC/WPE period, but only when its operation was 
synchronised with the aims and goals of the regime. The reason to single out the period of stable PMAC/WPE rule 
here is to differentiate it from the contested first years of its rule, when systematic and mass repression was practiced, 
and its waning days, when labour trouble and repression reappeared (Beyene 2012). 
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legislation establishing only ‘minimal’ standards. For the over 100 000 plantation workers active 
in Humera, he claimed ‘working and living conditions were extremely primitive’, ‘diseases such 
as malaria and elephantiasis’ were ‘rampant’, and wages were frequently unpaid (Killion 1985: 
538-539). Of 3000 unemployed persons ‘rounded up’ from the streets of Addis Ababa and airlifted 
to fill a labour shortage there in 1972, it was claimed that a full seventy percent had died a year 
later65 (Killion 1985: 539). Bahru (2008: 120-146), meanwhile, described the appalling conditions 
on a major plantation owned by the Dutch company Handelsvereniging Amsterdam (HVA) – the 
Wonji-Shoa Sugar Estate – where racial discrimination, ‘tyrannical’ management practices, 
dangerous working conditions, shoddy medical facilities, and poor job security were compounding 
factors. In the industrial sector, labour conditions may not have been as bad as in the plantation 
economy – indeed, workers inside the Wonji sugar factory laboured under quite different 
conditions from those growing and cutting the sugar cane in the plantations – but a number of 
authors testify to the poor conditions prevailing there too. Bekure (1984) has characterised working 
and living conditions in industrial plants in Addis Ababa in the early-mid 1970s as ‘intolerable’. 
Illustrating this point, he described how old machinery contributed to extreme noise, and poor air 
quality – where workers in textile and flour mills would be ‘covered in cotton and fibre dust’ 
(Bekure 1984: 614). He also discussed problems such as dirty and humid working environments, 
inhospitable temperatures, and the absence of enforcement of safety regulations.  These problems, 
in turn, were found to be aggravated by a lack of proper medical care. 
While the most extreme conditions may have lessened in intensity and frequency over the years, 
concerns over labour conditions are still being raised. The most recent ILO Decent Work Country 
Profile for Ethiopia cites a number of lingering problems. These include poor job quality and 
security; gendered discrimination; the prevalence of child labour; and – in the industrial sector – a 
high and increasing level of occupational injuries (ILO 2013). Compounding this problem, the 
labour inspectorate tasked with enforcing minimum standards suffers from severe capacity 
constraints and staff shortage. Assefa et al. (2016) also describe poor working conditions and 
employment quality in workplaces under study. In the expanding sector of commercial farming, 
Dessalegn (2011) found workers who ‘felt they were unfairly treated, had no job security and 
[were] not infrequently abused’. For female workers, such abuse included physical abuse and 
 
65 Although this figure appears exaggerated it provides an indication of the kind of perceptions that have been dominant 
in the literature.  
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sexual harassment. In the thriving horticultural sector, Hanan's (2011) and Tewodros' (2010) 
findings corroborate these concerns. In addition to the prevalence of outright abuse, they describe 
working conditions in which a number of disquieting practices are prevalent. These include gender 
discrimination, compulsory and uncompensated overtime work, denial of leave rights, arbitrary 
wage deductions and payment delays, poor job security and disregard of legal stipulations, absence 
of sanitary facilities, lack of medical services, harassment and dismissal of trade union leaders, 
and lax safety standards. It is noteworthy that in a sector in which dangerous chemicals are 
prevalent, Tewodros (2010) found a sizeable number of respondents lacking the most basic 
protective clothing. But it is unlikely that outright dangerous labour conditions are confined to the 
horticultural sector. Blattman and Dercon (2016) offer a laundry list of health hazards reported by 
workers from across the diverse workplaces studied, corroborating the impression that the 
prevalence of such hazards constitutes the rule rather than the exception. All the above is taking 
place within an environment in which the government's ‘relaxed attitude towards foreign investors 
regarding labour rights’66 precludes it from consistently enforcing even the minimal legal 
safeguards established. A cavalier attitude towards upholding standards, and lack of enforcement 
of minimum rules and legislation, are consequently problems that have either persisted or 
reappeared through the decades.  
3.3 Wage labour and manufacturing in the Ethiopian political economy 
It has frequently been noted that both the extent of wage employment and the size of the 
manufacturing sector in Ethiopia have been and remain limited. This is essentially true. But at the 
same time, the importance of wage employment and the manufacturing is more important than 
sheer numbers would indicate. It is clear that the prioritised ambition of successive governments 
has been to develop the non-agrarian economy and intensify surplus extraction occurring through 
the wage mechanism. This ambition to develop manufacturing and wage employment is key to 
understand the conflicts that have arisen over wages and over the organisation of the waged 
workforce. It is underpinned by two factors. First – and in the current conjuncture probably less 
important than in the past – it rests on the view that this sector represents the ‘modern’ economy. 
Second, it emerges from the perspective that its dynamic qualities are required to increase 
productivity, close a constantly negative balance of trade, and absorb the surplus labour emerging 
 
66 Dereje Feyissa paraphrased in Dijkstra (2015). 
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from the stagnant agrarian sector. That this is the manner in which successive governments have 
viewed matters can be demonstrated with reference to successive development plans. 
3.3.1 Plans and ambitions 
In the Imperial Ethiopian Government's first Five Year Development Plan covering the years 
between 1957 and 1961, ‘changes in the structure of employment’ were envisaged, with the 
creation of 140 000 non-agrarian jobs – a significant number at the time – forecasted, and ‘the 
most rapid increase of production’ to be attained in industry (IEG 1957: 31). To this end, planned 
investments in manufacturing, mining and electricity dwarfed those in agriculture by a factor of 
3.4 to 1. This sharply contrasts with the number of people employed in the respective sectors at 
the time, where the opposite held true by a ratio of 1 to 47 (IEG 1957: 6, 34)67.  The second five-
year development plan (IEG 1963b) maintained focus on infrastructural development and 
industrial growth. In terms of the agrarian sector, this plan brought about ‘a shift in favour of 
agricultural modernisation… away from smallholder agriculture and in favour of mechanisation’ 
(Dessalegn 2009: 50-51). Reflecting this, monetary investments assigned for commercial 
agriculture were five times higher than those assigned to peasant agriculture. The third and final 
five-year plan under imperial rule retained the bias favouring the manufacturing and wage 
employing sectors. It is notable that while agriculture was accorded primacy in the exposition, it 
was made clear that structural transformation away from agriculture remained ‘a basic objective’ 
of the plan (IEG 1968: 37, 182). Agriculture, despite its size, was assigned only about half of the 
funds assigned to manufacturing (IEG 1968: 50). Within agriculture, furthermore, it was 
commercial agriculture in general – and the waged sector of large-scale commercial farming in 
particular68 – that was assigned the role of the motive force: commercial agricultural was set to 
 
67 If electricity is not included, the investments in manufacturing and mining were 2.3 times those assigned to 
agriculture. There is, however, two reasons to include investments in electricity as essentially geared towards industrial 
development. The first is that the provision of electricity, at the time, was almost entirely confined to urban areas. The 
second, and more important, is that investment in electricity was meant to enable the expansion of manufacturing, 
which was seriously hampered by shortages (IEG 1957: 98). More generally, it was assumed that ‘the improvements 
in basic facilities will attract a larger flow of domestic and foreign capital into the productive sectors of the economy’ 
(IEG 1957: 32). Such basic facilities additionally included investments in transport and communication, a post which 
alone was six times higher than that of agriculture. This post has, however, not been included in the calculation above, 
as it can plausibly be argued that investments in transport and communications – unlike electricity – is as important 
in stimulating markets for agricultural goods as those for manufacturing goods.  
68 Commercial farming was estimated to expand by 12.6 percent (IEG 1968: 201). ‘The rapid development of 
commercial agriculture is the only way to get the relatively quick increase needed in agricultural exports’, the plan 
stated (IEG 1968: 191). It was commercial farming, furthermore, that was to ‘provide the dynamism necessary’ to 
achieve the general agricultural growth goal (IEG 1968: 37).  
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grow at about 5.7 percent annually, while subsistence agriculture was estimated to grow at only 
the rate of 1.8 percent (IEG 1968: 44). Reflecting this order of priorities, large-scale commercial 
farming was assigned six times the budgeted expenditures of peasant farming (IEG 1968: 202). 
The latter was forecasted to grow only at a pace commensurate with population growth, so as not 
to trigger ‘an uncontrolled exodus’ from the sector (IEG 1968: 182). Nevertheless, it was 
manufacturing – estimated to grow at an annual rate of a full 15 percent – that was to produce the 
major source of expansion (IEG 1968: 227). 
The post-revolutionary government retained a similar focus on manufacturing growth and large-
scale mechanised farming as the previous. Its Programme of the National Democratic Revolution 
(PMGE 1976) established the development of industry – ‘a prerequisite for a strong national 
economy’ – and the development of large-scale state-owned farms as prioritised tasks. More 
emphatically put, ‘it is only with industrialisation that a strong and free economy can be built’ the 
chairman of the WPE (Mengistu 1984: 33) stated at the founding congress of the party. In the only 
ten-year plan initiated by the party – which was not to be completed – manufacturing remained a 
top priority. Industry, it stated, ‘as the motive power for achieving economic development, will 
increasingly play a greater and leading role in the national economy’ (PMGSE 1984: 20). Since 
industrial production was rather limited, it was considered ‘imperative that much greater 
investments [was to] be made in this sector’ to ensure that the structural transformation of the 
economy was achieved (PMGSE 1984: 20). Within the time frame of the plan, it was estimated 
that industrial output would nearly triple, while agriculture was only expected to grow at an annual 
rate of 4.3 percent (PMGSE 1984: 24). Again, it was a form of agriculture reliant on wage labour 
that was made key to achieving even that modest figure: that of state farms. To achieve these goals, 
it was planned that between 4.3 and 5.7 billion ETB would be invested in manufacturing during 
the plan period, while 1.3 billion ETB was to be invested in the state farm sector. These figures 
assume meaning and strongly indicate the hierarchy of priorities when compared to the meagre 1.5 
billion ETB that was assigned to crop production in the peasant sub-sector, which encompassed 
the labour of over 80 percent of the population (PMGSE 1984: 37, 61, 74, 69). 
With the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991, there was, initially, a reprioritisation in favour 
of peasant agriculture. This took the form of an agricultural development led-industrialisation 
strategy, in which increasing agrarian incomes were expected to result in increasing rural demand 
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for industrial products. However, that the ultimate goal of this this endogenous and demand-led 
model was manufacturing growth is clear from the name. Over the years, and through consecutive 
national plans69, the goal of achieving structural transformation and industrial growth has taken on 
an increasing level of importance and urgency. This has culminated in the ambition, not only to 
build ‘an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy’ (MoFED 2006: 44) and to 
construct ‘a light manufacturing hub in Africa’ (MoFED 2016: 82), but even for Ethiopia to 
become ‘one of the leaders in overall manufacturing globally’ (MoFED 2016: 78). In practice the 
focus on peasant agriculture and internal demand has given way to an external-oriented 
industrialisation model70, combined with a newfound desire to attract investments in large-scale 
commercial agriculture. 
A factor that unites these aspect of the economic strategy is that their implementation exert 
downward pressure on real wages. In the first instance, the relative appreciation of agrarian prices 
raises the cost of living for wage earners and thus depresses real wages. In the second instance, the 
pressure on wages is direct, as low wages are the means by which low productivity can be offset, 
improving the competitiveness of Ethiopian manufacturing in international markets. That this is 
the manner in which policymakers understand the model can be illustrated by a few examples. 
Take, for example, the statement of the prime minister of the FDRE and chairman of the EPRDF 
that ‘in Ethiopia, to achieve our advantage in light manufacturing, we have kept [labour] costs 
low… we have to start with low-cost, labour intensive and low-technology solutions’ (Mills 2016), 
or his exhortation that ‘this generation has to sacrifice to bring productivity up’ (Jobson and 
Norbrook 2014). What this sacrifice entails is made clear in State Minister Abraham Tekeste's 
avowal that Ethiopians can ‘really save and postpone consumption’71 (Fortin 2016). The most 
explicit and official confirmation of this understanding, however, can be found in the most recent 
overall development plan – the second Growth and Transformation Plan, operational between 
2015 and 2020. It not only notes and vows to take advantage of ‘low wages’ to achieve 
 
69 See MoFED 2002; 2006; 2010; 2016. 
70 According to Arkebe Oqubay (2015: 92), a high level government official, Ethiopian industrial policy is premised 
on an export-led orientation, as derived from the East Asian experience. Arkebe (2015: 84-85) states that in 2012 the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) awarded two-thirds of all loans to the manufacturing sector, and less than a 
quarter to agriculture. This reflects DBE having been ‘brought into line with government priorities’.  
71 Saving, in this context, does not refer to individual bank account savings. Bank deposit rates have systematically 
been set lower than inflation over the last several decades, discouraging such savings. Savings must here instead be 
understood as the generation of investible surpluses, as consumption is ‘postponed’ to future generations. 
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manufacturing growth, but it further sets out that ‘close monitoring’ is required to ensure that ‘real 
wages do not exceed productivity growth’ (MoFED 2016: 106, 138).  
Moving to the second factor underpinning the ambition to develop manufacturing and wage 
employment, the issue of surplus accumulation comes to the fore. From a political-economic 
perspective, it is obvious that increasing surpluses cannot indefinitely be carved out of a peasant 
population cultivating a fixed amount of land. Surplus accumulation on an expanded scale requires 
a more dynamic setting than that. Furthermore, since the land reform of 1975, and the subsequent 
abolishment of the AMC and of required quotas, what surplus is extracted from the peasantry has 
been relaxed. This has ironically, but logically, resulted in in efforts to intensify surplus extraction 
and accumulation from wage labour and in the non-peasant economy – initially under the aegis of 
the state. The programme of the WPE (1984a: 70-71) stated that ‘since the effort to boost domestic 
accumulation in the current context is largely a question of increasing the state budget [and] since 
the major sources of accumulation are the production, distribution and service enterprises under 
state control, appropriate measures will be taken to raise ... their profitability’. In its economic 
guidelines (WPE 1984b: 113-114) it sets the aim to ‘double the rate of capital accumulation’, 
through, among other things, ‘reductions in costs and increases in productivity of public 
enterprises’. The elevated ambition of the current government to ensure that larger surpluses are 
extracted from a developing low-waged manufacturing sector, meanwhile, has already been 
evidenced. 
3.3.2 Outcomes 
Efforts and ambitions aside, however, whether the plans have resulted in successful outcomes is 
another question. Balance of trade data72 implies that the answer in terms of surplus accumulation 
is probably negative. In terms of expansion of the manufacturing sector, and wage labour more 
generally, there have already been some indications as to what the evidence of the trajectory is. It 
is probably not too farfetched to state that the high expectations have generally not been met. 
 
72 The current balance of trade gap, where total export value account for less than 16 percent of imports (Dawit 2016), 
seems to suggest that infusion of external capital – through FDI, loans, remittances, or external aid – is, at the very 
least in the contemporary period, a necessary substitute for the successful generation of surpluses in the domestic 
productive sectors. In this regard, it should be noted that the WPE 's Ten-Year Prospective Plan too was 
overwhelmingly reliant on high levels – 22.7 billion ETB, measuring just over half of total estimated investment 
(PMGSE 1984: 25-26) – of funding expected to be mobilised from foreign sources.  
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Nevertheless, the history of Ethiopian manufacturing and wage employment is one of intermittent, 
slow, yet steady expansion. 
Industrial manufacturing in Ethiopia is, with a few notable exceptions, a post-liberation73 
phenomenon. Although 83 industrial establishment were registered as operational at the end of the 
1940s74 (Eshetu 2004: 33), it was only in the 1950s that the push for industrial development began 
in earnest. Between 1950 and 1957 manufacturing output more than tripled (Eshetu 2004: 35), and 
during the period of the first five-year development plan, which lasted until 1961, it continued to 
grow rapidly. During the period of the second five-year plan, between 1962 and 1968, the size of 
the sector again almost doubled (Assefa and Eshetu 1969: 50). Extensive incentives to foreign and 
local investors, high protective barriers for domestic producers, and large infusions of state 
investment spurred the sector during this phase of expansion. However, constraints soon came to 
limit the expansion, including sharply declining investments and a relatively saturated home 
market. During the period of the third five-year plan, lasting until 1973, the manufacturing growth 
rate declined, from an annual rate of 14.5 percent over the span of the two previous plans to a more 
modest annual pace of 8 percent, and in the year leading up to the revolution it actually reversed 
into decline (Eshetu 2004: 47). In the seventeen years of PMAC/WPE rule that followed, 
manufacturing would continue to grow at a sluggish pace, only increasing in terms of GDP share 
as a result of the catastrophic performance of the agricultural sector. With the coming to power of 
EPRDF in 1991, the sector initially suffered from the removal of protection and relative disfavour, 
and its share in the national economy came to diminish. However, as of the early 2000s, a new 
push for industrial development and search for investible capital has commenced. This has, as 
noted above, come to result in a developmental strategy premised on structural transformation and 
rapid manufacturing growth. Partly reflecting the priority awarded to the sector, investments have 
again began to increase. 
Despite the growing absolute size of the sector measured in output, its share of the value of gross 
domestic production has remained low. In fact, several accounts appear to suggest that its relative 
contribution to GDP has actually decreased over the decades. According to one estimate, 
manufacturing contributed an average of just below ten percent between 1974/75 and 1982/83, out 
 
73 In the Ethiopian context, liberation refers to the 1941 end of Italian occupation. 
74 These generously included flour mills and sawmills. 
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of which medium and large scale enterprises contributed around half (Eshetu 2004: 156). By 1984, 
this figure had reached eleven percent (PMGSE 1984: 11), contracting to eight percent in 1990, 
and seven percent in 2001 (EEA/EEDRI: 2005) In 2014/15, as the government prepared its most 
recent plan to boost the sector, it stood at a meagre 4.8 percent of GDP, most glaringly exposing 
to what limited extent prior plans for the sector have succeeded. 
Potential crippling/retarding factors are too plenty and diverse to be conclusively listed here, but 
some of those which have been most frequently cited over the years (Eshetu 2004; Mulatu and 
Yohannis 1988; World Bank 2015; Arkebe 2015; EEA/EEDRI: 2005) include war; demand-sided 
and supply-sided problems, including the weak demand generated by a poor and subsistence 
producing peasantry and a lack of investible surpluses; a constrained domestic private sector; 
shortage of inputs, weak internal linkages, and over-reliance on imported inputs; lack of skilled 
technical and managerial staff; low productivity and low technological capabilities; poor 
infrastructure; excessive protectionism for prolonged periods; and – curiously for an economy in 
which the abundance of cheap labour is consistently cited as an exploitable endowment – a very 
high level of capital intensity75.  
The composition of the sector has remained fairly stable over the years. Textile, food processing 
and beverages have remained the overwhelmingly largest subsectors. The industries, furthermore, 
have been geographically concentrated to the Addis Ababa – Djibouti railway axis76, in addition 
to Asmara during the period that Eritrea was a province of the country. Ownership patterns, 
meanwhile, have changed over the years. During the imperial regime, a dominant part of the 
manufacturing sector was foreign-owned (Mulatu 1990). This was augmented by a not 
insignificant state-owned sector and a minor domestic private sector. After the nationalisations by 
PMAC, however, the state took over the dominant role, with state-owned enterprises accounting 
for no less than 94.5 percent of both capital and output in 1984 (PMGSE 1984: 63). Privatisation 
of many state-owned enterprises and trickling new private investment flows since the coming to 
 
75 See World Bank (2015: 26), where the Ethiopian manufacturing sector is found to be a full six times as capital 
intensive as that of Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. While the practice of ‘stuffing’ manufacturing enterprises during the 
PMAC/WPE period slightly reduced relative capital intensity, this has constituted a persistent feature of the sector, 
probably, in part, arising from an incentive structure oddly favouring the import and deployment of capital goods. 
76 In fact, along this axis, industries developed almost exclusively in and around one cluster stretching south from 
Addis Ababa to the nearby city of Nazret (contemporary Adama) and one cluster around the railway hub city Dire 
Dawa. 
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power of EPRDF has reverted the structure into one in which private77 ownership is again 
dominant, and foreign ownership increasingly important. A not insignificant part of the sector, 
however, remains under state ownership. 
3.3.3 The wage workers 
Employment numbers reflect the slow, uneven, but continuous growth of the manufacturing sector. 
CSA78 data suggests the development from a baseline of 15 000 workers employed in 
manufacturing in 1955; to 33 000 in 1963; 49 000 in 1968; 59 000 in 1975; 91 000 in 1985; 90 
000 in 1995; 118 000 in 2005; and 173 000 in 2010. It should be noted, with regards to these 
numbers, that the rapid increase between 1975 and 1985 can be attributed to the practice of 
‘stuffing’79 during the PMAC/WPE period. The stagnation in the ten years that followed 1985 can 
be attributed to retrenchments and hiring hiatus associated with, first, attempt to cut costs and boost 
profitability during the late PMAC/WPE period and early EPRDF period, and, second, with 
privatisation in the early 1990s. Furthermore, it should be added that while Eritrea, a relatively 
densely populated and economically advanced region, was included in the statistics from the 1950s 
onwards, its contribution was removed in the early 1990s, as the former province gained 
independence. Finally, it is important to recognise that the figures above pertains only to the 
manufacturing subsector of industrial employment, which additionally includes the larger 
subsector of construction and that of mining. The expansion of manufacturing employment in the 
last ten years, however, seems to constitute a break with the pattern of sluggish growth. In 2014/15 
the number of employed reached 380 000, and within the current Growth and Transformation Plan 
II, it is envisaged to grow to encompass 758 000 workers in 2019/20 (MoFED 2016: 138).  
Not all wage work, of course, takes place in the manufacturing sector. In Ethiopia, public 
employment in the non-productive sectors – civil service, military, police etc. – has always 
constituted the lion's share of such employment. The service sector is also a notable source of wage 
employment, and as has been indicated in the above, agricultural labour, including that in 
commercial agriculture, has constituted another major source. Where commercial agriculture ends 
 
77 This includes a number of endowment funds established by constituent EPRDF parties. 
78 Compiled from the range of Statistical Abstract published annually (for some years biannually) by Ethiopia's Central 
Statistical Agency since 1963. 
79 See Mulatu (1990), who probably coined the term, referring to the expansion of employment in order to meet social 
ends rather than productivity targets. The term, accidental or not, appears more appropriate than the term 
‘overstaffing’, which indicates that there is a given appropriate level.  
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and agro-industry begins is not clearly demarcated. Nevertheless, some indicative figures can serve 
to illustrate the magnitude of employment within this sector too. Dessalegn (2009: 92), for 
example, estimates that during peak seasons a full 125 000 workers were employed on commercial 
farms and plantations in the Awash Valley alone in the early 1970s, although all may not have 
been paid monetary wages. It is equally difficult to disaggregate the estimate of the 350 000 people 
thought to have been employed in mechanised agriculture between owner/farmers, out-growers 
and paid labourers (Dessalegn 2009: 97-98), but it serves to illuminate the size of the workforce 
in the sector. During the PMAC/WPE era in particular, this source of employment was largely 
replaced by state farms. In 1985 such farms employed 85 000 people, including seasonal workers 
(Gebru 1995: 273). The total number of people engaged in wage work has not been consistently 
measured. But here too a trajectory of slow, fluctuating, but recently accelerating pace of growth 
is discernible80. Its most recent spurt has seen the CSA figure of waged employees grow from 2.5 
million to 4.3 million between 2005 and 2013 alone. 
The social make-up of the waged workforce is as diverse as the multinational polity. However, 
early wage labour was most enthusiastically taken up by populations from the south-western part 
of the country where population density and land alienation had created a larger pool of available 
labour, and where tax and tribute demands had made cash incomes needed. For this reason, wage 
labour was early on associated with nationalities such as the Gurage, Sidama, Kambata, Welayta, 
and Oromo. This was reinforced by a deep-rooted cultural aversion to non-agrarian and non-
military labour among the northern ‘core’ nationalities, and the particular geographic pattern of 
capitalist penetration81 (Killion 1985; Pankhurst 1968). Over time, however, the significance of 
this factor receded. Contemporary wage labour is extensively mobilised from all national groups82. 
Because of past geographical concentration of schools, discriminatory practices and resultant 
differences in educational attainment, managerial staff has disproportionally tended to be recruited 
from the northern nationalities and from the former central province of Shoa. With the expansion 
 
80 The outlines of this trajectory has been sketched in Admasie (2015). 
81 ‘The geographical proximity of various ethnic groups to areas of urban and industrial development was crucial in 
establishing specific patterns of working class recruitment’ Killion (1985: 142) has written. ‘Before… 1935 almost 
all capitalist investments in the region occurred outside of the Abyssinian highlands. In this way, the impact of the 
imperial conquest on workers' recruitment from the conquered territories was reinforced by the pattern of capitalist 
penetration’. 
82 The possible exception here may be the inhabitants of the FDRE's ‘emerging’ regional states and the predominantly 
pastoral nationalities. Their proportionally lesser engagement in manufacturing, at the very least, could plausibly be 
explained by the meagre amount of manufacturing establishments located in those regional states. 
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of the educational system, and the abatement of discrimination there are reasons to assume that 
this tendency too has receded in importance. Finally, a gendered division of labour is evident 
within the wage labouring population. In the textile manufacturing and horticultural sectors for 
example, this is evidenced by a pre-dominant female workforce, but a predominantly male 
managerial staff. 
So far only a schematic discussion on the political-economic context has been undertaken. Only 
the size and contours of the make-up, moreover, of the waged workforce has been discussed. To 
understand the position of wage labour within the Ethiopian political economy, a number of other 
factors must be discussed in more detail, including that of the agency of workers. In the next 
chapters, it is this agency that is the subject of attention.  
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4. Organisation, movement and orientation: first cycle 
In this chapter a first cycle of contested advance and retreat of the Ethiopian labour movement, 
and a correspondent growth and decline in the assertiveness of its orientation, is discussed and 
analysed. This cycle stretches over a period ranging from the early 1960s – when the movement 
emerged as a country-wide force – to the end of the 1970s. It includes the conjuncture that resulted 
in the Ethiopian revolution, breaking out in 1974, and its aftermath in the years that followed. The 
chapter consists of two overarching parts. The most extensive part, covering the first six sections, 
consists of a chronological exposition, where special attention is paid to key conjunctures. This 
discussion is based on data from a number of primary sources, complemented by references to the 
secondary literature. Throughout the exposition factors that that were conducive or constraining to 
the growth of assertiveness constitute areas of attention. However, these factors are discussed and 
analysed in more detail and in a cross-temporal manner in the last two sections. 
4.1 Emergence and early times 
The Ethiopian labour movement emerged around the break between the 1950s and 1960s, 
stimulated by a number of factors. Railway workers of the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer Franco-
Ethiopien (CFE), who operated the Djibouti-Addis Ababa line, had been the first to organise. 
European workers of the company, with prior experience of organisation had set up a first workers' 
organisation and staged strikes in the years immediately following the First World War. But it was 
only in the aftermath of Italian occupation that Ethiopian workers came to play a leading role, and 
in 1947 CFE workers staged the first large-scale Ethiopian-led strike. Another early stimuli came 
from dock- and maritime workers in the port of Djibouti, who established a number of 
organisations and engaged in collective action and bargaining. The organised workers on the 
Djiboutian section of the railroad – which was separately administered from the Ethiopian section 
– won concessions that significantly improved their conditions compared to those of the workers 
on the Ethiopian section of the line, demonstrating the potential benefits of labour movementism. 
However, of more direct importance for the emergence of the Ethiopian labour movement was the 
experience of trade unionism in Eritrea, a territory which was federated with – and later 
incorporated into – the Ethiopian Empire in 1952. Prior to the federation, the British military 
administration of the territory passed a relatively generous labour law permitting workers to 
organise. Owing to guarantees offered at the time of incorporation, this law was initially respected 
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by the Ethiopian government, and organised labour, while banned in Ethiopia proper, continued 
to be permitted in Eritrea. The Eritrean labour movement was relatively small and urban. By 1958 
the Confederation of Free Eritrean Labour Unions (CFELU) incorporated some 10 000 workers 
(Stutz 1967: 112). However, although grudgingly tolerated, Ethiopian authorities were uneasy with 
its existence, which threatened to spark both imitative practices among workers in Ethiopia proper 
and centrifugal political mobilisation in Eritrea. The emerging link between Eritrean and Ethiopian 
workers at this conjuncture, and the inspiration the former exercised on the latter, can be illustrated 
by the manner in which a strike of Eritrean dockworkers in Massawa and Assab in 1954 was 
immediately followed by a strike of Ethiopian workers on the Ethio-Djiboutian railway. In 1958 
the situation in Eritrea came to a head when the CFELU staged a general strike. Repression 
followed, claiming the lives of ‘scores’ of strikers and protesters (Killion 1985: 378)83. In the 
aftermath the confederation was banned and its offices closed. Although the organisational 
structures were thus rendered defunct, the ideas propelling collective organisation had taken root 
among Eritrean workers. By means of inspiration and social intercourse those ideas were to spread 
further south. Meanwhile, southward labour migration, particularly in the waged sectors where 
labour movementism in Ethiopia proper was about to emerge in earnest, provided the emerging 
Ethiopian labour movement with an infusion of workers with organisational experience.  
By the end of the 1950s, the objective conditions for the emergence of an Ethiopian labour 
movement had ripened, as developmental efforts had created a mass of wage labourers capable of 
sustaining an economy-wide movement. The conditions under which these workers entered wage 
employment created immediate frictions. Meanwhile, local initiatives reinforced external stimuli 
in indicating the feasibility of collective action. Mutual aid associations in urban areas – iddirs – 
had for decades been a feature among the emerging urban populations in Ethiopia. These 
organisations, however, were generally limited in scope to providing assistance to its members in 
times of extraordinary stress – most typically in the organisation of burials. In the 1940s and 1950s, 
however, workplace iddirs began to be formed by industrial workers in a number of establishments 
(Killion 1985: 441-448). The scope of activities of the early workers' associations was limited to 
collective self-help and petitioning. Yet, in autonomously organising workers they carried the seed 
of what was to evolve into the Ethiopian labour movement. Initial attempts to sway the workplace 
 
83 The official figure of casualties was, according to the same author (1985: 379), 535 wounded and 9 killed. 
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power balance included ‘many instances where workers simply joined together and, with a flag 
waving, marched to the palace to submit their petition in the form of complaints’ (Syoum 2005: 
17).  Eventually, and where the conditions permitted, workers' associations turned into unions in 
all but name, and some of them – such as that at the HVA Wonji-Shoa sugar factory – came to 
stage successful strikes. This, in turn, propelled an intensified process where associations ‘sprouted 
up all over the empire’ (Syoum 2005: 27). With the genie out of the bottle, workers' associations 
multiplied, and strikes – hitherto a very rare and limited phenomenon – became frequent.  
Meanwhile, a cooperative forum for workers associations around Addis Ababa had been formed 
under the auspices of the workers' association of the Ethio-fibre Factory, and its chairman Aberra 
Gemu. In 1962, this forum was to form an umbrella organisation comprising twenty workers' 
association – the Ethiopian Labour Union (ELU). Although there was no a legal basis for its 
registration, and its application for registration therefore ignored84, the existence of an emerging 
centre was tolerated by the imperial government as the lesser of evils. A high imperial official 
would tell a visiting representative of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) that the government was aware of the ‘growing agitations among the workers who had 
staged several down-tools and walk-out actions recently’. The official disclosed that a ‘good 
number’ of workers' organisations had already been established, and that ‘some of them had 
already started creating trouble with employers’, including strikes. This concern, he admitted, was 
magnified by the fact that ‘workers went on strike without [first] discussing with the employers 
their grievances’, and by a fear that ‘communist elements’ existed among the workers. Another 
high official of the Ministry of National Community Development's (MNCD) Labour Department 
concurred that ‘the existing workers organisations were now growing into restless movements’. 
Because the government ‘was worried about the possible consequences of such illegal and 
“unwarranted” actions’, the ICFTU representative reported, it would speed up the passing of 
legislation regulating the formation and operation of trade unions. ‘The problem of establishing 
trade unions and grievance and negotiating machineries had become acute and the government 
was eager to get things done as quickly as possible’, the ICFTU representative concluded (Claverie 
 
84 ‘The essence of your request is equality of master and servant’, a letter from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(which, according to the 1944 Factories Proclamation, was the body responsible for industrial relations) stated 
dismissively (Zack 1967). Stutz (1967: 37), however, claims that the Ministry of Interior accepted the application for 
registration, but he seems to be alone in suggesting this. Whichever way, its existence was now tolerated if not 
explicitly recognised. 
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1962a). The legalisation of trade unionism in Ethiopia was thus precipitated by urgent pressures 
asserted by the emergent labour movement, and its permission was based on the expressed 
calculation that official trade unionism would stem the growing level of restiveness. 
The heightened activity among workers and ‘the growing number of industrial disputes’ (Zack 
1967), was reinforced by external pressures in convincing the state of the implausibility of ignoring 
the problem. In most newly independent African states, trade unions were not only permitted, but 
often important allies of ruling parties. As Addis Ababa was the selected capital of the Organisation 
of African Unity, and as Ethiopia was a member of the ILO, the absence of a national trade union 
centre posed a problem to the international image the imperial government wanted to project. 
Internally, moreover, a 1960 coup attempt had exposed the political fragility of the imperial 
regime, and made it more susceptible to pressure in favour of liberalisation. These factors 
reinforced the pressure from workers to force a change in official attitude, and a labour 
proclamation was finally issued in 1962. The proclamation permitted the registration of unions 
and in March 1963 the Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) was formed. 
Right from the outset, the emergent movement was beset by a number of problems. As noted in 
the previous chapter, the labour proclamation barred large sections of the workforce from 
organising, including agricultural workers and civil servants. Meanwhile, the effective ban on 
unionism in Eritrea remained in force until 1966. Funds, moreover, were scarce, especially in terms 
of what unions could afford to share with the national centre. Size was another constraining factor. 
It was a relatively small confederation that came into existence: only 15 000 workers were 
members in in April 1963 (Emmanuel 1977: 65). However, this did not prevent the imperial state 
from closely monitoring the movement, and enforcing control at the level it was most cost-
effective: the central leadership. 
The limits to CELU's autonomy were soon to be demarcated by the state. Within a year of its 
formation, the leadership – headed by HVA labour leader Abraham Mekonnen – had become 
impatient with the lack of progress in addressing concerns it had raised. Such concerns included 
the state’s failure to safeguard rights established in the labour proclamation, the disregard for 
persistent harassment and dismissals of union representatives85, and the increasing backlog of 
 
85 Killion (1985: 465) discusses the repression of a number of unions in the intervening time. 
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matters referred to the Labour Relations Board (LRB), which meant that workers whose rights had 
been violated were left indefinitely suspended. In order to force a resolution of these problems, 
CELU threatened to call a general strike. This constituted an intolerable act of insubordination, 
and the imperial government immediately moved to force a change in leadership, threatening the 
dissolution of the young confederation (Robinson 1963). As a result, Abraham Mekonnen resigned 
and Aberra Gemu was found shot to death86. According to confidential government 
communication to the ICFTU, the importance attached to having Abraham Mekonnen removed 
was not only motivated by his role in the strike threat. Rather, he was also accused of having 
contacts with ‘various Eastern countries’, and had discussed funding a literacy campaign with 
Soviet and Yugoslav officials (Robinson 1963). Whatever the precise reasons prompting the purge, 
‘the illusion of CELU's autonomy was destroyed’ (Killion 1985: 467-468). From this point on, 
Dessalegn (2002: 114) has argued, ‘the leadership knew that the threat of violent suppression was 
always hanging over its head’, as the imperial government continued to keep a watchful eye over 
its activities. 
While the strike threat had notified both the government and workers of the movement's potential 
power, in the process attracting new members (Zack 1965: 36), it had come at a price. It was a 
deferential leadership that replaced Abraham Mekonnen's, careful about retaining amicable 
relations with the state and employers. Indeed, many years later a Federation of Ethiopian 
Employers (FEE) official could congratulate the federation on ‘always [having] enjoyed excellent 
relationships and understanding with both the government and CELU’ (Syoum 2005: 83). Heading 
CELU's new leadership was Beyene Solomon, a unionist and former shoe factory worker from 
Eritrea, who represented no constituent union of CELU. Beyene surrounded himself with a number 
of freshly graduated staff members, from whom several were eventually brought into top 
leadership position in the confederation. Much like Beyene they represented no basic unions, but 
unlike him they also had no real experience of being wage workers. It has been alleged – even by 
sympathetic observers – that these staffers had little contact with workers, but aimed ‘only to 
develop a new labour profession’, and ‘tended to use their positions within CELU as a spring board 
for career development’ (Syoum 2005: 64; Seleshi 1979: 689, 698). These allegations would 
repeatedly be asserted in the conflicts that developed within CELU. Because CELU employees 
 
86 Whether Aberra Gemu was assassinated or committed suicide has been a matter of debate. In Killion's (1985: 467) 
assessment ‘the cause of his death was state repression’, either way. 
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were initially banned from standing for election, however, the confederation's statures had to be 
revised to permit their eventual elevation, and as Beyene and his staffers' influence increased they 
were amended accordingly. 
CELU's new leaders enjoyed a level of official tolerance that had eluded their predecessors and 
they earned it by supressing radical impulses within the movement. The machinations that the 
leadership was ready to employ to this end is illustrated by Beyene's criticism of Abraham 
Mekonnen's decision to allow a vote on the 1963 strike threat: despite a majority of workers' 
representatives supporting it, Beyene had, self-admittedly, preferred to reject the issue on 
procedural grounds, or subvert with delaying tactics. Abraham, Beyene (2010: 72) stated, ‘should 
have handled the matter more delicately… he was in error when he asked all workers for a vote 
[and] could have easily evaded the problem by saying that he needed to study the complaint first 
or something to that effect’. Such stalling tactics and procedural manipulation would be employed 
whenever the leadership was seriously challenged. But through its deferentialism, and the 
bureaucratic subversions it deployed, the leadership ‘alienated a significant [section] of the 
workers’, and eventually came to cause ‘a rift in the Ethiopian labour movement’ (Emmanuel 
1977: 66-67). 
4.2 External influences and the emergence of a labour bureaucracy 
The new leadership was rewarded for its efforts with a number of perks that came with holding 
high office. ICFTU documents reveal that as early as 1963, the monthly salary of the CELU 
president was 600 Ethiopian Birr (ETB)87, while that of the general secretary was 450 ETB88 
(Robinson 1963). This amounted to a yearly salary of a very well-paid worker89. In his 
 
87 While Ethiopian currency has been known as Birr in Amharic since its introduction, it was translated as Ethiopian 
Dollars until 1975, when ETB was adopted as its name in English too. Since the Ethiopian Dollar was shifted to Birr 
at an equal rate, and for the purpose of simplification, the abbreviation ETB is used throughout this text. 
88 In a report by ICFTU representative Robinson (1963) it is stated that ‘the president and general secretary agreed to 
draw only one-half of their salaries until the Confederation is in a better financial position’. However, only a few 
months later, this commitment was omitted from a funding requests (Beyene 1963b). In fact, the monthly salary of 
the president had now been increased to 650 ETB. In addition, a dozen other salaries are mentioned in 1964, including 
monthly 400 to an education officer; 300 to an organiser; and 300 to a typist (Becu 1964). The size of this 
representative and non-representative layer of relatively well-paid FTOs and staffers was only to continue to increase 
in the decade that followed. By 1965 the number of FTOs had reached four, and the number of officials had reached 
six, and in November of that year, at least 13 paid positions are mentioned (CELU 1965). At the ninth anniversary of 
the organisation, Beyene (1972) reported no less than 50 ‘permanent employees and advisors’, in addition to the FTOs. 
89 In fact, a monthly wage of 25-30 Ethiopian Birr was not uncommon to workers at the time. See Chapter 6 for a 
discussion on average wages. 
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autobiography, Beyene (2010: 174) mentions having possessed a villa, two cars, a film projector, 
and a gun during the time of his incumbency. This would have put his income far beyond the range 
of the earnings of regular workers at the time. Indeed, by the time the leadership was ousted, 
Beyene and his closest lieutenant Fissehatsion Tekie each had a regular salary from CELU over 
fourteen times as high as that of some regular staff employed by the confederation (CELU 1974c). 
And the salary constituted only one aspect of the many perks available90. The ICFTU archives 
contains uncountable invitations for and requests from CELU's top officials to visit the ICFTU and 
its member federations in Europe and America, as well as funding opportunities for studies and 
training programmes abroad – with generous per diem payments. These opportunities were clearly 
quite attractive – in the ICFTU representative's assessment, high CELU officials displayed an 
‘eagerness to get every possible chance to travel abroad’91 (Kindström 1967b). However, in 
addition to such material incentives, social elevation was another aspect of occupying high 
positions within the labour movement. In his memoirs Beyene (2010) recounts of rubbing 
shoulders with ministers, international officialdom, ambassadors, and the economic elite of 
Ethiopian society of the time. Beyene and CELU's General Secretary Fissehatsion Tekie also came 
to occupy senior official positions in ICFTU's African Regional Organisation, and Beyene was 
made a board member and vice president of ICFTU, and a deputy to the ILO Governing Body 
(Voice of Labour 1973a: 29). The manner in which top CELU officials had been co-opted into an 
elite circle of international labour officialdom was also made evident by their treatment after their 
eventual ouster. 
Right from the beginning, then, the top office-holders of the Ethiopian labour movement were 
subject to external influence. For its first long decade, such influence mainly came from the 
western-aligned and anti-communist international trade union movement, embodied in the ICFTU. 
Early influence can be illustrated by the fact that CELU's first constitution was drafted by ICFTU 
affiliates before CELU's founding conference, and that this conference was held immediately after 
and in the same venue as a preparatory training workshop organised by the latter (Killion 1986: 
 
90 According to former CELU employee Emmanuel Fayessa Negassa (1983, interview with Tom Killion), other carrots 
extended by the government included duty free privileges and funded ‘travel at will’. But it also included sticks, in 
terms of threat and surveillance. Emmanuel further claims that government stipends for salaries to CELU constituted 
another control mechanism, but notes that the CELU leaders were unwilling to admit this. 
91 Attractive opportunities to travel abroad was used in order to reward loyalists and punish unionist deemed disloyal. 
According to CELU's oppositional movement ‘cronies’ and people without connection to the labour movement were 
sent abroad due to this practice (Disaffiliated unions 1973). 
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460; Syoum 2005: 50-53). In fact, ICFTU representatives were so certain of their leverage that 
they could dictate provisions in CELU's constitution that ‘should’ be included (ICFTU 1963; 
Nedzynski 1963b). CELU applied for affiliation with ICFTU immediately after its establishment, 
and it became a full affiliate on January 1, 1964.  
For CELU, relations with ICFTU provided access to funds, transfers of skills, and an international 
affiliation that could provide a certain level of protection against state encroachment. Financial 
support was particularly important considering CELU's poor internal finances (Voice of Labour 
1970: 17; Seleshi 1970: 689). CELU's leadership, moreover, was apt at exploiting funds provided 
by the ICFTU and allies to its best advantage. However, CELU came to grow more dependent on 
the ICFTU than what the latter was comfortable with. At the outset of the relationship the assistant 
general secretary of ICFTU had written that ‘it is hoped that we can avoid, as a matter of principle, 
the payment of officers' salaries and rent’, as ‘our payment of officers' salaries interrupts [the 
development of good trade unionists] and thus, in many cases would provide a trade union elite 
whom, in the final analysis may not have the support of the workers’ (Nedzynski 1963a). These 
concerns, however prescient they proved to be, were soon expediently overlooked in the face of 
pressing needs and innumerable requests for assistance from Addis Ababa. Not only was 
responsibility for the salaries of the leadership, support staff and field staff accepted, but an annual 
grant from the ICFTU International Solidarity Fund (ISF) was regularised. Between 1964 and 
1970, this did not amount to less than 16 00 US Dollars per year, before tailing to 10 000 in 1971, 
11 000 in 1972, 6 000 in 1973, and 3 500 in 197492. In addition to such support, CELU managed 
to acquire substantial additional funds for organisational efforts and literacy campaigns, purchase 
of vehicles and property, and contingent expenses of all sorts. The ICFTU was not alone in 
supporting CELU financially, but a host of other international allies in the ‘free’ trade union 
movement that clustered in Addis Ababa provided additional assistance, including the AFL-CIO 
affiliated African-American Labor Centre (AALC) the Danish Landsorganisationen, and, for 
some time, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The AALC, for example, funded the construction 
of a new headquarter building. Upon leaving the country in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution, 
its representative reported that it had expended no less than 1 600 000 US Dollars supporting 
CELU over the previous decade (Kailembo 1974). To get a flavour of the relative importance of 
 
92 These figures are taken from the yearly ISF allocation decisions, available in the ICFTU archives. 
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such funding, CELU's statement of income, expenditure and balance for 1969 shows that out of a 
total income of 140 000 Ethiopian Dollars, 38 000 originated from ICFTU assistance, 54 000 from 
the AALC, and only 47 000 – quite precisely a third – consisted of funds generated by CELU itself 
(CELU 1969). This did not prevent CELU from submitting annual requests much in abundance of 
the regularised ICFTU contribution, and to voice indignation when these were not fully met (de 
Jonge 1964). 
The administration of support funds left a lot of leeway. So, for instance, could Beyene informally 
ask the ICFTU representative for disbursement of ISF funds for an opaque project he was 
personally leading in Eritrea, without clarifying the nature of expenses (Kindström 1966b). Neither 
the CELU board nor the ICFTU had been informed about the costs, nor received ‘any real 
information about his activity in Eritrea’ the ICFTU representative reported. On noticing hesitation 
Beyene explained that his reason ‘for not giving clear information to the members of the CELU 
board of his work in Eritrea was that some board members were against any activity in Eritrea’. In 
another instance Beyene argued that ‘he would rather use the monthly ETB 1000 to help [former 
president Abraham Makonnen]’ than the organisational support it was intended for. Although the 
latter suggestion was not met with approval of the funders, they nevertheless stepped in and 
awarded an extra contribution to meet Beyene's demands (de Jonge 1964). The lack of 
transparency in the usage of funds was not confined to the top level, but was an issue that caused 
problems and frictions throughout structures of the labour movement. Many of the conflicts that 
developed within CELU – from the central level to that of constituent unions – were marked by 
allegations of improper use of funds. 
ICFTU support came at another cost.  In return for its assistance, ICFTU demanded an unflinching 
commitment to anti-radicalism, and a level of exclusivity that permitted no contacts whatsoever 
with the federations organised in the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In fact, archival 
documents make it abundantly clear how the ICFTU, the AALC, and its allies viewed their 
engagement with CELU as ‘extremely important’ in assuring that the Ethiopian labour movement 
‘does not follow the course of our “eastern competitors”’ (Schirrmacher 1961; ICFTU 1962). ‘The 
urgency’, wrote ICFTU General Secretary Omer Becu to the president of AFL-CIO in 1964, ‘lies 
also in the fact that the very success so far of CELU has attracted the notice of communist 
embassies and other anti-free trade union forces, who are only too eager to gain a foothold within 
85 
 
CELU’. The role of ICFTU and AFL-CIO, he argued, was ‘to bar the way’ to such forces. ‘I have 
been vigilant in watching the prime factors in the trade union movement whether they have any 
underground truck with direct or indirect totalitarian forces’, reported ICFTU representative 
Ramanjuam in 1963, reflecting this order of priorities. 
The mechanisms by which adherence to ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ trade unionism – meaning anti-
communist, ICFTU-affiliated, anti-radical business unionism – was policed included continuous 
supervision. Lennart Kindström, the ICFTU representative to Ethiopia, was stationed within the 
offices of CELU (Beyene 2010: 85), from where he could closely follow the confederation's 
operations and its officers' movements. His correspondence reveals a great deal about the 
relationship between CELU, ICFTU and the rest of the ‘free’ trade union movement. Travels of 
CELU leaders to ‘suspect’ countries and contacts with trade unionists from outside the ‘free’ trade 
union movement was monitored, reported, and constituted a source of repeated exasperation 
among ICFTU representatives and officials. In 1966, for example, having been informed that 
CELU's secretary general had attended and given a speech at a WFTU meeting in Budapest, the 
ICFTU representative in Ethiopia was ordered to intervene. In response, Kindström (1967b) 
disparagingly wrote that ‘the CELU people do not really understand politics’, and were acting out 
of perceptions that it would be impolite not to accept invitations. Nevertheless, he arranged a 
meeting with the leadership to communicate the unacceptability of having done so. 
On hearing about the arrival of a Soviet trade union delegation to Ethiopia on another occasion, 
ICFTU General Secretary Omar Becu (1966) wrote to its local representative demanding that ‘you 
take immediate initiative [for a] common approach among free trade union representatives to make 
clear to CELU [the] consequences of accepting aid from elsewhere’, adding that he was ‘expecting 
firmness in handling this situation’. The ICFTU representative in Addis Ababa reported back that 
he had assembled the representatives of FES, Danish Landsorganisationen, and called on the 
advice of AALC. Presenting a joint front of financiers they called CELU's president and secretary 
general to a meeting, of which he gave the following account (Kindström 1967a): 
In the discussions my colleagues and myself were blaming both [Beyene] Solomon 
and [Fissehatsion] Tekie very hard [for] their action. Brother Tekie said that if he 
had known our serious reaction he should not [have] arranged this visit without 
consulting us first. That gave us the opportunity to tell him that he always is 
unwilling to inform and consult us of his dealing with CELU affairs. For instance; 
of his going to Dakar we [were] informed just a few days before his departure but 
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no one told about his intended trip to Europe after the Dakar Conference. That 
Brother Tekie had been to Budapest I got knowledge of by the cable from you. I 
told Brother Tekie that I knew of his visit to Budapest and asked him where else he 
had been and he told that he had been even to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 
I have had several private talks in this matter with Brother Solomon, and he has 
told me for sure that CELU is not going to accept any aid from the Russians. 
Having proceeded to discuss the matter with representatives of the MNCD and received the latter's 
assurances that the government would not allow any aid from the Soviet Union to CELU in 
whichever case, the ICFTU representative laid the matter to rest for the time being. The records 
thus indicates how the ICFTU and its allies demanded that CELU report on all its operations, and 
reserved the right to decide on matters of whom and where CELU officers could meet or go. But 
despite CELU repeatedly bowing to pressure and acceding to ICFTU demands, the records also 
show that such high-handed interference bred resentment and provoked attempts to circumvent it 
through rather innocuous and sporadic contacts with WFTU parties, while often, as testified to in 
the above, trying to conceal these from the ICFTU93. Another ‘serious complication’ thus 
developed when the ICFTU assistant general secretary attended the 1970 CELU anniversary 
celebrations and noticed the presence of two representatives of the Soviet trade union centre. This 
is how he reported it (Paladino 1970): 
I officially protested the presence of the WFTU and reminded CELU officers… 
that since I was obliged to report to the general secretary and the Executive 
Board on my representation to the Conference, that I would require explanations 
on CELU's invitation to the WFTU. The explanations which were given were of 
a make-shift nature and contradictory. The CELU officers finally resorted to the 
implication that the WFTU had been invited as a result of Government pressure. 
When I offered to discuss this directly with the Government and the Emperor if 
necessary, this argument was withdrawn. 
Most of us who witnessed the activities of CELU officers and their treatment of 
the Russian and WFTU representatives during these days concluded that the 
decision to invite the WFTU was one calculated to balance the impression that 
CELU was heavily dependent on the family of free trade unions; that the 
invitation was manoeuvred by the secretariat officers of CELU, aided and abetted 
by the inability of the CELU president, Beyene Solomon, to cope with the 
situation.  
I advised CELU officers that the ICFTU would look sternly on any continuous 
relationship of the CELU with the WFTU, and that the CELU would have to be 
 
93 ‘CELU officers always try to keep secret for me their connections with the trade unions in communist countries as 
I am an adversary of it’, Kindström (1968) wrote home to the ICFTU. 
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judged in the future by its acts as by its stated intentions. In my discussions with 
our representatives Kindström and Kanyago, I left instructions that from now on 
they would have to deal with CELU with a stronger hand. They agreed that the 
policy of caution which has been employed during the formative years of CELU 
would now have to be abandoned for more positive guidance 
In other words, responding to a token gesture of simulating autonomy on the part of CELU, the 
ICFTU determined that the exercise of even stricter control was warranted. In light of CELU's 
heavy reliance on ICFTU funds, this determination came with traction. Assistance from ICFTU 
and the international ‘free’ trade union movement thus came with another major constriction of 
autonomy. To make matters worse the ICFTU struck up a close working relationship with the 
imperial state, and was granted access to its highest offices including that of the emperor (Claverie 
1960). Any radical impulse would now be caught between and checked by, on the one hand and 
internally, a moderate leadership, and on the other hand and externally, an international trade union 
movement and the imperial state, working under close mutual understanding. 
4.3 Achievements and obstacles 
The training of union leaders was a task that the CELU leadership and its international allies took 
very seriously. Rather than merely a capacity-building exercise, such training included a crucial 
controlling/domesticating aspect in that it inculcated perceptions of the type of unionism deemed 
legitimate by CELU's leadership and its allies: business unionism. An example of this reasoning 
is found in the archives of the ICFTU. Reporting on ‘a serious wild cat strike in the course of 
which violence occurred’, a West German labour advisor at the MNCD wrote that ‘fortunately, it 
could be proved that in the pertinent undertaking no union activities whatsoever had been started 
before’. From this, he wrote, the conviction that ‘education is primordial’ had been reinforced 
(Graf von Baudissin 1963a). 
The concern with preventing strike activity continued to motivate the provision of training. In the 
aftermath of the 1963 general strike threat the same MNCD labour advisor wrote disquietedly that 
‘although the danger’ of a national strike had been overcome – and an, in his mind, entirely positive 
purge of the leadership had been achieved – there was now an urgent need to promote ‘better co-
ordination, cooperation with educational and other agencies and practical advice’. To this end the 
advisor urged the ICFTU to step in and provide assistance ‘immediately’, for, he stated ‘we cannot 
afford to leave the Ethiopian labour leaders alone for any longer period which would lead only to 
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a repetition of past frustration and even radicalisation’ (Graf von Baudissin 1963b). In 1966, 
moreover, ICFTU representative Kindström (1966a) reported having been able to make use of a 
volatile situation – widespread unrest had led the EEF to call for government intervention – to 
convince the CELU leadership of the importance of conducting more intensive training of local 
union leaders. Neglect of education, he wrote, was ‘in all simplicity the big reason to most of the 
trouble and grievances we are now afflicted with’. Labour unrest, in other words, was considered 
merely an expression of ignorance of essential trade union values and principles, for which a 
healthy dose of training and education, inculcating these values and principles, would constitute 
the most effective antidote. 
It has been claimed that prior to the 1974 ‘the whole energy of the confederation was absorbed in 
arranging training seminars for trade union leaders’ (Teketel 1983: 13). By 1972 no less than 85 
training seminars had been held with 2 923 workers' representatives across the country, and 148 
educational film screenings had been held for 62 184 workers (CELU 1972). Retaining this focus 
on training, CELU conducted a range of other activities. The confederation rendered legal and 
practical services to unions, assisted in collective bargaining efforts, negotiated disputes between 
local unions and employers94, supported unions engaged in legal wranglings, and published the 
newspaper Voice of Labour. Basic unions supported by CELU, furthermore, engaged in activities 
that reflected the origin of the Ethiopian labour movement in workers' self-help associations. Such 
activities included revenue-raising activities, the organisation of consumer and credit cooperatives, 
charitable and welfare efforts that included a major literacy campaign, provision of unemployment 
benefits, the organisation of sports and entertainment, and vocational training (Graf von Baudissin 
1964: 564-565; Voice of Labour 1973b: 30). 
Despite the curtailment of its autonomy and the increasing separation of the leadership from the 
rank-and-file, the Ethiopian labour movement continued to make progress over the 1960s and early 
1970s. Between 1963 and 1965 CELU affiliated unions had grown from 29 to 42; to reach 104 in 
1966; 201 in March 1974; and 225 a year later. Membership, meanwhile had tripled from 10 000 
 
94 Negotiation and mediation constituted another defining function of CELU. ‘CELU, by virtue of its wide coverage 
is looked upon to by many unions as conciliator and advocate’, CELU (1965) reported to ICFTU. It stated that ‘about 
40 percent of [active unions] have involved CELU in their negotiations with management’. ‘Almost all seek the help 
of CELU when the case goes to the Labour Department for conciliation and mediation’, it reported, with 90 percent 
of 1644 cases lodged with the latter allegedly involving CELU. 
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to 30 000 between 1963 and 196495; reaching 38 000 in 1966; 55 000 in 1968; 73 000 in 1973; 90 
000 in March 1974; and around 200 000 in 1975 (Zack 1967; Stutz 1967: 117; Fissehatsion 1968; 
Seleshi 1976: 28; Teketel 1983: 12; Killion 1985: 470). The pace of growth, an imperial 
government advisor admitted, ‘exceeded every expectation’ (Graf von Baudissin 1964: 564). 
Achievements recorded over the first long decade included the completion of a number of 
collective agreements, which by the end of the decade covered around 30 percent of CELU 
members (Emmanuel 1977: 70). In the first few years, these included ‘the unions at HVA, EAL, 
the railroad, and several commercial firms and textile mills’, and by 1972, 44 unions representing 
25 000 workers were covered by collective agreements (Killion 1985: 486, 489-490; CELU 1972). 
Early collective agreements included provisions that were often quite beneficial to workers, 
including, in one example, ‘a 15 percent wage increase, free housing and medical care’; and in 
others quite frequently increments of around 10 percent (ICFTU 1964; CELU 1972). These 
agreements were direct outcomes of effective pressure underpinned by a willingness to engage in 
conflict when required. The ability to effect and sustain such pressure was related to size, and ‘the 
strategic economic position’ of the various enterprises (Killion 1985: 486). As a result, it was 
unions such as HVA, Bahir Dar textiles, Ethiopian Airlines (EAL), Indo—Ethiopian textiles, 
General Ethiopian Transport, Mitchell Cotts, and CFE that managed to conclude initial collective 
agreements96. Another factor that united early entrants to collective agreements was that most such 
enterprises were state- or foreign-owned or managed. Suter (1966: 36) found early collective 
agreements to ‘have resulted in definite improvements in the workers' lot, especially as regards 
wages, fringe benefits, and protection against arbitrary dismissal’. He moreover found this to be 
linked to the existence of a vibrant labour movement as many of the enterprises where workers 
saw such betterment had strong unions, and had experienced strikes and unrest. Killion (1985: 
486) too found the establishment of collective agreements to be linked to the prevalence of unrest, 
 
95 The precision of some of these figures are contestable, but the nature of the trajectory is not. Emmanuel (1977: 65), 
for example, states that the total membership in April 1963 was 15 000 rather than 10 000. CELU itself, on its 
affiliation application to the ICFTU, cited its original membership as 20 000 (Beyene 1963a), and it continuously 
reported seemingly inflated numbers of new recruits each year by consistently, in each year's application for funds, 
revising the preceding year's membership numbers downward. The numbers submitted to the ISF were in turn 
systematically inflated by ICFTU's own officers. See, for example, Robinson (1963), where CELU's reported 20 000 
members are cited as 25 000. 
96 Shortage of activists and staff with qualifications to negotiate collective agreement meant that all early agreements 
had to be negotiated by CELU headquarter staff (Mesfin 1983, interview with Tom Killion). This was a factor that 
reinforced the trend towards the conclusion of agreements in the largest workplaces first.  
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and in the particular case of HVA's Wonji-Shoa site, Bahru (2008: 120-145) described how 
sustained and repetitive processes of strikes, petitioning, organising and collective bargaining 
forced the management to recognise the union, to bargain with it, and eventually to significantly 
improve labour conditions.  
Outside of the early achievers, however, Killion has argued that most collective agreements ‘did 
little more than ratify minimum state labour standards’ (Killion 1985: 489-490). Morehous (1968: 
70) has corroborated this view, stating that ‘many of the collective agreements [offered] little more 
than the law requires or what the employees had previously been receiving’, and Syoum (2005: 
99) found that ‘the few [employers] that [were] willing to bargain [were] not willing to agree to 
more than what the law [stipulated]’. Because of this, he argued, the labour movement had turned 
towards the state, pressing for legislative and institutional changes. This sentiment was reflected 
in a speech delivered by CELU President Beyene Solomon (1972), where he stated that ‘the unions 
have come to the conclusion that the fate of the Ethiopian worker does not so much depend on the 
day-to-day activities of individual employers, but more on [the] government’, and, as a result, that 
CELU was aiming for greater influence at that level. 
Morehous (1969) has discussed the dynamics by which differing outcomes were generated in 
different contexts. The prevalence of an active union or union experience in a company, he found, 
were factors that tended to generate more advantageous outcomes in terms of shorter working 
weeks, more generous sick-leave stipulations and closer adherence to agreements and legal 
provisions. More importantly, he argued, it was not so much the presence of any type of a labour 
union, but that of a struggling one, that was key in explaining advantageous outcomes, for in many 
cases where unions had fallen into inactivity, little or no improvements had been registered. 
Morehous (1969: 63), however, also found that while in many places the prevalence of a labour 
union caused ‘many more labour problems’ as it enhanced self-confidence and amplified workers' 
demands, the presence of a union was viewed positively by the management of several companies. 
The explanation offered was that it improved the ability of management to discipline workers, 
since, apparently, management perceived union leaders to be ‘much more likely to support 
management’ than workers were. These findings perfectly capture the dual nature of trade 
unionism described in the second chapter. 
91 
 
The Ethiopian labour movement encountered a number of profound challenges and obstacles in 
the long decade that followed the foundation of CELU. One such obstacle was the repression of 
organised labour at the level of the workplace. The dismissal of union representatives leading up 
to the aborted general strike attempt in 1963 has already been noted. Six years later, Morehous 
(1969: 51, 69) would claim that ‘the area of dismissal remains the most litigated [and] the most 
important in the eyes of employees’, with the ‘fear of dismissal’ – ‘all pervasive’ as it was taken 
to be – constituting the ‘dominant characteristic of employment relations in Ethiopia’. There were 
few restrictions to the right of employers to arbitrarily dismiss workers, and where severance pay 
was legally required, this requirement was often simply ignored. The dismissal of workers in the 
process of forming a union was often used to pre-empt union formation, and where unions had 
already been formed targeted dismissals of union officials or unionised workers remained frequent.  
Morehous (1969: 66) listed a set of examples that indicated ‘the extent to which some companies 
have gone to thwart a union’. They included ‘one bottling company [whose management] refused 
to recognise the right of its workers to form a union until a short strike was staged coinciding with 
a visit to the company by officials of the MNCD’; ‘the managing director of another company 
freely [admitting] that if the union pushed too much [for] a collective agreement, he would simply 
dismiss its leaders’; and one garage were ‘workers were told that since they were now working for 
different employers, they could not mix, the one objecting employee being summarily dismissed’. 
Other examples included the banning of all discussion among employees at work, and several 
employers who ‘openly admitting that an employee who complains too much will be dismissed’ 
(Morehous 1969: 70). In Dire Dawa, the basic union of the Chandris meat canning factory reported 
having had no less than 132 members arbitrarily dismissed by 197397. Morehous (1969) found that 
the strategical choice of whether to cooperate with and attempt to co-opt union leadership in order 
to exercise greater control over workers, or to suppress unionisation altogether, tended to vary 
depending on the country of origin of owners and managers. Syoum (2005: 68) concurred, 
claiming that foreign-owned and managed enterprises tended to be more accommodating. This, 
however, did not constitute a universal feature. The Lazaridis textile factory, A. Besse & Co, and 
Banco di Roma, were some of the foreign owned companies that were engaged in disputes for 
 
97 This number is found on CELU's ‘Confidential Data: Summary of Unions’ sheet for Chandris, located in CETU's 
archive. Although 132 dismissed worker is an exceptionally high number, many unions reported, in the same summary 
sheets compiled in 1973, being at loggerheads with the employer over dismissed workers. 
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having fired their union leaders in the year 1971 alone. At the Diabaco Cotton Company under 
Greek ownership, moreover, unrelenting repression of the labour movement was practiced. All 
members of the executive committee of the company union had been fired in the 1960s, and in 
1972 union representatives reported that ‘every time there is a general meeting the management 
calls for the police and workers are jailed for no reason’ (CELU 1972).  This draws attention to 
collusion between employers and the state. 
State bias presented a significant obstacle to the movement. On this point there is a broad general 
agreement across the literature. According to Emmanuel (1977: 71), for example, state intervention 
in industrial conflict was frequent, and tended, ‘in most cases’ to be ‘in support of the employers’. 
Seleshi (1979: 688) has concurred, labelling the government altogether ‘anti-labour’. The manner 
in which the boundaries of permissible union activity were policed has been touched upon. In 
regular times labour leaders were habitually harassed when conducing organising campaigns, 
officials were vetted and sometimes purged or arrested, the confederation was subject to 
surveillance and adherence to strict guidelines and warning, and its newspaper was tightly 
censored. But where parts of the labour movement still transgressed the boundaries of what was 
acceptable, a stronger reaction could be expected. Where strikes did occur, they were ‘in most 
cases… resolved by the use of state police forces’ (Seleshi 1979: 689)98.  Police was, for example, 
called on during the 1973 strikes of Diabaco cotton factory and Central Printing Press workers 
(Seleshi 1979: 698), and in the course of the 1971 Assab port strike an army officer in charge of 
port security threatened ‘to shoot any worker who did not report to work’ (Beyene 2010: 107). In 
another example an attempt to organise plantation workers in Nurahera and Melka Sedi was 
banned by the authorities and the union treasury seized. As the workers staged a strike in protest, 
police shot ‘several’ workers (Killion 1985: 537). A subsequent attempt to march to Addis to 
petition the emperor was also prevented by the police. But in the field of organising agricultural 
workers such as those mentioned, the cautious attitude of CELU's leadership constituted an 
additional obstacle. Killion (1985: 536) claims that its president Beyene Solomon was reluctant to 
organise agrarian labour, and quotes a contemporaneous report from the International Federation 
of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers (IFPAAW) stating that Beyene was ‘frightened’ of 
 
98 Not all policing was reactive. Frequently, police presence was called upon to pre-empt industrial action. In 
September 1970, for example, workers of the Indo-Ethiopian textile factory had resolved to go on strike, but before 
they could walk off police forces showed up preventing them from doing so (Tsegai et al. 1970). 
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the latter's organisational efforts among agrarian labour ‘as he and CELU exist at the sufferance 
of the emperor’. 
Even where repression was not open and dramatic, everyday state presence and bias was felt. An 
early ICFTU visitor to Addis Ababa reported that ‘three men were always behind me to watch my 
movements, record of the persons who come to meet me and report my speeches’ (Ramanjuam 
1963). Another ICFTU representative was told by a prominent Ethiopian academic about the 
latter's suspicion of foul play involved in the death of two leaders of the CFE union from the very 
same cause – a burst spleen – only days apart (Mboya 1958). Equally suspicious was a 1965 
attempt on the life of CELU President Beyene, the reasons for and perpetrator of which was never 
established99. In more mundane terms, basic union leaders frequently complained that the 
government was ‘anti-labour’ and that the Labour Relations Board was ‘anti-employee and anti-
union’ (Morehous 1969: 60). This was most emphatically expressed in its failure to safeguard the 
rights of union leaders. ‘The Board's reported tendency to allow dismissal’, Morehous (1969: 81) 
reported, ‘has placed a deep sense of insecurity on all present and potential union leaders’100. 
A telling example of how state repression functioned in synergy with moderating pressures 
emanating from employers and the CELU leadership can be found in the case of the Dire Dawa 
Textile Factory, where the assertive labour leader Zeleke Woldemariam had been imprisoned for 
allegedly organising an attack on a management representative. His successor Shiferaw Dessalegn, 
however, did not prove to be sufficiently malleable either, and was accused by the CELU 
leadership of making unreasonable demands on the employer. CELU first attempted to remove 
Shiferaw by bureaucratic means, but when this move was opposed by workers and thus failed, the 
 
99 Beyene (2010) discusses the event in his biography, without clarifying his thoughts on this. Half a century earlier, 
ICFTU Representative Kindström (1965) had found him ‘very uncommunicative of his own opinion about the reason 
for the seek of his life’. On the question of whether it was related to his position, Kindström reported Beyene as having 
answered in the affirmative, but this, Kindström reported ‘is all I get out of him’. 
100 As an FEE (n.d.) compendium of cases reviewed by the LRB up to 1967 indicates, however, the LRB was not 
averse to rule in favour of reinstating or compensating workers in individual cases. This, however, was never the case 
when a strike was involved. And the huge backlog of the LRB in any case meant that the effect of the selective justice 
it dispensed was undermined. Moreover, in several cases where the LRB ruled in favour of reinstating fired workers, 
the ruling was simply ignored by employers – see for example Addis Zemen (1971b). 
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CELU leaders called on the state to intervene and remove him101, which the state subsequently did 
(Killion 1984: 507-508). 
Progress and obstacles aside, a rising insurgent tide displeased with the orientation of the 
leadership emerged within the movement in its early years. ‘Internal and external opposition to 
CELU's leadership is as old as the organisation itself and seems to gather momentum in course of 
time’ a CELU employee (Emmanuel 1977: 71) wrote. The first challenge against Beyene's 
leadership came only a year after the confederation was founded. This is documented in a letter 
sent from CELU staffers Gebreselassie Gebremariam and Mesfin Gebremichael (1964) to a North 
American academic, which described an attempt by CELU General Assembly members, 
conducted while Beyene was out of the country, to establish an investigation committee, force a 
GA meeting, and possibly oust the president altogether102. Although this attempt failed, more 
challenges were to come. 
Dissatisfaction was, according to Emmanuel (1977: 72) evident on two levels: with the 
confederation leadership and its administration of the confederation; and with the strategic 
orientation they pursued. With regards to the former, Beyene was accused of being an employee 
of the confederation rather than a representative of any constituent union, and his leadership was 
accused of subverting internal democracy. In terms of the latter, the leadership's cautious 
deferentialism towards, and close collaboration with, the government was also a cause of discord, 
and the leadership's socio-material separation from the rank-and-file fed into and fuelled critiques 
of its role and orientation. On two separate occasions – in July 1964 and in December 1970 – the 
leadership had failed to honour General Assembly decisions to call general strikes and national 
demonstrations (Seleshi 1976: 7). Such subversion could only further frustrate and antagonise 
 
101 Fissehatsion Tekie (1983, interview) is on record stating that since Shiferaw was making demands on the employer 
that were considered excessive, and since he refused to listen to CELU's leaderships demands that he ‘restrain 
himself… we [the CELU leadership] had to tell the union to dismiss him’. ‘Not only did we tell the union but we took 
a stand’, Fissehatsion stated, and that stand included the direct intervention in the affairs of the union. ‘We had a very 
rough time even subsequently’, he concluded, ‘although we succeeded eventually with the support of the government’. 
This, however, was not without resistance from the workers. Beyene (1970) reported that as Shiferaw was removed, 
16 of his supporters entrenched themselves in the union offices, and began ‘arousing trouble’, in which one police 
man was hit by a stone and injured. As a result, Shiferaw and the 16 workers were arrested. 
102 Gebreselassie and Mesfin described the attempt as motivated by the desire of an oppositional candidate to take 
over the presidency and acquire a hefty pay, as well as by ‘personal hatred against Beyene by some union leaders’. 
They did, however, admit that there were substantial issues involved. Such issues included the frequency of GA 
meetings, which had not been held for some time, allegedly because of the leadership's fear of criticism, and that ‘there 
are some union leaders who genuinely think that Beyene is having too much contact with the government’. 
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dissatisfied members and representatives. In light of this, the leadership could not exercise 
complete control over a movement that had begun to exhibit tendencies of radicalisation. Neither 
could it check this slide. Factional struggles and wildcat action became the vents for militant 
pressure in the decade to come, but eventually the built-up pressure would prove uncontrollable. 
4.4 Radicalisation and conflict 
By the mid-1960s, CELU's leadership had begun to voice concern about being ‘unable to cope 
with the demands of the workers’, which, it claimed ‘were often quite unrealistic’ (CELU 1965). 
It reported to its international allies that there had been ‘much disagreements between CELU and 
its affiliates’103, with ‘one of the major criticism against CELU [being] that it was not doing enough 
for its membership’. Around the same time, the ICFTUs representative in Addis Ababa reported 
home that the CELU board was ‘divided in different groups’ (Kindström 1966b). But divisions 
were not confined to any one level of the confederation. Frictions and contention prevailed 
throughout the structures of CELU. 
Most fundamentally, opposition emerged from the leadership's refusal to put the movement on an 
offensive footing. When strike activity and unrest nevertheless broke out – which it frequently did, 
as shall be made evident in the sixth chapter – the default priority of the leadership was to come to 
a speedy agreement with employers. The Federation of Employers of Ethiopia (FEE) testified to 
having enjoyed good relations with CELU's leadership and was indeed particularly satisfied with 
mutual efforts ‘to avert industrial unrest’ (FEE 1972: 1). ‘I always chose the path of peace in my 
dealings with employers’, Beyene (2010: 109), the CELU president of the time, was also to 
recollect. Somewhat contradictory, Beyene (2016, personal interview) has also stated that there 
were instances where CELU's leadership covertly and discretely supported local strikes, officially 
calling on unions to adhere to legal procedures while simultaneously ‘indirectly telling them to go 
[on strike]’. Although this appears a prudent tactic in the face of the repressive inclinations of the 
imperial state, it is evident from internal documentation and external communication that such 
covert instigation must have occurred only rarely. In general, the leadership worked to contain and 
displace militant pressure that was building from below, and while it did so relatively effectively 
over its initial years, the displaced pressures built up and exacerbated the rift within the movement.  
 
103 In fact, the same report made reference to a ‘perpetual strife between CELU and its affiliates’, which the leadership 
had hoped that the constitutional changes of 1965 would put an end to. 
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Early militant labour opposition, however, occurred without structured coordination, and the 
CELU leadership was to skilfully combine a strategy of playing on external ties and resources it 
had access to with a degree of procedural and constitutional manipulation, in order to retain overall 
control over the movement. One example of the former was the selective disbursement and 
withholding of services, assistance and funds accessible at the central level – a method frequently 
utilised to compel constituent unions to fall in line with the leadership (Kiflu 2014, personal 
interview). The latter included revising the CELU constitution to allow for the promotion of key 
moderates to high posts; interfering in constituent union elections against disfavoured candidates;  
as well as deploying a number of gimmicks to sway the vote, or stall to prevent it; and subverting 
taken decisions where a vote could not be prevented or its outcome not predetermined104. Despite 
cries of foul play triggered by such manipulation, the leadership was re-elected at the General 
Assembly meetings of 1965, 1967, 1969 and 1972. But it was not without contention. 
In the lead-up to the 1965 elections, Beyene's leadership was challenged by Deputy Secretary 
Alemu Bogale, but the latter failed to generate sufficient support and was removed just before the 
elections were held. The re-election of the leadership was then followed by constitutional 
amendments that shored up its position. As a result of these changes, two employees of the 
confederation, who were part of Beyene's moderate group, were made secretary general and deputy 
secretary general respectively: Fissehatsion Tekie and Tesfa Gebremariam105. Following Beyene's 
own elevation to the presidency, this was another step towards instituting a non-representative 
layer of top officials. The move in this direction, however, generated its own tensions – ‘the 
opposition charged, and not without cause, that under the original CELU constitution anyone not 
directly linked or delegated by either a local or national union, cannot hold electoral office in the 
confederation’, a CELU insider wrote (Emmanuel 1977: 73). More constitutional engineering 
followed the 1967 General Assembly meeting. Unlike in the past, when the incumbent president 
was barred from chairing the board and the general secretary was ineligible from serving as board 
secretary, they were henceforth assigned to these positions mandatorily. Moreover, the task of 
 
104 Former CELU staffer Emmanuel Fayessa (1983, interview with Tom Killion) claims that refusal to intercede with 
the government when undesirable officials were elected, thereby denying them registration and legal recognition, was 
another method by which the CELU leadership discriminated against undesirable candidates. Additionally, preferred 
candidates were sometimes supported by CELU's open campaigning in constituent union elections, which included 
the evocation of the risk of government intervention. Ironically, such intervention was occasionally courted by the 
CELU leadership itself, when its interventions failed to sway the outcome. 
105 Tesfa Gebremariam was eventually to depart from this group, but only much later. 
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electing officeholders was transferred from the GA to the board, with the GA only providing 
ratification (Kindström 1967c). These measures significantly increased the powers of the top 
office-holders at the expense of the GA. 
In April 1969, Beyene's third re-election was followed by the co-option of two more staffers to the 
CELU leadership. This meant that five members of CELU's central leadership represented no 
constituent unions, out of which four had no experience of shop floor work whatsoever106. In the 
GA, however, the leadership was criticised for failing to ‘properly communicate’ the demands of 
the workers to the state (Killion 1985: 477). It was resolved that a strike should be called on 
Ethiopian Christmas Day in January 1970 to advance CELU's demand for a new labour law. But 
after having shored up its position, the leadership cancelled the GA-sanctioned strike and settled 
for the establishment of a joint committee with the government to look into the matter (Beyene 
2010: 116-117). No revisions to the labour law were adopted. 
CELU's international allies came in handy to the leadership, as the latter exhibited great skilfulness 
in utilising external ties to defeat challenges to its incumbency and moderate line. When discussing 
the 1967 congress, ICFTU representative Kindström (1967d) presents an illustrating account of 
the manner in which this could take place: 
Abraham Gabre [chairman of the executive board of the CELU] has always been 
very fond of WFTU and AATUF107 and adversary to the ICFTU, [FES], and AALC 
and the West in general and have argued for assistance and aid from the East 
instead of the West. He had support of some few members within [the] CELU board 
for the idea of aid from the East, and possibly of some other union leaders. 
However, some time before the annual Conference, Brother Beyene Solomon got 
knowledge of the intention of Abraham Gabre to raise the question about the 
foreign assistance to the CELU at the Conference without informing CELU in 
advance. Brother Solomon informed me what was going on and both of us agreed 
to the necessity of a counter-move to prevent the attempt of Abraham Gabre… I 
suggested Brother Solomon to have a flag made with CELU emblem and to present 
the flag to the CELU as a gift from the ICFTU, at the Conference. Brother Solomon 
found the idea good and, as the excellent policy maker he is, suggested that the flag 
should not be given at the opening ceremony but the time Gabre raised his matter. 
The flag was made, and in the afternoon on the second day of the Conference 
Brother Solomon called me to present the flag. Gabre had at that time raised his 
 
106 These were Beyene Solomon, president; Fissehatsion Tekie, secretary general; Tesfa Gebremariam, Mesfin 
Gebremichael and Gebreselassie Gebremariam. The latter four were ironically – and rather bizarrely, considering that 
US sympathies laid with their policies – termed ‘CELU's four horsemen’ by the US chargé d'affaires Parker Wyman 
(1975b). 
107 The All-African Trade Union Federation. A body that in 1973 was replaced by OATUU. 
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question but Brother Solomon suggested a break of the discussion for the ‘flag 
ceremony’. I could never imagine that the flag should be of so great effect as it 
became. All the delegates were happy and applauded and cheered and many of 
them made speeches with thanks to the ICFTU and praising the ICFTU for all the 
support and assistance given to the CELU. As the whole afternoon became a 
‘thanksgiving day’ to the ICFTU, Brother Solomon found afterwards there were 
neither time nor reason to continue the discussion of the matter raised by Gabre, 
and suggested the matter dismissed which was met with universal approval. 
Afterwards almost every delegate personally thanked me and the ICFTU for the 
grandiose gift. That proves again that things which can be seen with one's own eyes 
and touched with the hand is more appreciated by these people than things of 
abstract nature even if the latter is worth a million more. 
Aside from contemptuously denying ‘these people’ the capability of abstract thought, this account 
starkly demonstrates how the ICFTU colluded with the top leadership in subverting CELU's 
internal democracy – the ostensible protection of which constituted its official purpose for 
operating in the country. But no such collusion could completely stem the rising tide of opposition 
against the leadership. 
‘By the early 1970s’, Killion (1985: 478) has written, ‘the dissatisfaction among various groups 
within CELU had coalesced into a serious opposition movement to the entrenched national 
leadership’. When, at this stage, the opposition lodged a complaint with the labour department of 
the MNCD pertaining to the unconstitutionality of having non-representatives as office holders, it 
was dismissed, quite likely because the Ministry's sympathies laid with the leadership (Emmanuel 
1977: 74). In 1972, vocal opposition resurfaced as the CELU leadership suspended the CELU 
representative in Eritrea, Mesfin Abraha – a supporter of the opposition. Moreover, in order to 
eliminate the base of the most strident opposition, the regional committee for Addis Ababa and its 
vicinity was dissolved by fiat. The outrage this created forced the reinstatement108 of Mesfin and 
eventually the reestablishment of the regional committee for Addis Ababa and its vicinity. But the 
CELU leadership meanwhile won a fourth re-election. The opposition was convinced that the vote 
counting process was flawed and subject to government interference (Emmanuel 1977: 74-75). As 
the demand for a recount was turned down, and a CELU employee that had supported the 
opposition in the election was dismissed, the opposition hardened (Disaffiliated unions 1973; 
 
108 This was disputed by Fissehatsion (1983, interview with Tom Killion), who claimed that Mesfin was not reinstated, 
but replaced by a candidate favoured by Beyene. Either way, it is documented that Mesfin Abraha remained a labour 
official in 1974 and eventually was elected into CELU's leading body in 1975. Mesfin, according to Beyene (2015, 
personal interview), survived the revolution. 
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Killion 1985: 480). The charges brought against the leadership included ‘gross negligence in 
running the affairs of the confederation’ including financial misadministration, feeble 
organisational attempts, electoral irregularities, and mismanagement of internal disputes 
(Emmanuel 1977: 75). CELU's leadership, the oppositional movement claimed, ‘neither represent 
the workers nor sees itself as representing workers; rather having never dealt with a boss, they 
actually regard themselves as akin to management rather than labour’ (Disaffiliated unions 1973). 
The leadership was accused of colluding with employers and, it was alleged, had gone as far as 
sabotaging collective bargaining and blocking collective agreements drawn up by oppositional 
unions (Disaffiliated unions 1973). In terms of objectives, the oppositional movement advocated 
a socially broader, more offensive, and confrontational stance. It resolved that the most viable 
option was to disaffiliate and to create a new central institution of Ethiopian labour.  
In response to the fallout from the 1972 election, 30 dissatisfied unions109, representing some 15 
000 members, disaffiliated from CELU, declared their intention to form a new trade union centre, 
and applied for recognition with the Labour Department of the MNCD (Emmanuel 1977: 72-84). 
Unsurprisingly, the MNCD refused to register the new centre, and the oppositional movement 
instead launched a campaign to effect a change of orientation within CELU proper, as well as to 
undermine the deferential CELU leadership. ‘Because of their disciplined organisation and 
commitment as well as their vigorous organising drives’, Emmanuel (1977:76) has written, they 
‘were soon to surface and shake CELU to its foundations’.  
The dissenting unions included several which were dominated by white-collar workers found in, 
for example, insurance firms, trade companies, and Ethiopian Airlines110, but they also included 
unions of less privileged workers, such as that of United Wood Workers. That opposition was 
coming from a militant position is obvious from the declarations of the disaffiliated unions, but it 
can be questioned to what extent such opposition had been politically radicalised by the time. The 
disaffiliated unions' underground leaflets advocated change and implicated CELU's leadership 
through its links with the imperial government (Emmanuel 1977: 83). But the fact that the 
disaffiliated unions were seeking international affiliation with the Christian Democratic-oriented 
 
109 12 from Addis Ababa; 17 from Eritrea; and one from the Gojam province (Emmanuel 1977: 74). 
110 The union of Ethiopian Airlines had consistently been one of the most militant and its workers had staged strikes 
at least twice before the 1970s. In disillusionment with the cancellation of the 1963 strike threat and the subsequent 
moderate line espoused by CELU's leadership, it had withdrawn from playing an active role in CELU since 
(Fissehatsion 1983, interview with Tom Killion). 
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World Confederation of Labour (WCL) – hardly known for its radicalism – places subsequent 
developments into relevant context. 
The close relations between the state and CELU's leadership were again displayed when a visiting 
WCL official was stopped at Addis Ababa airport and had his documents seized, after CELU's 
President Beyene had reported him to the security services. Beyene (2010: 167) argues that this 
was justified as the WCL official was ‘carrying documents detrimental to the security of the 
country’, but that argument seems to reflect a conflation between the security of incumbency and 
the security of the country. Whichever the case, the intervention illustrates the extent of collusion 
between the CELU leadership and the state in jointly checking the movement.  But if the central 
leadership had hitherto been saved by its ties to the state and international patrons, dynamics 
outside its control were soon to condemn it to irrelevance: the fracturing of the Ethiopian labour 
movement was halted and reversed only by the outbreak of a major wave of labour militancy. 
When this was reinforced by massive stirrings among Ethiopia's urban population, beginning in 
February 1974, and a concomitant explosion in working class activity, the leadership would be 
rendered unable to arrest the pressures from below and forced to embark on a more confrontational 
course. But if February 1974 marked the beginning of a popular upsurge, the breakdown of 
imperial authority, and eventually a social revolution, it did not mark the starting point of the 
proletarian insurgency that has tended to be subsumed under it. Among workers, trouble had been 
brewing significantly more intensively in the period leading up to the February upsurge and strike 
activity had sharply increased over the preceding year. 
In July 1973, the dissenting unions and CELU signed an agreement wherein the latter committed 
to call an extraordinary General Congress in March 1974, in order to thoroughly review and revise 
the confederation's constitution (CELU 1973a). Moreover, the agreement regularised a procedure 
in which vacant posts were filled, and it stipulated a procedure for the regional committees of 
Eritrea and Addis Ababa and its surroundings – the two strongest bases for opposition – to adopt 
by-laws within one month's time. These concessions – which essentially met the opposition's 
immediate demand for a congress under more transparent conditions and the curtailment of the 
national centre's scope to interfere in the affairs of constituent unions and regional committees – 
led to a temporary truce. But before the constitutional issues could be resolved in the congress, 
focus would shift to more urgent tasks. 
101 
 
In that same year, 1973, Diabaco Cotton factory workers and Central Printing Press workers had 
gone on strikes, but failed to receive support from CELU (Seleshi 1979: 698). When the large 
union of the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) called a strike demanding that its 
right to engage in collective bargaining be respected, however, pressure piled on CELU's 
leadership to intervene in support of the 1200 striking bank workers. On August 26, 1973, a 
General Council session was called, and resolved to take solidarity measures, warned that it was 
ready to intervene, and vowed to stay in session until the issue had been resolved (CELU 1973b). 
The enthusiastic support that this confrontational move received within the movement is apparent 
in several dozens of letters from basic unions to Beyene Solomon expressing their determination 
and readiness to intervene111. Faced with such decisiveness, the imperial government conceded to 
the bank workers' demands, and a collective agreement was signed which included substantial 
retroactive wage increases (Andu-alem 1999: 48). This marked an important victory on behalf of 
the labour movement, and put into negative perspective the deferential strategies hitherto pursued, 
as it was made apparent that confrontation could result in major gains. As the February movement 
commenced, this lesson lingered heavy, and as pressure from within the labour movement to join 
in the popular upsurge increased, the reluctant top leadership was cornered112. 
The CELU congress of early 1974 was held in a radicalised mood. By now, the oppositional 
movement had developed a comprehensive critique that included fundamental aspects of CELU's 
strategy, accusing the leadership of ‘economism’, of betraying the labour movement, and of 
collaborating with a reactionary government: ‘the opposition's basic argument was that the 
Ethiopian labour movement [had] not only the right, but also the duty and responsibility, to go 
beyond its own immediate interests and join the masses, if not lead them, in a popular resistance 
against [the emperor’s] semi-feudal and oppressive regime’ (Emmanuel 1977: 77). The congress 
issued a long list of demands that were underlined by the threat of a general strike. CELU's 
demands have been characterised as ‘primarily corporate’ by unsympathetic observers (Ottaway 
 
111 See, for example, letters from the unions of Ethiopian Petroleum Workers (Hailu 1973); Indo-Ethiopian Textile 
Factory (Gezahegn and Abdu 1973); Michell Cotts (Sherefedin 1973); HVA (Elias 1973); Ethiopian Airlines (Seid 
1973); Addis Ababa Bank (Alemayehu 1973); United Wood Workers (Gebremicahel 1973); and Addis Ababa Hilton 
(Woldemariam 1973). 
112 Fissehatsion Tekie (1983, interview with Tom Killion), representing the top leadership, has admitted being against 
the proposal for a general strike. At most, he was willing only to repeat the practice of threatening to call one. Another 
member of the leadership, Gebreselassie Gebremariam (1983, interview with Tom Killion), meanwhile, contends that 
the general sentiment among delegates of the GA was that a strike had to be called, and that the strike would be a 
political strike announcing the arrival of the labour movement as a country-wide political force. 
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1976: 477). This misinterpretation may emanate from the leadership's concomitant assurances of 
moderation and loyalty to the Emperor113.  By this time, however, the leadership was no longer in 
effective command of the movement and the external mechanisms of repression and control that 
partly relied on that conduit had also broken down. A glance at the actual demands dispels their 
characterisation as purely corporate in nature. They include respect for the unconditional right of 
all workers to freely organise and to strike; the repealing of the old labour legislation and the 
implementation of a new progressive labour law; the establishment of a minimum wage and social 
security provisions including the establishment of pension funds; price controls; an end to 
censorship; and universal free education (CELU 1974a). That the demands were delivered as an 
ultimatum, and that government pleadings for negotiation were turned down, further underlines 
the unprecedented political and rebellious nature of this act of insubordination. 
On March 7, when it had become clear that the demands could or would not be met, CELU called 
a general strike for the following day. Close to 100 000 workers honoured the call, paralysing the 
economy and communications for three days. The number of strikers underscored the resonance 
of the strike call as it surpassed the number of members in CELU-affiliated unions (Killion 1985: 
550). The strike also demonstrated the clout of the labour movement as it forced the imperial state 
to surrender. The concessions extracted included government commitments to replace the labour 
law; to guarantee wage increments in all sectors and to establish a minimum wage; to allow all 
government workers to unionise; to punish managers who violated workers' rights; to introduce 
price controls; to postpone an unpopular reform of the educational sector and to make education 
free; and to establish pension and disability schemes; to restrict the legal space for irregular labour 
contracts; and finally to guarantee that no disciplinary actions were taken against any worker or 
union official participating in or leading the strike (EH 1974a). The fact that the state procrastinated 
and attempted to backpedal in the months that followed only underlines the magnitude of the initial 
concessions. Something similar can be said of official statements forthcoming in the wake of the 
strike. In the week that followed its conclusion state media lauded workers for ‘staying at home 
peacefully until their demands were met’, for their ‘gentlemanly behaviour’, and their ‘honest 
motives’ (EH 1974g). That was a far cry from the threatening and scolding rhetoric which had 
 
113 See for instance Ethiopian Herald (1974b). 
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accompanied the practice of control and repression in previous decades, and it indicated the degree 
to which the balance of forces had shifted. 
The success of the general strike had three immediate effects on the disposition of the labour 
movement. The first was that it irrevocably discredited the central leadership and the deferential 
strategy it had pursued. Beyene only formally resigned a few months later114, and while his 
lieutenants would remain in office until that autumn115, they had lost effective control. The central 
leadership was henceforth unable to arrest the movement's drift towards increasing militancy, and 
despite attempts to stem the strike wave that followed, strikes multiplied116. The split with 
proponents of the moderate tradition was deepening across the movement. ‘Within CELU 
affiliates’, reported the US embassy (Wyman 1974a) ‘inner rivalries are causing quarrels to flare 
up, and moderates are having to contend with more aggressive and radical elements. ‘Fist fights’, 
it stated, were ‘not uncommon’. 
A second effect of the strike was the soaring prestige of the labour movement and the sudden boom 
in membership it generated, which was reinforced by the government's reluctant permission for 
employees of over 40 public enterprises to unionise. In the weeks following the strike membership 
in CELU-affiliated unions increased by 40 percent, with some 35 000 workers joining its ranks 
(EH 1974j). Meanwhile, dormant unions were reenergised (Emmanuel 1977: 104). A US embassy 
cable from April of that year (Wyman 1974a) reported that ‘CELU headquarters has become [a] 
rallying point for workers whether unionised or not’, where ‘daily hundreds, often thousands, 
assemble’ keeping the assembly hall ‘in constant use’. By July, another 10 000 new members had 
joined affiliated unions (EH 1974v). 
A third and related effect of the strike was that it triggered an explosive boost in the confidence of 
workers vis-à-vis employers and the state. Five weeks after the settlement of the strike, the US 
embassy (Wyman 1974a) reported that the ‘turmoil in labour scene continues’, with new cases 
 
114 The content of Beyene's (1974) resignation letter suggests that his resignation indeed was due to his unpopularity 
in the movement. While not stating any direct reason, the short letter admitted that organisational performance had 
been far from satisfactory, and apologised ‘for any hard feelings’ caused. 
115 English names for various seasons are used here to convey an understanding of the Gregorian calendric months of 
the year in which events occurred, not as a description of the seasonal climate in Ethiopia. ‘Summer’, for this reason, 
broadly corresponds to the Ethiopian rainy season ክርምት; ‘autumn’ to the በልግ season; ‘winter’ to በጋ; and ‘spring’ 
to ፀደይ.  
116 See chapter 6. 
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arising ‘almost daily’. Throughout the spring and early summer a flurry of strikes engulfed the 
economy – from the smallest workplace to the largest, private to public, and across the country. 
Strikes large enough to warrant mention in the government mouthpiece Ethiopian Herald included 
those of airport employees; tobacco monopoly workers; teachers; haricot bean farm workers; 
import-export firm employees; civil aviation workers; employees of the Elementary School 
Building Unit; Addis Ababa municipality employees; finance ministry employees; railway 
workers; bus firm employees and transport company workers; dairy industry workers; hospital 
employees; garment manufacturing workers; taxi drivers; university staff; postal office workers; 
truck drivers; and telecommunication workers (EH 1974c; 1974d; 1974e; 1974f; 1974h; 1974i; 
1974k; 1974l; 1974m; 1974n; 1974o; 1974p; 1974q; 1974u). 
By late April 1974, however, a newly appointed government – whose tenure was to be short – 
attempted to stem militancy, reassert authority and impose industrial peace. Retroactively, the 
general strike was ruled illegal, and state media launched a campaign against workers for 
‘spreading anarchy’, warning stern measures against strikers (EH 19743; 1974s; 1974t). The 
upsurge in labour activity only receded with the adoption of a strategy of repression, including the 
deployment of security forces in workplaces; the disruption of workers' meetings, beatings, and 
arrest of workers and union leaders; and the intervention by the Ministry of National Defence, 
threatening that should the CELU not stop its alleged agitation, it would be closed down (EH 
1974t; 1974w). This shift in state rhetoric and practice towards labour indicates a fourth effect of 
the strike: it forced the state acknowledge the clout and potential of the labour movement and 
triggered the adoption of even tighter measures of supervision and repression. Although the 
repressive regime was relaxed in the summer of 1974, as a radical faction of the military came to 
seize control over the high offices of the state, the importance of pacifying the labour movement 
had been noted. Cumulatively, the noted effects meant that the labour movement and the state were 
firmly set on a course of continued and intensified confrontation over increasingly high stakes.  
4.5 Revolution and aftermath 
Upon toppling the imperial government and seizing power in September 1974, the PMAC 
suspended basic democratic rights, indicating that no opposition would be tolerated. CELU's 
annual General Assembly meeting was held in the immediate aftermath, with 250 representatives 
from across the country in attendance. The assembly was split between adherents to differing 
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orientations, but the momentum was with the radicals. A ‘fair amount of slogan shouting and 
occasional catcalls against CELU leadership’ allegedly accompanied the proceedings (Wyman 
1974c). US embassy official Wyman (1974b) reported that ‘a degree of radicalism has appeared’ 
in which some leaders ‘are suggesting that foreign “exploiters” should be pushed out and that 
CELU must beware of too much Americanism’. The General Assembly adopted a resolution which 
lent support to the toppling of the imperial government but opposed the PMAC's usurpation of 
power from a popular movement of which it considered labour a central component. The 
suspension of democratic rights was also denounced, with a special emphasis on the ban on strikes 
and demonstrations. In place of the PMAC, the General Assembly rallied behind the radical left's 
demand for a provisional people's government to be established, in which CELU demanded 
representation. The resolution threatened that ‘urgent action’ would be taken in response to any 
harassment, which under the circumstances could only mean another general strike (CELU 1974b). 
The PMAC rejected CELU's demands with dismissive references to the latter's past orientation117, 
but this ignored the obvious process of change CELU was in the midst of. However, while 
proponents of a radical readjustment of orientation were ascendant, several constituent unions, 
such as that of CFE and HVA's Metahara Sugar Plantation, rallied behind the new government 
(EH 1974x; 1974z). ‘Not all trade unionists were opposed to the new regime’, Clapham has noted 
(1990: 55): ‘the main industrial area of Addis Ababa, around Kaliti and Akaki to the south of the 
city, provided some of its most active and violent supporters’. This must be qualified, since the 
oppositional strand of the labour movement evidently also held some sway in those industrial 
areas. But from the outset, the labour movement was indeed split on how to view the PMAC, 
particularly in light of the latter's radical rhetoric and measures. The split would be seized upon in 
the tug-of-war between the PMAC and the labour movement that ensued. 
In response to CELU's resolution its leaders were promptly arrested. The General Council 
‘adamantly rejected’ a PMAC request to retract the GA resolution and the latent strike threat was 
consequently activated (Kailembo 1974a). Lack of clarity and coherence, however, doomed the 
strike attempt, and it was largely pre-empted. According to ICFTU representative Kailembo 
(1974a), the effort suffered from a lack of preparation and the fact that the union leaders that were 
to lead the strikes locally were all assembled in Addis Ababa. In Eritrea, communication failure 
 
117 ‘Where in the world has a trade union movement joined hands with the aristocracy and nobility to exploit workers’, 
an Ethiopian Herald editorial (1974y) rhetorically asks in response to CELU's declaration. 
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meant that the regional branch failed to call out its member unions (Sherry 1974). Kailembo, 
moreover, reported a rift within CELU's leadership, and suggested that Vice President Alem Abdi 
– a trade union leader from Seferian trading company and a veteran CELU General Council 
member – and staffer Tesfa Gebremariam were acting on behalf of the PMAC. To heighten such 
fears, Alem, who was the highest ranking CELU official that had not been arrested, actively 
worked to sabotage the strike by issuing a circular rescinding the General Assembly's strike call118. 
Accompanied by military officers, moreover, Alem toured workplaces telling workers that the 
strike had been called off, thereby severely undermining the strike call (Kiflu 2014, personal 
interview). In several places, the call was nevertheless heeded. Beyene (2010: 148-153) claims 
that the workers of Meta Abo Brewery were among those who actually walked off the job. A US 
embassy cable (Wyman 1974e) of September 25, moreover, stated that ‘a few hotels and branches 
of Commercial Bank had none or small number of employees report for duty’ while ‘some 200-
300 [striking] workers appeared mid-morning at CELU headquarters’. Soldiers soon appeared, 
however, and ‘remaining CELU officials [were] obviously despondent and recognised the futility 
of further effort’. ‘In retrospect’, the cable noted, ‘it is clear that [PMAC] saw clearly [that the] 
general strike threat had no backbone and, therefore, felt no compulsion to negotiate compromise’.  
In the aftermath of the attempted strike, the re-subordination of the labour movement took on 
additional importance for the authorities. According to Alemu Abebe119 (2014, personal 
interview), ‘[the PMAC] definitely saw the trade union [movement] as one of the potential places 
where opposition [could] flourish, so what it did after [the thwarted strike] was to make sure that 
this was not so’. Initially, a mixture of cooptive and repressive measures was adopted. The former 
included cajoling a new leadership to adopt a deferential orientation whereas the latter included 
police opening fire on a congregation of several thousands of workers in CELU's compound in 
October 1974, killing one and wounding two (EH 1974å). Following the shootings, workers were 
reported to have chanted in protest ‘we got rid of the Emperor but see how we are being treated’, 
while displaying the body of their dead comrade (Kailembo 1974b). That same month a 
 
118 Outside of this overt attempt to sabotage the strike, there were delegates who had favoured caution. The US 
embassy (Wyman 1974d) reported that it believed that the CELU leadership had only most reluctantly called the 
strike, and only because no compromise could be reached with PMAC. This ignores the fact that the strike notice was 
issued before serious negotiations could have taken place. 
119 Dr Alemu was initially a POMOA official, who in 1977 became the mayor of Addis Ababa. He was later to become 
a politburo member of the WPE and serve as, among other positions, deputy prime minister. 
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demonstration by ‘several hundred’ unemployed workers before an army camp was dispersed by 
‘several truckloads of troops with guns at the ready’ and a commander making clear his readiness 
to order fire (Wyman 1974f). 
Meanwhile, the loyalist group led by Alem Abdi attempted to exploit the vacuum that the arrests 
at the top had created to seize control over the organisation without holding new elections. In early 
January, while under control of this group, CELU issued a statement endorsing the PMAC and its 
‘Ethiopian Socialism’ (EH 1975a). Right from the outset, however, Alem's leadership was 
embattled. A ‘committee of 15 dissidents in Addis [Ababa] CELU affiliates, headed by Getachew 
Amare from Besse Co’, was reported (Wyman 1974f) to have taken the lead in the campaign, 
demanding new elections to be held immediately. The leaders of the labour opposition could bank 
on an unabated groundswell of militant energies from the rank-and-file. This expressed itself not 
only in strike action, but also in turbulence at, among other places, the offices of the LRB. ‘Crowds 
of unemployed workers’, reported the US embassy (Wyman 1974f), ‘appear daily before [the] 
labour commissioner's office and block entrance’. Employers' representatives arriving at the 
offices were reported to ‘have been beaten up’ on several occasions, including a case of one being 
‘heaved over [the] compound wall’. The workers were said to have attempted to set the buildings 
of the LRB on fire, and it was allegedly ‘not uncommon for [the] labour commissioner to be locked 
into his office, and frequently army and/or police called in to escort officials and members of LRB 
out of compound’.  
In the spring of 1975 the struggle for control over CELU intensified. On May Day demonstrations 
of 1975 – the first such occasion to be observed in Ethiopia – demands raised by workers included 
respect for the independence of CELU, restoration of democratic rights, and the dismissal of Alem 
Abdi. The latter was unable to complete his speech because of the noise from outraged workers 
(Kiflu 2014, personal interview). One report described workers carrying placards ‘calling for the 
hanging of Alem Abdi and accusing him of being a tool of the government’ (ICFTU 1975). This 
public display of discontent demonstrated the likelihood that proponents of a radical reorientation 
of CELU would come out on top if a GA was held under the prevailing conditions. To prevent 
this, bureaucratic hurdles to calling such a congress were erected. The PMAC threw its weight 
behind the minority loyalist faction which remained in control of CELU's headquarters, and 
worked to prevent a general congress from being held until such a time that the outcome could be 
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expected to be more favourable. Union leaders from Eritrea – who generally sided with the militant 
opposition – where denied permission to travel to Addis Ababa to attend meetings120. With the 
Eritrean unions unable to actively participate in central matters, it fell upon unions clustered in and 
around Addis Ababa – who for long had been networked in a regional coordinating committee – 
to spearhead the radical opposition. In place of a general congress, they called a meeting of this 
committee. About 100 unions in and around Addis Ababa elected a committee leadership headed 
by Marqos Hagos, a radical trade union leader from the insurance industry (Kiflu 1993: 217). 
The Addis Ababa unions continued to push for a General Assembly meeting. By March 1975 Alem 
Abdi had forbidden their committee to meet in CELU's offices. In response, the delegates detained 
him in the building, triggering the intervention of state security. In May they again prevented him 
from entering the compound. This appears to have been the final straw for the military rulers, 
demonstrating the inability of Alem's leadership to reassert control. The PMAC closed down the 
CELU headquarters altogether and banned union meetings. In its statement announcing the 
closure, the PMAC bluntly stated that the ‘so-called CELU’ had ‘outlived its usefulness, [and had] 
no place in Socialist Ethiopia’ (EH 1975b). Only a few days afterwards, however, the PMAC 
rescinded121 its decision. Open protests and strong opposition from unions and workers whom the 
PMAC canvassed for support apparently convinced the PMAC to reverse its position (Kailembo 
1975). Permission to finally hold fresh elections was also granted, spelling an end to Alem Abdi's 
influence. 
A Provisional Workers' Committee (PWC) headed by Marqos Hagos was elected on a May 31 – 
June 1 meeting, and was mandated to lead CELU until a congress of the General Assembly could 
be held (EH 1975c; 1975d). The elections were reported to have taken place in ‘good order’ with 
minimum state presence – represented by only one security officer. It appeared, to informers of 
the US embassy in Addis Ababa (1975), to demonstrate that ‘democratic processes were being 
 
120 The Eritrean unions would eventually manage to send representatives to the September 1975 congress of CELU's 
GA (EH 1975e). 
121 In a rather apologetic tone contrasting with the PMAC's statement from the week before, an Ethiopian Herald 
writer (Rahel 1975) claimed that ‘[the] temporary closure of the headquarters of the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Labour Unions last month was mistaken by some to be an indication of the government to emasculate organised 
labour’. This, the writer rather unconvincingly assured the reader, ‘of course, was a totally erroneous assumption’ as 
demonstrated by later events. 
109 
 
followed’122. This election marked the radical oppositional movement's seizure of formal control 
over CELU, but unlike its characterisation in some of the literature123 the new leadership was not 
by any means composed of infiltrating external agents or newcomers to the labour movement. 
Rather, the PWC was largely made up of experienced workers' representatives and veteran trade 
unionists. The five-man committee that was elected to preside over the May-June meeting included 
‘three trade unionists of established reputation’, including Elias Mengesha of HVA, Shumiye 
Teferra of Hilton Hotel, and Ibrahim Ahmed of Amropa Motors (US embassy in Addis Ababa 
1975), in addition to the chairman Marqos Hagos, who himself had been an elected workers' 
representative and a member of CELU's General Council for many years by that time. The roster 
of the PWC included the same names joined by a number of even more seasoned trade unionists. 
They included Vice Chairman Mesfin Abraha, who had for long been the senior-most CELU 
official in Eritrea, as well as the experienced leaders of two trading and retail companies' unions – 
Gebremichael Gebremedhin of Mosvold and Getachew Amare of A. Besse (CELU 1975a). 
The election of the PWC resulted in the creation of a certain amount of space in which a relatively 
autonomous movement could operate without much direct state intervention. Indeed, in the 
resolution (CELU 1975a) the PWC passed upon its establishment it hailed the ‘glowing struggles 
[which had driven] out the reactionary elements who were the enemies of the working class and 
[reinstated] CELU under the direction and control of the toiling masses’. This, it stated, constituted 
‘the historic occasion of the rebirth of the CELU into a democratic organisation’. The resolution 
‘strongly warned’ the PMAC against repeating the closure of its offices, demanded the release of 
its arrested leaders and an end to the exercise of censorship over its publications. It denounced the 
management of the nationalised corporations and demanded that workers, ‘through leaders of their 
own choosing, in an atmosphere of equality of freedom’ were allowed to participate in the 
management of these enterprises. It further called for government inspectors to leave state 
enterprises in order for a democratic workplace atmosphere to be created; an end to the wage-
freeze policy which the PMAC had imposed; the establishment of a minimum wage; and the 
promulgation of a new progressive labour law, to include provisions for job security, extensive 
social security, the abolishment and replacement of the LRB; and the free organisation of all 
 
122 Fissehatsion Tekie (1983, interview with Tom Killion) too, testifies that Marqos' group had the support of the 
majority. 
123 Discussed in chapter 2. 
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workers. The US embassy in Addis Ababa reported that the resolution contained ‘the first specific 
appearance of [a] communist line’ (Wyman 1975a)124. Probably most unpalatable to US officials 
was the announcement of CELU's disaffiliation from ICFTU, the eviction of the ICFTU and AALC 
offices from CELU's premises, and the denouncements that accompanied it. By now CELU was 
tilting towards positions taken by the clandestine leftist Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party125 
(EPRP), and although no formal alliance was ever proclaimed a certain convergence of views was 
to become apparent126. 
Organisationally, the PWC was successful in re-establishing and expanding the network of unions 
in the months that followed. In Kiflu's (2014, personal interview) assessment, the three months 
that followed was ‘the first time in Ethiopian history that there was an independent 
[confederation]’. Its autonomy and combativeness enabled it to attract large numbers of hitherto 
non-organised workers and establish new unions. This much was reluctantly admitted by the US 
ambassador (Hummel 1975a), who reported that although ‘[the] PWC is suffering internal strains 
and rivalries [it] seems to be making some progress towards its stated objective of re-establishing 
CELU HQs as genuine national centre for affiliated unions and workers’. The PWC's three-month 
report submitted in advance of the September 1975 General Assembly meeting, noted that inroads 
had been made in new sectors – for example, in organising tailors and sewers, tea house and bar 
employees, taxi and tractor chauffeurs, and mission employees – in the process establishing 41 
unions consisting of 8 500 workers, while also reviving a number of dormant unions and recruiting 
additional members to existing unions (CELU 1975c). Progress was also made in political terms, 
in acquiring the release of imprisoned former CELU leaders and obtaining official permission to 
hold a general congress. 
 
124 Mesfin Gebremichael of the old CELU leadership is quoted as having told the embassy that four technical advisors 
led by Kiflu Tadesse and Girmachew Lemma were responsible for drafting the CELU resolution attacking the PMAC, 
but another member of the ousted CELU leadership - Gebreselassie Gebremariam - adds that ‘many of those elected 
do indeed oppose the [PMAC]’ (Wyman 1975b). Mesfin would not have known that Kiflu and Girmachew were EPRP 
members at the time. Kiflu (2014, personal interview) agrees that Girmachew probably drafted the resolution. 
125 The EPRP had still not announced its existence, but the existence of a pole organised around its popular Democracia 
newsletter was becoming apparent. 
126 Note however, that while the EPRP's signature demand for a provisional people's government was featured in the 
September 1974 resolution – a full year before the emergence of that party – that particular demand was conspicuously 
absent from both the June and September 1975 resolutions. The perception, evident in much of the literature, that 
CELU had become little more than an EPRP front organisation by the mid-1975, does not take this fact into account. 
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The GA congress held in September 1975 testified to the level of support the radical leadership 
had acquired. The hitherto provisional leadership was re-elected on a regular term, and judging by 
the content of the resolutions (CELU 1975b) it was on an explicitly Marxist platform127. Although 
obviously unsympathetic to this platform, the US embassy's cables reported home about a 
legitimate process and an outcome consistent with the prevailing mood of the membership. 
‘CELU's rank-and-file was well represented at its General Assembly by individual union leaders’ 
it stated, ‘and we have no doubt that the resolution's bread and butter demands accurately expressed 
labour's needs’ (Hummel 1975e)128. The resolutions passed, however, included demands that were 
deemed ‘obviously unacceptable’ to the PMAC (Hummel 1975b). Most of these demands were 
similar to the ones that had been raised in the May resolution – and subsequently ignored – but 
they were now restated in a more assertive manner (CELU 1975b). The resolution expressed 
adherence to a popular democratic form of socialism and strong opposition to the prevailing 
authoritarianism and state capitalism. It demanded the reestablishment of civil and democratic 
rights – including the right to demonstrate and to strike, and the release of arrested progressives. 
Having had its previous demands for the democratisation of workplace relations ignored, CELU 
now called for the full removal of state-owned enterprises' management, and their replacement, 
across the board, with workers' representatives. In the case of its demands not being met within a 
month's time, it threatened that ‘all necessary measures’ would be taken. As the PMAC's rejection 
of these demands was somewhat of a foregone conclusion, and as this rejection could be expected 
to entail repressive measures, the CELU resolution included a provision that any harassment or 
repression would automatically trigger the activation of a general strike. To this end, preparations 
were made for a strike leadership to take charge in the event of arrests. But as subsequent events 
would bear out, the preparations were insufficient. 
The state responded in style. In an infamous event security forces were called to arrest distributors 
of leaflets containing the resolution at Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport. They found 
several hundred Ethiopian Airlines employees who, according to the government, ‘tried to obstruct 
the officers performing their duty, refused to disperse peacefully, and in fact encircled the security 
officers’ (ILO 1975). In what followed ‘a dozen’ (Ottaway and Ottaway, 1978: 9) workers were 
 
127 In that same month, a special issue of Voice of Labour consisting of a study compendium of The Communist 
Manifesto was issued. 
128 The number of unions represented at the GA, furthermore, was deemed to indicate the extent to which the PWC 
‘had done its work well in re-establishing links between affiliated unions and national centre’ (Hummel 1975b). 
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massacred, while many more were beaten and teargassed129. The repression and violence spread 
through the capital rapidly. The ICFTU assistant general secretary reported that ‘over a hundred 
people have been shot and it is reported that some 1 600 people have been arrested’. The arrested 
included Marqos Hagos, and ‘most of the 12 members of CELU's Executive Committee’, who 
were allegedly also ‘terribly beaten up’ (Luyimbazi 1976). Moreover, security agents attempted to 
track down each of the GA delegates and the 175 union representatives that had signed the 
resolution, arresting most of them (Vanderveken 1976). Workplaces were combed by agents 
aiming to identify rank-and-file workers who had been absent, with those deemed to be participants 
and instigators ‘arrested, beaten and reportedly shot’ (Hummel 1975b). In the course of the strike 
an explosion occurred outside the Addis Ababa telecommunications office, where the workforce 
was known for its strong opposition to the PMAC130. Although Kiflu (2014, personal interview) 
denies that CELU or EPRP were involved in the incident, it was seized upon by the PMAC as 
another pretext for clamping down on the labour movement. CELU was banned, and a state of 
emergency was declared: strikes, slowdowns, public assembly and distribution of leaflets were 
prohibited. This was enforced in the strictest manner as security forces were granted the right to 
shoot offenders on sight (EH 1975h; Clapham 1990: 55). In Akaki, a number of detained strikers 
were reportedly killed in front of their fellow workers so as ‘to teach [them] a lesson’ (Kiflu 2014, 
personal interview131). What remained of CELU's leadership went underground. 
The strike, meanwhile, was left without a coordinating body and failed to rally a critical mass. The 
US embassy in Addis Ababa (Hummel 1975b) described the manner in which it unravelled. ‘In 
the wake of [the Ethiopian Airlines] incident’, it reported, ‘strike call was assumed by some, but 
others awaited notification’. As a result, ‘hesitation, confusion and lack of communications 
doomed action from start’. But the call to strike was far from universally ignored. Workers of 
Moenco, Crown Cork, Sabean Metals, Darmar Shoes, and Ethiopian Airlines, among others, were 
reported to have walked out from work, and wildcat strikes continued for a full week at workplaces 
 
129 The official number of casualties was 4, while the number of injured was 29 (EH 1975f). In the government's 
account of events, the soldiers responded to ‘someone from the crowd [firing] a shot at them’ (ILO 1975). 
130 As late as March 11, 1977, an article published in Ethiopian Herald's ‘Revolutionary Forum’ column ostensibly 
written by a telecommunication worker, found it necessary to exhort colleagues to ‘clean our unions from EPRP 
traitors' (Tele Progressive 1977). 
131 Note also that Fissehatsion Tekie (1983, interview with Tom Killion) corroborates this claim by stating that the 
pro-PMAC labour leader of the Indo-Ethiopian Textile factory's union, located in the area, was ‘responsible for the 
massacre of workers’. 
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such as the Berhanena Selam Printing Press, Addis Tyre Company, Addis Shoe Factory, Fiat 
Company, Lazaridis Company, Addis Ababa's grain storage depot, Ethiopian Cider, Cement 
factory, Sadaolin Paints, Vaskin Company, and among petroleum workers, bank workers and 
insurance employees (Hummel 1975c; 1975d; 1975e). The US embassy (Hummel 1975b) 
estimated that between 8 000 and 10 000 workers participated in the strike, but this figure is 
considered far too low by Kiflu (2014, personal interview) who estimates that ‘a minimum of 
between 80 and 120 unions took part in the strike’. Much like what was reported about the radical 
labour movement in previous times, it has also been claimed that participation in the September 
1975 strike was relatively greater among white-collar workers. ‘Those who eventually walked off 
their jobs seem to come primarily from labour's most regarded elite’, a US embassy cable read 
(Hummel 1975e). But the cable also noted that the September 1975 strike was ‘the first time that 
substantial numbers of workers have translated their opposition to the [PMAC] into overt and 
united action’. According to Kiflu (2014, personal interview), the strike attracted as much blue-
collar support as white-collar. This included ‘fierce support’ throughout the Akaki industrial area, 
where the strike call ostensibly was most successful, and strikes continued for three to four days. 
Reeling from the blows suffered, radical workers and labour leaders began to rebuild a clandestine 
network of committees to coordinate activity. The experience of networking to augment pressures 
on the PMAC earlier that year provided a blue-print for constructing new clandestine structures. 
These consisted of rapidly multiplying groups of labour activists coordinated by a clandestine 
CELU Resurrection Committee. Funds were gathered to support the dependents of arrested 
workers and labour leaders, and a network was created that could coordinate resistance against 
attempts to impose control over the movement. By December 1975, Kiflu (2014, personal 
interview) claims, ‘a very large organisation’ had been created, ‘even stronger than before’132. At 
around this time, EPRP activists in the labour movement, and radical workers that had become 
sympathetic to its line, formed the Ethiopian Workers' Revolutionary Union (ELAMA)133. 
ELAMA constituted a separate organisational structure with horizontal attachments to the EPRP 
structures. Its establishment generated both an organisational asset for radicalised workers that 
 
132 Notably, the organisation even came to publish its own clandestine newspaper, CELU Resurrection (Kiflu 2016). 
133 The organisation is known by its Amharic acronym ELAMA, which reads የኢትዮጵያ ላባደሮች አብዮታዊ ማኅበር, 
literally translating to Ethiopian Proletarians' Revolutionary Association, but since the translation Ethiopian Workers' 
Revolutionary Union has been used elsewhere (Kiflu 1998), this translation will also be used here.  
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were prepared to continue to resist state impositions, and a political asset for the EPRP that allowed 
it to recruit workers in large numbers, providing it with a source of some of its most dedicated 
militants (Kiflu 1998). 
4.6 Confrontation and subjugation 
In December 1975 a new labour law was finally proclaimed. As noted in chapter 3 it was geared 
towards the imposition of industrial and institutional control rather than empowering workers. In 
addition to severely restricting collective labour rights, the proclamation made the abolishment of 
CELU formal and final, and stipulated its replacement with a new structure that was yet to emerge: 
the All-Ethiopia Trade Union (AETU). If there were any doubts as to the nature of the labour 
regime the proclamation aimed to usher in, official rhetoric, illustrated in an Ethiopian Herald 
(1975g) editorial entitled ‘Do more, ask less’ clarified it. ‘Under the canon now in force’, it read 
‘organised labour is no longer saddled with the burdensome [sic!] task of airing workers' 
grievances and engaging in invariably acrimonious wrangling with invariably materialist 
management’. Rather, workers' representatives were now expected to ‘bring their weight to bear 
on other areas where action is of the essence… meaning, essentially, hard work [emphasis added] 
for the common good’. ‘Then and only then’, it claimed ‘will organised labour find justification’. 
In another editorial, it was stated that ‘discipline is more indispensable than the luxury of 
“democracy”’. The US ambassador in Addis Ababa (Hummel 1975f) opined that the law, ‘stripped 
of its socialist jargon’, was essentially ‘moderate’, while the EPRP and ELAMA labelled the 
labour proclamation a ‘proclamation of slavery’ (ELAMA 1976; Kiflu 1998). Its promulgation has 
been interpreted as having sounded the death knell for the labour movement as an autonomous 
force (Killion 1985; Ottaway and Ottaway 1978). However, this could not be achieved by 
legislation alone, but would require meticulous scrutinising and culling of eligible candidates, 
recurrent purges and re-elections, and heavy repression that would continue over the next couple 
of years. The immediate results of the dissolution of CELU was, on the one hand, that the focal 
point of conflict now shifted to the process of purging oppositional labour leaders in the basic 
unions and their replacement with candidates deemed more loyal, and, on the other, a gradual 
displacement of opposition into clandestine structures. 
Through the autumn of 1975, the spring, and the summer of 1976 ELAMA coordinated a campaign 
demanding respect for labour and democratic rights, an end to state interference in union elections, 
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and the release of the imprisoned labour leaders. This campaign generated a flurry of defiant 
petitions and protest notes, stamped and signed by unions, representatives and workers134. The 
campaign included convincing workers to refuse to re-register their unions according to the 
requirements of the new labour law, or to hold fresh elections. As the protest and petition 
movement was conducted by and carried the seals of basic unions, or in some cases simply 
signatures of workers, the campaign appeared to be spontaneous rather than coordinated by 
clandestine structures. In March 1976, PMAC conceded to pressure to release a number of 
imprisoned labour leaders, including Marqos Hagos,  Beyene Solomon135 and Fissehatsion Tekie 
(EH 1976a), in time to enable union elections to be held before the stipulated deadline expired. 
This, however, proved to be the last major concession extracted, as the PMAC was preparing to 
pacify the labour movement once and for all. 
In the PMAC's attempts to enhance its influence and ability to penetrate new social layers, the 
Provisional Office for Mass Organisational Affairs (POMOA) had an important role to play. 
POMOA – formally established in April 1976 – was intended to constitute a platform for the part 
of the civilian left that was willing to work with the PMAC. It also intended to provide the latter 
with a cadre that could extend its social reach and assist it in establishing and asserting influence 
over masses and mass organisations. POMOA was overwhelmingly led and staffed by cadres and 
sympathisers of the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (AESM136) and, to a lesser degree, several 
smaller Marxist-Leninist groups137, which all had their own reasons for wanting to establish 
influence over the labour movement. POMOA played an important role in drafting the 1975 labour 
proclamation – which a MEISON official (Frewe 1980: 5) would describe as ‘one of the most 
important landmarks of the Ethiopian revolution’ – and in reorganising the unruly labour 
movement. Jealous of EPRP's influence within the labour movement, the POMOA-aligned groups 
saw the restructuring of the labour movement as an opportunity to gain that precious foothold 
among the labouring masses that their Marxist-Leninist credentials required.  
 
134 See, among the plenty examples in the CETU archives, letters from Various unions (1976a) and Workers' Union 
of the National Tobacco and Match Corporation (1976) to PMAC. 
135 Beyene would later be re-arrested and spend several additional years in prison. He was released in 1981. 
136 This organisation is often referred to according to its Amharic acronym: MEISON 
137 Waz (Labour) League, Ethiopian Oppressed Peoples' Struggle, Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Organisation, and, 
at a later stage, Revolutionary Seded (flame). 
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From April 1976 onwards, participation in workplace discussion clubs known as Workers' 
Revolutionary Forums was made mandatory for all employees, ostensibly to facilitate ‘free and 
democratic exchange of views’ (EH 1976b). In reality, they direct to guide the election of ‘correct’ 
representatives, to disseminate official policy among workers, all the while identifying and 
exposing oppositional workers. A painstaking process of exposing and weeding out ‘anarchists’ 
and ‘reactionaries’ within the workforce in general and among labour representatives in particular 
ensued. The ‘guided’ elections of labour leaders to the emerging structures of the AETU proceeded 
in tandem with this process. Despite the ‘coercive manner’ (Tienken 1976e) under which the 
process proceeded, it proved very difficult to ensure that the desired representatives were chosen. 
This is evidenced by the high number of incidents of dismissal, arrest and even execution of union 
leaders; cancellations of election results; forced re-elections; broken up meetings; arrest of 
participants; and postponements (EH 1976d; 1976e; 1976f; 1976g; 1976h; 1977b;  1977e; 1977f; 
Kiflu 2014, personal interview). Workers in constituent unions and industrial federations would 
be summoned to seminars, were the opposition was denounced and the desirable electoral outcome 
was indicated. However, through a combination of workers' intransigence and ELAMA 
coordination, elections could either not be held or, frequently, resulted in the re-election of the 
very same representatives that they were meant to replace (Kiflu 2014, personal interview). In the 
case of the re-organisational congress of the federation of manufacturing workers, for example, 
200 out of 250 delegates walked out of the meeting. Subsequent attempts led to turmoil, fist fights 
and the arrest of eleven delegates – some of whom were imprisoned for years and some of whom 
were later executed (Kiflu 2014, personal interview). The frustrations experienced by authorities 
are described by Alemu Abebe (2014, personal interview): 
The platform was still open, and there were not enough [pro-government] 
candidates to be promoted. What kind of leadership [that was elected] was not 
guaranteed [and] it was not possible to manipulate it. So [on a] platform organised 
by the government an opposing leadership [came] into place. Because even though 
[the government] created the legal framework [with a different intent], the people 
who [were elected] were still those that the labourers knew. 
Condemnations in state media makes clear that slow-downs, strikes, sabotages and other forms of 
industrial unrest were occurring with such a frequency that it evidently was considered a pressing 
problem. The labour proclamation and the wrangling over control it had set in motion had only 
aggravated this problem. Nor were the workers' forums always successful in bringing workers into 
117 
 
line. May Day demonstrations 1976 saw ranks of workers raising oppositional demands – on 
banners smuggled in and unfolded on Addis Ababa's main parading square138 – and armed 
repression. According to Kiflu (2014, personal interview) ‘many were arrested and killed’ in this 
incident, while Andargachew (2000: 339) claims that security officers – allegedly responding to a 
shot that had been fired from the demonstration – opened fire and killed around 20 demonstrating 
workers, wounding many more. On May 28, 1976, Ethiopian Herald voiced exasperation that 
‘there can be no escaping the fact that there are instances of where undue advantage is being taken 
of the opportunity provided by the discussion forums [,] so much so, in fact, that [POMOA] has 
just found it expedient to express – in no unmistakable terms – its dismay over this unfortunate 
drift’. The next day, PMAC issued a strong warning in response to its alleged understanding that 
‘some discussion forums have been turned into tools serving the interests of reactionaries desirous 
of causing production slow-downs’ (EH 1976m). But labour unrest continued unabated through 
the spring and summer of 1976. In July, the US embassy (Tienken 1976a) reported that postal 
office workers in Addis Ababa were protesting and demanding the release of their arrested union 
leaders. Port workers in Eritrea, sugar estate workers at the Wonji sugar factory, and casual coffee-
cleaning workers were among others who were reported to have been involved in unrest. 
The state responded to such frustrations with increasing levels of violence. Executions of suspected 
EPRP members had begun in 1976, and open confrontation with the latter was becoming 
increasingly likely. By the autumn the labour movement became embroiled in the violence. At 
around the same time the EPRP began to assassinate PMAC, POMOA and MEISON cadre it 
alleged were responsible for the heightened repression. The debate on the relative responsibility is 
neither resolvable nor relevant here139, but Kiflu's claim that it was the PMAC's inability to 
subordinate the labour movement that constituted the immediate trigger of the so-called ‘red terror’ 
campaign of the state is noteworthy (2014, personal interview) – if only because it calls to attention 
the central role of the labour movement in the convulsions that Ethiopia was in the midst of. 
 
138 Pictures from the demonstrations show participants marching across Revolution Square having unfurled a large 
banner proclaiming ‘CELU and ELAMA are companions in the struggle’ (Abyot 1980: 13). Markakis and Nega (1978) 
refers to ‘numerous placards’ demanding the establishment of a provisional people 's government, and Kiflu (2014, 
personal interview) claims that while the demonstrating workers had been carrying government-approved placards in 
the procession to the square, ‘almost all of them’ replaced them with concealed placards displaying oppositional 
demands on entering the square. 
139 See for instance Halliday and Molyneux (1981); Lefort (1983); Kiflu (1998), Negede (2014), Fikreselassie (2014), 
and Fisseha (2015). 
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According to this interpretation, mass repression was initially launched against the labour 
movement in Dire Dawa during the summer of 1976. Correspondence from Dire Dawa and its 
twin city Harar through 1975 and 1976 seems to corroborate the notion that the levels of unrest 
and harassment of the labour movement was particularly severe there, with frequent strikes, layoffs 
and arrests of labour leaders and workers (Various unions 1975; ‘All Harar proletarians’ 1976; 
Various unions 1976b). But whatever the merits of the argument above, mass repression was 
within short to replace administrative measures as the preferred means of subjugating the 
oppositional labour movement throughout the country. 
Meanwhile, the state went to great lengths to assure that new and loyal structures were formed. 
The weeding out of opposition and the identification of reliable candidates was only one side of 
this process – the other was the wholesale reorganisation of the unions and federations in 
anticipation of the re-foundation of a national centre. Re-elections, as noted however, continued 
to create undesirable outcomes. Out of eight federations which elected new leaderships in June 
1976, half had been replaced – by intimidation or forceful eviction – by the end of that year. The 
federation of banking and insurance workers had refused to partake altogether, and therefore had 
not elected any new leadership in the first place. Despite heavy efforts, only the leadership of four 
out of nine federations were deemed sufficiently reliable to participate in the foundation of a new 
confederation (Tienken 1976f). In December 1976, MoLSA called a meeting of trade union leaders 
in the town of Ambo, quite some distance away from the ferment of the urban and industrial arena, 
and ‘free from any possible lobbying by union members’ (Tienken 1976f). This meeting was 
attended by the full crop of the political leadership at the time, including PMAC Chairman 
Mengistu Hailemariam and the POMOA leadership. The session evolved into the founding 
congress of AETU, which officially occurred in January 1977, after sufficient preparations and 
assessments had made sure that only vetted loyalist leaders were present. As a result of the 
stringent requirements of the vetting procedure, only 65 representatives partook in the congress, 
and out of the names on the roster, few, if any, were recognisable as prominent or experienced 
union leaders. Those unions and federations that had yet failed to generate loyal and vetted 
candidates were denied representation at the congress (Tienken 1976f; 1977). Alemu Abebe (2014, 
personal interview), has described the difficulties encountered by the organisers in terms of having 
insufficient time ‘to manoeuvre’ since the confederation could not viably be banned indefinitely. 
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‘It was [only] later on that [the authorities] started penetrating the lower level trade unions’, he 
affirmed. 
September 1976 marked the last serious attempt by the oppositional labour movement to resolve 
the conflict industrially and politically, even if now also enhanced with insurrectionary tactics and 
means140. Repression and arrests had taken its toll on the movement in the preceding months and 
in many places the structures of the movement had already been depleted or rendered defunct. 
Having concluded that it was facing destruction if things proceeded along the prevailing trajectory, 
ELAMAs third congress decided to call a general strike as a last desperate throw of the dice (Kiflu 
2014, personal interview). In response to the general strike call, the PMAC released a statement 
warning that it had ordered security forces ‘to take appropriate revolutionary measures on the spot 
against all those individuals and/or groups who either instigate work stoppage or go on strike’. 
‘All anti-revolutionary forces who trade on the struggle of workers’, it vowed, ‘will perish’ (EH 
1976i). The strike took place in the immediate aftermath of a failed assassination attempt on 
PMAC's chairman Mengistu Hailemariam which reinforced the state's commitment to rub it out 
whatever the costs. The US embassy in Addis Ababa estimated (Tienken 1976c) that around 500-
650 persons were arrested during the week that followed and that between 20 and 50 ‘were killed 
September 22-23 as [a] result of strikes, demonstrations and stoning of buses’. The violence 
included seemingly random atrocities, such as the killing of seven in a raid on a popular hotel, but 
it also entailed systematic and targeted repression, including the execution of somewhere between 
100 and 600 of the arrested strikers and protestors (Tienken 1976c). Before the strike was 
smothered US embassy cables (Tienken 1976b; 1976d) reported that it had effectively caused 
power and water supply failures in parts of Addis Ababa as well as partial transportation stoppages. 
Strikes, which occurred ‘throughout the city’, included those of bank, utility and transportation 
workers, as well as workers at the tobacco monopoly and at two national textile factories. 
Shootings and stone throwing were reported across the city for several days, but in face of the 
tense atmosphere and the heavy repression that prevailed, the momentum could not be sustained.  
 
140 The compelling interpretation that the planned September 1976 general strike amounted to an insurrection attempt 
is Alemu Abebe's (2014 personal interview). Kiflu (2014 personal interview) disagrees with this characterisation 
claiming that the decision to call a strike was taken by a committee of workers' representative that had no prior 
knowledge of a coinciding assassination attempt on Mengistu Hailemariam. Either way, had a general strike – 
reinforced by demonstrations and armed activity – been successful, it would likely have amounted to an insurrection.  
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After the failure of the strike, conventional industrial unrest and contestation began to peter out 
(Tienken 1976f). It became less difficult for state agents and allies to achieve desirable electoral 
outcomes in the reorganisation of remaining unions and federations – although not yet all – as 
anything resembling opposition was now considered a serious crime, and since most of those 
identified as radical labour activists either had been arrested or had gone underground. The 
imprisoned allegedly included ‘thousands of 1st, 2nd and 3rd generation labour leaders’ (Kiflu 2014, 
personal interview). Coordinated resistance, in this environment, was no longer viable and a 
number of additional criteria was introduced to safeguard that only vetted representatives were 
elected at the various levels. Instead and aside of dispersed resistance, the contradictions still very 
prevalent came to express themselves increasingly in armed conflict. Workplaces were militarised 
and workers deemed loyal were organised in pro-government militias, armed and unleashed on 
perceived enemies within and outside their own ranks. Oppositional workers were a primary target 
of these militias and other security forces, and the campaign to expose and weed out real and 
imagined opponents within the workforce was intensified. In workplace after workplace across the 
country, ‘mercenaries’, ‘anarchists’, and ‘reactionaries’ were identified, denounced, imprisoned 
and, with increasing frequency, executed (EH 1976j; 1976k; 1976l; 1977a; 5/3/77; 1977c; 1977d; 
1977g; 1977h; 1977i). 
The opposition also militarised its strategy. Workers played a prominent role in the EPRP's urban 
military squads, and ELAMA established its own armed squads (Kiflu 1998; 2014, personal 
interview). Victims were claimed on both sides, although the opposition bore the brunt. A US 
embassy cable from March 1977 (Tienken 1977) portrays a war-like situation in the Akaki 
industrial area, where workers organised in opposing constellations were involved in hostilities 
that included assassinations and the use of explosive devices141. Indeed, March was to become a 
bloody month for the radical labour movement as well as the opposition in general. In one of the 
most infamous incidents of the revolution, ELAMA central committee member and Berhanena 
Selam Printing Press union representative Daro Negash, who was eight months pregnant at the 
time, and eight colleagues from the printing press whom had allegedly been identified as 
‘anarchists’ in the workers' discussion club, were killed by an armed squad working under the 
 
141 From a more partisan angle, the EPRP Foreign Committee's journal Abyot (1977) claimed that in that very month, 
state atrocities against workers in Addis Ababa alone included the killing of 25 employees of the cement factory; 15 
employees of the Lazaridis company; 20 employees of Indo-Ethiopian textile factory; 5 customs employees; 7 railway 
workers; 23 workers of the Pepsi Cola factory; and an unknown number of weaving workers in the Kolfe district. 
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order of a local Urban Dweller's Association142 chairman143 (EH 1977j). The same month David 
Ottaway (1977) reported the following for the Washington Post: 
The  government's  arming  of  workers  and  the  neighbourhood  associations  
immediately  led  to  bloody  strife  last week  in  the  Akaki industrial  sector  of   
the  city  and  to widespread  night-time  shootings. Unconfirmed reports said that 
as many as 70 workers died in fighting inside half a dozen factories… Meanwhile, 
six more assassinated labour officials were buried here this weekend.  
May Day celebrations in 1977 – called by ELAMA the day before the occasion in order to 
circumvent expected suppression – turned into the single-most bloody episode of the urban 
violence of the period. Protesters were met by machine-gun equipped jeeps firing into the crowds 
and demonstrators rounded up were summarily executed the very same night. Estimates vary over 
the number of dead, which range between several hundreds and over a thousand (Markakis and 
Nega 1978). Although far from all, or even the majority, of the victims of this massacre were 
organised workers, it is telling that the episode occurred in response to demonstrations for the 
international workers' day called by a workers' organisation. Exposures and purges would go on 
for several years, but at the end of 1977, what was left of the oppositional labour movement that 
had emerged in the 1960s, seized control of CELU in 1975, and parts of which had joined 
ELAMA's campaign in the aftermath of the banning of CELU, was vanquished and destroyed. 
Aside from scores of other workers and representatives, the militarised struggle in and over the 
labour movement took the lives of the last chairman of CELU, Marqos Hagos, and the first two 
chairmen of AETU, Tewodros Bekele and Temesgen Madebo – the former killed by agents of the 
state and the two latter both assassinated by ELAMA squads. Apart from the chairmen, AETU's 
treasurer Kebede Gebremichael; first deputy vice president, Gezahegn Kassahoun; vice president, 
Gezahegn Teklearegay; and executive committee member, Kebede Tekle also perished. Other 
victims of executions and assassination included Tessema Deressa, secretary general of the PWC 
and representative of the Awash Valley Project union; Ali Hussein, PWC member144 and union 
 
142 Known by their Amharic name, Kebeles. 
143 The public outrage the killings sparked and other atrocious excesses of the squad proved too much for the PMAC: 
its members – as well as the two colleagues of the murdered from Berhanena Selam Printing Press, who had 
‘identified’ them and called on the squad – were themselves in turn executed. See Wiebel (2014) for a broader 
contextualisation and discussion of the meaning of this incident within the campaign of state-sanctioned terror. 
144 A fourth PWC member, Mekonnen Tesfaye, was reportedly executed in a later round of purges of MEISON-
affiliated labour activists. Mekonnen was the assistant general secretary of the PWC, representing the union of Addis 
Ababa Cement Factory. 
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representative of the Indo-Ethiopian Textile Factory; Tsegaye Yehwalashet, secretary of the 
Transport and Communication Workers federation; Teferra, chairman of Electricity, Water and 
Gas Workers Federation; Wondimu Woldemedhin, first deputy chairman of the manufacturing 
industry workers' federation; Ademe Seifu, president of the Metahara Sugar Factory Workers' 
Union; Orion Adamutu, vice chairman of the plastics factory workers' union; and Kassahun 
Ambaye, chairman of the union of Awassa Farm Development  Enterprise  (Negede 2014: 253; 
Beyene 2010: 170-171; Fikreselassie 2014: 290; Kiflu 2014, personal interview; Andergachew 
2000: 409). At the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, victims of assassination included 
Permanent Secretary Guetnet Zewde – allegedly an important officer in the reorganisation of and 
wresting control over the trade unions (Tienken 1976e) – and section head Zewdu Alemayehu 
(Fikreselassie 2014). The dead rank-and-file members of the Ethiopian labour movement are too 
plenty to mention. That the violence of the period involved workers to a particularly marked degree 
is something that is agreed upon by former POMOA officials as well as EPRP leaders (Negede 
1980: 7; Kiflu 1993; 1998; 2014, personal interview; 2016). The PMAC chairman too, seemed to 
reflect this view when, decrying ‘infiltrators’ of the labour movements that had ‘inflicted heavy 
damages’, he spoke of the ‘death blow’ dealt to them by ‘revolutionary defence squads in 
residential areas as well as in production centres’ (Mengistu 1982: 36). 
Despite the defeat of organised labour opposition, dispersed troubles remained or re-emerged in 
the basic unions. More purges were also to follow as the POMOA coalition broke apart, one group 
at a time. First, MEISON-affiliated trade unionists and representatives were weeded out, removed, 
arrested, and sometimes killed. Subsequently, those affiliated with remaining smaller parties were 
subjected to the same procedure. On May 25, 1978 the full membership of the executive committee 
of AETU was dismissed and replaced (Walker 1978). This led to another round of purges in the 
basic unions that entailed violent repression too. At the Metahara sugar factory, for example, the 
AETU (1978) readily reported that an unstated number of ‘right roaders’145 in the leadership of 
the union and revolutionary guard committee had been ousted, subjected to a newly established 
‘Red Terror Committee’, and had ‘revolutionary measures’ taken against them. Senior MEISON 
leader Negede Gobezie (2014: 253) lists over 600 MEISON-affiliated workers and labour leaders 
who were purged, imprisoned or executed in this round of repression. Amongst those killed were 
 
145 The derogatory label used for MEISON in the aftermath of its falling out with the PMAC. 
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the leaderships of the Dire Dawa textile and cement factories, as well as 15 officials from the 
Wonji sugar factory union and the chairman of a union in the city of Nazret146. This repression led 
a MEISON official (Frewe 1980: 7-9) to claim that ‘the vanguard elements and elected leaders [of 
the working class] have been thrown in the [PMAC]'s prisons in their thousands’. Alemu Abebe 
(2014, personal interview) has noted that ‘the moment MEISON went underground, [the labour 
movement] was taken over by another organisation with literally with no resistance [emphasis 
added]’, but this seems only partially accurate.  In the aftermath of the purge, the AETU (1978) 
reported still having had to address labour unrest, sabotage and subversion at the basic unions of 
Metahara sugar factory, Wonji plantations, the Fibre factory, CBE, Upper Awash Agricultural 
Development Enterprise, church-owned enterprises, and Edget yarn factory. 
In November 1978 a new round of arrests were reported to have been made in AETU's 
headquarters, as another couple of smaller Marxist-Leninist groups had fallen out of official 
favour. In December that same year, it was followed by another purge of the full leadership of the 
AETU, and two officials were reported to have been shot (Chapin 1979a). The reasons reported 
for this purge were related to another bout of inter-party competition over control of AETU, but 
also that the ousted leadership had proven insufficiently enthusiastic in preparing the workers for 
the ‘extensive sacrifices’ that the upcoming National Revolutionary Development Campaign 
would require. ‘The failure of the AETU leadership to cooperate fully’, according to the US 
ambassador (Chapin 1979b), ‘was seriously threatening the government's ability to impose its will 
upon the workers’, indicating that whatever residues of autonomy that had remained were now 
removed147. This time, it appears, no resistance was registered from the rank-and-file. In fact, 
Ethiopian workers with whom the embassy reported to have been in contact with were resigned 
about ‘the seeming impossibility of any real labour union representation’ and ‘well aware of the 
extensive political manipulation by the government of the AETU’. ‘There is a widespread feeling 
that the organisation is a charade’, the ambassador concluded. Indeed, by the early 1980s not many 
independent-minded labour leaders remained in high positions. It was around this time that the 
1982 trade union law described in the previous chapter was passed, openly turning AETU into 
‘streamlined and reorganised’ structures ‘responsive to the leadership of [COPWE]’. This 
 
146 Contemporarily known as Adama. 
147 This conclusion was also drawn by the Department of State (1980: 70), which claimed that by 1979 ‘the modest 
level of independence enjoyed by unionists even a year ago has disappeared’, with the unions now having become 
‘entirely [emphasis added] controlled by the government, and serve only to mobilise and control workers’.  
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coincided with another purge of the AETU leadership and the installation of Tadesse Tamrat as 
chairman, a trade unionist from the Indo-Ethiopian/Akaki Textile Factory – that was to lead the 
confederation until 1991. 
At the tail end of the first cycle a new degree of control over the labour movement, hitherto unseen 
in scope, had been established. Unlike earlier stages this phase was marked by ‘more or less 
absolute control’ over its structures. In the late 1970s, according to Alemu Abebe (2014, personal 
interview) ‘everything [was] manipulated – there [was] no room for mistakes’. ‘Before anybody 
[was] nominated’, he explains, ‘he [was] scrutinised’. The structures had for all essential purposes 
been rendered impenetrable to and insulated from opposition, militant labour activism and rank-
and-file pressure alike. 
4.7 Constraining factors 
As would have been predicted from the review of the literature it appears that bureaucratisation 
was a factor that affected the Ethiopian labour movement through most of the cycle. With the 
emergence of a leadership with no direct links to, or origins in, any constituent unions, and 
materially and socially quite radically separated from the rank-and-file, bureaucratism was an 
essential aspect of CELU's features from the outset. In the sense that the top officials were neither 
representative of any unions, nor, in most cases, possessing any direct experience of wage work 
prior to being employed by the confederation, the process of bureaucratisation within CELU was 
quite extraordinary. The fact that the number of top officials was relatively small does not change 
the fact that they were greatly privileged – socially and materially. FTOs and staff members co-
opted into the leadership wielded a significant amount of power over the confederation as well as 
the basic unions. And they used it consistently to arrest, subvert and purge radicalism and 
militancy. Whether their pragmatism was determined by the privilege that came with office or not 
was initially a moot point. After the ouster of Abraham Mekonnen and the death of Aberra Gemu 
it appeared evident that meaningful assertiveness would lead to removal from office in any case, 
and top labour and state officials were eager to repeatedly point out that it was likely to result in 
the forced dissolution of CELU altogether (Robinson 1963; Morehous 1969: 75). In appearance, 
external pressures would seemingly fuse privileged bureaucratic interests with the institutional 
need of defending the organisation. The fact that this conflation was largely illusory and that an 
assertive strategy could actually lead to far-reaching concessions from the state, securing greater 
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autonomy for the labour movement, was a proposition that was not tested until 1973. By the time 
it became clear that this was the case, CELU's moderate leadership was doomed.  
Trade unionism had been legalised in Ethiopia in a conjuncture where labour unrest was becoming 
increasingly frequent. The imperial government assumed that open trade unionism under a 
moderate leadership and within a restrictive legal-institutional nexus could provide more efficient 
internal control mechanisms than external control and repression alone. The general success of 
this approach can be illustrated with a citation from a bakery union leader that appeared in CELU's 
Voice of Labour (1970: 11): 
Your union has tied our hands and feet. Before you organised us we used to get 
substantial concessions from employers by merely threatening a walkout. The 
employers knew that we did not kid when we threatened – the work, the flour even 
the equipment was not safe. Yet, now you have advised us that through the union 
we have first to discuss with our employers, then if we are not satisfied we have 
to submit our grievance to the labour relations section of the MNCD and that if 
we are not reconciled by the section we have to lodge our dispute with the LRB. 
The case does not stop there, either employers or employees can appeal to the 
Supreme Imperial Court [or even referred] to His Majesty's [court]. Yes, your 
union has weakened our unity. We neither have the money, the time nor the 
manpower to follow up our disputes through these channels. Your union has only 
tied us to the benefit of our employers. 
The above does not detract from the achievements of CELU and affiliated unions – some of which 
were quite substantial – but rather illustrate the dual role of trade unionism.  Moreover, it also does 
not mean that the state lacked effective instruments of direct control and repression in cases where 
events were to its disliking. Individual unions considered to be engaged in ‘unfair practices’ – for 
example, by calling a strike – could be forcefully dissolved by the LRB. This was the fate, for 
example, of the union of Lazaridis Cotton Mills in 1963. Invoking the wrath of the LRB, moreover, 
could have other deleterious effects, ‘since any declaration of illegality’ – the likely outcome of 
any strike call – would ‘entitle management to dismiss all the strikers’ (Morehous 1969: 65). 
On the level of the confederation, the state would intervene to shore up CELU's leadership 
whenever the latter was threatened, but also to impress on the latter the importance of remaining 
within approved parameters. Where the leadership could or would not guarantee an outcome 
consistent with official expectations placed on it, the state did not shy away from employing 
repression to generate such outcomes. The state was repeatedly to display a catalogue of measures 
ranging from harassment, arrests, violence, to occasional lethal force. Only later, when 
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contestation took place over increasingly high stakes, was it to engage in determined mass 
repression. When it did so, as has been demonstrated, it eventually resulted in the subjugation of 
the labour movement and the termination of its autonomy. But the aftermath of the Ethiopian 
revolution constituted a unique conjuncture, and to extrapolate from this that the state would 
always have been capable of employing such massive terroristic violence is unfeasible. Despite 
the constant preoccupation with imposing state control, the exposition above demonstrates that 
there were many times assertive strategies and militant practices managed to achieve important 
advances without triggering such measures. It also demonstrates that open state interference often 
triggered an adversary reaction among the workers and in fact fed into growing militancy and 
radicalisation. State repression, then, was an important factor in containing militancy at certain 
conjunctures, but for the longer part of the first cycle it was neither as reliable, cost efficient, nor 
effective as the internal control entrusted onto the labour bureaucracy. 
Through most of the 1960s and early 1970s, international support effectively reinforced the top 
leadership's deferential pragmatism. The international ‘free’ trade union movement, spearheaded 
in Ethiopia by the ICFTU, shouldered this task with the greatest commitment. Through the 
leverage that came with its financial assistance it would exert a level of influence over CELU's 
leadership that is incompatible with any meaningful autonomy of the latter. In fact, the dependence 
was so great that it was considered excessive, and a source of discomfort to both ICFTU and CELU 
top officials. Nevertheless, it was wielded authoritatively by the former when the latter was 
considered in disagreement with the principles of ‘free’ trade unionism – however innocent and 
symbolic these transgressions were understood to be148. But the vassal-like relationship would also 
 
148 Nevertheless, the service that CELU's leadership provided to the cause of anti-radical trade unionism was greatly 
appreciated by its international allies. The gratitude was demonstrated by the largesse the ICFTU and allies bestowed 
upon the CELU officials after their downfall. Intervention at the highest political level was undertaken in order to 
attempt to secure their release. After that been secured, there were few limits on the material and logistical assistance 
provided to the former top officials. Files in ICFTU's archive shows how key officials were extended funding and 
logistical assistance to take up residence or pursue studies abroad. Well-paid employment was also offered all key 
office holder by the ICFTU, the AALC, Organisation of African Trade Union Unity and ILO, and generous assistance 
was extended to family members. In one case, after having seen through that a family member was offered an 
internship at ILO, a former top official wrote to the general secretary of the ICFTU, informing the latter that ‘in the 
event that [she is not employed by OATUU as its secretary general had promised him], I shall be counting on your 
support to help my wife secure another training programme or job’ (Fissehatsion 1978). In the former president's case, 
assistance included, among other things, relief assistance funds through his imprisonment and in the immediate 
aftermath, the offer of a well-paid job for the ILO at his release, and 45 000 USD that funded relocation and studies 
in the US of two family members (Beyene 1990). This support to his person and family, ‘will definitely remain a land-
mark in the history of the trade-union movement in Ethiopia’, Beyene (1990) wrote his sponsors, signing of with 
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be seized upon internally to prop up the CELU leadership and to effect moderation among 
constituent unions. One way of doing so was through the ubiquitous ICFTU-funded training 
programmes that inculcated the principles of business unionism among workers' representatives. 
But as these attempts to internalise the values of ‘free’ trade unionism proved neither sufficient 
nor entirely effective, more direct mechanisms were deployed. The selective disbursement of 
supplied funds was a key tool by which CELU's leadership exercised influence over the orientation 
of constituent unions, and could force the latter to fall in line. Diversion from the acceptable line 
resulted in the drying up of funds. The leverage exercised in this manner was underlined by the 
precarious finances of the movement. Where this was not sufficient, it has been demonstrated how 
international allies colluded with the CELU leadership to subvert and overturn democratic 
decisions and processes. Finally, it has been documented how both the CELU leadership and 
ICFTU representatives regularly informed state offices on the activities of suspected radicals or 
allies alike. CELU leaders and international ‘free’ trade union representatives did not only collude 
with the state, but in the final instance they relied on its repressive capacity to ensure control over 
the movement. In total, the intervention of the international ‘free’ trade union movement reinforced 
efforts to keep CELU on a pragmatic footing. But in doing so, it also further constricted its 
autonomy. 
In terms of contextual factors, the poor strategic position of Ethiopian labour has been considered 
an important contributing factor to Ethiopian labour's perceived subordination to the state. Killion 
(1985) has argued that the almost unlimited vastness of the unemployed reserve army of labour 
and the menial nature of most wage labour combined to create an environment where workers 
were particularly susceptible to the threat of dismissal. ‘Dismissal is a particularly horrifying threat 
given the lack of employment opportunities and the vast number of unemployed workers’, 
Morehous (1969:69) noted, lending support to the above: ‘many jobs in Ethiopia remain relatively 
unskilled and replacement appears to be quite easy, thus affording most employers the luxury of 
dismissals at will’. The weak strategic position this generated, it was argued, was further 
undermined by two factors. First, Killion argued, ‘the semi-feudal structures of agrarian surplus 
expropriation remained the ultimate foundations of the political and material power of the 
 
‘Long Live the ICFTU, Long Live the AALC, Long Live the AFL-CIO’. The generosity with which the CELU 
officials were treated contrasts sharply with the silence by which the repression of the radical labour movement was 
met, and the complete indifference that the international ‘free’ trade union movement displayed towards several 
batches of subsequently imprisoned and exiled Ethiopian labour leaders.  
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autocratic state’. Secondly, the ‘master-servant’ relations that were predominant in agrarian 
Ethiopia were ‘imported’ by the first-generation wage workers to their new workplaces (Killion 
1985: 452-453). Combined, these three factors were argued to have resulted in Ethiopian workers' 
subordination to and dependence on the state.  
Contextual factors certainly cannot be ignored. However, since the factors mentioned here 
prevailed before, during, and after the cycle described above, they cannot decisively explain the 
shifting orientation and fortune of the labour movement. Moreover, the reliance of the pre-
revolutionary Ethiopian dominant classes and state on agrarian surplus extraction is an important 
observation with extensive implications, to be sure. But there is no reason to assume that this 
reliance on surpluses generated outside of the waged sector would weaken the strategic position 
of labour within the waged sector. It could very well be argued that the relative lesser importance 
of surpluses from the waged sector was a factor that generated a certain space for wage workers to 
advance their position. Indeed, Killion (1985:391) has also – somewhat contradicting the prior 
argument of his – argued that ‘because the hegemony of the imperial ruling class rested on their 
control over land and peasants, rather than the capitalist sector, the state was not particularly 
threatened by the organisation of workers in industries, which were largely foreign-owned’. If this 
is the case, the revolution, which abolished the fundamental surplus extractive mechanism in the 
agrarian sector – landlordism – and lessened the degree of those surpluses, would ironically have 
had the effect of enhancing the relative importance of surplus generation in the waged sectors and 
thus increased the ‘threat’ of organised wage workers. Indeed, the repressive control regime 
established by the PMAC over wage labour was altogether new in scope. While it may then be 
argued that the general political-economic territory in which the Ethiopian labour movement 
prevailed was quite inhospitable to autonomous and assertive labour movementism, the factors 
mentioned cannot be considered determinant to the subordination of labour to the state. Eventually 
none of them checked the emergence of a radical and militant autonomous labour movement. Only 
repression finally did. 
Another contextual factor that has been viewed as having left an imprint on the Ethiopian labour 
movement is that of social fractures. While this aspect should not be exaggerated, the issue of the 
national division of the workforce has been raised in a number of texts. In the aftermath of the 
1974 general strike, for example, a survey conducted by Seleshi (1976) found that views about the 
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general strike somewhat tended to differ among different groups of workers. While ‘blue-collar’ 
workers and workers from ‘non-dominant’ nationalities tended to view the benefits of the general 
strike in more economic terms, ‘white-collar’ workers and workers from ‘dominant’ nationalities 
emphasised the political gains (Seleshi 1976). This is a theme that Clapham (1990: 55) has also 
raised, claiming that blue-collar workers of the Akaki and Kaliti industrial district who were ‘more 
likely to be Oromo than Eritrean’ provided important armed support for the PMAC. He also 
claimed there was significant support for the PMAC among workers at Wonji ‘who were largely 
from Kambata and Welayta’, contrasting this with ‘more-skilled northerners who tended to oppose 
it’. Although Clapham's claims are less substantiated than Seleshi's, they somewhat reinforce the 
latter. It is plausible that national or regional origin had some level of tendency to correlate with 
orientation, at least within certain conjunctures. There are also indications that national fractures 
affected the coherence of the labour movement to some degree. According to Kiflu (2014, personal 
interview) for example, some of the resentment towards Alem Abdi stemmed from his Gurage 
origin, and some dissenters took issue with the Eritrean origin of several of the CELU leaders. 
Killion (1985), meanwhile, accounts for how the regionalist sentiments between Gojami and non-
Gojami workers fuelled conflicts within the union of the Bahir Dar Textile Factory. Seleshi (197: 
689) describes how oppositional labour activists accused the CELU leadership of ethnic and 
regional discrimination, and there are several reports in the CETU archives of conflicts in 
constituent unions entailing a national/ethnic aspect149. However, as there is overwhelming 
evidence of multinational participation across both the radical and moderate wings of the labour 
movement, the importance of this factor should not be overstated. While Tigrigna-speaking 
northerners, for example, provided the core of CELU's top officialdom, they also played an 
important role in the radical opposition. Something similar can likely be said of all those 
nationalities that constituted a significant share of the wage labouring population. If national 
fractions were an aspect that conditioned orientation, it was a contingent and minor one. 
As indicated in Clapham's claim above, much of the literature refers to the impact of another 
fracture: that of the differences in orientational tendencies between better paid and educated white-
collar workers, and blue-collar workers, with, perhaps unexpectedly, the former exhibiting a 
 
149 See, for example, Emmanuel Fayessa Negassa and Tedla Fantaye's (1971) report on the Papasinos Fibre Factory 
union for one such account. 
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greater tendency towards assertiveness, radicalism, and militancy150. Some accounts have ventured 
as far as claiming that the militant labour opposition movement was more or less reducible to a 
white-collar phenomenon – an unsustainable position in light of the exposition presented above. 
Much like the issue of national/ethnic origins, these differences should neither be generalised nor 
exaggerated, but neither can they be completely ignored. Unions in which skilled and educated 
workers played a dominant role provided the militant opposition movement with some of its 
firmest bases of support and many of its prominent leaders. Explanations proposed include the 
degree to which white-collar workers occupied a better strategic economic position, less vulnerable 
to dismissal because of the scarcity of skilled labour, and thus less dependent on employers or the 
intervention from CELU's national centre in case of conflict with the latter (Killion 1985). It has 
also been argued that education imbued skilled workers with universalist perspectives and lessened 
the relative importance of ‘practical bread and butter issues’ (Alemu, 2014 personal interview). 
Another explanation suggests that time in higher educational institutions exposed white-collar 
workers to the radical agenda of the student movement (Killion 493-494). However, only a small 
share of skilled workers had attended higher education, and none of the labour leaders was known 
for past student movement activism. Material interests driving white-collar radicalism have also 
been proposed. According to this view, white collar-workers were thought to generally have been 
more directly negatively affected by the nationalisations of the PMAC and had thus came to resent 
the latter (Alemu, 2014 personal interview). However, since the radical labour opposition strongly 
supported the agenda of nationalisations, demanding that they be intensified rather than relaxed, 
this is a quite implausible explanation (CELU 1975a). 
On a related note, however, it is possible that redistributive PMAC policies such as rent controls, 
agrarian reform and wage freeze in the upper echelons had a greater effect and influence on certain 
categories of workers. For example, workers from non-dominant nationalities were more likely to 
have relatives benefitting from the land reform as its impact was the greatest in the southern regions 
 
150 A variant is Andergachew's (2000: 342) geographical breakdown of support among workers for EPRP and 
MEISON in the early post-revolutionary years – which, considering the fact that the latter was at the time working 
with the PMAC, can be taken as proxies of support for the radical oppositional strand of the labour movement vis-à-
vis that of the state-aligned. While the former reportedly had more support among workers in Addis Ababa and the 
large cities, the latter had more support from workers in the areas surrounding Addis Ababa and among rural workers. 
Somewhat corresponding to both the social and geographical breakdowns discussed, Killion (1985: 501-502) contends 
that by 1973 ‘white-collar unions’ in and around Addis Ababa had come to lead the radical labour opposition. This 
ignores the fact that a majority – 18 to be precise – of the 30 disaffiliated unions were from outside of the greater 
Addis Ababa area. 
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where tenancy was more widespread, while blue-collar workers were more likely to benefit from 
price and rent controls. Better employment security, instituted in the aftermath of the revolution, 
could also have been a factor. White-collar workers, on the other hand, would have been more 
likely to be negatively affected by the wage freeze. Whatever the exact reasons, the proposition 
that white-collar workers were slightly overrepresented within the radical opposition seems 
plausible, even if the dichotomy it implies is somewhat artificial and the strength of this tendency 
has been exaggerated. Masses of blue-collar workers and white-collar workers from across the 
national spectrum participated in both the militant labour opposition movement and in the less 
militant structures and strands of the movement. ‘The social origin of the opposition [was] no 
different from the other sectors of the working class’ Kiflu (2014, personal interview) has stated. 
A quick glance at the roster of PWC members and supporting union leaders, as well as AETU 
leaders, would corroborate this view, giving few hints of relative over- and under-representation 
along these lines. The effect of social and professional fractures within the wage working 
population on the coherence and orientation of the labour movement, while plausibly existent, was 
subordinate to other factors. 
4.8 Conducive factors 
Radicalism and the coming of the high tide of militancy during this first cycle of assertiveness of 
the Ethiopian labour movement has often been explained in terms of external dynamics. 
References to the influence of external parties have been quite common. Depending on the 
different views on the legitimacy of such influence, this has interchangeably been referred to as 
infiltration, influence, or vanguardism. Since labour radicalism and militancy peaked during the 
conjuncture that also produced the Ethiopian revolution, it has unfortunately and erroneously come 
to be subsumed under the historiography of the Ethiopian revolution. It is only in this context the 
idea of ‘infiltration’ has any coherence, as it is only in this context an infiltrating agent can be 
identified: Marxist-Leninist groups that emerged within the same conjuncture in general, and the 
EPRP in particular. However, the exposition has demonstrated how labour radicalism and 
militancy far preceded the revolution, and hence the implausibility of subsuming the former under 
the latter. The idea of infiltration suffers from the same problem, but since a comprehensive 
evaluation is probably warranted, this requires somewhat of a detour.  
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In mid-1974, two staff members were recruited to CELU's headquarters: Kiflu Tadesse and 
Seyoum Kebede. Both were members of the EPRP151  – the former a member of the politburo – 
although they were not known as such to the CELU leadership nor the authorities. Girmachew 
Lemma, a former student leader who would join the same party that autumn, was already employed 
as CELU's legal advisor at that time. Kiflu and Girmachew, together with veteran CELU staff and 
labour opposition member Tedla Fantaye, formed a miniscule workers' committee of EPRP (Kiflu 
2014, personal interview). By mid-1974, however, the EPRP was a very small organisation, and 
its structures were in a rudimentary state. It was not in a position to exercise direct influence over 
or within CELU. Priority was given to finding legal and occupational cover for its members and 
its returnees from abroad – such as Kiflu152 – in order not to draw the attention of the authorities. 
As EPRP-member Samuel Alemayehu was a former CELU board member, he personally 
recommended the two EPRP members for employment. 
The development of EPRP influence within the labour movement did not occur until at a later 
stage. Initially, none of the prominent labour leaders – including Marqos Hagos – were EPRP 
members, nor were they exhibiting any traits that would distinguish them as partisan to any 
political faction. Alemu Abebe (2014, personal interview) and Kiflu Tadesse (2014, personal 
communication) have independently noted that the radical leadership was constituted by genuine 
labour activists and representative of the workers, rather than infiltrating agents. The fact that its 
leaders in the main were seasoned labour activists is also evident in CELU's documentation. The 
demands that attracted the rank-and-file to the labour opposition related to the conditions of labour 
rather than questions of state power, Alemu (2014, personal interview) has argued. Nevertheless, 
he assessed that in ripe conditions these demands were instrumentalised by the EPRP in order to 
penetrate the movement and gain influence over its leadership. It is an established fact that several 
key leaders came to join the party and/or its labour front, and whatever the reasons, once both 
movements found themselves targets of state repression a certain unity of purpose was indeed 
established. At this stage, according to Kiflu (2014, personal communication), it was the 
organisational resources that the EPRP members could offer, particularly in establishing and 
operating clandestine networks, that constituted the key aspect of this relationship. Politically, he 
 
151 Which was not to declare its existence for another year. 
152 Kiflu had returned from Soviet Union, where he had studied journalism, and was employed as editor for Voice of 
Labour on his return. 
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has claimed, there were no reasons for the EPRP's activists to interfere, as the confrontation 
between labour and the PMAC was generating radicalisation and a drift towards the party's 
position in any case. It is noteworthy that while the PWC declarations of the summer of 1975 
indeed reflected a convergence of views between CELU and EPRP on many issues, they stopped 
short of embracing EPRP's central demand: the establishment of a provisional peoples' 
government. CELU thus retained, to its end, that level of autonomy it had acquired through over a 
decade of contestation. This having been stated, it is clear that EPRP had gained a certain traction 
within CELU in its final months. This is illustrated by the fact that several additional EPRP 
members were eventually recruited as CELU employees153. As parts of the labour movement were 
driven underground beginning in 1975, moreover, the members of EPRP's workers' committee 
became instrumental in organising the clandestine structures of the movement. This is how Kiflu 
explains the origins of the clandestine structures (2014, personal interview) [abridged]: 
Underground meetings of around 15, 20, 35 [labour leaders] started taking place 
around this time. I and Girmachew took part and it was here that the groundwork 
for labour resistance was being given a leadership. And it was here that we 
[developed] a very neat structure. This is primarily the work of us – the EPRP. 
What we did was, we formed [zonal] committees. Those that attended [the central 
meetings] represented their [zones], and in the [zones], various unions took part, 
so that decisions that we passed down would reach the [zones] and the [zones] 
would take it to their unions. It was an effective mechanism. The [PMAC] was not 
aware of this activity. Alem Abdi was not aware of this activity. They thought 
everything was quiet [and] they had told [the workers] not to hold meetings. The 
involvement of EPRP in that struggle was determinant – it gave them direction. 
They had their issues, but what we gave them [was] the organisational format, how 
to best get organised. In Eritrea too, they formed a committee of 13 people. The 
way the one in Addis was formed. I think that Dire Dawa had its committee, the 
three committees were coordinating amongst each other [and] Alem Abdi was just 
sitting by himself, totally isolated. 
It was these underground structures of labour activists, networked with the assistance of a few 
EPRP cadre and containing a small but growing number of sympathisers, that coordinated the 
 
153 They included EPRP militant Mezgebnesh Abayu, editor of the party-aligned Goh journal. Her story was retold in 
former EPRP militant Mohamed Yimam's (2013) book Wore Negari, where Mohamed also described how he and 
another EPRP member was recruited to CELU to hold classes at HVA Wonji Shoa on socialism. Mezgebnesh's 
personnel file in the CETU archives indicates that her date of employment with CELU was September 1, 1975, and 
she remained a CELU employee to March 1976 the least. She was, in order, the fifth EPRP militant to have been 
employed by CELU's headquarters, following Samuel Alemayehu (who had left CELU by this time), Girmachew 
Lemma, Seyoum Kebede and Kiflu Tadesse. This was in addition to the many members recruited from among the 
rank-and-file workers and representatives, and a few EPRP militants like Mohamed Yimam who were engaged for 
short-term tasks. 
134 
 
resistance against Alem Abdi, against the closure of CELU's offices in May 1975, and, after the 
dissolution of CELU, that morphed into ELAMA. In this manner, the EPRPs input was important, 
but its influence was only attendant, for without the already grinding dynamics of radicalisation 
and growing militancy, its intervention would neither have been effective nor, perhaps, even 
welcome in the first place. In the most successful cases – such as with the coordination of basic 
unions for the 1976 campaign to have arrested leaders released – clandestine party-organised 
structures and activists could help in restructuring, revitalising and coordinating the labour 
movement, but not necessarily create militant energies where none existed in the first place. 
Underlining this interpretation of the direction of causality, Kiflu (2014, personal interview) has 
noted that the radicalised labour movement on a number of occasions in fact went further in 
militancy than the members of EPRP's workers' committee found prudent or tactically advisable. 
This includes the vote to call a general strike in September 1975, which members of the EPRP 
committee reportedly were ‘totally against’. 
The exposition above indicates that there is evidence of only limited external influence – whether 
cast as infiltration or vanguardism – in generating militancy within the movement. Labour 
militancy and radicalism generally developed outside of, for most of the cycle in the complete 
absence of, and occasionally even against the influence of agents of political movements operating 
within the labour movement. The militant labour opposition movement, moreover, was led by 
experienced workers' representatives, rather than infiltrating external agents. The fact that some of 
them were later recruited to political parties does not alter this fact. But most importantly, 
militancy, radicalism, wildcat action, rank-and-file pressure, and the emergence of a full-fledged 
oppositional movement within the labour movement are all phenomena that predated the 
establishment of political parties in Ethiopia altogether, never mind the EPRP's workers' 
committee. To assign a prominent role for the latter in the radicalisation of the former is therefore 
to be guilty of placing the cart before the horse. To say that a party, students, or any other entity 
was responsible for the long arch of growing militancy and radicalisation of the labour movement 
is to confuse causes and effects. 
If not the effect of external agencies, then, what were the factors that kindled the emergence of a 
radically assertive and militant Ethiopian labour movement in this cycle? It can be emphatically 
stated that militancy and radicalism was fuelled by pressures from below. There are many ways to 
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substantiate this. Workers were recorded to have found, by themselves, huge injustices in their 
relations with employers. Morehous (1969: 70-71) contemporaneous research on workers' 
attitudes found that ‘unwillingness to give a wage increase is viewed only as an attempt by the 
employer to squeeze more of an already outrageous [emphasis added] profit from the workers' 
toil’. 
Another way in which militant pressure from below came to express itself was in recurrent wildcat 
action. In fact, as has been demonstrated in the above, it was largely due to the desire to control 
such wildcat action that trade unionism was legalised in Ethiopia in the first place. In the long 
decade that followed, CELU President Beyene has affirmed that pressures from below often forced 
the hand of the local leadership and led to strikes whether the union officials wanted it or not 
(Beyene 2010: 109). Morehous found that rank-and-file pressures caused an inclination of union 
leaders to frequently call strikes during negotiations. Union leaders, he claimed, accepted this as a 
concession to the ‘the militancy of the mass of union members’ (Morehous 1969: 71). ‘CELU has 
always been a restraining force, because usually the workers would want to use force’, former 
CELU top official Fissehatsion Tekie (1983, interview with Tom Killion) has stated, corroborating 
this view.  
A final, most definite, expression of the radicalising effects of the militant pressures from below 
was the emergence of the oppositional movement, the protracted campaign it pursued against the 
deferential policies of the CELU leadership, and its eventual toppling of that leadership, placing 
the movement on an offensive footing. In the words of CELU staffer Emmanuel Fayessa (1977: 
97), writing about the radicalisation of CELU's demands in 1974, they were ‘apparently due to the 
pressure from the breakaway unions and also the growing militancy among the rank-and-file 
members of the organisation itself’. Whichever level looked at then, and through the full cycle, it 
can be asserted and substantiated that rank-and-file pressures from below was the main 
determinant and propelling force of assertive labour movementism during this cycle. 
The emergence of a layer of labour bureaucracy, while helpful in checking militant impulses from 
below, was itself an additional factor fostering resentment and generating pressure. The deferential 
orientation of this bureaucracy reinforced this tendency. Morehous (1969: 72-74) has described 
how the leadership drew ‘a great deal of criticism from union leaders and employees’, and how its 
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role ‘as an intermediary earned it some of its most bitter criticism’154. This included allegations of 
‘giving in and siding with the employer too soon’. According to Syoum (2005: 60), union leaders 
faced constant risks of being identified as ‘pro-management’. Typically, Morehous found, union 
officials were ‘distrusted by a substantial number of union members’. Frequently, this distrust 
originated in the perception that union officials were ‘too friendly with the management’. This is 
how Morehous (1969: 72) describes the dynamic: 
Whenever a leaders opposes the demands of the majority, even when on some 
reasonable ground, the workers accuse him of selling out to the company. After 
seeing the previous leaders removed from office for this reason, one union 
leader refused to compromise an outrageous wage demand with which he 
disagreed, but rather waited for the Labour Relations Board to rule against the 
union, thus preserving his image in the eyes of the members. 
These findings not only reinforce the conclusion that radical energies and pressures emanated from 
the rank-and-file, but further demonstrate the convergence of interests between the labour 
bureaucracy and the state. Collusion, according to Morehous (1969: 75), had ‘earned some of the 
CELU officials the name of government agents’. For while rank-and-file energies were sometimes 
skilfully displaced through a number of bureaucratic means, it appears that collusion with 
employers and the state, blatant state interference, subversion of democratic decisions, punitive 
and wilful allocation of resources, and unaccountability of top officials reinforced militant energies 
as often as thwarting them. The biases of state institutions and their repressive practices also served 
to increase frustration, militancy and radicalism. The denial of basic rights – to organise, to hold a 
general congress, to assemble and strike, and to elect representative officials – were points of the 
most vociferous opposition from the oppositional labour movement. In this manner, the high-
handedness of the state counter-intentionally provided fuel for further radical drift. Kiflu (2014, 
personal interview) has interpreted this dynamic in the following way: 
It was a natural process. Because they had been deprived the right to have an 
independent labour union. These were labour unionists. They were deprived their 
union rights. They were struggling for their union rights. It was that process that 
radicalised that section of the working class… It was the government that forced 
them to be radicals. Had the government considered, had the government allowed 
 
154 Killion (1985: 486-487) too has stated that ‘the very connections between CELU leaders, capital and the state 
created distrust of the national leaders on the part of rank-and-file workers’. Rather than lessened, he claimed, this 
was only reinforced by reliance on international financial aid. 
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them to have a union, a confederation that could cater to the needs of workers, I 
don't think that radical process would [have taken place]. 
While this interpretation has some appeal, it overstates the importance of state repression under 
the PMAC as it ignores the longer arch of growing militancy and radicalisation. Although it is 
plausible that government high-handedness constituted a reinforcing factor, there would have been 
no basis for the state to intervene had not the militant pressures prevailed in the first place. 
A final and intriguing aspect of militancy, radicalisation and assertiveness during this first cycle is 
the degree to which it appears to display attributes of a whole other dynamic. This dynamic, 
probably at least as important as the ones mentioned but hitherto neglected in the literature, can be 
proposed as a factor driving much of the cyclical growth in militancy and assertiveness discussed 
in this chapter: the process appears to exhibit traits of path dependence in the manner which 
assertiveness and readily identifiable achievements – in terms of outcomes of militant practices – 
play into and fuel one another. In the course of the late 1950s, the 1960s, and the early 1970s, a 
string of major achievements were recorded as outcomes of workers' struggles. This began with 
the establishment of the first workers' associations and the undertaking of the first successful 
strikes; proceeded with the legal recognition of trade unionism and the establishment of a 
confederation; a progressive shift in workplace balance of forces and the emergence of collective 
bargaining; and the emergence of the labour movement as a national social-political force capable 
of extracting heavy concessions from capital and the state, that finally generated the all-out 
showdown with the latter. Through each step of this development, achievements only seem to have 
further reenergised the movement and ratcheted up its force and demands. The best and most direct 
example is probably the manner in which, first, the successful bank strike of 1973 demonstrated 
the feasibility of militancy and released energies that resulted in the 1974 general strike, and, 
second, how the successful general strike triggered a strike wave through the spring, and generated 
a proletarian insurgency that lasted through the following couple of years despite severe 
repression. But there are plenty more examples, and this dynamic is identifiable on many levels. 
This factor – for which the term inspirational/demonstrative factor is proposed – will repeatedly 
be returned to and examined in the chapters that follows. 
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5. Organisation, movement and orientation: second cycle 
In this chapter, a second cycle of contested advance and retreat of the Ethiopian labour movement 
is discussed. A caveat is warranted at the outset: this cycle was not marked by a level of force and 
assertiveness commensurate with the first. Neither was the depth – the degree to which the process 
reached into and animated the structures of the movement – comparable to the first; nor was the 
duration of the cycle as protracted. Nevertheless, beginning in the waning days of the PDRE, 
stirrings within the labour movement were emerging again. These stirrings grew into a number of 
strikes and protests; a process of renewed networking and rebuilding among labour activists; and 
the emergence of a new confederation jealously guarding its autonomy and challenging state 
encroachment. However, before long the process was checked and reversed, and it consequently 
failed to generate the sort of dynamism and resilience that the labour movement showcased in the 
1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, this second cyclical appearance of a relative autonomous and 
assertive labour movement remains an important episode capable of shedding light on the general 
pattern of dynamics and forces that shape it. Moreover, if the second cycle contrasts with the first 
in that the state's strategy of containment and subjugation in the second case was more successful, 
examining the reasons why this was the case may go some way towards explaining the dynamics 
and determinants of the orientation too. 
Since the secondary literature on the Ethiopian labour movement beyond the 1970s is even scarcer 
than that which covers the period of the first cycle, the discussion contained in this chapter almost 
exclusively relies on primary sources. Archival and documental resources have been drawn on, 
and a number of interviews with former leading trade unionists have been essential in 
reconstructing the process. 
5.1 Renewed stirrings, renewed pressures 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the pacification and subjugation of the labour movement had 
been achieved by the late 1970s. Unions and workplace discussion forums, reinforced by party 
committees and armed squads, safeguarded industrial peace and discipline, disseminated 
government policy, and intercepted early signs of discontent and opposition quite effectively 
through the 1980s. Through most of the remaining long decade of PMAC/WPE rule, the labour 
movement remained docile. Industrial tranquillity was only punctuated by localised minor 
outbreaks of discontent, occasional state harassment, and new purges of labour representatives not 
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deemed sufficiently reliable. In 1990, for example, it was reported that ‘several trade union leaders’ 
had been arrested, including the secretary general of the Construction Workers' Union, the ETU 
secretary for Kaffa Region, and the central ETU secretary Alemayehu Tadesse (Sunmonu 1990). 
A notable exception to industrial tranquillity – in terms of strikes – took place at the 
Asmara/Barottolo Textile Factory in 1983. Here, workers refused to work extended extra hours 
without compensation – a common requirement – and when, as a result, wage penalties were 
imposed, they called a strike. The strike was met with a reaction that would strongly discourage 
any other union contemplating a similar course of action. First, the factory was surrounded by 
armed troops and 65 workers were arrested (Goitom 1985). The committee tasked with 
investigating the incident then declared the strike illegal, and warned that any such industrial action 
was ‘anarchist’ and ‘anti-revolutionary’ – two foreboding labels in the aftermath of the high terror 
of the 1970s. In addition to administrative punishment meted out against the workers, the ruling 
authorised the government to take ‘legal “measures”’ 155 [N.B. citation marks from the original 
text of the ruling] against strike leaders, who were accused of being followers of ‘secessionists’, 
and warned that in the future ‘measures’ would be taken ‘without hesitation’ in similar cases 
(Committee of the High Authority in the Region of Eritrea 1983). No reoccurrence of large scale 
industrial action was to take place in the years that followed, until when, at the end of the 1980s, 
the WPE's authority had begun to seriously erode. 
In the absence of any viable conduits or means of exerting pressure and affecting change, what 
progress that was recorded consisted of organisational expansion – both in terms of the size of the 
membership and the labour bureaucracy. Because membership in the AETU and the ETU was 
mandatory for production workers, the number of workers in affiliated unions grew from around 
200 000 in 1977 to over 300 000 members in the 1980s156 (Desta 1988: 140-142). The number of 
employees of the central confederation had meanwhile reached 644, and they were joined by basic 
trade union staff and officials (CETU 1994a). At the Akaki Textile Factory alone, for example, the 
ETU bureaucracy consisted of eleven FTOs with full wages paid by the company (Sikazwe 1993a). 
 
155 What these ‘measures’ consisted of can only be speculated on. It is noteworthy, however, that ‘measures’ during 
WPE rule was the standard euphemism for execution. The reservation that the measures would be legal is not very 
reassuring, since the emergency law operational in Eritrea at the time, and referred to in the ruling, permitted the 
employment of lethal force. 
156 For Andargachew (2000: 340), who cites a slightly higher number of unionised workers in 1977, this expansion 
alone constituted a ‘great victory of the Ethiopian workers’, and that was indeed how it was officially presented. 
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Instead of the old three-story headquarters built with funding from the AALC in the 1970s, ETU 
had moved into an eleven-story building constructed with assistance from the German Democratic 
Republic. But it was not only the professional staff that had expanded. The representative layer 
had also grown exponentially. In 1982, no less than 26 133 workers had been elected to leading 
bodies of unions – almost exactly a tenth of the membership – and reportedly been released from 
tasks in production (Beyene 2012: 245-246). 
Although open industrial conflict was rare, a few episodes of unrest occurred during the final years 
of WPE rule. When and where the opportunity arrived, workers displayed their resentment against 
the structures imposed upon them. In the autumn of 1989, some 400 workers whom had been 
transferred from the Akaki Textile Factory157 to the Adey Abeba factory without prior 
consultation, walked off the factory and brought their grievances to MoLSA. The lenient and 
careful manner in which they were handled by authorities and ETU officials indicated the 
beginning of a shift in the balance of forces (ETU 1989). During the spring of 1991, when the 
rapid erosion of the WPE's authority, repressive capacity, and its always shallow legitimacy was 
becoming apparent, signs of renewed labour combativeness multiplied. Workers in the industrial 
district of Akaki repeatedly protested against their working conditions and the despised labour 
bureaucracy. On several occasions, over a period of several months, workers from the Akaki 
Textile Factory demonstrated outside, attacked and stoned the ‘luxurious’ villa of ETU President 
Tadesse Tamrat158 (Geresu 2017, personal communication). Among workers and residents of the 
area, stories about the mythical luxuries of the house included rumoured facilities that allowed a 
car to be driven into the bedroom (Geresu 2017, personal communication), and the feeling among 
the workers was allegedly that ‘he had built the villa with their money’ (Hailu 2017, personal 
interview). In one case they were reported to have ‘dismantled’ parts of the building (Hailu 2017, 
personal interview). 
Beyene (2012: 250-254), furthermore, has described an ‘uprising’ taking place among workers in 
and around Addis Ababa in the waning years of the WPE. According to Beyene, the uprising was 
precipitated by the arrest of numerous workers and representatives that had protested poor pay and 
 
157 Previous to its nationalisation, this factory was known as the Indo-Ethiopian textile factory. 
158 Tadesse, a Central Committee member of WPE, committed suicide in May 1991, days after the fall of Addis Ababa 
to the EPRDF army. 
141 
 
intensified requisitions of ‘voluntary contributions’ to support the war effort159. As unrest spread 
through the industrial corridor leading south from the capital, it came to include workers at the 
Ethiopian Cargo Transport Corporation, in construction, at the Wholesale and Resale Trading 
Corporation, Alcohol Corporation, the Metahara and Wonji sugar factories, the Akaki Textile 
Factory and the Ethio-Fibre Factory. At the Akaki Textile Factory, workers' grievances included 
complaints over postponed annual wage revisions, the collective agreement, but also the charge 
that union leaders were tools of the WPE that did not represent workers, and the demand that 
workers be allowed to freely elect representatives. Eventually, the dispute became sufficiently 
serious as to trigger the intervention of a WPE delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Fisseha 
Desta, who promised to address some ‘minor economic questions urgently’ in order to pacify the 
workers. Meanwhile, however, Beyene claims that the PDRE president Mengistu Hailemariam 
had clarified that he would ‘take action’ against the ETU leadership should he hear anything further 
about workers disobeying. In any event, the spreading ‘uprising’ was said to have continued until 
the fall of the WPE government in 1991. Since Beyene's account is not backed up by any sources, 
and no dates are given for the events, it is difficult to substantiate in detail. The documentation and 
recollections available on the rumblings of discontent, petitioning, protesting and repression that 
took place in the final years of the PDRE seems to indicate that the term ‘uprising’ is an 
exaggeration. Nevertheless, Beyene's account corroborates the impression that stirrings of open 
discontent had again began to emerge among the workers and within the labour movement. 
The archive of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Addis Ababa, moreover, contains 
evidence of a number of emerging disputes. In April 1991, for example, a bitter conflict erupted 
between the management of the fuel company Total Mer Rouge and its union. On April 3, the 
union, alarmed by seemingly wanton disciplinary actions taken against workers in the context of 
negotiations for a new collective agreement, passed a resolution threatening to go on to strike (Graf 
1991a; Tadesse 1991; Kedeme 1991). In a meeting with the company's management, this was 
accompanied by the explicit invocation of the spectre of ‘bloodshed’ by the workers' 
representatives (Graf 1991a; Kedeme 1991). This triggered strong protests from the company and 
 
159 Contributions to the war effort did not only take the form of cash contributions. The AETU/ETU also drafted 
members to the wars with various insurgent movements that continued unabated throughout the period of PMAC/WPE 
rule. According to a sympathetic observer ‘AETU was able to arm and dispatch tens of thousands of volunteers [sic] 
from its ranks when Ethiopia was attacked by counter-revolutionaries and imperialist aggression’ in 1977/78 alone 
(Desta 1988: 140). 
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intervention by the ETU and authorities, forcing the union to back down from some of its bluntest 
threats (Graf 1991b; Total Mer Rouge Workers). But the grievances had not been addressed and 
the conflict was far from resolved 
If these emergent signs of a re-energisation were real, they were soon nipped in the bud. With the 
entry of the EPRDF army into Addis Ababa in May 1991, state power was rearticulated in the 
shape of a victorious insurgent force, conceiving itself as representing the rural masses and 
marginalised nationalities, intolerant of anything that could be perceived as urban opposition, and 
ready to use such force that had brought it to Addis Ababa to bear on any expression of such 
opposition. The labour movement did not constitute an obvious source of support in this scheme 
of things160, but its very size and strategic location made its control – or, at the very least, its 
pacification, preventing it from becoming a base of opposition – an important task. An abridged 
version of a leaked internal party document, stated that ‘without compromising [the trade unions'] 
organisational independence, we should try to control them and lead them through indirect 
organisational links’ (EPRDF 1996: 28). This turned out to describe the route that was to be 
followed quite presciently. 
The national trade union centre – tainted as it was by its close organisational and political 
attachment to the WPE – of the ETU and its industrial federations were abolished with the coming 
to power of EPRDF. The headquarters of the ETU, moreover, was initially taken over by the 
EPRDF army and made a command centre of the latter (Dawey 2015, personal interview). Several 
of the central leaders of the movement ended up in prison, and a few fled the country. The basic 
unions, however, were not abolished, but would be subjected to a leadership purge and mandatory 
re-elections.  
Initially, the incoming government had not formulated a coherent strategy in dealing with workers 
and the labour movement, except for purging the latter from WPE remnants and perceived 
oppositional holdouts. In July 1991, the new government – the TGE – began organising elections 
in the basic unions, in which WPE members and security personnel of the old government were 
banned from standing (DoS 1992: 130-131). As a result, a new crop of labour leaders emerged. 
 
160 While the peasantry was considered the mainstay of EPRDF support, and was indeed the social force that had 
brought it to power, the relationship the EPRDF claimed to enjoy with workers was more ambivalent. ‘Though the 
aim of our Revolutionary Democracy is not to completely free the proletariat from exploitation’, an internal party 
document was reported to read (EPRDF 1993: 23) ‘it is still the only approach that best serves its interests now’. 
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Reflecting the lack of a broader strategy, however, a report described how the new ruling party 
was involved in the purge and reorganisation of basic unions, but also how, purportedly, ‘in the 
absence of official guidelines Transitional Government officials have been tolerant of strikes and 
protests in the workplace’ (DoS 1992: 130-131). To management, this seemed to imply that ‘the 
TGE [was] being indulgent with labour demands’ (DoS 1992: 130-131). But mass retrenchments, 
and arrest of labour leaders seemed to contradict this interpretation.  
Alemayehu Tadesse, the ETU secretary cited in the above, for example, was released from prison 
when the WPE fell in May 1991, only to be re-arrested by the EPRDF government in August that 
same year (Sunmonu 1991). Melesse Shiferaw, a former regional chairman of ETU, faced a similar 
fate. Having been detained by the previous government for six months, allegedly ‘for the sake of 
labour rights’, he was forced into exile with the coming to power of the EPRDF, claiming that ‘all 
my former colleagues are in prison’ (Melesse 1991). Massive retrenchments, meanwhile, 
contrasted with the relative job security workers had enjoyed during the previous regime. While 
no conclusive total figure is available, an ILO (2005: 21) study indicates that between 1991 and 
1997 over 17 500 workers of state-owned enterprises alone were retrenched or forced into early 
retirement. This figure does not take into consideration the effects of liberalisation and 
privatisations on workers in private or privatised enterprises. Moreover, the 1992 decision of the 
Transitional Government to radically devalue the Ethiopian Birr – from 2.07 to 5 ETB per USD in 
one fell swoop – in combination with the liberalisation of food prices, led to a hollowing of real 
wages of those that retained their jobs, which was only partially offset by the TGE's decision to 
raise nominal wages in the public sector161. But renewed attacks on the position of labour did not 
only come from the state. Employers too were eager to take advantage of the disorganisation of 
the workers and the shifting workplace balance of power this entailed. 
These incursions resulted in resentment, anger, and, eventually, resistance. ‘What surprised me’, 
a young resident of the Akaki industrial area of the time recalls (Geresu 2017, personal 
communication), ‘[was that] two years after EPRDF come to power, protests erupted and actually 
people became nostalgic about the Mengistu time’. In August 1991, 2 500 workers of six gold 
mines staged an eight-day strike, demanding pay increments and improvements of conditions.  
Two months later the prime minister of the TGA admitted that the government had taken notice 
 
161 This point is examined in more detail in the following chapter. 
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of several strikes and workers demanding better remuneration, and in the next month-and-a-half 
workers of printing presses, an animal fodder factory, and the Ethiopian Freight Transport 
Corporation, would also strike (EH 1991a; 1991b; 199c; 1991d). In late 1991 and early 1992, 
moreover, two large strikes took place among skilled and comparatively privileged workers: at the 
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia162 and at Ethiopian Airlines. The contours of a strike wave were 
becoming apparent, but emergent stirrings took other expressions too, and they included a wave 
of protests and demonstrations. 
In 1993, the US Department of State reported ‘numerous actions taken by former employees of 
state agencies who had been laid off in the process of economic restructuring or had lost their jobs 
in May when Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia’ (DoS 1994). But it was not only 
retrenched workers that were protesting. Workers that had staged public demonstrations and 
protests against poor salaries and injustices in the two previous years included, among others, those 
of the Kaliti Food Factory, Assab and Massawa docks, Addis Ababa Fuelwood Plantation, the 
Addis Tool Machine Factory, the Ethiopian Building Construction Authority, the Merchandise 
Wholesale Trade and Import Enterprise and employees of six hospitals around Addis Ababa163 
(EH 1991b). The most visible protest took the form of retrenched workers of the Ethiopian 
Maritime Transport Authority, who erected makeshift shelters and camped on Addis Ababa's 
central Mesqel square while conducting a hunger strike. 
Meanwhile, workers scrambled to reorganise in such a manner that would allow them to establish 
some form of defence against the most pressing danger – the threat of mass dismissals. This is how 
the situation was described by a leader of the union of the Ethiopian Domestic Distribution 
Corporation at the time (Hailu 2017, personal interview): 
The government was trying to sell every enterprise. Workers were losing their job 
on a daily basis. Our enterprise, EDDC, was one of the high risk priorities for the 
government. They were openly declaring that they [were] going to retrench 
everybody and sell the company. That was the time that I became a trade union 
leader and it was a very risky time to get this responsibility. But in a few ways we 
started to get organised and started to talk to authorities, to talk to our managers 
on this issue and on how to save the families of the workers. For us, the priority 
 
162 See more on this in the below. 
163 Workers of a significantly higher number of other enterprises demonstrated against management officials accused 
of corruption and embezzlement. But since it is difficult to decipher the degree to which these demonstrations were 
related to government-instigated purges of management, they have been left out from this discussion. 
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was to get job security. At that point also, the government decided — there was a 
push somewhere in our discussion – to lift the ban that they had put on trade 
unionism. 
With or without recognised unions, workers in many places erected defensive obstacles to the 
pressures that were mounting, but the re-recognition of the reorganised basic unions added some 
momentum to attempts to resist. At Total Mer Rouge, the conflict between workers and 
management had not yet come to a conclusion, and workers were petitioning against the 
management and demanding redress for the perceived injustice they had suffered (Total Mer 
Rouge workers 1991). Its reorganised union, which had continued to demand a resolution to its 
grievances – including a greater say in management decisions and a 20 percent wage increment as 
part of a new collective agreement – became the target of renewed harassment by the management 
in the summer of 1991. It was refused management recognition, and its executive committee was 
denied permission to meet during working hours or in the company premises (Graf 1991c). While 
the union instructed all workers to refuse any transfers and disciplinary actions pending discussions 
between management and the union, its chairman was accused of ‘attempting to foment anarchy’ 
and suspended (Debebe 1991; MoLSA 1991; Graf 1991d). He was only rehired after significant 
pressure from the workers – a petition signed by 100 workers threatened a strike in the absence of 
his rehiring (Total Mer Rouge workers 1991) – and intervention from the government, recognising 
the explosivity of the situation (Dawit 1991). 
Bank workers, meanwhile, where at the forefront of the renewed stirrings. At the Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia wages had largely been frozen since the 1970s (Andu-alem 1999). This had 
significantly reduced the real income of the workers. It was the union's demand to revise these 
wages – as well as to overturn a unilateral managerial decision to discount compensation for annual 
leave forfeited – that triggered a confrontation with the incoming government (Andu-alem 1999: 
51-52; Etana 1991). Despite the CBE union having been reorganised and having held officially 
sanctioned elections, its leadership proved anything but submissive on this point. A series of 
meetings was held to avert the strike threat, but they came to nothing as the management, allegedly 
‘in consultation with the Government was stalling and was unwilling to negotiate’ (EHRCO 1995: 
57). With no dialogue forthcoming, a strike was called and the workers walked off the job on 
December 12, 1991. MoLSA termed the strike illegal, and the government announced that all 
strikers would be dismissed. On December 14, several union leaders, including the president of 
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the union, were arrested in their offices (Andu-alem 1999: 51; EHRCO 1995: 58). In light of these 
countermeasures, combined with promises to ‘settle the grievances’, workers began to return to 
work (Andu-alem 1999: 55). Initially, workers in provincial branches returned while Addis Ababa 
branches remained closed. In the capital the strike held out for a full eleven days before the High 
Court intervened, declaring the strike illegal and threatening both dismissal and criminal 
prosecution of workers who failed to report back to work immediately (Andu-alem 1999: 55-56; 
EH 1991f). While most striking workers were allowed to return, 54 were labelled instigators and 
were banned from doing so. They remained dismissed until 46 were rehired two years later, 
following negotiations between a new union leadership and the government (Andu-alem 1999: 58; 
EHRCO 1995: 58-59). 
Whatever the outcome, this incidence indicates the degree to which section of the workforce had 
come to view its conditions as intolerable, the determination it was developing to struggle to 
change those conditions, and the intolerance the incoming government displayed towards the 
demands of labour. But as has already been indicated, it was not only bank workers that were 
beginning to grow restless. The years between the fall of the WPE and the re-foundation of a 
national trade union centre saw a large number of strikes. At the Akaki Textile Factory, the 
problems began with the government arresting the union leader Legesse Bajeba, and subsequently 
refused to recognise his election as union chairman, on the allegation that he was a participant in 
the state terror of the 1970s. According to more sympathetic accounts, however, Legesse had in 
fact been imprisoned for several years by the previous government and it was rather his 
outspokenness against government plans to privatise the factory and against retrenchments that 
drew the government's ire (Dawey 2015, personal interview). At the Ethiopian Electric Light and 
Power Authority (EELPA), meanwhile, the union leadership was dismissed - allegedly for 
attempting to organise a strike (Dawey 2015, personal interview). 
5.1.1 Renewed pressures: dismissed and transferred union leaders 
The 1982 Trade Union Organisation Proclamation (PMGE 1982: 113), discussed in the third 
chapter, entailed the provisions that ‘no member of any leading body of any trade union may, 
without the prior approval of the minister [of labour and social affairs], be suspended from work 
as a result of disciplinary action’ and that no such member of a leading trade union body, in the 
absence of the minister's explicit consent, may be ‘transferred from the undertaking or urban centre 
147 
 
in which he works’. In line with these provisions, a filing system was set up by MoLSA containing 
case files on union leaders that had been dismissed or transferred by the employer. These files, 
labelled ‘dismissed or transferred union leaders’164 were kept open until the 1982 proclamation 
was repealed by the 1993 labour law, promulgated in January of that year. They contain invaluable 
evidence of what can only be described as a renewed crackdown on labour leaders. Ostensible 
reasons for termination and transfer ranges from disciplinary issues such as lateness, absence, 
embezzlement and corruption, to more explicit expression of discontent such as protesting and 
arguing, minor acts of sabotage, organising unrest and ‘fomenting anarchy’, and even violence 
against management personnel and colleagues. The chart below illustrates the number of compiled 
cases of terminations and transfers of union leaders over time.  
Chart: Dismissed and Transferred Union Leaders 1982-1993 
 
Source: Computation of data from the three volumes from MoLSA archives165. 
This compilation highlights a number of striking phenomena. First, it is clear, due to the sparse 
amount of cases dated before 1989, that a union leader possessed a considerable level of job 
security under the period of stable WPE rule. There was only one single case of termination of a 
union official in the years between 1982 and 1986. This should of course not be confused with 
 
164 Three volumes, labelled ማህበር መሪዎችን ከሥራ እገዳ ወይም የሥራ ዝውውር መመሪያ, were compiled before the files 
were closed in 1993 and are kept in MoLSA's archive. These contain the cases sent to MoLSA head office alone. 
Cases resolved at the workplace, or through the mediation of local MoLSA branches may thus not have reached the 
central level. However, as any case that could not be solved locally or regionally in amicable terms were transferred 
to the Ministry, it nevertheless accounts for the most significant cases, and those which actually ended in termination. 
165 The numbers indicated are that of the number of individual cases of union leaders dismissed or transferred, as 
mandatorily reported to MoLSA. Note that the data for the years 1982 and 1993 does not cover the full year, as the 
1982 law only came into force in the month of March of that year. More importantly, the law was repealed in the very 
first month of 1993. The few cases reported in that year are thus the outcome of the fact that the law required reporting 
of such incidences for only the twenty first days of the year. 
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tenure security, as there were other mechanisms – internal to the trade unions, or the external 
directives of the WPE – to remove union leaders from offices. But it was extremely rare that union 
leaders were dismissed or transferred by the employer. To take such action was simply not a 
prerogative that employers and managers appear to have enjoyed. 
Secondly, however, there is a sharp increase in the number of dismissed and transferred union 
leaders during the last couple of years of WPE rule. This indicates an increasing power of 
employers and management vis-à-vis trade unions that seems to coincide, on the one hand, with 
the weakening of WPE power and, on the other, its 1990 introduction of a reform agenda intended 
to establish a liberalised ‘mixed economy’. If one looks at the official reasons given for the 
terminations and transfers, the overwhelming majority seem to reflect issues of workplace 
indiscipline and neglect. However, that cannot be taken to mean that the upturn was determined 
by issues of workplace discipline alone, but also reflects a shifting balance of power in the 
workplace, where the power of employers over labour increased as the state somewhat withdrew. 
Finally, the files account for another upturn in the frequency of termination of union leaders after 
the seizure of power by the EPRDF. As already noted, the EPRDF instructed all unions to conduct 
new elections where WPE members and labour officials associated with the old regime were barred 
from standing. Because this most massive purge that affected all unions ostensibly took place 
within the trade unions and did not involve employers, it is not registered in the files under 
discussion. The renewed purge of labour leaders illustrated in the graph was thus not directly 
connected to the political purge of the unions, but took place in addition to this and originated in 
employer-employee relations. Again, the reasons given for termination do not refer to activities of 
unionism or politics, but rather workplace transgressions. As has been described with regards to 
the case of the Total Mer Rouge workers above166, however, disciplinary pretexts can often cover 
for problematic relations with the labour movement. Certainly, this is likely to have been the case 
in many more instances. But the importance of this new wave of harassment of trade union leaders 
lies in the manner in which it reflects a major shift in the workplace balance of power: the 
weakening of the labour movement vis-à-vis employers and managers. 
 
166 While it is clear from the correspondence between the management of Total Mer Rouge and MoLSA that the union 
leader, Debebe Haileselassie, was fired for his unionist activities which allegedly entailed ‘fomenting anarchy’, a 
belated attempt was nevertheless made to describe the reasons for his termination as embezzlement of fuel due to 
faulty registration in a vehicle log book (Wolde Mikael 1991). 
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5.2 Re-emergence of a relatively autonomous confederation 
While most basic unions had continued to operate – albeit having to elect new officials – no 
industrial federations nor national trade union centre existed between 1991 and 1993. Initially, it 
has been alleged, the TGE was planning to transfer all ETU's assets to a committee rehabilitating 
former soldiers (CETU 1995a). However, pressures and persuasion from, among other, ETU 
employees managed to sway the government (CETU 1995a). Pressure was compounded by a 
network committee of around twenty leaders of the most influential unions around Addis Ababa – 
including the CBE, the railway corporation, and Berhanena Selam printing press – demanding the 
return of the confederation headquarters to the workers and the reestablishment of a national centre 
(Dawey 2015, personal interview). Instead, a caretaker committee was established to administer 
ETU's assets, reorganise the unions and prepare the ground for the re-foundation of a national trade 
union centre (Sikazwe 1993a). Chaired by Dawit Yohannes, a senior EPRDF official, the caretaker 
committee consisted of a handful of former ETU employees167, and a former official. However, 
the caretaker committee was restricted to operating within the confines of a limited space assigned 
to it by the government. 
Outside of the government sanctioned process represented by the caretaker committee, basic 
unions and labour activists networked in impromptu constellations. An early ad-hoc network of 
workers' representatives is described by Hailu Ourgessa168 (2017, personal interview) in the 
following terms: 
Once we were elected and started leading the basic trade unions, we went into this 
clandestine fight to bring back the banned confederation. We started connecting to 
other trade unionists everywhere, within the city and outside the city. We started a 
kind of chain around the country because there was no central or national union 
that brought us together. We had no choice. Everybody was worrying about job 
security. So everybody was trying to get in touch with the other guy to know what 
was going on and to get together and protect the jobs. Because every day we were 
hearing bad news from here and from there. Workers were losing their jobs in 
thousands. It was an emergency kind of feeling that forced us to get in touch with 
other trade unionists. That's how we started the clandestine arrangement to bring 
back the national union… it was one-off contacts. It was not formalised, it was not 
in a formal kind of meeting where we sat and discussed. We were just exchanging 
 
167 They included Tedla Fantaye, the veteran member of the labour opposition of the 1960s and 1970s, who had spent 
several years in prison due to his involvement in the movement. 
168 Hailu was the Head of the EDDC union and was to be elected the president of the Federation of Commerce, 
Technical and Printing Industry Trade Unions on its founding congress. 
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information on what was going on and what needed to be done. Things were 
moving very fast. We had no time. As soon as we started doing this we heard that 
the government also had started clandestine movement parallel to this. We later 
learned that they had reached quite an advanced level. 
Another, more formalised, constellation that emerged around this time was the Unity 
Association169, which has been described as ‘an activist core’ and ‘a rival force against the 
illegitimate caretaker committee’ (CETU 1995b). The Unity Association established contacts with 
CETU employees, and set up an office in the CETU building (Hailu 2017, personal interview). 
The fact that the Unity Association was not restricted from doing so indicate that some form of 
permission – explicit or implicit – for its activities had been granted. Purportedly, the government 
saw an opportunity to draw in leading members into its orbit, as it eventually would (Hailu 2017, 
personal interview), but it is also plausible that the joint pressures these developments exercised 
on the government was a driving factor contributing to the TGE's decision to speed up the re-
foundation of a national centre and, in early 1993, issue a new labour proclamation which provided 
the stipulations for it.  
The international ‘free’ trade union movement reinvolved itself in the reorganisation of an 
Ethiopian national trade union centre from the outset. Expressing a quite striking continuity of 
aims and priorities, it was represented by the very same institutions as in the 1960s and 1970s, 
who brought about the reappearance of several key individuals. In 1992 Fissehatsion Tekie and 
Gebreselassie Gebremariam170 returned to Addis Ababa representing the AALC, and Andrew 
Kailembo, who had been sent by the ICFTU to Addis Ababa in the 1970s, also returned on a 
mission for the organisation (Kailembo 1991). These organisations again inserted themselves right 
into the process of reorganising a national centre. As around 3 000 workers gathered in Addis 
Ababa to discuss the draft labour law for three days, AALC arranged a seminar the day after the 
closure of this meeting, with one hundred labour representatives invited. It was decided that this, 
in turn, was to be followed by an ICFTU-held two-week intensive course for ‘selected participants’ 
(Kailembo 1991). ICFTU was also made part of a committee for research and organisation set up 
 
169 አንድነት ማህበር, which also translates to Union. 
170 Fissehatsion was, as discussed in the previous chapter, CELU's former secretary general, and Gebreselassie was a 
former CELU General Council member. Both had been key members of the group of young staffers that Beyene 
Solomon had brought into the leadership of CELU. Fissehatsion would stay on as the AALC representative in Addis 
Ababa for a couple of years, and would play a role, as the exposition below describes, in the struggles over the new 
confederation. A third member of ‘CELU's four horsemen’, Mesfin Gebremichael, was dispatched as ILO's observer 
to the 1993 national conference of trade unionists (Sikazwe 1993a).  
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by the caretaker committee, which was tasked with providing a working paper on modes of trade 
unionism for the national conference (Sikazwe 1993a). 
The Ethiopian government made itself another central player in the reorganisation of the labour 
movement. As early as in December 1991 the ICFTU regional representative reported having 
‘learnt of moves within the EPRDF government to tame the trade unions’ (Sikazwe 1994c). 
Several sources make clear that the EPRDF government, engaged as it was in drafting a new 
Ethiopian constitution based on the principle of national-linguistic federalism, was pushing for a 
trade union confederation made up of national/regional federations rather than industrial ones171 
(Sikazwe 1993; Dawey 2015, personal interview; Hailu 2017, personal interview; Schwass 1995). 
The ICFTU and the US embassy, on the other hand, was arguing for a traditional structure based 
on industrial federations, arguing that a national/regional compartmentalisation entails a 
politicisation of ethnicity that ‘contradict  the trade union spirit’ (Sikazwe 1993a). While resistance 
from international institutions, labour activists and workers themselves would have done much to 
discourage the government from imposing such a configuration, the issue was only conclusively 
resolved at CETU's founding congress. 
Originally, the refounding congress of a national centre was scheduled to be held in March 1992 
(Kailembo 1991), but just as had been the case in the 1970s, the process of reorganisation took 
longer than expected, in order to yield acceptable outcomes. In mid-1993, however, the caretaker 
committee finally called a national conference. The conference, attended by 400 representatives 
of the basic unions, was tasked with deciding on how the new confederation was to be structured, 
and with electing an organising committee that would oversee the refoundation of the national 
federations, prepare the ground for and oversee a general congress (Sikazwe 1993a). The 
committee elected consisted of 28 members and was chaired by Mekuria Gebremedhin. However, 
there were allegations that the selection of delegates and the election process were flawed. The 
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO 1995: 56) argued that the committee was illegitimate. 
 
171 According to Hailu (2017, personal interview), the idea was based on the experience of the largest constituent party 
of the EPRDF – the TPLF – during its years of armed struggle. In Tigray, it had organised workers in the ማሕበር 
ሸቃሎ ትግራይ (Proletarian/Workers' Association of Tigray, or Trade Union of Tigray). In Tigray, which is 
nationally/ethnically relatively homogenous, this form of organisation faced no obvious limitation, but when 
transplanted to a multinational setting such as that in workplaces around Addis Ababa, things would be insurmountably 
more complicated. The idea was eventually dropped, but according to Hailu, the separate structures of ማሕበር ሸቃሎ 
ትግራይ were not absorbed by the refounded CETU. 
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Among other things, it was alleged that the largest unions had been excluded, and that as a result 
‘preorganised stooges’ of the government had prevailed (CETU 1995a: 3). To some participants, 
it became obvious that there was an organised hand behind the selection of delegates (Hailu 2017, 
personal interview). This hand, according to one participant, belonged to the Unity Association, 
which had organised supporters in such a way to exercise control over the meeting and the elections 
(Dawey 2015, personal interview)172. Whatever the details of this were, the meeting ended overt 
and direct government control over the affairs of the labour movement by dissolving the caretaker 
committee and replacing it with an elected committee. In the months that followed, the committee 
drafted a constitution and oversaw the process of reorganising basic unions (CETU 1995a). But 
suspicion that covert and indirect external control was being exercised continued to linger. There 
were allegations that the reorganisation of unions was directed from above, and that the leading 
body continued to report to the government173 (Hailu 2017, personal interview). Where the workers 
refused to be organised by an external committee conceived of as operating under government 
supervision and insisted on self-organisation, their unions were withheld recognition by MoLSA 
(EHRCO 1995: 57). This was the case for the large unions of EELPA, CBE, and Akaki textiles 
and garment factories, where, as described in the above, frictions and conflict between the 
government and workers had already developed (EHRCO 1995: 57-60). In November, however, 
the organising committee declared that all basic unions had been reorganised in accordance with 
the labour law passed earlier that year, and called a general congress (Mekuria 1993).  
In November 1993, 1500 delegates of all basic unions – represented according to size – met in 
Addis Ababa and formed the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions. During the four-day 
congress, a constitution was adopted and an executive committee was elected in what observers 
reported to be ‘a free and fair election’ (Sikazwe 1993b). The confederation formed consisted of 
nine industrial federations, incorporating 482 basic unions with a total membership of over 200 
000 workers (CETU 1995a: 7; EH 1993b). The idea of a confederation structured along 
regional/national lines was rejected by an overwhelming majority of unions (CETU 1995a). 
 
172 According to Dawey (2015, personal interviews), the majority of the 28 members of the Organising Committee 
were unaffiliated trade unionists, while he characterised 11 as ‘out-right members’ of the ruling party and its 
proletarian branch. Hailu (2017, personal interviews) corroborates the existence of such a divide by stating that ‘in the 
organising committee [there were] quite obvious divisions on what should be done, how it should be done and on a 
vision towards a national trade union’. 
173 According to Hailu (2017, personal interview) the organising committee in fact continued to function ‘under 
[advisor to the prime minister] Dawit Yohannes’. 
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Instead, a conventional structure of industrial federations was adopted. The founding congress was 
immediately followed by foundational congresses of the industrial federations, and, subsequently, 
a first congress of CETU's General Assembly, were office-holders were elected. The candidate for 
the presidency allegedly preferred by the government, Mekuria Gebremedhin, was defeated in the 
vote, and Dawey Ibrahim174 of the National Industrial Federation of Tourism, Hotel and General 
Service Workers' Trade Unions, was elected CETU president.  The faction Mekuria represented, 
moreover, failed to secure a majority in either the Supreme Council175 or the Executive Committee. 
The defiant mood and the outcome of the congress and the assembly is vividly described by Hailu 
Ourgessa (2017, personal interview), who was a delegate to it [abridged]: 
From the outset, it was a fight. It seemed as if everybody was informed through the 
informal structure. We had already discussed what the government was doing and 
everybody was angry about what the government tried – on the issue of organising 
the confederation on ethnic lines [and] that the government was trying to control 
the trade union movement. They tried all their best to control the [congress]. They 
failed. In every agenda that they put forward, the [representatives] was freely 
discussing with no fear – zero fear – saying what they wanted. …The founding 
constitution of CETU was laid out and every line was discussed line by line. That's 
where we dismantled everything that they tried to sell to us… It was surprising. I 
had contacted quite a few trade union leaders and we had discussed the intentions 
of the government and ways to fight it. But what I saw at national level at the 
assembly was that everybody was thinking on the same line. Everybody was 
aware… [The pro-government faction was] quite confused. They didn't expect this. 
They were running left and right; they were trying to control the situation. They 
couldn't. 
‘From the informal discussions I had with several delegates’, ICFTU's representative Sikazwe 
(1993b: 2) noted, ‘it was obvious that the conclusions including the election results were to the 
satisfaction of the vast majority’. But this would not hinder the consolidation of a dissenting group, 
clustered around former members of the organising committee, who advocated closer adherence 
to government policies. Despite having been outvoted on issues pertaining to the constitution and 
most positions in the confederation’s leading bodies, this group had followers elected as presidents 
of a majority of the industrial federations. Mekuria, its most prominent member, was elected 
 
174 Dawey Ibrahim was a former EPRP member who had left the organisation a decade earlier and been pardoned by 
the PMAC. He had made a civil career as an employee of the Ethiopian Red Cross, whose union he was elected leader 
of (Dawey 2015, personal interview). 
175 The Supreme Council was the body of 107 delegates tasked with supervising the activities of the Executive 
Committee. 
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president of the Federation of Food, Beverages and Tobacco, and Allied Trade Unions, and 
secretary general of CETU.  
Long before the congress, it has been alleged that the ruling party had involved itself in an attempt 
to ‘influence election results’ within basic unions that were to send delegates to the congress, as 
well as those that determined the composition of the executive committee of CETU and the 
industrial federations (Praeg 2006: 186; CETU 1995a). One way of doing so was through the 
EPRDF's ‘proletarian branch’, which allegedly had set up headquarters within the Bole Printing 
Enterprises. Its leader was an EPRDF commander by the name of Tesfamariam Faris, and it has 
been alleged that Dawit Yohannes too was a member (Dawey 2015, personal interview). Trade 
unionists from workplaces across the country would be selected, recruited, given courses in party 
policy, prepared for elections to offices in the labour movement, and instructed on approved 
candidates to vote for (CETU 1995a). If this strategy had any success to it, it was in the elections 
to the leaderships of a number of basic unions and industrial federations, rather than in the majority 
of basic unions and at the level of the central confederation. According to the EHRCO (1995: 63), 
several pro-government members of the organising committee ‘did not limit themselves to 
overseeing the formation of trade unions [but] also succeeded in having themselves elected at the 
grass root, federation and confederation levels’. Another means of attempting to exercise control 
over the labour movement was allegedly through a grouping of former EPRP members who had 
shifted loyalties to the new ruling party, known as Forum 84 (Praeg 2006: 184). Dawey had 
reportedly participated in this forum and was initially said to have had at least the tacit approval 
of the government (Praeg 2006). If this was ever the case, that approval was to be withdrawn 
shortly following his election.  
For some months after the congress, a relatively autonomous national trade union centre 
reappeared. It was also a quite well-resourced national centre that came into existence, having been 
able to acquire a good deal of the ETU's assets. This included the three large and centrally located 
– in its old and new compounds – headquarter buildings of the latter, several vehicles, hotels, and 
gas stations which combined ‘generated quite a bit of money for CETU’ (Schwass 1996). In its 
discussion with the government it raised the issue of handing over confiscated property176, and it 
 
176 According to CETU leaders, the EPRDF had seized 29 vehicles, 20 furnished offices, and above one million USD 
of funds that belonged to the labour movement (Hailu 1995; CETU 1995a). 
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managed to secure the return of some of the funds that belonged to the defunct ETU (CETU 
1994a). The new confederation attracted growing number of workers. Within the 14 months that 
followed its establishment, CETU grew to incorporate 506 basic unions and 258 000 members 
(CETU 1995a: 7). 
In terms of international affiliation, ICFTU's representative noted that the issue was not resolved 
by CETU's founding congress but referred to the newly elected leadership. In the following month, 
CETU wrote to the WFTU announcing its disaffiliation from the latter177 and intent to ‘maintain 
neutrality’ (Dawey 1993). The ICFTU, however, was pressing for close cooperation from the 
outset and pledged 10 000 USD to cover immediate educational needs of the new confederation 
(Sikazwe 1994c). Only six months after the founding congress, neutrality ceased to be a priority, 
as the Supreme Council agreed to re-apply for affiliation with ICFTU (CETU 1994b). The 
application was expected to be approved at the ICFTU Executive Board meeting in December of 
that year. Relations with the AALC were described as particularly good, with the AALC 
purportedly extending ‘unreserved assistance’ to CETU (CETU 1994a: 4). However, as later 
events would demonstrate, the assistance was far from unconditional.  
Tacit government hostility was discernible to top CETU officials from the outset of their tenure, 
and although it had not yet to develop to open confrontation, there was allegedly an ongoing 
campaign to sift out basic union leaderships – such as that of the Ethio-Djibouti Railway – which 
were deemed insusceptible to pressures from the pro-government faction (Hailu, 2017 personal 
interview). Far from superseding the factional division that had emerged before and during the 
election process, it became more pronounced in the aftermath. As early as May 1994 a UN agency 
that were renting office space in CETU's building reported that ‘it became clear from commotions 
on the eleventh floor… that there were difficulties in a meeting of CETU’, and that this had 
introduced ‘a great sense of insecurity’ among its staff (Were 1995).  CETU, meanwhile, spent the 
months that followed re-establishing dissolved unions, conducting seminars and workshops for 
trade union leaders, and plan for cooperative efforts to purchase firms slated for privatisation and 
generate employment for retrenched workers (Svartbekk 1994). However, there was no major 
mobilisation, no major victories, no ground-breaking advances, nor even much success in staving 
 
177 The AETU had affiliated with the WFTU shortly after its establishment and its successor organisations – ETU and, 
for a brief moment, CETU – had remained affiliated. 
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off the worsening conditions for much of the wage-working force. The relatively autonomous 
CETU's struggles were defensive, and they were conducted in a hostile environment. 
Although there had been several sources of friction between the government and CETU178, it was 
the political-economic trajectory that generated antagonistic contradictions that would lead to the 
complete breakdown of relations. The TGE had, since coming to power, committed to a program 
of liberalisations that created renewed pressures on the income and job security of workers. 
Privatisations and efforts to improve profitability of state-owned enterprises led to massive 
retrenchments, which had already triggered a number of spontaneous protests from among 
workers. In 1992, TGE entered into an agreement with the IMF that saw it adopt a structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) supported by loans from the latter. In addition to shrinking the 
budget deficit, devalue the national currency, remove subsidies, liberalise prices and trade, the 
SAP included far-reaching privatisations, triggering legitimate fears that they would result in 
retrenchments. The government admitted that it was ‘well aware’ that it would be ‘painful’ and 
entail ‘massive hardships’ (CoR 1993: 51-53). In hindsight Hishe Hailu (2005) has corroborated 
those fears. He found that the Ethiopian case was unique in a comparative sense, as there were no 
safeguards against retrenchments in the process. In addition to job losses, he found that almost 
seventy percent of interviewed workers reported that the process had led to harassment of workers' 
representatives, which, in over thirty percent of the cases, included dismissal of representatives. 
While CETU did not oppose economic adjustment in principle, it demanded a say in the 
implementation of the process, and was critical towards SAPs in light of the social costs registered 
by the implementation of such programmes elsewhere on the continent. In the summer of 1994, 
these concerns prompted CETU to plan a symposium to ‘come up with a concrete trade union 
position… as to how to deal with the social costs of SAP affecting its members’ (Dawey 1994a). 
Before this symposium, scheduled for October that same year, could be held, however, open 
conflict erupted within the movement and between the movement and the government.  
 
178 The most serious issue was CETU's demand that the government and ruling party return requisitioned CETU 
property. But other issues included the refusal of the government to engage in dialogue with CETU; its insistence on 
minor changes in the CETU constitution – replacing the word ‘nation’ with ‘country-wide’ in order for it to adhere to 
the ruling party's definition of the concept of nation; and its refusal to recognise the election of an industrial federation 
president who was dismissed from his job in the aftermath of his election. One exception to the fraught relationship 
was the handover to CETU-backed cooperatives of around 40 trucks that had belonged to the dissolved public 
enterprise Ethiopian Freight Transport Corporation, as well as several shops (Dawey 2015, personal interview). 
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On August 10, having concluded that no meaningful dialogue was forthcoming but that the 
negative consequences of the programme were becoming acute, CETU called a press conference 
to lay out its position and concerns. At the press conference, CETU President Dawey Ibrahim drew 
up a list of problems faced by confederation, including its inability to have all its confiscated 
properties returned by the government, the construction of bureaucratic obstacles for its operations, 
neglect in addressing labour rights cases lodged with relevant authorities, and the denial of a role 
for the confederation in policy dialogue (CETU 1994a). But the most damning charge was levelled 
against the SAP-aligned policies. Dawey, speaking for the Executive Committee, stated that the 
programme had aggravated unemployment, eroded job security and led to 6 000 arbitrary 
dismissals, undermined the position of Ethiopian industry, and, through the devaluation of the 
Ethiopian Birr and the abolishment of subsidies, led to rampant inflation (CETU 1994a). CETU 
demanded a say in the planning and implementation of SAP policies, in order to alleviate their 
negative effects on workers, and that the government slow down the perceived ‘rushed’ pace by 
which the programme was being imposed. The statement included a call that ‘the time has come 
for Ethiopian workers to struggle without opportunism and hesitation with the leadership of 
CETU’, and that the duty to ‘fight and fend off’ the dangers incurred by the SAP – despite affecting 
all society – would have to fall upon the workers, who were most seriously affected (CETU 1994a: 
15). This act of insubordination set the stage for an open conflict and the eventual destruction of 
the relative autonomy that CETU had enjoyed. 
5.3 Resubjugation 
At the press conference Dawey hinted to differences within CETU, condemning ‘some trade union 
leaders [who] give statements blessing the inflictions caused on the workers’ and demanding that 
federations fall in line with CETU's Executive Committee in its willingness to ‘struggle to protect 
and preserve the rights and interests of the workers’ (CETU 1994a: 5). Indeed, the press statement 
‘provoked immediate reaction from both his opponents and supporters’, and the dissenting leaders 
of six industrial federations issued statements distancing themselves from the leadership and its 
criticism of the government (Sikazwe 1994c: 3). The fault lines were unsurprisingly the same as 
those that had become apparent during CETU's founding congress. The group of trade unionists 
aligned with the government, and in several cases affiliated with the ruling party's proletarian 
branch, led several industrial federations. With the schism developing between CETU's leadership 
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and the government, they formed ‘a splinter group from within the Confederation with the 
objective of making it dysfunctional’ (Praeg 2006: 187). 
The dissenting faction charged Dawey with having held the press conference without the approval 
of the Executive Committee or leaders of federations, and for having turned down a government 
offer to meet with CETU's Supreme Council. It characterised the leadership as ‘confrontational’, 
and accused it of showcasing a discriminatory attitude towards northerners (Tamene 1991: 1; 
Sunmonu 1994). A weeklong meeting of the Supreme Council failed to resolve the differences. 
Rather, it led to further acrimony and an open split. Allegedly, the proceedings were preceded by 
government harassment and intimidations (Mukupa 1994), and interrupted by ‘unruly behaviour 
and walk-out of some members of the council during the meeting, including the brandishing of a 
pistol’ (Sunmonu 1994). According to Dawey (2015, personal interview), some members of the 
dissenting faction had come dressed in military jackets and carrying arms – one threatening the 
chairman of the audit commission at gunpoint. In response, Dawey suspended 29 members of the 
council who had walked out, including Mekuria, on disciplinary grounds.   
In the executive committee, the majority – six out of nine members – sided with CETU's president 
(Sikazwe 1994c). This was also the case in the Supreme Council, where 79 out of 108 sided with 
the leadership (ION179 1994a). But among the leaders of the industrial federations, six out of nine 
sided with the dissenting group (Sikazwe 1994c). The dissenters created a parallel structure of pro-
government unionists labelling themselves ‘Peace and Free Trade Union Seeking Members of 
CETU's Supreme Council’ (PFTUSM), who alleged that under the prevailing circumstances no 
one had the right to act or speak in the name of CETU. As 35 of its members petitioned MoLSA 
asking it to arbitrate, 5 federation presidents180 affiliated with the group wrote to MoLSA asking 
it to intervene and cancel the registration181 of CETU altogether (Sunmonu 1994; Central High 
Court 1994). PFTUSM (1994) produced a document listing its grievances, which now included 
 
179 Indian Ocean Newsletter 
180 Namely those of the Energy Chemicals, Petroleum and Minerals Trade Union Federation; Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco Trade Unions Federation; Transport and Communications Trade Unions Federations; Tourism, Hotels and 
General Service Trade Unions Industrial Federation; and Agriculture, Fishery and Agro-Industrial Trade Unions 
Federation. 
181 This account was given by the minister of labour and social affairs to the court. EHRCO (1995: 63) corroborates 
the claim that the dissenting federation presidents petitioned for the cancellation of the Confederation. The presidents 
of the dissenting federations, however, later claimed that they had been opposed to deregistration in principle 
(Haileselassie Abraha et al. 1995).  
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the allegation that Dawey was seeking to ‘direct the labour movement to serve the interests of the 
opposition182 forces’, that suspensions from the Executive Committee were based on ethnic 
discrimination, and that the leadership had embarked on a campaign ‘mobilising support of rank 
and file members travelling throughout the country, dividing the movement on the ground of ethnic 
grouping’. Indeed, the split generated mobilisation and activity. CETU's leadership decided to call 
an extraordinary congress to resolve the situation, and arranging this required coordination with 
unions throughout the country. The leadership claimed that it had secured a quorum and a majority 
in the Supreme Council for suspending the 29 members, rendering the minority faction irrelevant 
to its legal right to call a congress. But instead of a congress, what followed was a prolonged court 
process punctuated by repeated mediation attempts and underlined by a government ban. 
According to Praeg (2006: 187), ‘prolonged litigation suited the members of the pro-system 
faction’, and the manner in which they acted seems to corroborate this interpretation. OATUU 
Secretary General Hassan Sunmonu (1994), who undertook a mediation effort in late October 
1994, returned frustrated with the stalling tactics that the group employed. ‘I observed’ Sunmonu 
reported, ‘that the CETU president and his group were genuinely ready and willing to negotiate 
with the other group in order to peacefully resolve the crisis’. ‘On the other hand’, Sunmonu noted, 
‘the dramatis persona of the other group, namely, Mekuria Gebremedhin, CETU secretary general 
did not attend the two sessions of the reconciliation meeting’. From the lack of high-level 
representation and the dissenting group's unwillingness to agree even on an agenda for the 
discussions, Sunmonu concluded that ‘it was apparent that [its delegation] either had no full 
mandate to negotiate or they were negotiating in bad faith’183. Meanwhile, the dissenting group 
encouraged all constituent unions to boycott the upcoming extraordinary congress, and several 
union leaders belonging to it publicly announced their intention to do so184 (Tamene 1994; ION 
1994b). It was becoming obvious that the Peace and Free Trade Union Seeking Members were 
 
182 The fact that opposition parties released statements in support of CETU (Sikazwe 1994c) may have contributed to 
this interpretation. 
183 This perception was supported by ICFTU representative Sikazwe (1995a: 6), who opined that ‘it can be safely 
concluded that covert government support to Dawey's rivals is responsible for their belligerent conduct’. 
184 The overwhelming evidence and documentation (see, for example, the explicit statements to this end in Ethiopian 
Herald 1994b; 1994c; 1994d; 1994e) available on the dissenting group's opposition to the holding of the proposed 
congress did not stop its representatives from attempting to convince visiting foreign trade unionists, a few years later, 
that it was the CETU leadership that refused to call a congress (Schwass 1996). 
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seeking neither a negotiated resolution nor a resolution based on a congress majority, but only 
direct government intervention.  
The failure of attempts to reconcile the groups meant that the contestation shifted to the question 
of holding a congress. While CETU's leadership argued that this was not only the most 
procedurally correct option, but also the most democratic, the dissenting faction was doing 
everything it could to call it off. The government, perhaps unsurprisingly, joined in on the 
dissenting group's side.  Four days before the extraordinary congress was due to be held, uniformed 
and plain-clothed police, sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, arrived at the CETU 
headquarters. They occupied the president's office and banned CETU's Supreme Council from 
conducting a preparatory meeting, despite the fact that the majority of Supreme Council members 
had shown up (Dawey 1994c; EHRCO 1995: 64). This intervention was followed, a few days later, 
by a complete ban on CETU operations, including access to offices, vehicles and funds (Dawey 
1994d). Sources cited by Tamene (1994: 1) claimed that ‘the government may have found it 
necessary to block the meeting after the pro-government failed to galvanise enough labour support’ 
and that had the extraordinary congress been held, a majority of delegates ‘would have called for 
strikes against the structural adjustment, and would have endorsed the expulsion of the government 
group’. In any case, the government's intervention clearly indicated that it was operating under the 
assumption that the outcome of the congress would be detrimental to its interests, as represented 
in the labour movement by the PFTUSM faction. As a result, the extraordinary congress could not 
be held. An ICFTU representative, arriving at the CETU headquarters on the morning of the 
scheduled congress, learnt that no less than 30 police officers and MoLSA officials had closed and 
sealed CETU's offices (Sikazwe 1994a; 1994c). The officials argued that they were enforcing a 
court order suspending CETU's activities, which had been issued at the request of MoLSA, which, 
in turn, had been petitioned to do so by the dissenting group (MoLSA 1995a; Sikazwe 1994c). 
According to MoLSA's vice minister, ‘the intervention was required to keep industrial peace’ 
(Tamene 1994a). But MoLSA, never a credible neutral arbitrator, issued an additional threat, 
announcing its intention to cancel CETU's registration altogether if the matter was not resolved in 
one month's time (Sikazwe 1994b). In the absence of a permission to hold a congress, however, 
such a resolution never seemed likely, and the government's intervention strengthened the resolve 
of the dissenting faction, which now explicitly insisted on government mediation alone. This stand, 
a visiting ICFTU representative reported, ‘gives merit to the fear that the group may be buying 
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time so as to allow the one month suspension notice to elapse and therefore give the government 
an excuse to withdraw CETU registration and establish a “conformist” organisation’ (Sikazwe 
1994b).  
Before cancelling CETU's registration, a MoLSA attempt – whether genuine or not – at mediating 
failed, as it was accused of bias185 by CETU's leadership, and as MoLSA insisted on CETU 
acknowledging that its decision to suspend the 29 Supreme Council members was illegal186. At 
the lapse of the one-month notice period, MoLSA announced the deregistration of CETU, claiming 
that ‘no peaceful solution was in sight’ (MoLSA 1995b). As the Confederation lodged an appeal 
to the High Court, the decision to deregister CETU was left pending. Instead, a court order was 
issued describing MoLSA's decision to close CETU's offices as ‘inappropriate’ and instructing it 
to allow its reopening (Wossenyeleh 1995; CETU 1995a: 34; Central High Court 1994). To the 
chagrin of CETU's leadership, MoLSA refused to heed the court order187 and lift the blockade on 
CETU's offices. Moreover, it refused to recognise the legality of CETU's Supreme Council and 
Executive Committee, since the organisation was considered dissolved188 (Dawey 1995b). MoLSA 
instead turned to the Federations, where a majority of leaders were dissenters, and, without basis 
in either CETU by-laws or labour legislation, instructed them to establish a joint interim committee 
to administer the confederation's property189 (Wossenyeleh 1995). In Dawey's (1995a) assessment, 
this measure signalled the commencement of the process to reorganise an ‘appendage 
confederation’. ICFTU Representative Sikazwe (1995a: 7) appeared to be of the same view, stating 
 
185 The question of government bias can be resolved quite straightforwardly. Not only did the government operate, at 
every conjuncture, in favour of the dissenting faction, but sometimes bias was more explicit. For example, an official 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were reported to have told representatives of the Canadian Labour Congress not to 
work with any of the three federations whose leadership supported CETU's leadership, and government representatives 
had stated that Dawey and his allies were working with the opposition (Kailembo 1995c). Moreover, it was reported 
that representatives of the dissenting faction turned up to meetings in government plated vehicles, and had been issued 
with rights to carry weapons (Schwass 1996). 
186 The argument was that, with the walk-out of the dissenters, no ¾ quorum prevailed. This argument was rejected 
by CETU who claimed that 94 out of 106 members had been present at the opening of the meeting, before the 29 
members walked out (CETU 1995a; 1995b: 2).  
187 This indifference to a court decision convinced OATUU (1995) that the government ‘aimed, without any doubt, at 
repressing CETU and finally, subjugating the trade union movement at a time when the situation of Ethiopian workers 
is seriously threatened’. 
188 A couple weeks after it had criticised the minister for acting outside of his jurisdiction in closing CETU offices and 
requested it to be reopened, however, the court, faced with the deregistration of CETU, closed the case on the basis of 
the dissolution of the latter. 
189 The leadership of the three industrial federations loyal with CETU's leadership rejected the call to join the interim 
committee (Sikazwe 1995a), and the court would eventually rule to affirm that MoLSA had no legal grounds to ask 
CETU to set up such a body (Sikazwe 1995d). 
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that ‘the setting up of an interim committee by the Ministry of Labour is a clear sign of 
government's intention to reorganise CETU in order to install its own people into trade union 
leadership’. MoLSA would face legal problems in having this open intervention accepted by 
courts, but the intervention was nevertheless significant in indicating the length to which the 
government was willing to go to see to it that the relative autonomy of CETU was terminated and 
that a deferential national centre emerged. 
Meanwhile, repressive measures were brought to bear on supporters of CETU's independent line. 
In mid-November, Dawey (1994e) wrote to the ICFTU claiming that CETU delegates had been 
refused exit visas to attend meetings abroad. Moreover, he reported that harassment of workers' 
representative by police and security was ongoing across the country. This included the arrest of 
seven labour officials, dismissals, suspensions, and forced removals of five labour leaders, 
thorough surveillance and intimidation of representatives, and even physical assault190 (Dawey 
1994e; CETU 1995a). Combined with the ban on holding meetings and on calling a congress, these 
measures were interpreted as aimed at ‘paralysing the trade union movement’, a purpose for which 
the government had allegedly ‘mobilised all its resources (financial, security cadres, 
administrators, managers, shadow union leaders, mass media etc)’ (Dawey 1994e). 
In early 1995, Dawey (1995b) had come to conclude that MoLSA was ‘waging a war of 
annihilation against the confederation’.  By this time, it was reported that nine union leaders had 
been victims of extra-legal dismissals and that 80 out of 108 Supreme Council members had 
reported harassment or intimidation (Dawey 1994b; CETU 1995a). Moreover, an additional nine 
trade union leaders and some 80 members of EELPA's union were reported to have been dismissed 
by February 1995 (CETU 1995a). But the list of repressive measures and the gravity of the threat 
they posed would only grow in the months that followed. In early 1995, two senior CETU officials 
had fled abroad citing ‘persistent persecution’, and in March that year two labour leaders from 
EELPA would follow them across the Kenyan border and into exile (Sikazwe 1995a; 1995b). By 
the summer of 1995, Hailu Ourgessa, president of the Federation of of Commerce, Technical and 
 
190 The vice president of CETU had been attacked on his way home from the office in May 1994, and spent a week 
hospitalised (CETU 1995a: 15-16). Fekadu Tenkir (1997), a CETU Executive Committee member and president of 
the union of the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, claimed to have been beaten by eight opponents while presiding 
over the annual congress of the union in March 1997. 
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Printing Industry Trade Unions, presented the following remarks to the workers' group of the 
International Labor Conference in Geneva (Hailu 1995): 
[The government] has removed trade union leaders from their positions in unions 
forcefully, through political means, dismissal, forced resignation etc. Up to now 73 
trade union leaders have lost their leadership without the consent and willingness 
of members. It has waged [a] massive terrorisation campaign, has physically 
assaulted the vice president of the confederation, has interrogated, harassed, 
intimidated, surveyed and imprisoned union leaders and their families. As a result 
of this campaign some of our colleagues are forced to leave their country and run 
into exile  
The government's position was, on the one hand, to deny these allegations and to claim that the 
entire affair was an internal dispute within CETU, which it was not a party to. But it also showcased 
a contradictory impulse to challenge CETU's leadership and openly involve itself in that dispute: 
rhetorically, practically, and legally. ‘If Dawey believes that the Transitional Government of 
Ethiopia was anti-workers’, the president of the transitional government stated, ‘he should fight it 
instead of asking to be consulted by it’ (EHRCO 1995: 62). In its communications, the government 
explicitly embraced the interpretation of the dissenting group that CETU's leadership had ‘denied 
the democratic rights of its members and is taking arbitrary measures without the consent of the 
majority’ (TGE 1995: 1). But there was no question that the government's claim to neutrality was 
somewhat disingenuous, and even if divisions existed within the movement – as it had between 
moderates and militants, government-aligned and autonomous trade unionists in previous times – 
the state's role was much more than that of an even-handed arbitrator in the conflict. The degree 
to which it intervened was such that it was becoming the adverse party, and not only a party to the 
conflict. This can be illustrated by the testimony of former CETU branch secretary of Amhara and 
Benishangul Gumuz Getachew Abera (2017, personal interview). A supporter of CETU's 
executive committee, Getachew was first subject to attempted persuasion, including being called 
to the office of a senior EPRDF official. There he was promised that should he drop his support 
for the leadership he would be rewarded with attractive employment opportunities, but he was also 
warned about the fallout should he fail to do so. When this proved ineffective, Getachew was 
labelled an ‘anti-peace’ element and subjected to harassment that included constant surveillance, 
and, in one incident when visiting a Bahir Dar beverage factory, being threatened with a gun. The 
threat of physical harm meant that in the years that followed Getachew would circumscribe his 
movement to Addis Ababa. A couple of years later, when CETU was being refounded along pro-
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government lines, he was warned by EHRCO sources, CBE union officials, and an EPRDF insider 
who, independent of one another, had received information that his life was in danger. As a result, 
he left the country. 
CETU's application for ICFTU affiliation lodged in June 1994 was left pending. Because of the 
turmoil that engulfed CETU in the following months, ICFTU's Executive Board meeting in 
December that year decided to suspend the admission process. The ICFTU had ‘strongly 
condemned’ the deregistration of CETU, which it interpreted ‘as representing a naked aggression 
by the authorities against the autonomy and independence of the Ethiopian trade union movement’ 
(ICFTU 1994), and it had protested the government's non-adherence to court orders obliging it to 
reopen CETU's offices, allow its officials to carry out their tasks, return requisitioned property, 
and unfreeze its bank accounts (Jordan 1995). In early 1995, ICFTU began extending relief and 
legal support funds to CETU (Dawey 1995c; Dewil 1995). However, the provision of such funds 
was limited, both in terms of amount and in duration. Moreover, it was apparent that the 
international trade union movement was split on the issue. While the ICFTU, the Canadian Labour 
Congress, and initially the OATUU offered CETU some financial and political support, the AALC, 
still represented by Fissehatsion Tekie, was considered ‘sympathetic’ to the pro-government 
faction, and was alleged to be ‘financing activities’ of its six federations (Sikazwe 1995a: 5). 
Consistent with the first cycle, a protracted process of establishing new deferential structures 
ensued, although this time accompanied by considerably lesser violence. First, and as mentioned, 
the government working with the dissenting faction established an ad-hoc committee at the level 
the latter was dominant: among the presidents of the industrial federations. Secondly, state-aligned 
actors began to campaign for the ouster of union leaders deemed disloyal at the basic union level. 
‘New committees were set up in factories’ throughout the country (Praeg 2006: 187), while old 
structures were taken over. A lot of ‘work at the grassroot levels in order to win the members at 
the local level’ was another component of this, not surprisingly incurring the charge ‘that the 
government [was] interfering in trade union affairs’ (Kailembo 1995c: 1). In fact, a representative 
of the International Federation of Employees, Technicians and Managers visiting Ethiopia reported 
that the government was ready to use any means, including ‘intimidation, harassment and bribes’ 
in order to ‘capture’ resistant unions (Schwass 1996). At the Fincha sugar plant, for example, local 
authorities removed nine members of the union's executive committee for having refused their 
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demand that they denounce CETU's leadership (CETU 1995a). As early as 1995, a large number 
of other intransigent workers' representatives were reported to have been removed, dismissed or 
transferred from places such as EELPA, Bahir Dar Textile Factory, Dedessa plantation, Ethio-
plastic plant, Shakisso mine, Ethiopian Insurance Corporation, CETU's Jimma and Nekemte 
branch offices, Gomma coffee plantation, a public shop union, Tika agricultural plant, Ethio-
Djibouti Railway, and Wabe Shebelle Hotel191 (CETU 1995a: 21-26; Dawey 1995a). The 
dismissed and arrested representatives included members of CETU's Supreme Council and 
Executive Committee. In the summer of 1995 CETU president Dawey was himself briefly 
detained192 and that same autumn he was ousted from the leadership of the basic union and 
federation he represented, after elections to which he had not been nominated. For ICFTU 
representative Sikozwe (1995c), this indicated ‘that the government is making serious inroads in 
the trade unions and swaying the rank and file support to its side’. 
At the federation level too, the three leaderships still aligned with CETU's Executive Committee 
were put under additional pressure. A seventh federation gave in to the pressure and switched 
allegiances without any open coercion, but the Federation of Commerce, Technical and Printing 
Industry Trade Unions had to be closed down and sealed off before it could be taken over in 1996, 
taking the number of government-aligned federations to eight (Praeg 2006: 187-188). ‘Observers 
were aware of the reality that all of the above developments (spanning the transitional period) were 
in conflict with the legal process, which was still pending’, Praeg (2006: 187) assessed193. The 
following excerpts from an EHRCO (1996: 5-6) report vividly illustrates some typical mechanisms 
that facilitated the process: 
On October 19, 1996, the [Commerce, Technical and Printing Industry] 
Federation's 152 Council members representing 47 member plant unions held a 
meeting. After discussing the work done so far and the Audit Committee's report, 
the meeting was adjourned for the next morning to discuss the remaining agendas. 
 
191 Responding to these allegations, the government claimed that while it was ‘unable to confirm the arrest and 
detention reported by CETU’, dismissals and suspensions are the prerogatives of employers with which ‘the 
government cannot interfere’ (TGE 1995: 4). The government, it announced, ‘has no interest in [CETU's] affairs’ 
(TGE 1995: 6). With regards to the mass media campaign in full swing, the TGE (1995: 4) stated that each faction 
‘use the free press and media to air their own separate views’ and that ‘the government in no way can control the 
freedom of expression of citizens as well as association’. In view of the fact that the largest media outlets were state 
owned and directed, this comes across as a bit disingenuous. 
192 This was, according to Dawey (1997), his third detainment, each one occurring that same year and lasting between 
8 and 10 hours. 
193 See also CETU (1995b) for a thorough treatment of the legality of the government's intervention in the first place. 
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When the discussion on the next agendas commenced on October 20, about 30 
factionalists began to stir trouble by demanding that the Federation's Executive 
Committee give up the podium and submit themselves to a gimgema (assessment) 
of their performance. When the other Council members rejected their unprocedural 
demand, the former began shouting and prevented the meeting from proceeding 
smoothly. In order to avoid the break out of violence, it was decided to adjourn the 
meeting. However, 30 of these factionalists remained behind and tried to proceed 
with the discussion on their own. At this time the Executive Committee of the 
Federation reported the matter to Woreda 15 Police Station and the latter evicted 
the factionalists from the meeting hall. On the evening of October 21, however, 
Ethiopian Radio and Television reported an incredible piece of news. The official 
media falsely claimed that at its meeting of October 19 - 21, the Federation of the 
Commercial, Technical and Printing Federation rejected the reports of the 
Executive Committee as well as Audit Committee, replaced these committees' 
members by newly elected ones and passed a resolution demanding that CETU be 
newly re-organised. Following this false report on the official media, Ato Tesfaye 
Sodano, deputy minister of labour and social affairs, wrote a letter on November 
4, 1996 giving recognition to the newly "elected" leaders. 
Having secured the government's support, the "new federation leaders", 
accompanied by two policemen, went to the head office of the Federation where 
they found Ato Mulatu Gurmu, the legitimate treasurer, working alone in his office. 
They assaulted him physically, took away from him the keys of his drawers and 
office, his personal notebook and money, and then evicted him by force from the 
office. They also broke into the other offices of the Federation and thus staged their 
coup. Surprisingly though, two of these "new federation leaders" do not belong to 
any member plant union and hence are not even members of the Federation. 
Although Ato Mulatu Gurmu has reported the attack against him to Woreda 18 
Police Station and Office of the Public Prosecutor, no legal action as yet been 
taken against the aggressors in accordance with the Law. 
The purge described in the above is corroborated by a number of sources and 
correspondent accounts from the time194. It furthermore does not seem to constitute an 
exceptional case, but rather an indicative example of the machinations followed in cases 
where basic unions or federations resisted advances for reorganisation, or for the 
 
194 See, for example, the vice president of the concerned federation's account (Ali 1996). According to him, the hostile 
manoeuvring by the dissenting faction supported by the government was triggered by the federation's refusal to join 
the interim committee of federations, established by the government to run CETU affairs and eventually reorganise it. 
The federation's refusal was premised on the ongoing court process, and the perceived unconstitutionality of a minority 
group of Supreme Council members reorganising the confederation. The federation instead demanded that a general 
congress be held. Within the federation, the vice president wrote, the dissenting faction had only managed to acquire 
support from 7 out of 54 basic unions, and 9 out of 52 council members to overturn this stance. Hence the resort to 
coercive strategies. 
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replacement of leadership deemed hostile. In basic unions too, foul play facilitated the 
process of turning resistant leaderships. 
[T]he trade union of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia was prevented from 
carrying out its normal functions by the Labor and Social Affairs Bureau of Region 
14 on the pretext that the term of office of the union executives has expired. As a 
result the executives have been unable to call a union meeting to hold an election. 
The Bank's management has also made the executives to take forced leaves. 
Again, the Labour and Social Affairs Bureau of Addis Ababa Region, although fully 
aware that the terms of office of the union executives expired on March 7, 1997, 
barred the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation Trade Union from carrying out its 
functions in a letter dated June 13, 1996. On the basis of the Bureau's letter, the 
Corporation's management, too, wrote a letter dated June 25, 1996 barring the 
union executives from carrying out their trade union duties. After getting the 
necessary permission, when the labour leaders called a meeting of union members 
to explain to them the problem at hand, the Labour and Social Affairs Bureau 
cancelled the meeting through its letter of August 6, 1996. The union's application 
to the Region 14 Administration for permission to hold a meeting was also rejected 
through the Administration's letter of August 8, 1996. Repeated applications to 
hold a union meeting were rejected by the above offices (EHRCO 1996: 6). 
Around this time, the court process over CETU's future, which had stalled when the government-
sponsored interim committee was denied the right to represent CETU and administer its property, 
was helped by the ‘dropping’ of two of the three judges on the appeal court deemed too 
sympathetic to CETU's case (Sikazwe 1995c; Schwass 1996). This paved the road for the eventual 
‘right ruling’ (Schwass 1996). 
The process of organising a new CETU along loyalist deferential lines gained new momentum in 
January 1997 when eight of the nine industrial federations met and formed an eighteen member 
Coordinating Committee to Reorganise CETU (1997). Between April 22 and 24, these eight 
federations held a General Congress. On the final day of the congress the courts threw out the last 
obstacle in the form of an appeal lodged by Dawey (Kailembo 1997b), clearing the path to the 
emergence of a reconstituted CETU and ending the contestation over the trade union structures. A 
new deferential CETU, clear of any assertive ambitions, was born, its novelty illustrated by the 
fact that its entire executive committee – save one member – consisted of new elects (Egulu 1997). 
An observer to the congress concluded that it ‘clearly shows that manoeuvres from the Ethiopian 
government have paid off’. But while ‘on the surface everything seemed rosy’, it was also reported 
that ‘a lot of behind-the-scene moves’ took place (Kailembo 1997c). In this way whatever risk that 
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an unpleasant surprise like that of the 1994 congress would reoccur was eliminated. Rather than a 
celebration of union democracy, the ICFTU observer of the congress reported that it ‘marks the 
climax of interference by the Ethiopian government into CETU affairs’ (Egulu 1997:1). 
By now, international affiliates were also becoming more prone to accept the termination of 
relatively autonomous trade unionism, some more enthusiastically than others. AALC had made 
its embrace of the prevailing forces explicit, participating and delivering an address to the congress 
and pledging to work with the new confederation (Kailembo 1997c; Egulu 1997). Suspicions about 
the activities of especially its Nairobi based representative Fissehatsion Tekie had become so 
serious that there had developed ‘a consensus among ICFTU and major affiliates to keep [him] out 
of Ethiopia (and Eritrea) because he cooperates with the government to keep trade unions in line’ 
(Schwass 1996).  But OATUU195 and ILO had also ‘in effect given recognition to the new 
leadership’ (Kailembo 1997c). And despite having reported gross interferences, and arguing that 
the time was not yet ripe for cooperation, ICFTU was also slowly beginning to change footing 
(Schwass 1996). Its regional general secretary Kailembo (1997a) argued that because the 
dissenting group were now in majority, they could no longer be ignored. The argument was based 
on the familiar argument about ‘the strategic importance of Ethiopia in Africa’ (Kailembo 1997a). 
International Transport Workers' Federation' general secretary David Cockroft (1997) agreed with 
this assessment, pointing to the perceived danger of the refounded CETU orienting itself towards 
the more independent OATUU over ICFTU, bluntly stating that ‘it is time to mend fences’. ‘We 
should also recognise’, ICFTU African regional General Secretary Kailembo (1997c) wrote ‘the 
fact that the government has succeeded in breaking up CETU and making it a pro-government 
organ’. It would take the ICFTU another five years to fully normalise relations with this organ.  
The situation for remaining representatives and unions unwilling to submit was becoming 
grimmer. Immediately before the reorganising congress Dawey and two other CETU leaders fled 
to Kenya, citing around-the-clock harassment and explicit warnings from several sources of an 
alleged government plan ‘to cause severe injury’ to them, potentially including long periods of 
detention or worse (Dawey et al. 1997). The banking and insurance federation, which strenuously 
 
195 With regards to OATUU, the change of heart of its general secretary, Sunmonu, appears to have been sudden and 
sharp. He was reported to have told congress delegates not to ‘disappoint Africa, your government and OATUU’ 
[emphasis added], and to have promised them to assert pressure on the absent Bank and Insurance Federation to join 
them and to work with the government (Egulu 1997c: 2). 
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refused to be reorganised within the new CETU, was again the last one to submit. This 
intransigence came to an end through an alleged ‘coup’ in 1999, for which the ground had been 
prepared among member unions for some time. In the union of the Ethiopian Insurance 
Corporation, for example, new elections were held in January 1998 and ‘stage managed’ to assure 
that union leaders with ‘political backing’ replaced the old leadership (Alemseged 2000: 11). Other 
constituent unions were allegedly ‘frozen’ and prevented from operating and meeting (Abiy 1998). 
In 1999, control had been gained over a sufficient number of unions within the industrial federation 
to topple the leadership, a feat which was expedited by the forced retirement of the federation 
president, Abiy Melesse. The largest union of the federation, that of the Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia, stood out as an exception which was ‘strong enough’ to prevent subversion and uphold 
a combative line for at least another year (Alemseged 2000: 33-34). Abiy himself had begun to 
‘fear for his life’ (ILO 2000: 23/75), and would go into exile shortly after his ouster196.  
At this point, the context requires consideration. While the Ethiopian Teacher's Association (ETA) 
is not the subject of study here, the conflict and repression it was embroiled in very much related 
to the situation of CETU. A conflict between the government and ETA had been simmering since 
1992. Bank accounts had been frozen, offices ransacked and sealed, splits had been fomented and 
a new organisation emerged with government recognition, the leadership was harassed, while 
members loyal to the leadership were dismissed across the country (Praeg 2006: 193). None of 
this had been sufficient, however, to rub out the original ETA. In 1996 its chairman, Taye 
Woldesemayat, was imprisoned and eventually given a fifteen year sentence for allegedly having 
been member of an illegal armed opposition movement197. ETA executive member Assefa Maru 
was shot to death by security forces on his way to the office the next year. According to 
eyewitnesses the shooting was not preceded by any warning, while the government claimed that 
he had attempted to evade arrest. The fact that police entered the ETA offices and thoroughly 
searched it the same day, however, suggests that the target was the association and its 
representatives, rather than any one individual (ION 1997). ‘ETA officials have become favourite 
targets of the Ethiopian authorities, who are apparently determined to use any means to break the 
trade union’, the Indian Ocean Newsletter (1997) reported. All this provided relevant context and 
 
196 Abiy Melesse was a veteran trade unionist who had reportedly spent over two years in jail during the PMAC/WPE 
government. Sometime after going into exile in the United States, in 2006, he was shot to death by an acquaintance. 
197 He would spend six years in jail before being released. 
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lingered heavy on the minds of resistant trade unionists. As there had been only half-hearted 
attempts to conceal these measures, this deterrent effect was likely an intended purpose. It 
influenced the decisions of dozens of trade unionists to go into exile, and it must have also worked 
to convince those staying behind of the prudence of keeping a lower profile. 
5.4 Aftermath 
The reassertion of control over the structures of the labour movement caused fallout on a number 
of levels. The Ethiopian government was severely criticised for the intolerance and bias it had 
showcased, both domestically and internationally198, but judging by the employment of similar 
strategies when faced with undesirable organisational constellations199 in the years that followed, 
it appears that the outcome was considered in positive terms. For the new loyalist CETU, however, 
the problems relating to its lack of legitimacy would continue to linger. 
A number of obstacles kept complicating CETU's relations with parts of the international trade 
union movement. These included CETU's silence on the forced removal of independent-minded 
trade unionists including Abiy Melesse, the imprisonment of Taye Woldesemayat, the death of 
Assefa Maru, and the deportation of trade unionists of Eritrean citizenry during the Ethio-Eritrean 
war (Jordan 1999; Kailembo 1999). These concerns were not important to AALC and ILO, who 
had been working with and supporting CETU since the 1997 congress (Kailembo 1999), but they 
remained obstacles to CETU's relationship with the ICFTU and some of its member federations. 
In the most sharp-worded statement, the president of the Canadian Labour Congress rebutted a 
CETU request for normalisation of relations saying ‘we have followed with dismay the erosion of 
independent trade unionism in your country including the killing, arrest, and forcing into exile of 
real workers representatives … [and] we agree with the ICFTU/AFRO policy of isolating those 
inside the country who are collaborating with the current government and not speaking out against 
the violation of trade union rights’ (White 1999). If this was ever the policy of ICFTU, however, 
its practice by 1999 was different. Two months after the above cited letter was written an ICFTU 
AFRO delegation visited CETU, and although it staked out a path to normalisation (Kailembo 
1999), it would take until 2004 before CETU was readmitted to ICFTU. 
 
198 See EHRCO (1995, 1996), and the reports and protest letters from OATUU (1995) and ICFTU cited in the above. 
199 Both civil society organisations – such as the ETA – and a number of legally registered political parties have since 
found themselves having offices closed, bank accounts blocked, splits fomented, and courts' rulings favouring the 
dissenting faction issued against them,  in an eerily similar fashion. 
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Despite, then, eventually regaining international recognition, it was a wing-clipped CETU 
enjoying little legitimacy that prevailed. There were palpable doubts over the degree to which the 
organisation represented the genuine interests of Ethiopian workers. In 2001 an Ethiopian 
newspaper ridiculed the leader of CETU at the time, Amare Alemayehu, for having stated that 
CETU ‘does not believe that strikes can resolve industrial disputes’ (John W.: 2001). This 
standpoint of CETU, the author claimed, hollows the constitutional stipulation of the right to strike, 
‘outrageously disparages the great sacrifices of workers in Ethiopia’, and poses question as to 
whose interests CETU's leadership really represent (John W.: 2001). The following year the US 
Department of State (DoS 2003) reported that ‘publicised allegations of widespread corruption 
within CETU's leadership ranks and of CETU's close ties to the Government have paralysed the 
organisation’. ICFTU's Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights from the same year 
reported that ‘the government blatantly interferes in trade union affairs in all sectors’, with ‘many 
trade union leaders [having] been removed from their posts and/or forced to leave the country’200. 
It stated that ‘trade union leaders are still being sent to prison because they sought to protect their 
rights, while many more are sacked simply for forming a trade union’ (ICFTU 2003). The next 
year DoS (2004) reported that although, unlike previous years, it had no reports of union leaders 
being forcefully removed or forced into exile, ‘government interference in unions’ nevertheless 
continued, and was described in the following terms: 
CETU leadership was aligned with the ruling party and did not fight vigorously 
for workers' rights. Findings of widespread corruption in 2002 within CETU's 
leadership had not resulted in any disciplinary actions by year's end. In January, 
four members of CETU's nine-member executive committee, who criticised the 
majority five-member block's decisions were forced from office and replaced by 
four members hand-picked by the Government. 
In 2005, the same department reported that ‘complete government control of the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU)'s executive committee continued throughout the year’. In 2007, 
more serious infringements were reported, including the harassment, intimidation and 
imprisonment of union leaders by security collaborating with employers. This allegedly included 
militia and police killing labour activists working on a sugar cane project in the Afar region, but a 
request from the concerned industrial federation that the government investigate the violence was 
allegedly ignored (DoS 2008). Harassment continued to be reported by the end of the decade, 
 
200 This precise wording would reappear in each consecutive issue of the annual survey until at the very least 2012. 
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targeting union members and organisers, and including frequent dismissals of  activists, with 
‘lawsuits alleging unlawful dismissal often [taking] years to resolve because of case backlogs in 
the courts’ (DoS 2011). None of this resulted in any meaningful protest from CETU being 
registered, much less any resistance. But by 2008 employers’ harassment of union leaders and 
organisers had become so severe that the CETU congress denounced ‘the rising number of 
violations of workers' rights and of those of their trade union representatives, who are facing 
“serious problems” in several companies’ (ITUC 2009). That same year it was reported that ten 
workers including three union officials at the Bole Printing Enterprise in Addis Ababa had been 
suspended, and that similar dismissals had taken place at Kaliti Food Factory201 and the Dashen 
beer brewery (ITUC 2009). 
These allegations represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of reported infringement of union 
rights by both employers and the state202. It remains true, as was stated in a DoS (2004) report 
from over a decade ago, that since the first labour proclamation of the EPRDF government came 
into effect no strike that has come to the attention of the concerned courts has been considered 
legal. Moreover, many newly established corporations refuse their workers the right to organise 
altogether, contravening labour legislation but facing no sanction from the government or courts. 
In one of the recently constructed industrial parks that is meant to spearhead Ethiopia's industrial 
transformation, for example, it was reported that only 3 out of 17 enterprises had tolerated that 
workers established a union (Dawit 2017a: 11). At the massive Huajian shoe factory, meanwhile, 
workers who attempted to form a unions were dismissed, and at the Sheraton Addis Hotel 65 
unionised workers were dismissed in the midst of bargaining for a new collective agreement 
(Kirubel 2014). The dismissed included the entire union board, and despite attempts to appeal to 
courts the conflict was only resolved two years later when Starwood Hotels and Resorts 
Worldwide intervened responding to international pressure. Similar transgressions – including 
harassment and dismissals of union organisers – have been reported in the horticulture industry 
(Hanan 2011; Tewodros 2010). According to an official of the Industrial Federation of Textile, 
Leather and Garment Workers' Trade Unions this reflects the reality that workers at three quarters 
 
201 The problems faced by the Kaliti Food Factory union in its relationship with management – it was a state-owned 
enterprise at the time – was confirmed by the union chairman, who claimed that the management ‘tried to divide the 
union’ (Teshome and Teklemedhin 2015, personal interview). 
202 See, for example, the numerous reports from ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association and ICFTU's/ITUC's 
Annual Survey of Violation of Trade Union Rights. 
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of all Ethiopian enterprises are denied the right to unionise (Dijkstra 2015). The emasculation of 
the Ethiopian labour movement has had severe repercussions on the rights and conditions of 
Ethiopian labour. The effects on wages is something that is discussed in the next chapter.  
5.5 Constraining factors 
As has been noted, the second cycle described in the above was neither as profound nor as 
protracted as the first. Nevertheless the renewed stirrings, organisational efforts and eventual 
confrontation constituted a distinct process against the background of the docility of the prior 
decade. But the emergent movement had its wings clipped and its autonomy curtailed early. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that the collision with the state prematurely ended a process of 
renewed mobilisation, but on another, it may be argued that the abrupt manner in which it came to 
an end indicates the shallowness of the process and the weakness of the movement in the first 
place, and that these two aspects – the relative shallowness, and the relative brevity – of the process 
constituted two sides of the same coin.  
Conflict, once it erupted in earnest, was mostly localised at the central level, and what resistance 
was attempted took place in court rooms and offices rather than on the shop-floors and in the 
streets. Although there was rank-and-file involvement and pressures that moved the leadership to 
take an assertive stand, those pressures were given no viable outlet. Despite part-taking in localised 
unrest and organisation, the rank-and-file was not mobilised for the decisive confrontation that 
followed. In that sense, the process was relatively shallow when compared to the first cycle. While, 
in the 1960 and 1970s, workers struggled for years despite a state that was at the very least equally 
repressively inclined as that of the 1990s, a similar kind of rank-and-file mobilisation and activity 
never prevailed during the second cycle. The reasons for this are several, but among these 
constraining factors there were few novelties. In fact, it could be argued that most of these factors 
prevailed in greater magnitude during the first cycle. 
Bureaucratisation does not, in the main, appear to have been a factor with major impact on the 
movement. Labour officials were at the forefront of the attempt to carve out an autonomous space 
for the labour movement, despite the risks involved. Top officials of CETU, however, were very 
well remunerated203. High salaries were established after open debate as a measure to pre-empt the 
 
203 The CETU president earned 1800 ETB/month, branch secretaries 1000 ETB (Dawey 1995d). Federation President 
Hailu Ourgessa (2017, personal interview) characterised his as ‘the salary of a minister’. 
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risk of financial incentives being used to subvert individual labour leaders (Hailu 2017, personal 
interview). One could of course very well argue that the opposite is true: that material privilege 
and separation from the rank-and-file would instil a cautiousness and render labour leaders less 
willing to risk their position. Over the longer term those dynamics could potentially have become 
decisive, but for the short term, and perhaps because of the brevity of tenure that CETU's high 
officials enjoyed, this does not appear to have constituted a major moderating force: most top 
labour officials were apparently willing to risk that privilege.  
With regards to relations with and pressures from the state, there were no major departures from 
the established path. Such pressures, again, proved a major – even decisive perhaps – constraining 
factor to the emergence of an assertive labour movement. ‘History repeats itself’, Dawey (1994b) 
wrote to the ICFTU, ‘the confederation at its inception, is confronted with such difficulties as 
infringements of trade union rights [and] violent repression of its activities’204. ‘Unfortunately’, he 
continued ‘the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and/or the party in power has [since the 
beginning] been engaged in outright suppression of the confederation with a view to make it its 
own wing’. The motive of the government, he alleged was to ‘formally subordinate the 
confederation to the control of the party in power so that it will play the role of a transmission 
belt’. Indeed, in this respect there was a strong flavour of history repeating itself.  
Neither were the methods of re-establishing state control very new. The list of grievances in late 
1994, included refusal to register or recognise large unions – such as those of the Akaki Textile 
and Garment Factories and the Ethio-Fibre factory – that were considered resistant; interference 
in the internal processes of constituent unions including dismissal of union representatives; refusal 
to turn over union property held by the government; launching of derogatory mass media 
campaigns; and harassment and intimidation of workers' representatives (Dawey 1994b; CETU 
1995a). CETU president Dawey (2015, personal interview) describes the severity of repression in 
the following terms: 
 
204 The references to the past, and to events discussed in the previous chapter, were manifold. According to Hailu 
Ourgessa (2017, personal interview), members of Mekuria's PFTUSM faction referred to the seventh floor of the 
CETU building – where the intransigent Federations of Commerce, Technique and Printing Industry and of Banking 
and Insurance had their offices – as ‘Assimba’, the name of the mountain base of EPRP's army in the 1970s, denoting 
the perception that those federations were somehow linked to the latter. Moreover, Hailu recalls that members of the 
government-aligned faction ‘reminded us many times that this area, this building, this trade union movement, is used 
to blood, telling us that blood might flow if we follow the same line’. 
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They mobilised every force under their power against the workers. From the 
headquarter of the confederation, down to the primary union, even the remotest, 
this Fibre industry in Gambela — they allocated cadres and started removing 
leaders from the primary unions, arresting them, killing some. 
The alleged killings, according to Dawey's estimation, took the lives of around 59 labour leaders 
around the country (Dawey, 2015, personal interview). That number, however, must, for the time 
being at least, be considered unverified. ‘The present government has been much less violent than 
the [previous] but equally unwilling to tolerate an independent trade union movement’ Dessalegn 
(2002: 114) has written. ‘Its favoured tactic since the 1990s has been to force a split in the trade 
unions considered hostile to its policies and then give its support in favour of friendly leaders’, he 
continued, describing a more established pattern that only rarely included lethal force. ‘On 
occasions’, rather, ‘independent minded leaders have been harassed, thrown in jail on trumped up 
charges, or forced to flee the country’. 
The state, then, proved prepared to go to great lengths, taking severe measures to rein in the 
autonomy that the labour movement enjoyed. But it did not necessarily go any further than what 
it had done under previous governments. In fact, it can be argued that state repression, although 
very important in bringing an end to the second cycle, was less intense and widespread than under, 
at the very least, the previous cycle. For that reason, the rather rapid halt the movement grinded to 
– when compared to the several years of intense struggle against terroristic violence in the 1970s 
– cannot be explained in terms of state repression alone. 
State intervention, by encouraging a dissenting faction from within the movement and preying on 
internal divisions, resembled the strategy deployed during the first cycle. The TGE ‘had done all 
its preparatory job to draw its stooges in the movement so that it [would] fight from within to 
pursue its political ends’ a CETU (1995a: 10) document read. ‘By monopolising the leadership of 
the Organising Committee the pro-government members succeeded in holding federations 
executive leaderships through rigged elections’, it stated. ‘Among the nine federations they 
succeeded in holding majority positions in five, which now sparked the split’, it explained its 
looming demise. However, as plausible as some of the allegations contained here seem – especially 
in light of the fact that active dissent from within the movement actually came almost exclusively 
from the leaderships of those federations – there would have been nothing new with attempting to 
subvert the movement from within, in order to charge at it from without. The movement in the 
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1970s was subjected to the precise same methods, where, initially, Alem Abdi had played the role 
of the internal spoiler, giving cover to government intervention. However, this had initially proved 
unsuccessful as Alem Abdi was ousted and the government was forced to recall its decision closing 
CELU's headquarters. Fomented divisions and splits, alone at least, is not then sufficient to explain 
the demise of the autonomous labour movement. 
Dawey had argued that an inherited obstacle originated in the fact that the history of Ethiopian 
labour movementism was marked by the rise and fall of regimes, that all previous and 
contemporaneous governments had viewed the movement as a threat and ‘devised annexations 
methods’ to assert control over them, and that this had ‘left the movement without experience, 
education and strong structure of trade unionism’ (CETU 1995a: 9). But when judged against the 
discussion contained in the previous chapter, this holds only partially true. Indeed, successive 
governments had viewed the labour movement as a threat and had tried to establish control over 
it. However, success in this endeavour was by no means guaranteed, and it had faced continuous 
resistance. The PMAC/WPE had put in place an impressive internal and external control regime, 
which effectively checked the development of assertiveness through the 1980s. But structures 
intended to carry out a vertical control function in one context can assume a very different role 
when the context or the balance of forces is altered, as the years around the demise of the WPE 
would demonstrate. 
History also somewhat repeated itself in terms of the role played by the international ‘free’ trade 
union movement, and the moderating pressures it asserted. While initially supportive of a certain 
autonomy of the Ethiopian labour movement, this support was not without conditions, and 
international affiliates would again attempt to check the movement's assertiveness, if not to the 
same extent as during the first cycle. When CETU, in the midst of an onslaught, planned ‘a major 
demonstration’ for February 26, 1995, ICFTU African regional General Secretary Kailembo 
(1995a) was ‘trying to convince Dawey not to carry out such a demonstration for the time’, 
claiming it would be ‘counter-productive’. Indeed, the demonstration was never held. Fissehatsion 
Tekie, meanwhile, the former general secretary of CELU and an ardent collaborator with ICFTU, 
notably again was involved in exercising restraining pressure in the 1990s, this time as a 
representative of the AALC. Several CETU leaders testifies to this role of his (Hailu 2017, personal 
interview; Dawey 2015, personal interview; Getachew 2017, personal interview). The president of 
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the Federation of Commerce, Technique and Printing Industry Unions, who was a supporter of 
CETU's leadership, for example, affirm that Fissehatsion offered him a scholarship abroad in order 
to remove one of the central ‘troublemakers’ (Hailu, 2017 personal interview). There are 
allegations that similar offers from the same source were responsible for turning at least one 
federation president to the side of the government-aligned faction (Dawey 2015, personal 
interview; Hailu 2017, personal interview). Moreover, the disbursement of AALC funds to 
federations rather than the confederation did a lot to weaken the national centre and strengthen 
centrifugal forces at a key conjuncture. Eventually, AALC support for the federation-based interim 
committee implied an open commitment to support these forces. In the end, the manner in which 
former labour officials were treated by supposed allies in the international trade union movement 
clearly contrasted with earlier batches and demonstrated the attitude dominant in the latter. The 
care that the international ‘free’ trade union movement showed for the CELU top officials was 
quite extraordinarily generous, but the new CETU exiles were not treated with any resembling 
level of welcome. Initial refugees of the movement arriving in Nairobi were given some emergency 
support from ICFTU (Sikazwe 1995b), but the latter's attitude soon shifted. New and remaining 
exiled leaders (Hailu 2017, personal interview; Kailembo 1995b; Laurijssen 1995) not only had 
applications for financial support rejected, but were urged to return to Ethiopia. All in all, while it 
was certainly not a decisive factor in determining the orientation of the labour movement during 
the second cycle, the carrots and sticks wielded by the international trade union movement was 
nevertheless generally geared towards inducing moderation. 
Issues of lesser importance identified in the first cycle have been mentioned within the second 
cycle too. Once again, there were episodes and fault-lines reinforced by perceived or real national 
divisions, but once again this factor is easily exaggerated. There were accusation of discriminatory 
attitudes against northerners in the executive committee, which mirrored accusation against the 
dissenting faction as having its origin in recruitment drives of the ruling party among such 
northerners. Reports (Schwass 1995), meanwhile, mentioned the suspicion that government 
intervention was motivated by the desire to have one nationality dominate union leadership. But 
beyond ostensibly constituting one factor behind the emergence of a minority faction, there are no 
indications that workers and workers' representatives perceived of their interests as, or acted as if 
they were, as anything but, at the very least, conjoined. Most importantly, it was the workers that 
overwhelmingly and decisively rejected the government-initiated proposal of organising the 
178 
 
movement along regional/national lines. And even if national/ethnic origin had some level of 
tendency to converge with faction divisions, the former factor can consequently not carry more 
weight than the effects of the factional split that it may have conditioned. As it has been found that 
the prevalence of a dissenting minority was not decisive in determining the labour movement's 
orientation, it logically follows that any factor that merely contributed to this prevalence cannot be 
considered any more so. 
The economic weakness of the labour movement has been proposed as a general factor determining 
its eventual subordination. This factor has two relevant aspects. On the one hand, the years of 
PMAC/WPE rule had significantly improved the material resources available to the movement. 
On the other, it had enhanced vulnerability, in terms of employees and facilities that required 
continuous flows of funds. This was seized upon by the government, which froze assets that could 
have served as strike funds, including 2.5 million ETB of liquid means, as well as numerous 
valuable real estate (Tamene 1994: 1). While in theory, the relative wealth of the movement 
compared to previous times could have served as an asset, it also came to constitute a liability. 
Either way, the importance of this factor should probably not be exaggerated, as it was when the 
labour movement was at its economically weakest – having lost the support of the state and its 
international allies in the mid-1970s – that it staged its most formidable campaigns. The situation 
of the wage working population at large has also been forwarded as an explanation of moderation. 
Tamene (1994:1) mentioned, as a factor why he deemed it unlikely that workers would vigorously 
defend CETU, that ‘with [an] unemployment rate far exceeding the nation's half a million [sic] 
workforce, many workers may find it difficult to sacrifice their jobs’. This argument very much 
dovetails that of Killion (1984), pertaining to workers in imperial Ethiopia, where unemployment 
was just as much of a ravaging problem. But as has been demonstrated, it did not prevent workers 
from engaging in sustained campaigns of unrest and resistance during that conjuncture. By itself 
then, it appears to be an unsubstantiated conclusion that the vulnerability of Ethiopian wage 
workers determines pragmatism and moderation. But if looked at in terms of a defensive struggle, 
within a negative cycle rather than a positive one, it may take on a higher level of importance. 
None the factors described in the above then – important as they may be to different degrees and 
in different contexts – can effectively explain why the growth of assertiveness was cut short with 
such relative simplicity in the 1990s. None of the factors can be claimed to constitute a determinant 
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factor, even if state repression probably can be seen as having been decisive within the immediate 
context it took place. But to identify the reasons why state curtailment and repression was instantly 
so much more effective in the 1990s than in the 1970s, one has to look for other factors. One such 
factor, which is identified as the demonstrative/inspirational factor in the previous chapter, is 
notable also in its absence or in an inverted shape. It needs to be noted that the second cycle 
described in the above was a cycle of defensive manoeuvres and retreats rather than offensive 
measures and advances. This time, there was no radicalism in terms of demands to shift the 
strategic position of workers relative to capital, nor to significantly enhance the workplace power 
of workers. The first stirrings, the rumblings of strikes, and the scramble to organise where all 
motivated by the necessity to defend the immediate interest of workers who had experienced a 
precipitous decline in their leverage and conditions, and were now faced with renewed assaults. 
All major workplace incidents were motivated by such defensive concerns to protect what little 
was left. It is telling that the conflict between the state and CETU, as well as within CETU, 
originated in, on the one hand, the adoption of an SAP that was assumed – rightly so – to result in 
retrenchments and further decline of real wages, and, on the other, a renewed attempt to bring its 
structures under control. What the workers could hope to achieve from this, at least in the short-
term perspective, was only to arrest these processes, but hardly to reverse them or make any 
meaningful advances – no such goals were, at least, ever formulated. While erecting defensive 
positions may constitute a powerful motivating factor, it may be argued that it does not breed the 
same offensive, triumphant and optimistic atmosphere as the ascending cycle of unrest and 
organisation driving the position and leverage of workers forward, and resulting in demonstrable 
material and social gains. 
5.6 Conducive factors 
Much like the above mentioned constraining factors, there were few novelties among the factors 
that drove the development of what assertiveness that emerged in the second cycle. But herein 
appears to lay one major difference from the previous cycle: the relatively lesser magnitude of all 
identified conducive factors. Moreover, when compared to the first cycle, there were some notable 
absences. 
During the second cycle, the labour movement found no effective external allies, and was not able 
stake out a space of manoeuvre within a broader popular movement, as had CELU in the 1970s. 
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To be sure, there were offers of support from oppositional grouplets (Sikazwe 1994c), but the 
weakness and lack of leverage of those constellations was so glaring that rather than to serve as a 
source of support, any affiliation – even by association – was deemed to constitute a liability rather 
than an asset, and was rejected by CETU's leadership. That, of course, is not to say that there were 
no individual labour representatives that came to join these groups – just as some would join the 
ruling party – nor to ignore that the government would seize on any perceived convergence 
between the labour movement and opposition parties to allege that the former was being 
manipulated by the latter. Any real support from these groups, however, was neither plausible nor, 
in any meaningful way, forthcoming. Moreover, the CETU leaders were informed by what they 
considered the pitfalls of the past – excessive proximity to political parties – and jealously guarded 
what autonomy they had. In the words of Federation President Hailu Ourgessa (2017, personal 
interview), CETU ‘fought back’ when opposition parties tried to ‘hijack’ the struggle over the 
labour movement by calling a demonstration against government attacks on it. Autonomy was 
considered a virtue and a strength that was dependent on organisational detachment205, but as the 
discussion above indicates this can also come to constitute a weakness. 
When the eventual assault on the labour movement began in earnest, little resistance was offered. 
It is likely that the isolated and vulnerable strategic position the movement occupied contributed 
to the cautiousness and restraint exhibited by the leadership – including the absence of any serious 
attempt to launch a general strike. CETU President Dawey (2015, personal interview) has claimed 
that the Supreme Council decided to prepare for a general strike by gathering the required number 
of representatives' signatures. In Dawey's estimation, they would ‘without a doubt’ have acquired 
a sufficient number of signatures to hold a legal strike, had the movement not fallen victim to 
repression. ‘I had been agitating workers to that effect’, Dawey (2015, personal interview) has 
affirmed: ‘I sent messengers to every direction to collect [the signatures required]’. However, 
several of the messengers were arrested. The legal path to a general strike was further narrowed 
with the ban on CETU. However unlikely the prospects were that the concerned judicial 
institutions would have permitted it, Dawey confirmed that that the option of calling an extra-legal 
general strike was never seriously entertained. 
 
205 There were common initiatives with the ETA, but nothing that moved much beyond issuance of joint press 
communiques. 
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But although the leadership declined to increase the stakes by calling a general strike, this was not 
agreeable to all parts of the movement. One prominent CETU leader testifies that quite a number 
of workers and workers' representatives ‘came to [CETU], asking us to call a strike’ and that the 
CETU leaders ‘were receiving pressures from every direction that we have to call a strike’. This 
included the expressed willingness of several unions to call out its members. The government too, 
he assesses, were weary – ‘terrorised’ in fact – by the prospect of a general strike. This expressed 
itself in repeated warnings and threats ‘telling us we really should not do that, that it will be the 
end of it’. But in any event, the decisions in the end came down to the leadership. ‘On our part’, 
he recognises ‘we were not ready to call a general strike, because we had just been in office for 
few months [and] we had not even finished going to the basic trade unions to introduce ourselves 
when the government started attacking us’ (Hailu 2017, personal interview). 
In other words, despite the fact that the confrontation played out at the level of high officialdom, 
the pressure to take an assertive stand originated from the rank-and file-and the basic unions. While 
the pleas for a general strike came from the lower levels, reluctance prevailed at the top. This 
dynamic expressed itself much before outright suppression began. The CETU president, for 
example, affirms that the decision to call the fateful press conference that triggered the split and 
the showdown with the government was precipitated by ‘pressure’ not only from the government, 
but also ‘from below’, within the movement (Dawey 1994b). ‘There was a turmoil going on’, 
Federation President Hailu Ourgessa (2017 personal interview) has stated: 
Right after the election [of CETU's leadership] people were coming to the 
national [centre]. They did not go right away and strike. They came and asked, 
‘this is happening to us, what shall we do’? They were ready. Some [workers' 
representatives] even asked their workers already to come out [on strike]. But at 
the national level what was being said was, ‘strike is the ultimate thing that we 
should do – we have to refrain from going on a strike before we organise CETU 
properly’. 
These pressures gathered further pace as the effects of structural adjustment policies started biting 
(Hailu 2017, personal interview): 
[Workers' representatives] were coming to the national [centre]. Even those that 
were not retrenched. Those who had heard that the government was going to close 
their factory. They were coming to [CETU's] office, to Dawey's office, from 
everywhere. Workers were ready to go for a strike. We are the ones who are to be 
blamed, we are the ones who said ‘do not do it’. We were not strong enough to go 
in that direction. That [would] be a twenty-four hours matter for the government 
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to close everything and stop everything and force us to work from zero… Workers 
were coming to the office and asking us what we were doing. Some were asking to 
go for a general strike. Some were going for a demonstration. We discussed and 
what we said was, ‘look, let us stay our ground – what we should do is to make it 
public that we oppose what the government is doing’. 
Pressure from the rank-and-file did not end with the coming of the conflict. While it has been 
claimed that, once the repression under way, workers ‘mounted a very, very determined resistance 
to keep their local trade unions’ (Hailu 2017, personal interview), this was never given a 
coordinated and organised outlet. Rather, workers were left to fend for themselves in dispersed 
local struggles where the balance of forces were tilted decisively against them. In the majority of 
cases, this bred resignation, defeat and eventual surrender to imposed trade union structures, 
employers and management. 
In its active phase, the labour movement autonomously reproduced networks and informal 
mechanisms, much as it had done in the previous cycle. The networks which the early re-emergent 
movement created displayed similarities to those networks that emerged before 1963; those of the 
labour opposition of the late 1960s and early 1970s; and those that emerged again, after the 
repression of CELU from 1975 onwards. However, the emergence of networks during the second 
cycle has – unlike during the first cycle – been explained in terms of a largely spontaneous process. 
Their emergence around the industrial belt stretching southwards from Addis Ababa was 
facilitated by the density of workplaces and workers in the area (Hailu 2017, personal interview): 
This is what we know about the labor movement in Ethiopia: we touch each other 
on a daily basis, informally. If you go to Akaki — it's a labour area — and you talk 
something to someone, during the night they go to the local pub and inns, and chat 
and discuss about this informally. Everybody gets the information. You will touch, 
in Akaki, in a day, 200-300 different unions. From there, it will travel in every 
direction. And the concentration of factories and enterprises in and around Addis 
Ababa, near Akaki and Wonji, also helped the dissemination of information 
quickly. I think the clandestine movement we were part of before the formation of 
the trade union, which was informal with no structure, exchanging information 
here and there, helped a lot.  
However, the spontaneity of these networks and their failure to crystallise into organisational 
structures contributed to the movement's failure to exhibit the same kind of tenacity and dynamism 
as it had in the 1960s and 1970s. The absence of central coordination atomised resistance once the 
formal institutions of CETU had been rendered defunct, and thus facilitated the relative simplicity 
by which control was eventually reasserted over the movement. Despite this, the networks 
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constituted a valuable resource by which efforts could be coordinated in the emergent phase of the 
movement. 
But the state too was organising clandestine networks, and it was intervening in the affairs of the 
movement long before it had developed a determination to suppress it. Much like in previous 
decades, this did not immediately generate the outcomes intended. Instead, government high-
handedness created resentment and determination among the workers. This is how the process has 
been described (Hailu 2017, personal interview) [abridged]: 
The agenda that the government pushed on labour united labour itself. They went 
from union to union with the same agenda. Every union was angered, every union 
was against this. We did not want [a dependent confederation]. The previous trade 
union of the Derg – we hated it. It was not a trade union. Did we want to have the 
same thing again? That was the issue. We did not want to politicise anything. But 
if asking for [labour rights] is politics, we could not help it – we were politicians. 
But we had not intended in any way to take a political line. What we had done was 
to protect our interests as workers. We didn't want to have a party-controlled trade 
union. That was basic. That was the thing that united us. We have repeated this 
many times to them: ‘Look, we had a labor union under Haile Selassie and 
immediately when Derg came they destroyed it and they put their trade union. You 
came in and you destroyed what Derg put in. And now you are trying to put your 
trade union. No, we want our trade union and not yours. And it is only when we 
have our trade union that it will last long; that it will not be required to be 
disbanded each time the government is changed. We want our trade union, 
controlled by us, working for us and whichever fate it has, that fate should be 
decided by the workers – not by you’. 
State intervention, then, again created its own counterforce in moving workers to resist and 
reinforcing their determination, initially becoming a factor conducive to the development of 
assertiveness rather than, as expected, a force that arrests it. As workers began to organise, 
moreover, state-aligned actors commenced on a process of restructuring, purging old officials and 
selecting new candidates, that was strikingly similar to the process that prepared the formation of 
AETU, even if accompanied by much lesser violence. Just like in the initial phases of the 
organisation of AETU, however, these aims proved elusive. The representatives elected by basic 
unions and the national leadership appointed by these representatives proved unwilling to submit 
and go against the most basic interests of the workers: to retain their jobs and pay. This again 
illustrates how motion is propelled by activities from below. It reflects the enduring logic that 
drives repeated organisational attempts among Ethiopian workers, and the establishment of the 
vehicle through which collective leverage can be asserted in the first place.  
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Another curious factor that needs to be taken under consideration, with regards to the second cycle 
as much as the first, is the degree to which white-collar workers were at the forefront of 
organisational efforts and industrial action. Two early and telling examples are the strikes called 
by CBE and EAL workers. During the height of the conflict, the unique resilience of unions within 
the banking and insurance sector and the federation of these unions has been noted. In more recent 
times, workers of the Hilton and Sheraton hotels in Addis Ababa protesting labour conditions have 
reinforced this point. Again, skilled workers have been a source of militant energies. But much 
like in the first cycle, this is not to detract from the importance of the blue-collar labour force206 or 
to imply a division of the workforce on the question of orientation. Rather, it is probably 
reasonable, as Killion's (1985) argued, to assume that an enhanced capability to engage in open 
protest of skilled categories is linked to a comparatively advantageous position on the labour 
market. Geographically, moreover, workers in and around Addis Ababa have continued to supply 
the labour movement with some of its most militant constituencies. In addition to the relatively 
higher concentration of skilled workers, this is probably related to the critical mass of workers 
located in and around the capital, where strikers and protesters are not as exposed and vulnerable 
to harassment as in smaller towns, and where the conditions for social contagion are conducive. 
It may be concluded from the above that a number of factors impinged on the orientation of the 
Ethiopian labour movement during the second cycle to different degrees, with none of them being 
determinant on its own. But returning to the variable identified as the demonstrative/inspirational 
factor, it is again notable that in this second cycle, while there was resistance, there were no 
significant victories. The second cycle was always a rear-guard attempt to establish defensive 
barriers, and very few of those barriers held when facing stress. The strikes that were called, 
important as they were, tended to end in few concessions from employers. Moreover, there was 
only limited initial progress – in terms of acquiring organisational autonomy – which was reversed 
relatively expediently. But most importantly, perhaps, there were no readily identifiable 
betterments for the rank-and-file, or any major concessions extracted from employers or the state. 
Rather, Ethiopian wage workers saw their conditions and position progressively deteriorate. The 
inspirational/demonstrative achievements that characterised the upturn of the first cycle must 
therefore be considered largely absent in the second. In that context, path dependency could only, 
 
206 To be sure, two of most recent large strikes, at the time of writing, have been held by plantation workers. 
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at best, mean stagnation and inactivity. At worst, it bred retreat and resignation. Particularly since 
the rank-and-file was never called upon, nor given an outlet for its energies. 
It is not known, a journalist (Tameness 1994:1) reporting in the mid-1990s wrote ‘why the 
government has been so determined to oust a popularly elected leader’. But determined it was. 
And it is probably not too far-fetched to assume that it was related to the potentials of an 
autonomous labour movement. Not, perhaps, only, as Tamene would speculate, ‘for it to become 
a conduit for opposition groups’, but also for it to become a conduit and vehicle for the defence of 
the interests of workers at a time where low wages and retrenchments were essential aspects of 
implementing IMF-backed programmes, and, in light of the reorientation of the economy, of 
enhancing the rate of profit so as to attract greater investments. This is a proposition that requires 
more investigation into issues such as the long-term trajectory of wages, which is addressed in the 
following chapter. 
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6. Wages and unrest 
In this chapter, the aim is to scrutinise the impact of the labour movement on the position of labour, 
and vice versa, by examining shifting levels of unrest and the movement of real wages207 over the 
past six decades. The first section of the chapter examines aggregate levels of unrest in the waged 
sectors, while the second section does the same for the movement of real wages. The two 
consecutive sections consists of case studies on unrest and wage movements as derived directly 
from personnel files of two large Ethiopian workplaces: the Bahir Dar Textile Factory and the Dire 
Dawa railway depot. The purpose of reviewing the case studies is to test the degree to which the 
central statistical data corresponds to facts on the shop floor, to disaggregate the data looking for 
patterns that are hidden in the national statistics, and to allow for the impact of local dynamics on 
general patterns. In the final section, the findings derived from the aggregate data and the case 
studies are summarised. 
6.1 Shifting levels of unrest 
No continuous statistics exist over incidents of unrest or strikes in Ethiopia. Neither are such 
incidents compiled in any existent archival register. Partly, this is a result of the fact that due to 
the legal obstacles maintained in all consecutive Ethiopian labour legislations, no strike has ever 
been considered legal by pertinent authorities. It appears, moreover, that no comprehensive 
measurement of the occurrence of labour disputes or compilation of archived court documents of 
such disputes exists208. The probable reasons for this include the shifting responsibility for 
handling labour disputes between different bodies over the years, most of which – conciliation 
committees, labour relations boards, labour courts etc. – have been dissolved over the years; and 
the poor state of the archives of MoLSA, which appear to have been culled in the early 1980s.  
Whatever the cause, the paucity of comprehensive data and statistics has made a somewhat 
unconventional approach necessary. Relying on numerous sources of scattered data and references, 
an attempt is made to reconstruct the outlines of a general periodisation of shifting levels of 
intensity of unrest. This entails three different aspects. First, each strike incident209 that has been 
 
207 Nominal wages adjusted for inflation. 
208 The exception are labour disputes in Addis Ababa, which, since the last decade or so, seems to have been compiled 
in one registry. However, for this inquiry little benefit can be derived from such a short and recent series. 
209 This is taken to mean incidences in which a number of employees, sufficient in number to disrupt regular operations 
of the workplace, have withheld labour, by not showing up to work, by laying down tools, or by walking out of work. 
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reported and found in the literature, in official and unofficial reports, in archives and 
correspondence of labour and state officials, and in major newspapers and journals210 is compiled. 
Secondly, portrayals of the shifting general trends and levels of industrial conflict in the literature 
are reviewed. Finally, what limited data and short statistical time series that exist – such as 
mentions of short-term trends in industrial disputes – is presented to augment the above. 
Combined, this allows for a schematic periodisation of shifting levels of unrest over the last half-
century. While the data presented here is not to be taken as conclusive and exhaustive, it is argued 
that it captures, broadly, and gives an indication of trends and divergences in aggregate levels of 
unrest. The validity of this is moreover tested against the workplace case studies – from where 
complete and undistorted data has been harvested.  
The table below presents the strike incidents reported. 
Table: Reported strike incidents in post-liberation Ethiopia211 
Year 
Number of 
major 
incidents Workplaces affected and sources 
1941   
1942 1 CFE (Killion 1984: 259) 
1943   
1944   
1945   
1946 1 CFE (Killion 1984: 399) 
1947 1 CFE (Killion 1984: 400-401) 
1948   
1949 1 CFE (Killion 1984: 409-410) 
1950   
1951   
1952 1 CFE (Syoum 2005:28) 
 
‘Invisible’ forms of protest and resistance, individual disputes, or disputes channelled through the conciliation 
committees, courts etc., when not having led to collective action, are thus not measured here. The reason is that 
‘invisible’ forms seldomly generate documentation beyond the workplace archive. Only strikes where the workplace 
or sector, and year of occurrence – in Gregorian and Ethiopian calendar – has been established are listed, except for 
in the case of general strikes. 
210 Newspapers in Ethiopia constitutes a very incomplete source when it comes to measuring strikes. Long periods of 
heavy censorship has meant that only for relatively short periods have they been able to report on strike action. For 
this reason, relying on newspapers alone would generate a much skewed representation of shifting levels of unrest, 
and so, this type of source can only constitute a complimentary source to the others mentioned. 
211 For the years 1953-1990 the chart includes strikes that took place in Eritrea, which was then federated 
with/incorporated into Ethiopia. While this period began in 1952 and ended in 1991, those two years are not included, 
since for the larger part of the years Eritrea was not administered as a part of Ethiopia 
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1953   
1954 3 
HVA Wonji; CFE; Dockworkers in Massawa and Assab (Bahru 2008; Killion 
1984: 422) 
1955   
1956   
1957   
1958 2 
Ethiopian Airlines; General strike in Eritrea (Bekele 1998; Killion 1984: 377-
379) 
1959 1 Darmar shoe factory (Beyene 2010: 45) 
1960 1 Sava glass factory (Syoum 2005: 28) 
1961 3 
HVA Wonji-Shoa; Indo-Ethiopian textile factory; Darmar shoe factory; 
(Killion 1984: 438, 447)  
1962 5 
Bole International Airport;  construction workers; Highway Authority; Heavy 
freight transport enterprise; taxis (Zack 1967; Stutz 1967: 37; Killion 1984: 
383; Beyene 2010: 50-51) 
1963   
1964 3 
Ethiopian Airlines; Dire Dawa cotton factory; Eritrean railway workers (FEF 
1964; Killion 1984: 507; Goitom 1985) 
1965 2 
HVA Wonji;  General Ethiopia Transport (Killion 1984: 496; Bahru 2008; 
Prakken 1966) 
1966 3 
Berhanena Selam Printing Press; Debre Berhan Wool factory; HVA Wonji-
Shoa (Beyene 2010: 103; Prakken 1966) 
1967 4 
HVA Wonji-Shoa; Several strikes at the Bahir Dar textile factory; Leather 
Factory (Killion 1984: 522-523; FEE n.d.) 
1968 2 
Several strikes and slow-downs at Dire Dawa cotton factory (Killion 1984: 
508, 657) 
1969 2 HVA Wonji-Shoa; HVA Metahara (Killion 1984: 524-525) 
1970 1 Assab oil refinery (Beyene 2010:  106-108) 
1971 2 
Diabaco textile factory; Assab Port (Addis Zemen 1971b; Beyene 2010: 106; 
Bondestam 1975: 547) 
1972 1 Abader Farm (CELU ‘Confidential Data: Summary of Unions’, 1973) 
1973 7 
CBE; Nurahera and Melka Sedi plantations; Diabaco; Central Printing Press; 
‘a number of strikes by… “white-collar” workers in the parastatal companies’ 
of Addis Ababa; ‘many strikes’ in HVA Wonji-Shoa and Metahara (Seleshi 
1979: 698; Beyene 2010; Killion 527, 537, 548) 
1974 25 
General Strike; Humera plantations; Imperial Ethiopian Tobacco Monopoly 
workers; teachers; haricot bean farms; import-export firms; Civil Aviation; 
Elementary School Building Unit; Addis Ababa Municipality ; Ministry of 
Finance; dairy industry ; CFE, Anbessa bus firm; General Ethiopian Transport 
Company; Addis Ababa Dairy Industry; Eritrean hospitals; Garment 
Manufacturing; taxis; Haile Selassie I University staff; Postal service; truck 
drivers; and telecommunications;  (See chapter 4) 
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1975 18 
Moenco; Crown Cork; Sabean Metals; Darmar Shoes; Ethiopian Airlines; 
Berhanena Selam Printing Press; Addis Tyre Company; Addis Shoe Factory; 
Fiat Company; Lazaridis Company; grain storage depot; Ethiopian Cider; 
Cement factory; Sadaolin Paints; Vaskin Company; Petroleum workers; 
Banks; Insurance companies (see chapter 4) 
1976 6 
Addis Ababa power and water utility; Banks; Addis Ababa transport sector; 
Tobacco Monopoly; two national textile factories (see chapter 4) 
1977   
1978   
1979   
1980   
1981 1 Elaberet plantation (Eritrea information 1981: 14) 
1982   
1983 1 Barattolo/Asmara textile factory (Goitom 1985) 
1984   
1985   
1986   
1987   
1988   
1989 1 National Textile Corporation (ETU 1989) 
1990   
1991 5 
Gold mines; Akaki and Kaliti Animal Fodder Factory; Ethiopian Freight 
Transport Corporation; printing press workers; CBE (EH 1991a; 1991c; 
1991d; 1991e) 
1992 2 
Ethiopian Airlines; Akaki textile factory [possibly in 1993] (DoS 1993: 91; 
Dawey 2015, personal interview) 
1993 1 
Ethiopian Electric Power Authority [possibly in 1992] (Dawey 2015, personal 
interview) 
1994   
1995   
1996   
1997   
1998   
1999   
2000 2 Construction workers; Ethiopian Airlines mechanics (DoS 2001) 
2001 3 
MIDROC Construction Ethiopia; Gilgil Gibe Hydroelectric Plant [both 
possibly in 2000]; Ring Road construction workers (John W 2001; DoS 2002) 
2002 1 Road construction crews (DoS 2003) 
2003   
2004   
2005 1 Dragados road construction (DoS 2006) 
2006 1 Road construction workers (DoS 2007) 
2007   
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2008   
2009   
2010 1 Roto PLC (DoS 2011) 
Source: Author's compilation 
A number of things ought to be pointed out about the reliability and representativeness of the data 
presented above. To begin with, the list is not conclusive, and it can probably be assumed that a 
good number of cases have not been reported in such a manner as for it to be included in the table 
– even if the most serious incidents in terms of the numbers of strikers, the longevity of strikes, 
and the political-economic disruption they have caused are likely included. Much like Silver 
(2006: 37) stated, rather than attempting to ‘produce a count of all or even most incidents of labour 
unrest… the procedure is intended to produce a measure that reliably indicates the changing levels 
of labour unrest – when the incidence of labour unrest is rising or falling, when it is high or low – 
relative to other points in time’. Moreover, the magnitude of the incidents differs from case to 
case, with a time-trend discernible. The 1981 strike of plantation workers in Eritrea – a minor one 
by all accounts – was only reported by a publication issued by a group solidarising with the 
insurgent movement in the region. The 1973 bank strike, on the other hand, was reported widely 
and has generated plenty of documentation. While it can safely be ascertained that the latter 
constituted a consequential event, it is difficult to ascertain the same with regards to the former. 
Moreover, the coverage of sources differ over time. Detailed descriptions of strikes by DoS began 
only in 1992. Press freedom to report, meanwhile, was relatively greater in the periods of 1974-76 
and from 1991 onwards, albeit never absolute. The emergence of a private press after 1991 adds 
to the potential sources. One should in other words expect somewhat of a relative 
overrepresentation of incidents reported for the years 1974-76, and from 1991 onwards, when 
detailed attention was more frequently forthcoming, the diversity of sources was greater, and when 
censorship was comparatively lesser. Correspondingly, the number of strikers were generally 
higher in cases reported in earlier periods as well as in the early 1990s, indicating that a greater 
impact was required for the incidents to be registered and/or that strike incidents were generally 
more severe and involved more workers. These caveats notwithstanding, a number of things stand 
out from the compiled data, which is illustrated in the chart below. 
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Chart: Major strike incidents in post-liberation Ethiopia encountered in the literature
 
Source: Author's compilation 
The first and most obvious observation is that, even if only the tip of an iceberg is captured212, it 
can be established that between 1973 and 1976 an unprecedented upshot in strike activity took 
place – a so-called proletarian insurgency. While this much has been made clear in the literature, 
it has often been interpreted as an outcome of the revolution. In this context it is noteworthy that 
the upsurge in activity preceded the 1974 revolution – rapidly increasing strike action evidently 
began the year before the popular unrest, that eventually resulted in the revolution, broke out – 
putting into serious question the standard interpretation of cause and effect between labour unrest 
and the revolution. Secondly, it is notable that the years around the formation of CELU seem to 
have witnessed a pronounced increase of unrest, and that the full decade-and-half of the 1960s and 
early 1970s were marked by a consistent prevalence of mobilisation and unrest. This is particularly 
conspicuous when compared to the 1940s, the 1950s, and the post-1977 periods. However, from a 
tranquil paucity, there are brief episodes of activity registered between 1989 and 1993 and again 
around the year 2000. Again, it needs to be noted that the strike action that took place in the 1960s 
and 1970s registered here was generally on a significantly larger scale than in the 1980s. Moreover, 
 
212 The degree of omission is probably the greatest for the years around 1974, when, on the one hand, industrial peace 
broke down to a level where not all incidents could plausibly be covered, and where other paramount events distracted 
attention and ability to report. Indeed, it is probable that while in 1974 several hundred workplaces were affected, the 
1975 and 1976 strikes also saw strikes in hundreds of workplaces. Again, and for similar reasons, there appears to be 
a relatively high degree of omission in the early 1990s, where references to general levels of unrest do not tally with 
the specific incidences reported. 
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while unrest during the 1989-93 period has been described in the literature and involved thousands 
of workers, there are few sources discussing the incidents in the 2000s and there are no figures on 
the number of strikers or the longevity of the strikes, except qualifications in, for example the DoS 
reports, of the ‘minor’ scale of incidents. In other words, it is evident that the activity registered in 
the 2000s was of a significantly lesser magnitude than in the 1990s – let alone the 1960s and 1970s. 
But it is not only in terms of intensity, measured in the number of strikes or strikers, that the period 
of the 1960s and early 1970s stands out. The magnitude and seriousness of the unrest taking place 
in those decades also manifested itself in terms of the practices that accompanied the strikes. A 
number of examples from Killion's research illustrates the point. At the Bahir Dar Textile Factory, 
unrest in the year 1967 alone included repeated strikes and the setting on fire of parts of the factory 
and warehouses (Killion 1984: 512). At the Dire Dawa Cotton Factory, meanwhile, serious 
problems developed between the union and management, leading to the personnel manager being 
attacked and ‘severely beaten’ by assailants, before the state intervened and imprisoned the union 
chairman (Killion 1984: 506-507). At the HVA plantations and factories, repeated unrest was 
reported through the 1960s, and strikes were accompanied by episodes of sabotage. ‘Wonji has 
had series and series of strikes’ Mesfin Gebremichael (1983, interview with Tom Killion) has 
stated – ‘if it was not in the plantation it was in the factory, if it was not in the factory it was in the 
plantation’. The manner in which unrest was climaxing in the period leading up to the revolution 
has been noted by HVA labour leader Elias Mengesha, who stated that particularly the two last 
months of 1973 saw a remarkable number of strikes at the Wonji and Metahara sites (Killion 
1973:527). Throughout the wage working sector, similar reports lends credence to the impression 
that unrest was not just extensive, intensive and reoccurring, but also very serious, and steadily 
escalating. 
In order to thoroughly evaluate what has been described in the above, however, references to 
general levels of strike activity – as opposed to date- and place-specific incidents – need also to be 
taken into account. Here, the literature seems to broadly confirm the picture of shifting unrest 
levels outlined in the above. A number of unspecific references to unrest underlines this 
impression. Syoum (2005: 28) spoke of ‘wildcat strikes in many industries around 1960’. In 1962, 
meanwhile, the Ethiopian assistant foreign minister Getachew Makasha told a visiting ICFTU 
representative (Claverie 1962b) that some of the unions had ‘started creating trouble with 
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employers’, including staging ‘two strikes in the shoe industry and in the textiles’. Other senior 
officials informed the same source about a number of ‘concerning’ strikes and ‘growing agitations 
among the workers, who had staged several down-tools and walk-out actions recently’. In the 
following years, Markakis and Nega have written (1978: 58), ‘strikes were plenty’. Suter (1966: 
37), meanwhile, has written about ‘reports of numerous strikes since the legalisation of labour 
unions’, with Ethiopian Airlines and Indo-Ethiopian Textile workers having ‘conducted several 
work-stoppages over prolonged periods’. By 1966, the FEE President Prakken was growing 
exasperated. Citing ‘an increasing tendency of labour difficulties in many enterprises’, where ‘in 
most instances normal grievance procedures, as stipulated in the law as well as in collective 
agreements, were not observed’, he called on the government to exercise stricter control over the 
unions, and ‘to eliminate labour unrest and restore order and respect for the law’. ‘Violation of the 
law by workers and unions, as is a common feature now’, he claimed, not only risked jeopardising 
the economy, but could lead to ‘uncontrollable violence’ (Prakken 1966). Yet by 1973 industrial 
conflict did not appear to have subsided. That year, Prakken's successor as FEE president, Bekele 
Beshah (1973), spoke of a ‘spat of illegal strikes’, including at least three in ‘very important 
establishments’, and opined that ‘industrial relations developments in Ethiopia seems to have taken 
a turn for the worse’. 
Unrest continued unabated through the early years of the revolution. In 1976 a senior POMOA 
official claimed that production was ‘seriously hampered by slowdowns, attempted strikes, and 
other forms of sabotage’ (Senay 1976: 18-19). The PMAC chairman was later to confirm the 
prevalence of widespread labour unrest during the early years of the revolution (Mengistu 1982), 
and two prominent economist (Mulatu and Yohannis 1988: 105) claimed that such unrest and 
disruption was equally important in explaining the poor performance of the early post-
revolutionary economy as ‘shortages, war and civil strife’. But after this period of intense strike 
activity, and outside a few years from around 1989 to 1994, references to unrest are glaringly few. 
The emergence of renewed stirrings and unrest in the waning years of the WPE has been discussed 
in the previous chapter, and included the process Beyene (2012) labelled an ‘uprising’ in the 
industrial corridor leading south from Addis Ababa. It also included the unrest of the early EPRDF 
years, and most prominently the modest but substantive strike wave between 1991 and 1993. 
Despite the availability of detailed annual DoS reports for subsequent years only a few odd and 
lesser cases are registered after this period. For most of the post-1994 years it is either explicitly 
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stated that no strikes took place, or only ‘minor’ ones did. Moreover, for the post-1977 
WPE/PMAC period, the press of the political opposition has been examined to find evidence of 
officially unreported unrest, with only a couple of minor cases reported213. All of the above 
supports a periodisation of shifting labour unrest that tallies rather well with the data presented in 
the above. 
Unfortunately, only fragments of statistical data covering the trends discussed here exist. Strikes, 
as mentioned, has never been measured in a systematic manner, and labour disputes have been 
measured over only a few brief moments. Moreover, the measurements do not lend themselves to 
long-term comparison, as the laws and institutions tasked with handling labour disputes changed 
frequently. This having been stated, a few short time series of registered labour disputes, which 
shed light on some key conjunctures, are available.  Stutz (1967: 90-91), for example, identifies 
an upward trajectory of labour disputes in the 1960s. Individual labour disputes registered in all 
instances grew from 137 in 1963; 468 in 1964; to 776 in 1965. Meanwhile, cases involving trade 
unions increased from 11 to 70, and disputes handled by the LRB grew from 31 to 161 between 
1962/63 and 65/66 (Stutz 1967: 95). MoLSA's Labour Statistics Bulletin – a one-off publication 
that was immediately discontinued – of 1979, meanwhile, testifies to the sharp effects of the 
militarisation of the workplace struggles in 1977/78 – a period which saw the most intense 
violence. Between the year 1976/77 and 1977/78, the number of new labour disputes registered 
declined from 27 700 to 12 000214 (MoLSA 1979: 17). A final conjuncture for which statistical 
time series data exist is the time for the implementation of the 1982 trade union act. During the 
year it was proclaimed – 1982/83 – labour disputes registered in Addis Ababa lower courts 
numbered 2 300 (MoLSA 1987: app. 1: 5). By 1985/86 this number had been reduced to 1 150, 
indicating that registered disputes had halved in the three years since the legislation that turned 
trade unions into formal WPE instruments had been enacted (MoLSA 1987: app. 1: 5). The 
comparable 1978/79 figure of labour disputes registered at the Addis Ababa MoLSA branch office, 
meanwhile, had been a full 5 900 (MoLSA 1979: 19). While it is improbable that all those cases 
 
213 These source include, for example, the EPRP's publication Democracia, MEISON's New Ethiopia, TPLF's People's 
Voice, EPRDF's EPRDF Bulletin, and a number of EPLF publications, including Vanguard. 
214 The subsequent year – 1978/79, which was the last one covered – saw a modest increase to 17 700, but this is not 
to be taken to mean that there was any real re-emergence of industrial conflict. Rather, as MoLSA (1979: 17) 
explained, this partial rebound was caused by an increase in the number of reporting branch offices that year. ‘In 
general’, the document states, ‘labour disputes are reducing’. 
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where registered in courts, the compiled numbers nevertheless imply the prevalence of a steady 
decline – underlined by sharp drops during key conjunctures – in the number of labour disputes 
registered throughout the period 1976-1986. However incomplete, then, the time series of 
statistical data are, what statistics exist seems to reinforce the trajectories outlined, through the 
1960s to the 1980s at the very least. 
Reports also lends credence to the reappearance of strike activity in the early 1990s. The DoS 
(1992: 130-131) Country Report on Human Rights Practices in 1991, for example, perceives a 
temporary official tolerance ‘of strikes and protests in the workplace’, which could only have been 
derived from the repeated appearance of such unrest. Moreover, in 1991, as has been noted, the 
prime minister of the TGE testified to the increasing level of workers' protest and strike activity, 
and in 1993 the Ethiopian labour scene was reported to have seen ‘numerous actions’ of retrenched 
workers (DoS 1994). By the mid-1990s, however, reports of unrest had become glaringly few, and 
have reappeared only in recent years. Blattman and Dercon (2016) mention four recent wildcat 
strikes on flower farms and in a shoe factory. October 2017 alone, moreover, saw major strikes at 
the Sher horticulture farm and the Castel Winery, which combined involved 5 200 workers; and a 
general strike threat – the first to be issued in over 40 years – by CETU (Fasika 2017b; Fasika 
2017c; Addis Fortune 2017). Despite such recent activity – which may or may not herald the 
reappearance of a combative labour movement – the secular trend of labour unrest since the mid-
1970s, and particularly the cyclical trend between the mid-1990s and 2010, has been one of 
declining levels. 
From what has been discussed in the above, a schematic periodisation of shifting levels of unrest 
may now be attempted. Because of the relative incompleteness of data sources, this can only be 
taken to constitute an indicative and tentative illustration of such levels, and it has therefore also 
necessarily been cast in general terms. Moreover, it is subjected to the test of more concrete data 
from the workplace archives later in this chapter. All this having been said, this section has 
demonstrated that certain trends in the general levels of unrest over the last six decades or so can 
be identified. Even if the period 1973-1976 constitutes an outlier here, there is a clearly discernible 
arch of increasing unrest beginning in the late 1950s/early 1960s, intensifying through the 1960s 
and 1970s, and cresting in 1973-76. It has also been demonstrated that even if the 1990s saw the 
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re-emergence of a wave of unrest, it did not reach the same heights as the first. A schematic 
periodisation would therefore look something like the chart presented below.  
Chart: Schematic periodisation of general levels of unrest 1950-2010
 
 
In addition to what has already been stated, it is notable that the periods of low unrest levels have 
coincided with periods when organised labour has been thoroughly co-opted and controlled, while 
the periods of moderate, relatively high and very high levels of unrest have coincided with the 
prevalence of either a decentralised but relatively autonomous labour movement without a national 
centre (before the formation of CELU and between 1991 and 1993); a centralised movement with 
a pragmatically or deferentially-oriented centre that enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy (in the 
early 1960s, 1970s and between 1993 and 1994); or (in the case of the 1973-1976 period) a labour 
movement with a radical and autonomous centre. 
6.2 Movement of real wages 
In order to measure the development of real wages for the corresponding period, longer time series 
of comparable data are fortunately available. In 1963 the CSA began to publish the annual 
Statistical Abstract in which manufacturing wages were measured, containing data going as far 
back as 1955. Eventually, the abstracts stopped including the figure for average pay per employee, 
but since this figure can be derived from dividing total wages and salaries paid by the total number 
of employees, it can still be calculated. In other words, this publication provides a source for 
calculating comprehensive time series of the average nominal wage paid to employees in Ethiopia's 
manufacturing sector since 1955. 
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A few things needs to be noted with regards to the time series data on manufacturing wages 
presented. First, the date is derived from the manufacturing sector alone. Since, however, this 
sector is entirely based on wage labour, and since this sector is the primary one in which 
unionisation has been permitted throughout the time period concerned, this is deemed appropriate 
for the inquiry. In other sectors dependent on wage labour, such as that of the civil service or 
agricultural day labourers, unionisation and collective bargaining has, for large parts of the period, 
not been permitted. It would thus be more difficult to measure the impact of these factors on wages 
in these sectors. Secondly, while nominal wage data is available going back to 1955, systematic 
price index data – which is required to deflate nominal wages and calculate the value of real wages 
– is only available from 1963 onwards. It may be noted that between 1955 and 1963, nominal 
wages grew only by a total of 7.5 percent, which seems to indicate a very low or even negative 
real wage development if later inflationary trends prevailed, but in lieu of price index data, this 
cannot be concluded with any level of certainty. From 1963 onwards, price index data from Addis 
Ababa is available, and the deflated real wage can therefore be calculated by dividing the nominal 
wage with the price index. The fact that it is Addis Ababa's price index data that is used, despite 
the fact that much of the waged workforce was employed outside of the capital, requires a short 
justification. From a pragmatic point of view, price index data is only available for Addis Ababa 
for the greater part of this time series. But while this may lead to distortions in the short run – 
arising from, for example, fluctuating supply mismatches – prices in Addis Ababa can logically 
not move too far away from those in other urban centres over a longer period. Moreover, for the 
period that alternative data is available – between 1999/2000 and 2010 – the accumulative national 
rate of inflation has been slightly higher than the rate in Addis Ababa. In other words, using the 
national inflation rate would have reduced calculated real wages since the year 2000 even further. 
Finally, it needs to be noted that the CSA has reset the baseline year of the price index a number 
of times over the period of this inquiry. Whenever this is the case, the new base year's 1963 index 
has been multiplied with the consecutive year's index in order to reach a computed index number 
that retains 1963 as the baseline year. A chart of deflated real wages in the manufacturing sector, 
taking these points into consideration would thus look as follows. 
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Table: Deflated Real Wages 1963-2010 
Year 
Nominal average 
yearly wage 
Computed Price Index 
1963 
Deflated wage = Nominal 
wage/inflation 
Real wage 
index 
1963 663.4778722 1 663.4778722 1 
1964/65 690.4387894 1.12215 616.4632048 0.929139058 
1965/66 877.9967471 1.252 701.2753571 1.05696872 
1966/67 1102.347291 1.268 869.3590622 1.310306038 
1967/68 1164.968584 1.278 911.5560122 1.373905673 
1968/69 1223.680318 1.28 956.0002483 1.440892437 
1969/70 1264.216919 1.298 973.9729732 1.467981095 
1970/71 1350.081414 1.43 944.1128771 1.422975681 
1971/72 1381.965153 1.437 961.7015679 1.449485519 
1972/73 1460.943486 1.35 1082.18036 1.631072271 
1973/74 1535.136078 1.47 1044.310257 1.573994102 
1974/75 1577.26788 1.597 987.6442578 1.488586582 
1975/76 1795.532066 1.701 1055.574407 1.590971532 
1976/77 1944.727238 2.187 889.2214165 1.340242763 
1977/78 1988.657414 2.551 779.5599429 1.174959973 
1978/79 2088.333735 2.916 716.1638323 1.079408768 
1979/80 2234.09171 3.364 664.1176308 1.00096425 
1980/81 2297.707704 3.535 649.988035 0.979667992 
1981/82 2361.827471 3.752 629.4849336 0.948765528 
1982/83 2540.40083 3.961 641.3534032 0.966653795 
1983/84 2550.199505 3.945 646.4384043 0.974317956 
1984/85 2754.295572 4.278 643.8278569 0.970383315 
1985/86 2802.01442 5.094 550.0617236 0.829058129 
1986/87 2998.221371 4.594 652.6385222 0.983662831 
1987/88 3107.871454 4.483 693.2570721 1.044883486 
1988/89 3166.098867 4.8 659.6039306 0.994161159 
1989/90 3303.936683 5.176 638.3185245 0.962079598 
1990/91 3171.559524 5.442 582.7930033 0.878391018 
1991/92 3379.374183 7.387 457.4758607 0.689511859 
1992/93 4112.935845 8.164 503.7892999 0.759315903 
1993/94 4502.527495 8.453 532.6543825 0.802821623 
1994/95 4725.7934 9.095 519.6034525 0.783151141 
1995/96 5075.633892 10.007 507.2083434 0.764469117 
1996/97 5301.033941 9.496 558.2386206 0.841382424 
1997/98 5473.899331 10.237161 534.7087274 0.805917951 
1998/99 5892.143467 10.327224 570.5447531 0.859930341 
1999/00 6335.641741 10.757525 588.9497576 0.887670535 
2000/01 7027.909961 10.42245 674.3049821 1.016318721 
2001/02 7574.804353 9.97428465 759.4333447 1.144624978 
2002/03 7907.761285 10.4432949 757.2094211 1.14127306 
2003/04 8268.890977 11.0269521 749.8800123 1.130226107 
2004/05 8201.145213 11.8190583 693.8915948 1.045839845 
2005/06 9089.849589 12.80919105 709.6349452 1.069568368 
2006/07 9776.953684 15.20635455 642.951843 0.969062979 
2007/08 12730.40826 18.40708895 691.6035609 1.042391299 
2008/09 13552.76686 23.81738274 569.028386 0.857644859 
2009/10 13459.07308 26.20516604 513.6038086 0.774108422 
2010/11 16160.78038 31.29809623 516.3502682 0.778247911 
Source: CSA's annual Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13. 
 
215 Owing to a lack of data for 1964/65, the inflation rate for this year alone is a proxy derived by calculting the mean 
value of the preceding and subsequent year. 
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The table above is illustrated in the following chart, where the shifting real wage index – meaning 
the shifting average real wage in the manufacturing sector – is depicted. 
Chart: Deflated Real Wage Index 1963-2010 
 
Source: CSA's annual Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13. 
A number of features stand out from the data presented in the above. To begin with, while the 
years between 1955 and 1964 seems to have seen a very slow wage growth, the pace picked up 
considerably in the mid-1960s. Most strikingly, real wages grew rapidly through the late 1960s 
and early 1970s so as to peak around the time of the revolution. But as much as the revolution 
coincided with the highest relative level of real wages recorded, and thus the crest of the arch, it 
also constituted the conjuncture in which the Ethiopian labour movement was thoroughly 
subjugated, and the point where a catastrophic collapse of real wages began. Through the second 
half of the 1970s they declined sharply. Since that point, two movements are apparent. The first is 
a renewed fall of wages to its lowest position – less than half of its 1975 levels – in the aftermath 
of, first, the adoption of a liberalisation programme by the WPE, and, subsequently, the seizure of 
state power and implementation of renewed liberalisation programmes by the EPRDF. Secondly, 
what appeared to be the beginning of a recovery of real wages around the millennium – coinciding 
with the beginning of the most recent phase of expansion of the Ethiopian economy – levelled out 
and dropped back again at the end of the decade. Real wages at the end of the first decade of the 
21st century thus remained considerably lower than they were in 1963, and quite catastrophically 
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lower – still less than half – of what they were in the mid-1970s. In other words, despite economic 
conjunctures shifting, the collapse of wages that coincided with the defeat of the hitherto relatively 
autonomous labour movement has never been reversed, nor significantly ameliorated. 
The disconnection between real wages and shifting economic conjunctures can be illustrated in 
other ways. If the data in the above pertains to what – following Marx's (1990) concepts of absolute 
and relative surpluses216 – can be referred to as absolute exploitation, the concept of relative 
exploitation is derived from the degree to which increasing output is uncompensated for in wages. 
To be sure, the data presented above shows that absolute exploitation has increased in degree, but 
it is noteworthy that relative exploitation have done so at a significantly higher rate. By dividing 
the total amount of wages paid by the total value of output over the same years, the wage share is 
calculated. Its decline is illustrated in the below. 
Chart: Wage share of total value of output 1964-2010 
 
Source: CSA's annual Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13. 
Here the secular trend of decline is striking, with the wage share descending from over 15 percent 
in 1966 to just over 5 percent in the most recent year. The upward movement in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s can largely be attributed to the rising real wages achieved during that period. However, 
the spike of the wage share between 1988/89 and 1992/93, it needs to be noted, is a ruse. It is 
 
216 The former referring to the manner in which surpluses are generated through manipulating the amount of worktime 
the worker is not compensated for, while the latter refers to surpluses generated as a result of increasing productivity 
of workers. 
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explained by a sharp but temporary drop in output that coincided with the acute phase of the 
Ethiopian civil war – where supply and distribution systems broke down, and an increasing number 
of industries found themselves cut off from the larger market – and the political reconfiguration 
that followed. What the graph illustrates is that while workers have lost around one-quarter of real 
wages since 1963, they have, over the same period of time, been deprived of almost two-thirds of 
the wage share they used to command. 
Two factors, excluding that of workers' agency, that can be forwarded as alternative explanations 
for decreasing real wages require mention here. The first is inflation, and the second is productivity 
levels. Inflation has exercised recurrent pressure on real wages. However, to assign a determinant 
significance to this factor would be to exaggerate its role. While inflation generally – in any 
economy – is the instrument by which real wages are depressed, it cannot achieve this by itself. 
As has been demonstrated, high levels of inflation has been a constant feature of the Ethiopian 
economy over the past six decades, yet it has not always resulted in falling real wages. In the 1960s 
and early 1970s, nominal wage gains were more than sufficient to make up for this factor. It is 
only with the stagnation of nominal wages that this factor becomes important, and then only as an 
attendant factor. 
Another factor that could, potentially, have explained the decline of real wages is productivity. It 
could, for example, have been suggested that the WPE's practice of ‘stuffing’ workplaces with 
relatively superfluous workers affected wages negatively. However, although ‘stuffing’ appears to 
have been practiced (Mulatu and Yohannis 1988: 105), this does not appear to explain the wage 
fall. On the one hand, and as already noted, the wage share – reflecting total wages as a share of 
output, and would thus be likely to grow when ‘stuffing’ is practiced – continued to decline. But 
moreover, if this was indeed a major problem effecting downward pressures on wages, one would 
expect to observe a declining value of output – calculated in ‘real’, deflated terms – per employee. 
As the chart below demonstrates, this was not the case. 
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Chart: Deflated value of output per employee 1965-2010 
 
Source: CSA's annual Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13217. 
From the chart above it is apparent that while ‘stuffing’ may have led to a somewhat declining 
level of labour productivity in the late 1970s, this remained significantly higher than in the mid-
1960s. The disrupting effect of the acute phase of the civil war is here expressed in an inverted 
order, by the sharp indention observable in the late 1980s/early 1990s.  But this levelled out after 
a few years as the crisis receded. Moreover, while the most recent growth in productivity is evident, 
this does not appear to have resulted in any real wage gains. In other words, in Ethiopia real wages 
movements appear to have been largely decoupled from shifts in labour productivity. And since 
labour productivity has more than doubled since the 1960s, while real wages have fallen, the rate 
of exploitation218 has risen sharply – much more so in recent years, in fact, than in 1983, when the 
ILO (1983: 15-16) warned that ‘wages were lagging far behind productivity increases, revealing a 
rapidly increasing rate of exploitation’. 
To this discussion, the question of the organic composition of capital219 could be added. If labour 
productivity has been increasing, how is this reflected in its relation with the fixed component of 
capital and the productivity of the latter? The graph below illustrates the index of the value of 
output – which include wages – over the total value of fixed capital, where 1964/65 constitutes the 
baseline year. The effects of ‘stuffing’ on the organic composition of capital, and hence the 
 
217 The value for 1967/68 alone is a proxy. 
218 Measuring the ration between value of output/surpluses and wages. 
219 Which measures the ratio between the value of fixed capital and wages. 
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productivity of fixed capital, is observable in the bulge through the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
During these years the productivity of labour decreased while the productivity of capital increased, 
which is a logical outcome of ‘stuffing’. It is only during the expansion of the 1960s and in the 
latest upturn, since 2002, that both factors' – labour and capital – productivity have increased. 
However, while the first episode of such joint growth in factor productivity concurred with or 
resulted in increasing real wages and an increasing wage share, the latest episode has not translated 
into wage gains – whether relative or absolute. 
Chart: Indexed total value of output/total value of fixed capital 1964-2010 
 
Source: CSA's annual Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13220. 
One pertinent question is to what extent these figures tally with the representations found in the 
literature. As has been noted, the literature has generally, and quite sweepingly, represented real 
wages in imperial times as stagnant and poor: ‘extremely meagre’ according to Bekure (1984: 
611); ‘extremely low’ in the words of Killion (1984: 429); or ‘appealingly low’ according to Lefort 
(1983: 26). This impression is put into serious question by the data presented in the above. 
Moreover, dispersed references to wages in specific workplaces and/or during specific 
conjunctures in the literature, when assembled into an aggregate description of trends in wage 
movements, lends support to the data presented. 
 
220 The value for 1967/68 alone is a proxy. 
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By the mid-1960s, Ginzberg  and Smith (1967: 98) listed daily wages between 0.65-1.50 ETB in 
the industrial sector, reaching up to 200 ETB/month in the service sector, which seem to tally 
rather well with the CSA data presented. But collective agreements and conflict settlements arrived 
to at workplace after workplace cumulatively exercised an upward pressure on wage levels over 
the 1960s and early 1970s. A number of examples may serve to illustrate this. At the Dire Dawa 
Textile Factory workers' minimum daily wages were increased from 0.80 ETB to 1.25 ETB/day 
in 1963 alone, following an agreement between the newly established union and factory 
management (Killion 1984: 505-506), while at the HVA sugar factory in Wonji minimum daily 
wages had almost doubled, from 0.75 ETB to 1.30 ETB, between 1954 and 1964221 – years of 
fierce contestation on the site (Bahru 2008: 134-136). The collective agreement struck in 1964 
alone increased daily minimum wages from 1.10 to 1.30 ETB and reportedly added 70 percent to 
the wages of permanent employees (Bahru 2008: 136). In preparation of its third General 
Assembly, CELU celebrated some of its success in the preceding year: collective agreements at 
the St George Brewery and Ethio-Synthetic Textiles had led to wage increases of 5-11 percent, 
while the Chandris Meat Canning Factory in Dire Dawa had agreed to set a minimum daily pay at 
1.35 ETB (CELU 1972). This was to be contrasted with the Diabaco cotton company, where the 
union had been severely harassed, its executive committee members fired, and no collective 
agreement had been signed. Here, it was reported that ‘workers that have served for more than 15 
years with the company, still now get 0.75 [ETB] a day’ (CELU 1972). But individual employers 
could only resist the movement so far without risking serious disruption, and the wage movements 
in the economy at large testified to this trend. In the decade between 1964 and 1974, real 
manufacturing wages were found to have grown at an average annual rate of 7.4 percent (Mulatu 
1990). 
That employers were starting to feel the pinch of rising wages is a documented fact. Bekele Beshah, 
the president of the FEE, wrote a letter to the minister of national community development and 
social affairs222 stating that ‘wages and fringe benefits are becoming more and more excessive and 
are not reciprocated with a commensurate rise in productivity’. ‘Such a tendency of spiralling 
wages and cost’, he continued ‘will, unless checked in time, damage the national economy [and] 
 
221 Note that these figures pertain to the factory workers. The casual cane cutters in the fields were paid significantly 
less, had weaker employment security, worse labour conditions, and were not permitted to organise.  
222 Reprinted in CELU (1972). 
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need in our view, countermeasures on a national scale’. Replying for CELU, Solomon Tekle Tsion 
did not attempt to refute the characterisation of wage developments as ‘spiralling’, but rather 
referred to the relatively small size of the workforce covered by collective agreements – 44 
establishments employing 25 000 workers – compared to the size of the labour force and 
population of the country (CELU 1972). Nevertheless, the contending parties appear to have been 
in agreement that the trend of wage movements was one of rapid increase. This included the 
government, which was, perhaps surprisingly, not viewing it in entirely negative terms. The fact 
that the imperial state was not uniformly opposed to wage increases in the urban sector was 
affirmed by the minister of labour and social affairs, Getahun Tessema (1970), who explicitly 
asked employers to raise wages and condemned those ‘in their zeal to amass greater profits have 
rejected demands for wage increases that could well be afforded and were commensurate with the 
valuable contribution labour had made to the welfare of their enterprise’. 
Indeed the upward trajectory of wages was recognised by an ILO report released the year before 
the revolution, warning that ‘trade union pressure’ and high civil service pay had possibly made 
urban wages ‘too dear’ (ILO 1973: 56). While it found civil service wages the most concerning, it 
recommended ‘immediate wage restraint’ in the manufacturing sector too, ‘especially on entrant 
wages’ (ILO 1973: 56). Considering the source, this statement is quite noteworthy. Outside of 
vividly demonstrating the degree to which wages had indeed grown up to this point, the report also 
highlights the issue of pay differentials within the waged sector. These include the difference 
between civil servants and production workers; between workers in unionised and non-unionised 
sectors; between urban and rural workers; and between male and female workers – where the first 
mentioned categories were consistently paid more than the latter. Since the concern here is with 
organised labour, a short discussion of how this aspect was portrayed is warranted. ‘The unionised 
sector’ the report states, covered ‘approximately 70 plants, largely owned by the government or 
by foreigners’. Union pressures in this sector had resulted in a situation where ‘high wages’ 
prevailed, which for many workers entailed wages ‘substantially in excess of ETB 2.00 per day’ 
(ILO 1973: 53). As long as relatively high wages only prevailed in a comparatively small share of 
the economy, this was deemed to be tolerable. But wages in the unionised sector, the report 
claimed, nevertheless needed ‘to be monitored carefully’, to avert the danger that ‘collectively 
bargained wage spills over into the non-unionised sectors’ (ILO 1973: 54). This concern was also 
showcased in the government's ban on unionisation in larger sectors of the economy and in its 
206 
 
effort to supress unrest and organisation spilling into the agrarian waged economy. That strategy 
had apparently been successful, because although there were indications that rural wages were 
growing223, they were still assumed to amount to only ‘around 40 percent of urban wages’ in 1973 
(ILO 1973: 55).  
In the civil service, however, the opposite trend was observed, as the possession of a higher degree 
was greatly rewarded. Ginzberg and Smith (1967: 91) identified this premium on education as ‘one 
of the outstanding characteristics of the Ethiopian scene’, with BA; MA; and PhD degree holders 
commanding monthly starting wages of 450; 550; and 750 ETB respectively. By 1972, the average 
yearly civil service wage was 1860 ETB, which was calculated to be 500 ETB higher than wages 
in other urban sectors (ILO 1973: 53). This was considered ‘very high’ by the ILO, which stated 
that ‘a wage of [ETB] 600 per month for a new graduate is clearly excessive [and] approximately 
equal to the earnings of new graduates in the UK’ (ILO 1973: 53). But wages, as has been 
demonstrated in the above, where set to collapse across the board, and the fall was the sharpest for 
those found in the highest brackets. 
The collapse of wages following the revolution is evident in the literature as much as in statistics. 
Mulatu and Yohannis (1988: 108-109) observed that by 1981 real manufacturing wages had 
declined to 61 percent of their 1974 level, while a DoS (1986: 112) report for 1985 stated that 
‘while consumer prices have soared, wages have not risen in 10 years’. The result, according to 
the report, was a dire situation in which ‘wage earners at the bottom of the pay scale can no longer 
be said to earn a salary that provides a decent living for workers and family’. If this was true in 
1985, it was probably all the more so in 2010, as real wages had slid further in the intervening 
time. 
Initially, the mechanism triggering the fall was a wage freeze imposed by the PMAC, combined 
with high levels of inflation. The wage freeze was eventually partially lifted, but not to a degree 
where it allowed real wages to recover. The WPE's ambition was to progressively narrow the wage 
gap by raising the lowest wages by the relatively highest percentages, and retain a wage cap on the 
comparatively highest levels. This may have had some effect on wage distribution as is discussed 
in the below, but it was offset and dwarfed by the rise in the retail price index (Robinson 1982: 
 
223 Girma (2017: 47), for example, has found that wages for migrant agricultural wage labourers in Wondo Genet grew 
from 0.50 ETB/day in 1966 to 0.75 ETB around the time of the 1974 revolution. 
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32). While the wage gap may have slightly narrowed then, it only did so while all manufacturing 
real wages was in a midst of a collapse. Several additional non-waged forms of surplus extraction 
that were introduced compounded the problem, including nominally voluntary – but in reality 
requisitioned – contributions of labour, and the equally ‘voluntary’ cash contributions solicited for 
the war effort, which included a full month's pay each year. 
A powerful mechanism for regulating the movement of real wages available to the PMAC/WPE 
was the government's issuance of guidelines for overall wage movement in the dominant state-
owned sector. There was never any pretence as to the reasons of state intervention in wage setting. 
Tesfa Gebremariam (1987:147), who by the time was a MoLSA official224, stated that under 
circumstances wherein underdevelopment and poverty prevailed ‘any social and economic 
planning of necessity has to constrain free collective bargaining’. ‘Over the last 11 years’, he 
confirmed, ‘the government has issued guide-lines for the increase of wages for the public sector 
to be observed during negotiations’.  
It should be noted that there was an upturn in the number of collective agreements signed during 
the PMAC/WPE era – no less than a twentyfold increase in the first decade of PMAC/WPE rule 
according to Tesfa (1987: 149). However, the importance of this factor pales when the coercive 
atmosphere and the commandist manner in which it took place is factored in. Not only were the 
unions hierarchically organised, subjected to total centralism, and eventually the command of the 
party, but, as indicated, the wage setting mechanism of the state lingered heavy. ‘Nothing is 
regarded as outside the scope of negotiation except, of course, the areas where government 
regulations determine the parameters for the public sector for some negotiable issues like the 
setting of the maximum increase in wages’, Tesfa (1987:149) stated without a hint of irony. 
Considering that these areas of government regulation and parameter-setting were quite extensive, 
and, as indicated, included wages, this in effect meant that most essential issues were outside the 
scope of bargaining. Moreover, the state reserved extensive rights when it came to enforcing 
collective agreements throughout the economy. This included the prerogative of the minister of 
labour and social affairs to ‘declare the draft collective agreement proposed by one of the parties 
to be binding upon the [other] party’, if he found a party to be negotiating in ‘bad faith’. Moreover, 
 
224 Tesfa had been ousted from CELU in the mid-1970s, after having participated in Alem Abdi's attempt to put the 
confederation on a pro-government footing. 
208 
 
even on issues where the parties were in agreement, the minister had the right to refuse to register 
the agreement should it contravene any existing law, regulation, or policy of the government (Tesfa 
1987: 148). Throughout the PMAC/WPE era, then, the downward wage movement was established 
at the level of policy. 
Neither the calculation presented above nor the literature indicates that the trajectory of this 
movement has been substantially altered, or that real wages have been allowed to recover, since 
the PDRE became the FDRE. Two years after the fall of the WPE, DoS (1994) reported that 
although Ethiopia had no legal provisions of a minimum wage, a public sector floor of 105 
ETB/month had been set, and that while the situation had now reversed to one wherein the private 
sector tended to pay comparatively higher wages than the public ‘many workers earn less than the 
minimum wage’. The wages paid, it was assessed, were nowhere near sufficient. Citing the 
Ethiopian Office for the Study of Wages and Other Remunerations, it stated that a family of five 
would at the time require a monthly income of 430 ETB ‘to maintain a bare minimum standard of 
living’, which meant that ‘even with two family members earning the public sector minimum 
wage, the family receives only about 50 percent of that needed for healthful subsistence’. 
Contrasting with the direct manipulation of nominal wages in the PMAC/WPE era, the 
mechanisms that have undercut wages in the FDRE period have been a sliding decline reinforced 
by repeated devaluations of the exchange rate of the ETB – one in the in the early 1990s, another 
one in 2011; and a most recent one in October 2017; the removal of a range of subsidies on 
consumer goods; increasing taxation and new forms of taxes, such as the value added tax 
introduced in 2003; and, partially resulting from this, reoccurring bouts of inflation. As the World 
Bank has stated, because of the size of the public sector, inflation is a mechanism particularly 
effective to checking real wage in the Ethiopian economy, making them ‘particularly prone to 
political “manipulation”’ (2016:51). In this manner, real wages have, whenever showing 
indications of recovery, been re-repressed. In 1998, a report found that wages in the public sector 
had not yet been compensated for the 1991 ‘inflationary shock’ (Khrisnan et. al. 1998). Public 
wages therefore remained lower than when the WPE fell, although wages in the private sector had 
recovered. Moreover, the World Bank (2016:51) found evidence of a real wage drop between 2003 
and 2014, with only a slight recovery recorded in the two last years of the period. By 2016, 
Ethiopian labour costs were allegedly ‘on average one tenth the price of those in China’, with blue-
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collar manufacturing wages hovering around 700-800 ETB a month (Mills 2016). A plethora of 
accounts substantiates this description of the general level of wages225, with one author – 
implausibly – suggesting that Ethiopian manufacturing wages have become ‘the lowest in the 
world’ (Wuilbercq 2017). Even the World Bank (2015: 55) has found the situation concerning. It 
described manufacturing wages for unskilled workers as so low as unable to drop any further, thus 
‘preventing the market from clearing’. What prevented wages from falling further was not, the 
World Bank argued, high ‘reservation wages’, but rather ‘because they are already clustered below 
the food poverty line’ and any further downward movement would render workers incapable of 
meeting ‘minimum nutritional requirements’ – in other words, they have hit rock bottom. 
Even the comparatively privileged sectors have seen real wages fall over the decades. As has been 
discussed, the privileged position of public employees has deteriorated, but so has the position of 
some of the most advantaged workers in the private sector. At Addis Ababa's Hilton Hotel, for 
example, the 2017 monthly minimum pay was 600 ETB – to be compared with a 70 ETB-floor 
when the hotel opened in 1969 (Fasika 2017a). As the computation above indicates, the price index 
has multiplied by over 30 times in the same period, meaning that the real minimum wage at the 
hotel in 2017 was in fact less than a third – and probably less than a quarter – of its 1969 level226. 
Meanwhile, the ‘urban bias’, so prominently displayed in the past had, at least partially, been 
reversed. As noted in chapter 3, moreover, the ratio of surplus extraction in the peasant economy 
has been progressively relaxed, contrasting sharply with the findings from the manufacturing 
sector. Girma (2017: 47) found an example of a worker employed in a perfume factory in 1994 
and 1995, making 2 ETB/day, while, at the same time assessing that a private farmer would make 
around 3 ETB/day, illustrating the decline of industrial wages relative to agrarian income. Girma 
(2017: 48) moreover found that agricultural wage labour in Wondo Genet's khat farms fetched 50 
ETB/day in 2012, which would compare favourably with manufacturing wages. 
Summing up, the aggregate national statistics indicate a number of conspicuous shifts that have 
occurred with regards to manufacturing wages in Ethiopia over the last five decades. Most 
fundamentally, a period of incline through the 1960s and 1970s shifted, around the middle of the 
 
225 See, for example, Dijkstra (2015) and Assefa et al. (2016) for typical substantiating accounts of starting wages 
ranging in the monthly 600-800 ETB range. See also CSA (2014) for a breakdown of the incomes of waged workers. 
226 Incidentally, the workers of Hilton Addis Ababa have in the past constituted an unlikely source of labour militancy. 
Its union was active in CELU's radical opposition in the 1970s, and its President, Shumiye Tefera, was a member of 
the PWC.  
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decade, into a sudden and sharp slump, followed by a long period of secular decline, interrupted 
by temporary episodes of stabilisation. The degree to which this holds true in the individual 
workplaces selected for the case studies is something that is discussed in the following sections. 
6.3 Case study: the Bahir Dar Textile Factory 
The Bahir Dar Textile Factory was constructed in 1961 and production commenced the year after. 
The factory was financed by Italian war reparation funds and the location of the factory, in the 
North-eastern Gojam province227, was intended as a reward to the people of the region for having 
played a prominent role in the resistance to Italian occupation. Bahir Dar, however, was a poor 
provincial city228 and it had an immense shortage of educated personnel. As a result, management 
staff and the skilled workers were recruited from other regions – particularly the central Shoa 
region and Eritrea. Meanwhile, the unskilled workforce consisted largely of locals. This created 
tensions in the workforce.  
The factory was state-owned until 2017, when it was sold to Tiret, a conglomerate established by 
the ruling front's constituent party in the Amhara National Regional State – the Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM). It has, however, been managed under different arrangements. In 
its early years the factory was managed by, first, Yugoslavs, and later Indian executive staff, before 
management was Ethiopianised in the 1970s (Demmelash 2014, personal interview). Between 
1975 and the early 1990s it was incorporated in the National Textile Corporation (NTC), before, 
again, being re-established as a separate state-owned share company. Struggling with profitability, 
however, it was leased out to Chinese investors in the early 2000s, but the lease was cancelled 
after 18 months and management was reverted to the state. This state of things came to an end only 
in 2017. 
Despite having been established within an import-substitution regime which granted the textile 
industry high levels of protection – ranging from 90 percent to 526 percent depending on product  
in the 1970s (Eshetu 1973: 50) – the Bahir Dar factory has rarely, if ever, been profitable. In fact, 
 
227 Since the establishment of the FDRE located within the Amhara National Regional State. 
228 According to its Governor at the time, Gaitachew Bekele (1993: 125-130), Bahir Dar in 1961 had no paved road, 
and only the port administrator's office and residence had piped water and electricity. The imperial government's plans 
for the city, however, were ambitious, and with the support of West German planners it was expected to grow to 
become a sizeable and important economic hub. The textile factory was the centrepiece of this plan. Other provisions 
included the concurrent construction of a referral hospital, a polytechnic institute funded by the Soviet Union, a 
teacher's training school, and a hydroelectric plant at the nearby Blue Nile falls. 
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it has been described as ‘a financial disaster’ that had not avoided losses for a single year by 1973 
(Eshetu 1973: 53). With the decline in industrial profitability that came with the economic crisis 
of the subsequent years, it is unlikely that this situation improved much, and when it was brought 
up for privatisation in the early 2000s its inability to generate profits was a key factor. The fact 
that it would take more than a decade and additional state investments before a willing and capable 
buyer could be found speaks for its poor profitability. 
As is generally the case, textile production in Ethiopia has been and remains a very labour intensive 
endeavour. This, by all accounts, is one of the main reasons it developed to become the largest 
manufacturing subsector in Ethiopia – both in terms of the number of engaged workers and in 
terms of output (Eshetu 1973). The workforce largely consisted of women229. At the 
commencement of production, the workforce consisted of 1 000 employees, a number that had 
grown to 1900 two years after, reaching 2 345 in the mid-late 1960s (Demmelash 2015, personal 
interview; ILO 1984: 14; Eshetu 1973: 54). This figure was to grow slightly in the decade that 
followed, and thereafter remain relatively stable until 1991 at the very least, when the factory 
employed 2 909 workers (Tarpinian 1992). Renewed attempts to achieve profitability, and an end 
to the practice of ‘stuffing’ after the fall of the WPE, have since reduced the workforce to around 
1 500 workers. 
In August 1963 the Bahir Dar Textile Factory Workers' Union was registered with the Labour 
Department of the MNCD with 550 members. This figure grew to 1 200 in 1964; 1 725 in 
September 1965; and by 1970 it had acquired a membership of 2 200 workers (ILO 1984: 14; Suter 
1966: 52; CELU 1970). Through several years of the 1960s and early 1970 its president was 
Workneh Atalai, a charismatic labour leader from Gojam – who was no stranger to controversy. 
 
229 That the majority of production workers were women is reflected in the fact that while in the factory’s overall 
workforce women were slightly outnumbered by men in 1964, almost 60 percent of union members that same year 
were women (ILO 1964). This tallies with Killion's (1984: 442) assessment that in the mid-1960s, ‘60% of all 
Ethiopian textile workers were women’. According to Killion, ‘the high proportion of unskilled women workers had 
some effect on textile workers' solidarity, as the female workforce had a high turn-over rate due to marriages and 
pregnancies’. Moreover, he claimed that ‘because of the frequent subordination of women in Ethiopian social 
structures, female workers usually deferred to male managers and co-workers, and they rarely played an active role in 
workers' organisations’. While it is an indisputable fact that labour leaders, with a few notable exceptions from, for 
example, Ethiopian Airlines and in CELU's General Council – largely tended to be male, the question of whether the 
gendered division of the workforce had any effect on solidarity is something that has to be empirically examined rather 
than simply asserted. Bondestam (1975: 545) pointed out that while ‘it was thought until a couple of years ago, that 
women are traditionally less prone to labour disputes, and are therefore less of a threat in factories that depend on a 
large number of unskilled workers… a strike among the textile workers in 1971 showed… that this assumption was 
wrong’. 
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According to Killion (1984: 511), Workneh purportedly played on regionalist sentiments and 
divisions within the workforce, while, allegedly regarding the union's finances ‘as his own’230. The 
charge of embezzlement would lead to his removal by court order (Killion 1984: 512), but having 
been reinstated by 1970, Workneh claimed that the relationship with management was ‘very 
harmonious’ (CELU 1970: 50). By this time, three consecutive collective agreements had been 
entered into, the first one as early as February 1964231. This had the enterprise adopt a check-off 
system which greatly benefited the finances of the union, and as a result the union had been able 
to establish a bakery and bar for the workers, as well as a school for the their children (CELU 
1970: 50). The collective agreement furthermore included free medical care (Suter 1966). 
While individual workers at the factory suffered from a similar lack of employment security as 
other workers in the 1960s and early 1970s, the 1975 labour law and the incorporation of the 
factory into the NTC changed this. For the subsequent period ‘the process required to terminate 
workers remained highly structured and time-consuming’ (Tarpinian 1992: 9). It required the 
management to issue three warnings before dismissing a worker, with managers allegedly 
complaining that the process could take up to a year (Tarpinian 1992: 9). As a result of this, and 
the rigid rules surrounding resignations and transfers, staff turnover remained very low from the 
mid-1970s to the early 1990s, and managers in the early 1990s reported generally low levels of 
absenteeism and ‘good’ labour-management relations (Tarpinian 1992: 9). Although the period 
after the adoption of the 1993 labour law and the break-up of NTC has seen some deregulation of 
requirements to dismiss workers, it seems unlikely that employment security has deteriorated to 
the level of the 1960s.  
Despite having entered into collective agreements at a relatively early stage, and despite some 
beneficial provisions, however, wages at the factory had been described as relatively low when 
compared to other manufacturing establishment, including other textile industries (ILO 1964: 10). 
According to Ginzberg and Smith (1967: 98) wages at the factory compared poorly with those in 
comparable enterprises in the mid-1960s – unskilled workers of the former earned between 0.65 
and 0.80 ETB daily, while standard wages of unskilled workers in the sector generally ranged 
 
230 His alleged regionalism is an issue also raised by Demmelash (2015, personal interview) and Fissehatsion (1983, 
interview with Tom Killion).  
231 The Bahir Dar Textile Factory was only the second workplace in the empire to conclude a collective agreement, a 
few days after HVA (Stutz 1967: 140). 
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between 0.80 and 1.50 ETB, or, for example, between 0.90 and 1.00 ETB at the Indo-Ethiopian 
Textile Factory232. After being incorporated into the NTC, government-set wage policy was strictly 
applied. This included putting all workers ‘on a fixed pay scale, without regard to production’ and 
without any incentive plans (Tarpinian 1992: 9). As has been discussed in the above, these pay 
scales were ungenerous, and were moreover only rarely and very cautiously revised, despite 
inflation. Whether the situation improved after 1992 is not evident from the literature, but is a 
proposition that is tested in the following section. 
The Bahir Dar Textile Factory saw several episodes of labour unrest. Beginning in its early days, 
workers, according to a factory union leader, created ‘constant disturbances’ (Demmelash 2015, 
personal interview). Wage and workload related complaints fuelled strikes ‘all the time’ in the first 
years of operation (Demmelash 2015, personal interview). Although the most acute phase of this 
round of conflict came to an end with the signing of the first collective agreement unrest never 
disappeared completely. Although no strike was organised by the union in the following years, 
repeated threats were issued reminding the management that another strike would see the full 
workforce walk out (Demmelash 2015, personal interview). Such threats underlined the 
negotiations of the subsequent collective agreements. 
In 1967 ICFTU representative Kindström (1967d) reported that the union had been beset by 
‘internal trouble’ which was ‘worrying CELU very much’ and that Fissehatsion Tekie, CELU's 
general secretary, had been dispatched to Bahir Dar to mediate a solution.  Killion (1984: 512-13), 
probably referring to the same episode, describes how unrest resurfaced when regionalist 
sentiments and unrest spread across the factory and into the city, in response to Workneh being 
suspended. Since workers were armed, security forces had to be called in before new elections 
could be held. Workneh, however, was reinstated again some two years later and remained in 
office until 1974. 
According to fellow Bahir Dar labour leader Demmelash Tebekew (2015, personal interview) it 
was the workers themselves who eventually removed Workneh. This took place in the context of 
renewed unrest around the time of the revolution, and amid accusations that Workneh was dividing 
the workers. Eventually Workneh and a number of other labour activists were transferred from the 
 
232 The same figures for skilled factory workers were monthly 50-80 ETB, while the category of ‘production workers 
industry’ were reported to earn 40 ETB/month (Ginzberg and Smith 1967: 98). 
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factory. His removal facilitated the election of a new batch of labour leaders more to the liking of 
the new government, but it did not put an end to unrest at the factory. The warehouses of the 
factory were set on fire in 1975233, and ‘several strikes’234 were held before repression stamped 
out the resistance (Demmelash 2015, personal interview; Killion 1984). For this task, no less than 
200 workers were enrolled in the factory's Revolutionary Guard235 militia and equipped with 70 
firearms (PMAC Provisional Revolutionary Guard Committee 1977). The chairman of the union 
and the workers' discussion forum, Seife Asnake236, was one of around 10 workers and labour 
leaders killed in the struggles that followed the revolution (Demmelash237 2015, personal 
interview), while many more were arrested. According to Negede (2014: 254) a second round of 
purges of MEISON affiliated unionists included 20 workers at the factory. This appears to have 
concluded the phase of open contestation and ushered in a period of relative tranquillity. 
During the mid-1980s, the union developed a number of grievances against factory management 
and the NTC in the process of bargaining for a new collective agreement. In the absence of any 
permissible outlet for the frustrations, however, the union was left to write petitions and meekly 
worded appeals to the corporation and the Ministry of Industry to seek resolution – quite frequently 
met with strongly worded rebuttals from the latter. The only major incident that took place within 
the corporation – and one of very few strikes to be attempted during the high rule of WPE in total 
– was the Asmara/Barottolo Textile Factory strike in 1983, discussed in the previous chapter, and 
the outcome of that strike left no question as to how the re-emergence of insubordination would 
be treated. 
But in the 1990s, the factory's union again became embroiled in turbulence. The first episode that 
garnered attention was an alleged sabotage in September 1993, conducted by workers who 
 
233 This happened in the Ethiopian calendar year of 1967, which is most likely to refer to the first eight and a half 
months of 1975 G.C., but could also refer to the last three and a half months of 1974. 
234 Note, however, that while the representative of the Bahir Dar textile factory union, Adugna Regassa, signed the 
1975 September CELU resolution threatening a general strike, the official Ethiopian Herald (1975i) claims that the 
Bahir Dar textile factory workers did not take part in the September 1975 general strike attempt. 
235 The revolutionary guards – የአብዮት ጥብቃ – organised in workplaces and neighbourhoods was a central instrument 
of the state-sanctioned violence, discussed in more detail by Wiebel (2014). In most factories, a guard squad 
numbering between 10 and 50 members, equipped with a dozen rifles, was deemed entirely sufficient. The number of 
guards and arms at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory is somewhat of an outlier. 
236 According to Demmelash, Seife and other workers had been accused of propagating the formation of a ‘Provisional 
People's Government’, the EPRP's central demand at the time. Seife's personnel file at the Bahir Dar textile factory, 
confirms that he was killed in 1978, within the ‘red terror’ campaign. 
237 Demmelash himself was arrested no less than three times during this period. 
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removed key equipment, causing a shutdown (EH 1993a). In late 1993, moreover, the arrest and 
subsequent disappearance of Abebe Aynekulu, a technician and trade unionist who was alleged to 
be an EPRP member, caused unrest at the factory (EH 1994a). In response to the disappearance, 
the union leaders called on workers to demonstrate and demand to learn of his whereabouts. The 
plan was to march from the factory into the city, but the demonstrating workers were intercepted 
by security forces at the factory gates. In what followed, 40 workers who were considered seditious 
were suspended by the factory management, operating under the auspices of a senior ANDM 
official238 (Getachew 2017, personal interview). In the mid-1990s, moreover, the factory and its 
union became involved in the conflict within CETU and between CETU and the state. The general 
secretary of the union was arrested in 1994, while the chairman and an executive committee 
member were arrested in October that same year (Dawey 1994e). The latter two were released a 
couple of months later, but they were not allowed to return to their jobs (Dawey 1994e). 
6.3.1 Wages and unrest at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory 
From the data contained in the sample239 of digitised personnel files from the Bahir Dar Textile 
Factory, the following index of the aggregate average real wage movement has been calculated. 
 
238 MoLSA would eventually overturn the decisions to suspend the workers (Getachew 2017, personal interview). 
239 The sample which this section is calculated from, consists of data harvested from 850 personnel files from the 
Bahir Dar Textile Factory. The files have been randomly selected from a series of 4221 personnel files digitised by 
the IISH. Each file consists of, on average, around 75 pages. From these files, all data on wages, unrest/disciplinary 
action, position, gender, years of service, dismissals, and other reasons for termination were harvested and compiled 
in a database. Wages were then deflated by the computed Addis Ababa Price Index published by the CSA in the annual 
Statistical Abstract. SPSS software was then used to calculate mean incidents of unrest, wages etc. for the workers 
active during each year – a number that diverges from year to year, but is generally higher for earlier years, and 
comparatively lower towards the end of the period, due to the fact that not all workers who were active those years 
have yet completed their employment at the factory, and those files have therefore not yet been transferred to the 
archives. 
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Chart: Aggregate Mean Real Wage Index from Bahir Dar Textile Factory Sample240 
 
Source: Author's computation of data from Bahir Dar Textile Factory personnel archives sample 
A number of things are apparent from the chart. The first one is that much like wage movement 
registered in the data from across the manufacturing sector, there is a sharp rise in real wages in 
the years between the early 1960s – when the factory was established – and the mid-1970s. 
Subsequent to this, wages at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory too embarked on a prolonged decline. 
In the initial years the fall was sharp, consuming somewhere around a third and two-fifths in the 
eight years after the 1976 high-water mark. Again, much like for the country-wide sectoral data, 
there was a slight recovery in the second half of the 1980s, but this was followed by a renewed 
prolonged decline, and only punctured by periods of stabilisation.  
But there are also dissimilarities with the pattern of the national data. The first instance is the fact 
that the wage swings were distinctively sharper at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory than was the case 
in the aggregate sector. Real wages at the factory appear to have multiplied by a factor of over 2.3 
between the years of 1964 and 1976, only to be reduced to roughly a quarter of that level in the 
subsequent 34 years. Yet, it took much longer for real wage gains achieved in the first phase to be 
rolled back at the Bahir Dar textile factory than in the country as a whole. It appears that this 
 
240 Until 1963, and in some cases afterwards, wages were often recorded in daily terms rather than monthly. When 
converting daily wages to monthly wages, the 1993 labour proclamation states that ‘for purposes of determining the 
qualifying period of service required for the entitlement of an annual leave, 26 days of service in an undertaking shall 
be deemed to be equivalent to one month of employment’ (FDRE 1993). For this reason, and since the 48 hour 
workweek has been constant since the 1963 labour proclamation, 26 work days has been calculated to mean one 
month's pay. 
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reversal was not completed until the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, while on a 
national scale the gains from the previous decades had already been consumed by the end of the 
1970s. The reasons for this can probably be derived from the discussion above and relate to the 
particular wage level at the factory. The sharp upswing of wages in the first phase was probably 
partly explained by the fact that wages at the factory were generally lower than in similar 
manufacturing establishments in the 1960s. The comparative levels are illustrated in the below. 
Chart: Yearly Real Wages in 1963 ETB in Comparison 
 
Source: Author's computation of data from Bahir Dar Textile Factory personnel archives sample; 
CSA's annual Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13. 
By the mid-1970s wages at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory had converged with, and actually 
surpassed, average wages in the national manufacturing sector. They remained roughly level until 
the end of the 1990s. By this time, the factory was no longer at the technological forefront of 
Ethiopian manufacturing. It may be surmised that the emergence of newer, more profitable 
manufacturing enterprises may have been a factor that stabilised average wages across the 
aggregate sector, while such stabilisation did not occur at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory. Whatever 
the merits of this argument, the chart illustrates how the Bahir Dar Textile Factory workers, who 
were successful in driving up their wages and reaching parity – and more – with other Ethiopian 
manufacturing workers through the 1960s and early 1970s, were unable to secure real wages that 
remained even relatively stable at a later phase.  Nevertheless, not all categories of workers faced 
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the same relative slump. The chart below displays the disaggregated average real wages of 
management and non-management personnel at Bahir Dar Textile Factory. 
Chart: Disaggregated Monthly Mean Real Wages in 1963 ETB for Management and Non-
management personnel at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory241 
 
Source: Author's computation of data from Bahir Dar Textile Factory personnel archives sample 
The chart above illustrates the impact of the PMAC/WPE's wage equalisation policies, which 
cannot be gleaned from the aggregate sectoral data. Beginning in 1976, there was a levelling effect 
of the cuts and freezes on management wages, combined with an attempt to steer what little room 
for nominal wage increments existed towards non-management employees. This meant that non-
management wages were not as severely affected by the downturn as management wages, and 
there is every reason to assume that a similar trend of relative convergence prevailed between 
wages of technical and manual workers. Nevertheless, the data indicates that while shop floor 
workers were comparatively less afflicted, their real wages too declined sharply – by more than 
half, or even two-thirds – between 1976 and the late 2000s.  
Another aspect of aggregate wage movements pertain to gendered divergences. In order to 
examine this, the chart below illustrates the differential between mean male and female wages in 
the Bahir Dar Textile Factory sample. The chart indicates that by the time of the revolution, the 
most extreme divergence had already subsided, but male wages retained a premium of almost 50 
 
241 Due to data shortages for the years 1971, 1972 and 2001 management wages for these three years are proxies, 
derived by combining the preceding and subsequent years and dividing that value by two. 
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percent over female wages. In the decade after the revolution, however, a more moderate 
differential of around 10 to 20 percent emerged. From the evidence from the Bahir Dar Textile 
Factory, it seems that gendered wage discrimination was significantly and systematically rolled 
back over the five decades measured, even if indications towards a trend of renewed differentiation 
may be discernible in the data from the last few years of the sample. 
Chart: Differential between mean male and female wages
 
Source: Author's computation of data from Bahir Dar Textile Factory personnel archives sample 
If the discussion above provides an indication of real wage movements at Bahir Dar, the shifting 
trends in unrest and indiscipline at the factory remain to be examined.  In order to measure this, 
the mean annual incidence of disciplinary transgressions per worker per year has been calculated 
from those workers in the sample active each year. This includes incidences of disciplinary 
warnings received by a worker; terminations on disciplinary grounds; engagement in unrest; 
destruction of property; violence; agitation/incitement; insubordination; and absence that have 
caused a disciplinary charge – i.e. excluding permitted leave, sick leave, or such occasional 
absence which has not been deemed worthy of a disciplinary charge; detainment for workplace 
behaviour; and also protest petitions by workers and resignations carried out in explicit protest 
against management. This is illustrated in the chart below. 
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Chart:  Mean incidents of disciplinary infractions/unrest
 
Source: Author's computation of data from Bahir Dar Textile Factory personnel archives sample 
A pattern not entirely dissimilar from the chart on national strike activity emerges here, where the 
first half of the 1960s stands out in terms of unrest/indiscipline. The peak occurred in 1964, the 
year after the signature of the first collective agreement, but unrest and indiscipline remained 
relatively high until the revolution, after which it rather abruptly came to an end. During the years 
of high state terror, unrest and indiscipline remained low, and reappeared in earnest again only in 
the second half of the 1980s. The next peak came between 1993 and 1996, and coincided with the 
high tide of the renewed struggle over the labour movement. To this extent, the data derived from 
the sample largely confirms the schematic outline of shifting levels of labour unrest on a national 
scale. The most significant differences is that, first, the country-wide spike of labour unrest 
between 1973 and 1976 is only partially visible in the data from the Bahir Dar Textile Factory. 
Secondly, the re-emergence of unrest in the second half of the 1980s found in the sample data 
seems largely unconnected to any broader country-wide wave of unrest. Obviously, either of these 
differences can be rooted in the manner in which local dynamics differ from national, but it is 
probably important to note that there is a slight probable tendency in the sample to statistically 
over-represent incidences of unrest/indiscipline taking place beginning in the mid-1980s. This is 
because changes in the personnel administration system – first in terms of the separation between 
wage administration and other personnel affairs, and subsequently because of computerisation – 
from the 1980s onwards means that some workers disappear from the statistics during uneventful 
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years242, but not those that had disciplinary infractions registered. This somewhat inflates the 
comparative weight of incidences in the last three decades or so, to a degree which is difficult to 
measure and to discount for. 
A final illustration of relevant trends in unrest and indiscipline, but which also reflect employment 
security, can be found in the chart below. The chart illustrates the share of active workers in the 
sample who were dismissed at any given year between 1963 and 2000. 
Chart: Rate of dismissal of workers
 
Source: Author's computation of data from Bahir Dar Textile Factory personnel archives sample 
As illustrated in the chart above, the early years of operation were marked by frequent 
dismissals, repeatedly affecting around and above five percent of the workforce per year. 
Another spike in the rate of dismissal occurred at the end of the 1960s, before settling down to a 
lower rate. In the 1990s, dismissals again appear to have become more frequent, although not 
reaching the levels of the 1960s. 
 
242 For workers whose files indicate a start- and an end-date of employment this is not a problem, as they can be 
considered active for all intervening years. But for those workers whose files do not include a start- or an end-date, 
uneventful years before or after any personnel events are registered cannot be counted. Since the files that contains 
such ambiguities are relatively few – probably less than a quarter, it is presumably not of decisive importance, but it 
has probably nevertheless slightly inflated mean numbers of incidences in the 1980s to 2000s. 
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6.4 Case study: CFE/CDE 
The CFE243 was founded in 1908 to traffic the railway that was being built between Djibouti and 
Addis Ababa, and commenced operation nine years later. It was established as a joint venture 
between French investors, with the Ethiopian government participating as a minor shareholder. In 
1959, however, the Ethiopian state procured sufficient shares to take ownership over half of the 
stock. Reflecting this new balance, the corporate headquarters were moved from Paris to Addis 
Ababa that same year. In 1981 the company was renamed Compagnie du Chemin de Fer Djibouto-
Ethiopien (CDE), and as the Djiboutian state took over ownership of French shares it was turned 
into a joint Ethiopian and Djiboutian state-owned enterprise. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the 
CDE entered into a long period of decline and the line fell into disrepair. The creation of a new 
and separate Ethiopian Railway Corporation in 2007 and the subsequent construction of a new line 
operated by this corporation, as well as the poaching of personnel and material from the CDE, 
unequivocally point to the immanent liquidation of the CDE at the time of writing. The actual 
railway line trafficked by the CDE was decommissioned in 2016. 
The Dire Dawa depot on the railway is located midway between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, at the 
edge of the Eastern Ethiopian highlands, close to the old trading city of Harar. It was selected 
because of its geographic location on the centre of the line; its proximity to Harar; and the relative 
cool temperature and access to fresh water its location at the escarpment offered. The area was 
largely inhabited by Somali and Muslim Oromo, but as the city of Dire Dawa developed around 
the railway it gathered a distinctly metropolitan population drawn from across and outside the 
empire. The railway depot included – in addition to the station and administrative offices – supply 
warehouses, training centres, a fuelling station, a clinic, and the mechanical workshops of the line. 
Personnel files from across the Ethiopian section of the line244 was, upon termination of 
employees, sent to be stored at the Dire Dawa offices. For this reason, the sample of files derived 
from Dire Dawa represents the whole Ethiopian section of the line. 
 
243 The CFE was renamed the CDE in 1981, four years after Djibouti gained independence. CFE, in turn, was the 
successor to the Compagnie Impériale des Chemins de Fer Ethiopiens, which had begun work on the railway in 1896 
but gone bankrupt in 1907. 
244 The Ethiopian and Djiboutian sections of the line have consistently been administrated separately, with the 
Djiboutian headquarters located in Djibouti city after the relocation from Paris. Wages on the Djiboutian section of 
the line were significantly higher than on the Ethiopian section. 
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CDE/CFE was an almost exclusively male workplace, with nearly all of the few women employed 
by the enterprise serving in its clinic245. The workforce included a high number of foreigners, 
although these numbers declined through the 1950s, 60s and 70s, as management and skilled 
labour increasingly was recruited locally. In the aftermath of the revolution, the process of 
Ethiopianising the workforce was brought to completion. 
Although labourers along the line had organised in prior constellations and staged strikes as far 
back as 1919246, its labour union, or syndicate as it was called, was established in 1946, with the 
aim to ‘protect Ethiopian workers from racial discrimination’247 – something that was rampant in 
the enterprise (Mboya 1958). The Syndicat des Cheminots staged three major strikes – in 1947, 
1949, and 1955, before it fell into relative inactivity. This combined with a sharp reduction of 
traffic and staff – going from 5 000 to 2 000 employees – during the 1950s to reduce the importance 
of the syndicate (Killion 1992: 603). In 1958, as noted, Tom Mboya visited Ethiopia and reported 
having been told that both the syndicate's president and vice-president had died, under what he 
perceived to be suspicious circumstances, in that year. Moreover, he was told by railway union 
officials that the union had become dormant and weak, organising only some 400 workers (Mboya 
1958). Nevertheless, in the early 1960s, when the process of establishing a country-wide trade 
union centre gathered pace, the syndicate had been revitalised and became an important player 
whose experience, reputation and semi-legal status was drawn upon. Through the 1960s and the 
early 1970s the union was led by Demena Lemma, who was also a member of CELU's General 
Council. The syndicate was legally registered according to the Labour Relations Proclamation in 
December 1962, and by August 1965 it had organised 1 600 members (Suter 1966: 52). The head 
office of the syndicate was located in Dire Dawa, and it had a branch office in Addis Ababa. It 
was a relatively well-funded union whose secretariat employed eight staff members and which 
could afford hiring instructors and purchasing books in early illiteracy campaigns. It also owned 
land and buildings, including a sprawling members' club in Dire Dawa (CELU 1970; Robinson 
1963). As one of the largest and most important unions in the country, it was the seventh to 
 
245 Only 20 out of 2000 CFE employees in 1964 were female (ILO 1964: 10). 
246 A series of strikes was led by European workers of the enterprise between 1919 and 1926. See Killion (1992) for 
details on early labour unrest along the railway. 
247 Racial discrimination was expressed both in terms of wage differentials and in the hierarchies of authority, with 
Europeans occupying the management positions in the early days of the syndicate. As follows, the syndicate's struggle 
against racial discrimination was aimed at increasing wages of the Ethiopian rank-and-file workers as well as to 
Ethiopianise management.  
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negotiate a collective agreement with its enterprise, concluding its first such agreement in 
December 1966 (Stutz 1967: 140).  
In terms of wages, the workers of CFE/CDE have for long periods, across the board, constituted a 
privileged group of relatively well-paid workers: ‘a virtual “labour elite” in relation to other 
Ethiopian industrial workers during the 1960s’, in the words of Killion (1984: 426). The probable 
reasons for this are several. The technological sophistication of the endeavour combined with the 
skilled labour force required is one factor. The impact of the high wages paid to European workers 
– but also Yemeni, Djiboutian and Somali subjects of colonial regimes – was another factor, as 
Ethiopian workers fought to close the wage gap. Moreover, the sustained militant pressure 
exercised by the organised workers of the enterprise between 1946 and 1955 repeatedly resulted 
in wage gains248. By the 1960s, the workers on the railway had already achieved substantial wage 
gains, and were thus relatively well-paid, but they were no longer at the forefront of militancy 
within the Ethiopian labour movement. 
The revitalised CFE union staged its first and only major strike in 1974. By this time it had 1500 
members and was led by Teshome Aberra. In addition to the strike, unrest along the line in that 
same year included a demonstration in Addis Ababa and a sabotage of the line outside Dire Dawa 
(Killion 1984: 429). In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, however, the leadership of the 
union rallied behind the PMAC and issued a condemnation of CELU's September 1974 strike call. 
Although Dire Dawa was a hotbed of industrial unrest and armed repression in the subsequent 
years, no major strike would again take place along the railway. But that did not mean that all 
workers were at peace. According to Kiflu Tadesse (2014, personal interview), who visited Dire 
Dawa in 1974, ‘there was a cleavage, there was a conflict between two major sections of the 
railway union: one section was the administration and those affiliated with the administration – 
they were mainly French-speaking Ethiopians from the central part of the country – and the other 
section was the rank-and-file… they were at loggerheads with each other and they were on the 
verge of calling a strike’. Illustrative of the vacillating position of the syndicate, and the loyalist 
tendencies of its leadership at the time, is the fact that while the railway workers' union was listed 
 
248 Killion (1984: 171) has pointed out how the ‘wages and benefits which later were to give the railroad its reputation 
as the “best paid and most secure employment” in the region did not exist at the end of the world war’, but were rather 
‘won by railroad workers only after a prolonged struggle with  French capital’. Indeed, by means of an example, the 
minutes of the Conciliation Commission (1947) to settle the 1947 strike on the railway mentions different categories 
of workers receiving between 20 and 40 percent wage increments. 
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as a signatory of the June 1975 protest note against the ‘anti-proletarian’ actions of the Dire Dawa 
MoLSA labour department (Various unions 1975), the stamp and the signature249 of the union was 
conspicuously missing from the document.  
In 1994, with the coming of a new episode of conflict over orientation within the labour movement 
and between the movement and the state, the CDE union again became involved. Perceived of as 
supportive of the CETU Executive Committee, its leadership was purportedly the first target for 
subversion in the conflict. According to Hailu Ourgessa (2017, personal interview), a dissenting 
faction supported by officials of the industrial federation for transport and communication workers 
in Addis Ababa was funded and equipped to go to Dire Dawa in their hundreds, where they 
‘attacked’ the leadership and removed it250. The episode spelt a final end to what was left of the 
reputation of militancy of the railway workers' union. 
To summarise, the workers of CFE/CDE have played an important role in disseminating the ideas 
and practices of organisation and collective action among Ethiopian workers. The railway 
syndicate also provided the Ethiopian labour movement with a key source of militant impulses in 
its earlier phase. Over the last four decades, however, this vanguard position was abandoned as the 
organisation of railway workers increasingly came to favour moderation over militancy and 
bargaining over action. 
6.4.1 Wages and unrest on the Railway 
The sample of files collected from the railway corporation is considerably smaller251 than that of 
the Bahir Dar Textile Factory, although they span a longer period of time. The comparatively lesser 
size of the sample is motivated both by pragmatic factors252, and because the CFE/CDE constitutes 
an important but a quite extraordinary outlier in Ethiopian wage labour and corporate history – in 
terms of age; levels of remuneration; the composition of the workforce; and the technical skills 
required by workers. For these reasons, it has not been deemed useful to disaggregate data between 
 
249 It was the only large Dire Dawa union listed in the petition where the stamp and signature of the union chairman – 
Ali Melew in the case of the railway workers union – was missing.  
250 According to Hailu, the removal was the outcome of a ‘mob decision’ and an apparent threat of violence. 
251 The sample consists of 300 workers' personnel files. 
252 The work on digitising the personnel files in the Dire Dawa depot is still ongoing at the time of writing. 
226 
 
male and female workers253 or between management and non-management personnel254. But there 
are nevertheless illuminating patterns discernible in the sample. 
The chart below presents the mean real wage index from the Dire Dawa Railway Depot sample of 
CFE/CDE personnel. Because the price index necessary to make deflation possible is only 
available from 1963 onwards, and because only very few workers in the sample were in 
employment after 1995, the chart covers only the intermediary years 
Chart: Aggregate Mean Real Wage Index from CFE/CDE Sample  
  
Source: Author's computation of data from CFE/CDE personnel archives sample 
It is apparent from the chart above that while the upward trajectory of national real wages from 
the early 1960s to the mid-1970s is visible here too, the upswing is neither as sharp as that found 
in the aggregate manufacturing sector statistics, nor as that in the Bahir Dar Textile Factory sample. 
The downward turn from the mid-1970s onwards is, on the other hand, much sharper than that 
found in the aggregate manufacturing sector statistics. The reason for the former is probably that 
the relatively high wages railway workers had already acquired by the beginning of this period 
limited the relative weight of nominal wage gains in the early phase. During the downturn, 
meanwhile, it logically follows that national wage equalisation policies would hit the relatively 
 
253 Because of the extreme predominance of male workers. 
254 Because of the technological sophistication of the enterprise, skilled non-management personnel at CFE/CDE 
frequently hade higher wages than most management personnel elsewhere and sometimes also than managers within 
the enterprise. It would have been more useful to separate technical workers from manual workers, but because no 
viable standardised way of doing so can be established from the files, it has not been attempted. 
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privileged railway workers comparatively harder than lesser-paid workers. A chart comparing 
average real wages on the railway with country-wide manufacturing wages illustrates this point. 
Chart: Mean Yearly Real Wages in 1963 ETB in Comparison 
  
Source: Author's computation of data from CFE/CDE personnel archives sample and CSA's annual 
Statistical Abstract 1963 to 2012/13. 
From the chart above, the comparatively privileged position of CFE workers coming into the 
period of organised labour is readily discernible. Moreover, the chart illustrates how wage 
equalisation policies led to a convergence of CFE wages with national manufacturing wages, 
consuming both the wage gains railway workers made prior to the emergence of organised labour 
country-wide, and those that had been acquired in the contestations of the 1960s and 1970s. 
When it comes to unrest and indiscipline on the railway, it cannot be measured in quite the same 
manner as in the sample from the Bahir Dar Textile Factory. This is because a standardised report 
system, where each personnel file contained a report chart covering each incidence of unpermitted 
absence and each yearly wage review – even for years where no revision had taken place – was in 
use until 1977 only. After 1977, such reviews, and absences, were only sporadically reported. 
Because of this incompatibility, only absence deemed serious enough to warrant an official 
warning255 has been included in the calculation. Moreover, the revision of the reporting system in 
1977 implied that significant numbers of workers – for whom no official warnings had been issued 
 
255 The system of reporting official warnings has been consistent since the 1940s. 
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– disappear from the statistics during uneventful years, and thus that a significant inflation and 
distortion of the mean amount of incidents subsequent to this cut-off year would occur. For this 
reason, the mean yearly averages calculated during these two different periods are not comparable. 
Hence, the measurement of mean incidents have been divided into two separate charts 
corresponding to two different reporting system. 
Chart: Mean total amount of disciplinary infractions/unrest at CFE/CDE 1946-1977  
 
Source: Author's computation of data from CFE/CDE personnel archives sample 
The above chart confirms the impression of the late 1940s – a period of militancy that saw two 
major strikes on the railway – as a time of heightened unrest and indiscipline. But even in the 
aftermath of this period, indiscipline and unrest did not peter out, but remained relatively high, and 
reached new peaks when the union was reactivated and during the mobilisation for a first collective 
agreement. Subsequent to the signing of this agreement – with the railway workers' privileges 
codified and safeguarded – a downturn in activity began, and this downturn was only punctuated 
by a spike in activity during the outbreak of massive country-wide labour unrest in the 1970s. 
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Chart: Mean total amount of disciplinary infractions/unrest at CFE/CDE 1978-1995   
 
Source: Author's computation of data from CFE/CDE personnel archives sample 
The chart above indicates that the early 1980s saw the re-emergence of high levels of unrest and 
indiscipline. This is comparable to the lesser increase in activity in the 1980s that was visible in 
the Bahir Dar Textile Factory sample, although it only appeared in the second half of the decade 
in the latter. The reason for this surge cannot readily be derived from neither the data, the literature, 
nor the national context. As this manifestation of renewed activity came at the end of the most 
serious drop in real wages on the railway, it can be speculated that this may have constituted a 
factor. Moreover, as this period of activity saw the end of the fall of real wages and a partial 
recovery, it may also be speculated that these two factors were related. This, however, is difficult 
to substantiate. Whatever the explanation, the year 1986 marked the end of the period. The next 
period of increased activity coincided – as it did in the Bahir Dar Textile Factory – with the peak 
of the second cycle of struggle over and within the labour movement. In this process, as mentioned 
above, the CDE union was an early target for subversion. Much like at the Bahir Dar Textile 
Factory, the latter period of activity came to an end roughly at the same time as a new co-opted 
national labour centre emerged. 
Finally, at the CFE/CDE too, the rate of dismissal indicate a higher level of indiscipline and 
restiveness, and/or a lower level of job security, before the revolution, as illustrated in the chart 
below. The rate of dismissal was particularly high in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. The years 
of PMAC/WPE rule, on the other hand, were marked by a very low rate of dismissal. Much like 
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at the Bahir Dar Textile Factory, this appears to indicate either lower levels of indiscipline and 
unrest, greater job security during this period, or both. 
Chart: Rate of dismissal of workers at CFE/CDE 1946-1995
 
Source: Author's computation of data from CFE/CDE personnel archives sample 
6.5 Summary: wages and unrest 
The examination of the data on wages and unrest presented in the above has generated a number 
of findings and indications. The most striking and obvious finding, observable in the aggregate 
country-wide statistics and reinforced by the case study data, pertains to the swings in the 
movement of real wages in the Ethiopian manufacturing sector since the early 1960s, and, it 
appears, in related waged sectors. They consist of a pronounced upward trajectory through the 
1960s and early 1970s, which in the midst of the revolution shifted to a steep and prolonged 
downward trajectory, after which real wages intermittently stabilised over certain periods and 
continued to decline over others, but never substantially recovered. 
The data presented decidedly contradicts Killion's (1984: 476-477) claim that CELU's leadership's 
‘gradualist policy [failed] to result in significant material or political gains for Ethiopian workers 
during the 1960s’. On the one hand, as was discussed in Chapter 4, political gains were made 
through the 1960s and early 1970s, which placed the labour movement in a central position in the 
political convulsions that followed. In this chapter it has been demonstrated that material gains too 
were made, in terms of progressively increasing real wages. While it may be true that these gains 
cannot be reduced to outcomes of the policies of the leadership, and that it was in fact the pressures 
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from outside and frequently even against the leadership that provided the propelling force of these 
developments, the standard depiction of the period as one in which workers failed to make 
meaningful advances does not hold up to scrutiny. Whether because of, despite of, or unrelated to 
the policies of the leadership, advances were made. It is probably not too far-fetched – considering 
how these advances were made within a context of sustained and increasing combativity of the 
broader movement, and considering the fact that when latter collapsed, the former were reversed 
too – to assume that the orientation of the broader movement was a key factor here. 
The extraordinary gains that Ethiopian workers secured during the long decade preceding the 
revolution in terms of wages and position requires an explanation. While the political-economic 
context must be taken into consideration, it has been demonstrated that wage outcomes cannot 
simply be explained by productivity levels, as productivity shifts appear to have been completely 
disconnected from the movement of wages over the full period under review here256. Moreover, 
while relative abundance and scarcity of factors of production may be important in explaining 
wages, the Ethiopian waged workforce has, throughout this period, remained surrounded by mass 
unemployment. Not much has changed in this respect257. Killion, however, was entirely right when 
he pointed in the direction of the origin and type of surpluses extracted by the dominant classes in 
explaining a certain – perceived at least – laxness in the enforcement of repression of the labour 
movement in the urban economy by the imperial regime. Apparently, as it turns out, late imperial 
Ethiopia was not as consistently inhospitable to the labour movement as the literature has portrayed 
it258.  Probably, this is linked to how the rulers perceived their interests: at the apex of the social 
structure was a class that relied almost exclusively on agrarian rents rather than industrial 
surpluses. To this class the urban waged sector may largely have appeared to be an irrelevance, a 
space of ‘modernist’ window dressing largely performed by and for foreigners. Corroborating this 
view, a CELU organiser at the time (Emmanuel 1983, interview with Tom Killion) has stated that 
‘they did not like the labour union, not even the government, they were very suspicious, but they 
 
256 Indeed, from the horse's mouth, the World Bank (2016: 51) in 2016 confirmed that ‘in Ethiopia, real wages do not 
reflect productivity levels’. 
257 In West Africa, for example, Austin (2013) has argued that as a result of population growth real wages fell in the 
1960s and 1970s, and, for unskilled workers, have continued to decline since. However, the fact that Ethiopia has 
possessed a huge reserve army of labour since the beginning of the period under examination – 20th century Ethiopia 
never having been as labour scarce as West Africa, but rather relatively land scarce – this cannot have been a decisive 
factor here. 
258 That having been said, as the data on dismissals imply, it was not necessarily very hospitable to the individual 
worker. 
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did not worry very much about it, because the people who had labour problems were foreign 
companies, local businessman, all [sic] of them [being] Armenians and Greeks’. Indeed, 
supporting this interpretation is the fact that the right to organise was not extended to the agrarian 
day-labourers working on the farms of the dominant classes and categories. Ironically – because 
of the egalitarianist political rhetoric which was deployed – it was the incoming post-revolutionary 
rulers and those who have ruled Ethiopia since who raised ambitions on surplus extraction in the 
waged sectors, and thus exacerbated pressure on wages259. It is not far-fetched to suggest that the 
collapse of real wages – always prone to political manipulation, and never merely the outcome of 
market factors – and the sharp ascent in the rate of exploitation discussed in the above is linked to 
this fact. 
But while the political-economic context and the efforts of the state must have affected wage 
movements, even in its laxer phase it was not the state that functioned as the vector of wage gains. 
Rather, the force propelling the advance was the active pressure from the labour movements. The 
most conspicuous historical dynamic displayed in the above is the relation between real wage 
movement and levels of unrest: real wages increased in times where the most pronounced levels 
of unrest prevailed, and immediately embarked on a sharp downward trajectory after the collapse 
of the labour movement and the repression of unrest wages. This is true for the aggregate statistics 
from the national manufacturing sector as much as for both workplace samples tested in the above. 
It is not only in hindsight that the correlation between the agency of workers in organising and 
engaging in unrest and the position of labour, measured in wages, becomes evident. It is also clear 
from the statements of a number of partisan participants – representatives of Ethiopian employers 
– of the time that this was how they conceived it. Moreover, in their statements it is possible to 
identify the reciprocal causation that has been termed the inspirational/demonstrative factor at 
work. First, the following excerpts from a memorandum written by FEE President and HVA 
Ethiopia executive J.M.J. Prakken in 1966 clarifies how successful collective industrial action 
inspired and fed into new rounds of unrest [author's emphases]: 
Relative calm was disrupted by the illegal strike initiated in 1964 by the workers of 
EAL. In the second part of 1965 more labour difficulties developed which 
eventually culminated in an illegal strike at General Ethiopian Transport thus 
paralysing transport communications in Addis Ababa and all over the Empire of 
 
259 See discussion in chapter 3. 
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Ethiopia. It is regrettable that apparently no action was taken against the 
offending strikers concerned who infringed the law, as this seems to have 
encouraged others considering numerous strikes and slow-downs that erupted in 
various industries during the past few weeks. In this respect we mention inter alia, 
a slow-down in A. Besse & Company, a general strike in Debre Berhan Wool 
Factory and a strike and slow-down in HVA-Ethiopia's Wonji and Shoa Factories, 
the latter lasting already for more than 15 days. In addition to this, there are reports 
about an increasing tendency of labour difficulties in many enterprises… The 
prevailing labour unrest is either a consequence of previous illegal labour actions 
having remained unpunished, or else that they are incited by agitators intent on 
embarrassing the Government. (Prakken 1966) 
Seven years later, the situation had not improved, and new wage gains were feeding into new 
unrest, and vice versa. FEE president of the time, Bekele Beshah, lamented that unpunished unrest 
led to growing boldness, and increasing wages [author's emphases]: 
Industrial relations developments in Ethiopia seems to have taken a turn for the 
worse. The most recent spate of illegal strikes in at least three very important 
establishments all of which have gone unpunished are in our view a cause for 
concern. What is even more worrying is the flood of threats, intimidations and 
coercion that have been directed against the government – and against the 
responsible officials of the institutions that have been the victims of these illegal 
acts… It is obvious that there has been a growing misuse of union power which, 
unless checked by law and its effective and impartial implementation, will 
jeopardise the future of collective bargaining… Very important issues here, are the 
costs of such strikes in loss of production and harm to the economy, and the 
vulnerability they show of business in general and of the government and public at 
large to industrial action in key sectors… If organised labour is to play an effective 
role in the nation's economic endeavour they have to do it as insiders… and not as 
outsiders pressing their demands and imposing their wishes by brute, naked force 
of slowdowns and strikes… The irresponsible exercise of trade unionism is not to 
be taken lightly. If no immediate legal remedies are implemented the chain of 
events very likely to be created could without any doubt jeopardise economic 
stability the consequences of which are again quite catastrophic. The submission 
to pressure, and intimidation as a result of which wages and other conditions of 
employment may be pushed up will automatically bring in its wake a rise in prices 
and eventually a spiralling in wages and prices. (Bekele 1973) 
But as important as it is to point out the reciprocity of cause and effect in driving gains and further 
militancy, the reverse is evidently also true. Repression, subjugated structures and collapsing 
wages was eventually to lead to a vicious cycle of passivity and defeat. A negative path dependence 
that the Ethiopian labour movement, despite attempts, has not yet escaped. 
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7. Conclusions 
In what follows the main findings are summed up and the implications of these findings on the 
literature are assessed. Prior to this, however, a brief note on the current conjuncture in the 
perspective of the socio-historical dynamics discussed is warranted. 
Half a century of labour movementism in Ethiopia has produced mixed results. Advances have 
been followed by retreats, conjunctures in which an assertive orientation has been adopted have 
been enclosed in longer periods where a deferential outlook has prevailed, and periods of emerging 
autonomy and burgeoning activity have been followed by periods of repression, co-option and 
docility. In terms of the position and conditions of labour, few achievements have endured. It is 
not unfeasible, when taking stock of things, to conclude that the movement has come full circle, 
as a former labour leader has done (Hailu 2017, personal interview): 
We are back to square one. We are now at the level that Ethiopian workers lived 
during the days of Aberra Gemu, when they fought for eight hours working day. 
We are there. We are back. We are back by fifty years after all this blood, tear and 
wear. 
In light of what has been presented, it is somewhat truistic to speak of contemporary plights of 
Ethiopian labour. The fact – highlighted in the citation above – that this state of things is the 
outcome of struggles that have seen a fair share of sacrifice aggravates its woefulness. However, 
it is only partially true that Ethiopian labour movement has little to show for in the present. 
Tangibly and structurally, there are few aspects of the current conjuncture worthy of celebrating, 
but there is a deep well of experience and important lessons that have been generated in the process. 
These experiences constitute foundations which any future advances must relate to and are likely 
to draw upon. 
It is evident that the current configuration is neither inevitable nor immutable. Things have not 
always been this way, and they are highly unlikely to remain so perpetually. Moreover, the present 
configuration is very much the conjunctural outcome of past contestations, and past periods of 
tranquillity have rapidly shifted to periods of contestation. That ought to be a caution for those 
who act on the presumption that industrial peace and low labour costs are stable outcomes, whether 
engaged in planning or profiteering – much as the assumptions of planners and profiteers of 
yesteryears were dashed on the hard rock of class conflict. In many ways, the present appears ripe 
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for another advance of the Ethiopian labour movement, and there are, at the very least, a few signs 
that another era of contestation may not be very far off: in October 2017 alone there were, first, 
reports of a work stoppage at the Sher Horticulture Farm involving 4 000 strikers and the 
destruction of farm property; second, CETU publicly warned that should the government fail to 
negotiate and amend a new draft labour legislation it had presented, the confederation would call 
a general strike; and third, a strike broke out at the Castel Winery in which 1200 workers downed 
tools and barred management representatives as well as police officers from entering the premises 
(Fasika 2017b; Fasika 2017c; Addis Fortune 2017). The Castel Winery workers only agreed to 
recommence work after five days on strike, and after wage increments of up to 70 percent had 
been secured. Underlining the historical importance of these developments, they included the 
national centre's first explicit wielding of the general strike threat since September 1975, and, in 
terms of number of strikers, the greatest outburst of labour unrest since the early-mid-1990s at the 
very least. Reinforcing the impression of cyclical continuity, moreover, the draft labour law, which 
had triggered the confederation's warning, was condemned as a ‘proclamation of slavery’ in a 
statement issued by a group of exiled labour leaders (2017) – the very same label which the EPRP 
had attached to the 1975 labour law. 
7.1 Determination of orientation 
A number of factors that drove the development of assertiveness over the two cycles have been 
discussed in this dissertation. To begin with, pressures from below constituted the key force 
propelling the development of an assertive orientation during both cycles. In the first example, this 
was expressed in the high levels of unsanctioned unrest; the push from the rank-and-file on local 
representatives to call strikes; the pressures exercised, in turn, by workers' representatives on the 
central leadership to articulate assertive demands and to enforce them by militant practices; the 
emergence and crystallisation of a militant oppositional wing of the larger movement; the eventual 
toppling of the central leadership; the repeated re-election of radical representatives in the face of 
repression; and the development of a full-blown proletarian insurgency engulfing the waged 
economy through the mid-1970s. During the second cycle, pressures from below were most 
prominently expressed in the call from local unions, representatives and rank-and-file workers on 
the CETU leadership to call a general strike, but also in the manner in which spontaneous networks 
emerged from below in order to reconstitute the labour movement and prevent the state from 
determining its orientation. However, while pressures from below have been important in 
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propelling the development of assertiveness, the reasons why it has been forthcoming in differing 
degrees of force and traction need still to be accounted for. 
The role assigned to vanguard/political movements operating within the labour movement does 
not appear as straightforward as that of internal pressures. While it may briefly have been important 
during the high tide of labour radicalism in the 1970s, that labour radicalism largely developed 
outside the influence of, and temporally prior to the existence of, any vanguardist organisation. 
This, however, is not to detract from the importance of the organisational resources and 
opportunities that the relationship between the radical labour movement and political organisations 
– the EPRP in particular – availed.  
A factor that checked assertiveness and militant practices during both cycles was the role played 
by the state. This factor became most conspicuous during the phases of active repression that 
brought both cycles to end. In this sense, the counter-mobilisation of the state has constituted an 
important moderating factor, but it has not been determinant on its own. That is because there were 
periods when state repression was deployed but was unsuccessful in subduing the movement. In 
fact, heavy-handed state measures counter-intentionally fuelled the further development of 
assertiveness and militancy to some degree during both cycles. While state repression and 
harassment of the labour movement – repeatedly conducted in concert with employers – has 
constituted an enduring feature in the history of Ethiopian labour movementism, state control has 
been most effectively achieved when it has been outsourced to the labour bureaucracy, enabling 
the state to largely withdraw from the internal day-to-day operations of the movement. This has 
worked rather well during all periods of relative calm, where the role of the state has been reduced 
to the intermittent but important role of monitoring the boundary of permissible activity and 
reinforcing a co-opted labour bureaucracy with the credible threat of intervention should that 
boundary be crossed. 
At this point, however, a note on the relationship between the political conjuncture and displays 
of labour assertiveness and militancy is warranted. It appears to be the case that periods in which 
the state's repressive capacity has declined have also been periods during which the labour 
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movement has displayed its most open combativeness260. This relationship is rather self-
explanatory: the relative weakness of the state's repressive capacity presents and enhances 
opportunity. However, the role of such opportunity should not be exaggerated. Opportunity alone 
cannot generate successful contestation, and is meaningless in the absence of the other aspects of 
mobilisation: if grievances, perceptions of injustice, adversity, and rank-and-file militancy is not 
prevalent in the first place, opportunity cannot be exploited. Moreover, in the Ethiopian example 
the development of militancy and assertiveness largely took place during times when the state's 
repressive capacity was intact. 
The process of bureaucratisation constitutes a moderating factor which was most conspicuously 
effective during the early phases of the first cycle. Here, a labour bureaucracy developed outside 
of the direct orbit of, and with only occasional incursions from, the state. In all subsequent 
constellations, the development of a deferentially oriented and separated layer of labour 
bureaucracy has required exogenous imposition and/or direction. However, another external entity 
was crucial to the consolidation of a moderate leadership – this was the international ‘free’ trade 
union movement. ICFTU and its allies closely monitored and interfered at all representative layers 
in order to dampen militant energies and to inculcate ‘business unionism’ among workers' 
representatives. Its most effective efforts were aimed at reinforcing the moderate leadership within 
the movement, giving it access to a range of resources and also directly assisting it in subverting 
democratic processes when these were deemed incompatible with the principles of anti-radical 
unionism. But while propping up the leadership, the ICFTU and allies also exercised control over 
the latter, making sure that it did not stray the slightest out of line, and did not hesitate to call on 
the state to collaborate in this endeavour. As a result, not only were militant energies suppressed, 
but so was the autonomy of the movement. While the same constellation of international 
organisations re-entered the fray with the foundation of CETU, and while they were not 
unimportant sources of moderating pressures during this cycle, the influence they exercised this 
second time was not as great. This was, first, because the conflict that embroiled the movement 
broke out before even CETU's affiliation request with the ICFTU was processed, and as a result 
the mundane form of bureaucratic unionism that most readily lends itself to external pressures 
 
260 This appears again to be the case with the October 2017 general strike threat, having been issued in the midst of a 
period of broader political unrest, and a – temporarily at least – decline in the state's ability to enforce order. However, 
it ought to be noted that the strike threat also came at a time when a most significant deterioration of labour rights had 
been announced. 
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could never develop; and, second, because the level of state interference and repression was too 
overt to be ignored by most affiliates of the international ‘free’ trade union movement. But the 
latter did not prevent some organisations, such as the AALC, from intervening to shore up the 
most obviously co-opted and deferential structures, and help to put a decisive end to what 
autonomous labour movementism remained. 
A couple of contextual factors relating to social and professional divergences within the waged 
workforce have been discussed in the foregoing chapters. The nature of the influence that these 
factors have exercised has been shown to be contingent. However, a notable aspect of the 
development of assertiveness in the history of the Ethiopian labour movement is the prominent 
role of educated or skilled white-collar workers. This factor may not be as curious as it would 
appear, since white-collar workers have constituted a relatively large share of the workforce. When 
combined with the fact that assertiveness and militancy has not necessarily been forthcoming 
during the times when conditions and wages have been the poorest, it indicates that the objective 
economic conditions have not been central to the development of militancy and assertiveness. 
Neither does the effects of the structural position suggested by some authors – the high levels of 
unemployment and/or the relatively small size of the waged sectors – appear to have generated 
any one type of orientation on its own. Other factors are needed to account for the shifting degree 
of pressure from below, and the manner in which that pressure has been contained or given an 
outlet. 
7.2 Effects of orientation 
In the previous chapter it was demonstrated how wage improvements have coincided with high 
levels of unrest: both across the manufacturing sector, and at the two workplaces covered. The 
reverse also holds true: during periods of relatively low levels of unrest, wages have tended to fall. 
This does not by itself mean that causality has been established, but in light of the evidence of the 
impact of specific strikes on negotiated wages, a causative mechanism has been identified. 
Collective bargaining underlined by strikes and unrest frequently led to substantial improvement 
in wages during the 1960s and much of the 1970s. Since aggregate levels of unrest were high 
throughout the long decade this had a cumulative effect. In this manner the assertiveness and 
militancy of the labour movement led to significant wage gains. That this is how alarmed 
representatives of Ethiopian employers understood the unfolding process has also been 
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demonstrated, and by the end of the long decade, even the ILO was voicing concern about the level 
of wages. In light of this, it is hardly surprising that at the moment the Ethiopian labour movement 
collapsed – both organisationally and as a set of militant practices – real wages embarked on a 
sharp and lengthy decline. During the second cycle, strike activity and unrest again briefly flared 
up, but it was smothered early. This time, there was no immediately discernible effect of activity 
on aggregate wages. This does not, however, contradict the causative relationship outlined above, 
but rather underlines the importance of the endurance, repetitiveness and depth of activity – 
occurring repeatedly, at all levels, throughout an extended period – that characterised the first 
cycle.  
Wages, of course, is only one aspect of the position of labour, and strike activity is only one aspect 
of orientation. The position of labour can also be illustrated by the social and political clout of 
organised labour, which grew considerably during the first cycle's long decade of contestation. 
The more assertive the movement grew, the more force did it appear to gather and the more 
influence did it command. In the late 1960s, employers had grown exasperated with their inability 
to pacify the movement, and by 1973, the successful bank strike signalled that the labour 
movement had become an autonomous force that the state would have to reckon with. This was 
merely confirmed by the 1974 general strike and its aftermath. 
In terms of the conditions of labour, there is little comparable data that can be drawn upon to 
measure changes. However, it should be noted that while the 1975 labour law introduced severe 
restrictions on the collective rights of labour, it addressed many of the demands relating to 
individual labour rights – including employment security safeguards, health and vacation 
provisions etc. As has been demonstrated by the falling rate of dismissal, moreover, this led to a 
pronounced improvement in job security. There are therefore reasons to assume that the pressure 
exercised by an assertive labour movement eventually helped to generate certain betterments in 
the conditions of labour. The fact that many of these provisions have since – in times of lesser 
militancy and assertiveness – been removed, only serves to underline the effects of orientation on 
outcomes. Overall, there has been a marked impact of the Ethiopian labour movement on the 
labour regime – manifested both during periods of greater assertiveness and, in inverted shape 
through reversals, during periods where a more deferential orientation has prevailed. 
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Militancy and assertiveness has had another important effect. The attraction it has exercised on 
workers has been displayed in the membership gains that followed all major expressions of 
assertiveness: the general strike of 1974; the foundation of the Provisional Workers' Committee 
on an explicitly radical and assertive platform in 1975; and the CETU declaration of opposition to 
the structural adjustment programmes in 1994. This final point suggests an important aspect of 
assertiveness: it finds resonance and therefore enhances force – in other words, it goes hand in 
hand with clout, which, in turn enables the further development of assertiveness. If, then, these 
factors have reciprocally reinforced and kindled one another there is every reason to expect them 
to operate in a reciprocal interplay with other factors too. 
For one, it appears that unrest – and thus militancy – has been correlated with the degree of 
autonomy of the movement. During times of high levels of unrest, as according to the periodisation 
in the previous chapter, the autonomy of the labour movement in general and of the national centre 
in particular tended to be relatively greater. This is not to suggest that autonomy has necessarily 
produced militancy, among other things because militancy in terms of wildcat action has largely 
been unsanctioned in the first place, but rather that militancy has generated space for the national 
confederation to operate more autonomously. Relative autonomy, meanwhile, has been an 
essential condition for all major advances, which in turn have attracted a broader membership, 
generating further clout. But there are more reciprocities at work, as will be made evident. 
7.3 Reciprocal interplay of cause and effect: the inspirational/demonstrative factor 
The reciprocal interplay between causes and effects of orientation is something that has been 
evidenced on a number of levels. This has imprinted a degree of path dependence on the process 
in which orientation is established. On the one hand, it has generated virtuous cycles of increased 
assertiveness, advances and betterment, and on the other it has generated vicious cycles of defeat 
and despondency. It may be posited that this factor is decisive in explaining why the pressure from 
the rank-and-file has been forthcoming to such different degrees, and has generated such different 
outcomes over different periods: when ignorable or surmountable, and when not. This would 
explain why, for example, rank-and-file pressure could more readily be overcome in 1965 or 1990, 
than in 1975; or why no meaningful pressure appears to have been forthcoming in 1980 or 2005.  
It has been shown how the advances and gains achieved during the first cycle led to the continuous 
ratcheting up of demands and assertiveness; how this was reinforced by growing membership 
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numbers and militancy; how the workplace balance of forces began to shift; how strikes and unrest 
led to concessions from employers and the state, generating higher wages and growing autonomy; 
which in turn enabled the movement to make even bolder demands. At its peak, these demands 
included the full socialisation of all major enterprises, democratisation of workplace relations, and 
the subordination of management to the control of workers. Moreover, these demands were 
supported by a movement that had generated a proletarian insurgency and was expanding at a rapid 
pace. But when this movement was defeated – in conditions comparable to a civil war – 
demobilisation followed, reasserted control spelled the end to autonomy, and repression led to a 
rapid decline in militancy. The movement, consequently, had lost all clout. There were not to be 
any further concessions – none were necessary to a vanquished movement – but a hardening of 
conditions. As a result, wages collapsed and the position of labour slumped. In the tail end of the 
cycle, there was only resignation and docility. It would take a decade before new stirrings 
appeared.  
When these stirrings emerged, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was not long before a renewed 
process of mobilisation and increasing assertiveness began. Unrest and protests were the first signs. 
When a new government came to power and dismantled the inherited structures of the labour 
movement, spontaneous networks and rearguard industrial action re-emerged in response. 
Eventually, a number of large strikes took place. More generally, the tranquillity that had 
characterised the industrial scene was replaced by contestation. The workers not only managed to 
press the government to permit the reestablishment of a national confederation, but through 
spontaneous networks they reasserted a certain level of control over the process, leading to the 
refoundation of a relatively autonomous confederation. However, the balance of forces were 
decisively tilted against the movement and the new confederation. The new government had 
embarked on a programme of liberalisation that was inimical to the interests of labour, and had 
already displayed an inclination to curtail the space available to the movement. From the outset, 
then, the labour movement's campaign was a defensive one. As much as efforts were made to halt 
the worsening of conditions, no major advances were attempted. Neither were the rank-and-file 
mobilised for any larger industrial contestation, not even when the government clamped down on 
the movement in earnest. As CETU's leadership decided to defend the confederation in courts of 
law rather than on the industrial scene and on the shop floors, each union was left to fend for itself. 
Any resistance was thus dispersed, and would eventually be defeated in isolation. In other words, 
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the reciprocal growth of factors could only just begin before it was halted and reversed. Instead, 
only a year after the establishment of the confederation, the labour movement was on a path of 
successive defeats, further curtailments, demobilisation, and declining levels of activity – all 
within a context of worsening conditions, mass retrenchments, and hollowing of rights. 
The term inspirational/demonstrative factor has been proposed to describe the reciprocal interplay 
of factors outlined in the above, and to enunciate the mechanism by which these outcomes are 
produced. It is the inspiration that advances built on militant practices and an assertive orientation 
generate, and the demonstrative effect it has to convince workers and representatives of the 
viability and prudence of adopting a certain orientation, that explains the increasing lure of 
militancy and assertiveness within a virtuous cycle. Obviously, the opposite holds equally true: 
that an orientation or strategy that fails to result in any meaningful gains – or worse, that generates 
defeat and worsening of conditions – demoralises workers and demonstrates the imprudence of the 
prevalent path. In cases where an alternative path is available, this may very well be the preferred 
option, but where no such path appears to be open, it is likely to breed despondency and resignation 
rather than militancy. But this is a proposition that needs to be examined in light of the theory 
reviewed. 
7.4 Implications for theory and the literature 
7.4.1 Literature on the Ethiopian labour movement 
A number of assumptions, portrayals and interpretations inherited from the literature on the 
Ethiopian labour movement lend themselves to review in light of the findings of this research. 
They include the portrayal of labour conditions and wages in imperial Ethiopia as particularly 
harsh; the assumption that few improvements were achieved during the long decade following the 
emergence of the Ethiopian labour movement; the view that the movement has consistently been 
weak, and the argument that this weakness has expressed itself in the consistent subordination of 
labour to the state; the somewhat contradictory notion that the close attention paid to the labour 
movement by the state has been irrational; the political-economic interpretation of the imperial 
regime's attitude towards organised labour; the subsumption of labour radicalism under the 
historiography of the 1974 revolution; and the attribution of labour radicalism to the role of 
‘infiltrating’ agents in the labour movement. Several of these views requires reassessment in light 
of the findings in this dissertation. 
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To begin with, it appears that late imperial Ethiopia – contrary to the inherited wisdom – was not 
an environment as consistently hostile to organised labour and as resistant to its aims as the 
literature has indicated. In fact, when compared to subsequent regimes, the late imperial state 
comes across as the least intolerant in this regard. Late imperial Ethiopia saw the emergence of a 
vibrant labour movement, sustained industrial contestation, and a concurrent rapid increase of real 
wages across the unionised sectors. This was all to collapse rather abruptly, and the wage gains 
recorded in the 1960s and 1970s were consumed in the decade that followed. Despite Ethiopia's 
newfound pattern of economic growth in more recent years there are not very encouraging signs 
as to whether it is resulting in renewed wage gains. Late imperial Ethiopia remains, ironically, the 
hitherto comparatively most hospitable historical context for organised labour in the country. 
Although the findings contradict Killion's portrayal of the imperial labour regime in this regard, 
they support his interpretation of the important role of different types of surpluses and forms of 
surplus extraction that dominant classes rely upon in determining the attitude of the state towards 
organised labour. While the imperial government, dominated as it was by landed rentier interests, 
could afford to ignore, or at least adopt an attitude of benign neglect towards wage labour, all 
subsequent governments have felt compelled to intervene more directly and severely to subjugate 
the labour movement and to exert downward pressure on real wages. The minister of labour and 
social affairs of the imperial government could speak of the importance of increasing wages and 
meetings the demands of labour. Subsequent administrations, on the other hand, have stressed 
profits, intensified surplus accumulation, and low labour costs. These are not merely rhetorical 
points, but reveal something about the underlying pattern of dominant interests.  
While Killion's account of the role of the above-mentioned political-economic factor is 
convincing, his characterisation of the labour movement as having been perpetually weak and 
subordinated to the state is less persuasive. There are few reasons to accept the characterisation of 
relationship between the labour movement and the state in the first half of the 1970s as one of 
‘subordination’. In fact, the opposite was true: eventually, the two parties were in open conflict. 
Neither is the determinant role assigned to the effects of other structural factors – the level of 
unemployment and the relatively minor size of the waged workforce – very convincing. A large 
‘reserve army of labour’ has been a constant feature of the Ethiopian political economy. If this did 
not prevent the upward swing of wages in the first cycle, and if it did not prevent the emergence 
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of an assertive labour movement in the 1970s and 1990s, there are few reasons to believe that it 
would do so in the 1980s or 2000s. This also serves to refute Killion's assessment that CELU's 
strategy had failed to generate material and political gains. In fact, it has here been demonstrated 
that both the material conditions and political position of labour were substantially improved. 
The findings presented corroborate the important role the state has played in repeatedly reining in 
the autonomy and assertiveness of the labour movement. However, while this factor has been 
important, it has not been determinant by itself. An assertive, militant, and autonomous labour 
movement has coexisted with repressively inclined and hostile governments in Ethiopia in the past. 
It may do so again, and the relationship is not mechanical. But the state has its reasons for aiming 
to prevent this. Aspiring to exercise close control over the labour movement is hardly, as Dessalegn 
has suggested, irrational. On the contrary: a militant and assertive labour movement has repeatedly 
shown that, whatever its relative size, it is capable of serious economic and political disruption. Its 
strategic location, its high concentration and its – in civil society – unparalleled level of 
organisation, means that the labour movement remains a force whose potential power is only 
matched by the disruptive potential of the demands it has articulated. These have, at times, 
pertained not only to the ‘corporate interest’ of wage workers, as the Ottaways would describe it, 
but the revolutionisation of the relations of production, the empowerment of working people, 
greater social justice, and a radical alteration of ownership structures. 
Importantly, the findings presented in this dissertation dispels the validity of subsuming Ethiopian 
labour radicalism under the historiography of the Ethiopian revolution, and it puts to rests the 
notion that ‘infiltration’ can satisfactorily explain the upswings of assertiveness. These ideas have 
been refuted on several levels. To begin with, the sequence is not right. Labour radicalism in the 
1960s and 1970s manifested itself in a longer arch, reaching far deeper into the past then neither 
the subsumption nor the idea of infiltration permit. Militant opposition to the moderate policies of 
the CELU leadership had existed for a decade, and had crystallised into an organised oppositional 
and militant wing of the labour movement several years before the explosion of urban unrest – 
which eventually came to lead to the revolution – began in February 1974. Militant energies had 
increased rapidly in the few years just prior to this. The 1972 decision of 30 militant unions to 
disaffiliate from CELU and the flare-up of serious labour unrest in 1973 constitute only the most 
glaring examples of this. Moreover, labour radicalism, in the form of the oppositional labour 
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movement, preceded the formation of the political parties that were deemed to have produced it 
by a full decade. It is not plausible to speak of conduction when the supposedly conducted activity 
commences prior to the arrival of the conductor.  
Ethiopian workers have acquired militancy and assertiveness predominantly through their own 
experiences of injustice and adversity, in the workplace, in the unions, and in society at large. In 
this sense, Kelly's mobilisation theory appears to more accurately explain events than the notion 
of ‘infiltration’: the development of a sense of injustice and the establishment of adversarial 
relations had been attained by the time of – or at least soon after – the foundation of CELU. But in 
the mobilisation phase, leaders are important. When those leaders could no longer be overturned, 
so much worse for employers and the state. While such leaders emerged in the basic unions they 
initially had little influence over the broader movement. But this changed with the crystallisation 
of an oppositional labour movement, and its eventual seizure of control over CELU. Furthermore, 
when this radical leadership could draw support from the emergence of a broader social 
constellation of radical forces, it enhanced opportunity and resources available. Herein lies the 
major aspect of the importance of radical political movements operating in and with the Ethiopian 
labour movement. In the same manner, the social contagiousness of the urban uprising in 1974 and 
the initial openings the revolution presented may have been factors that favoured the further 
development of labour militancy, but they had not produced it. These factors had neither created 
the sense of injustice nor adversity – neither had they produced the radical labour leaders. Those 
were products of the experiences of Ethiopian workers in the practice of class contestation. 
7.4.2 Theory 
In addition to what has been discussed in the above, the findings presented in this dissertation are 
relevant to the theoretical literature in several ways. They pertain both to the literature on the 
dynamics that determine orientation, and to the literature on the effects of assertive strategies and 
militant practices. Moreover, in the discussion a possibility of bridging the divide between these 
two strands of literature has been identified, calling attention to the question of reciprocities 
between causes and effects. 
To begin with, the findings corroborate theorisation on the moderating effects of bureaucratisation 
and of external pressures from the state and employers, as well as the international labour 
bureaucracy. The Ethiopian example also reinforces the view that trade unions perform dual roles, 
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serving both as mediums of collective power of workers, and simultaneously as mediums of 
exercising over workers. In checking unsanctioned militancy, the leadership of the Ethiopian trade 
union movement has repeatedly joined forces with employers and the state, enabling compound 
pressure to be exercised. However, when state and employers have displayed excessive heavy-
handedness towards the labour movement, or when labour officialdom too blatantly has attempted 
to subvert internal democracy, this has repeatedly had the adverse effect: fuelling militancy among 
workers rather than smothering it. The Ethiopian example lends credence to the view that it is 
generally militant energies and pressures from below that propel the development of assertiveness. 
But it should be noted that in the Ethiopian case, labour officialdom has not always and 
straightforwardly supressed militancy. It has also relied on militant activity to justify its role and 
strengthen its hand vis-à-vis employers, the state and the international labour bureaucracy. While 
sometimes threatening the leadership, such militant energies and pressures from below has also 
served to carve out a space in which a certain degree of autonomy could appear. In other cases, it 
forced a reluctant leadership into confrontations it would have preferred to avoid. 
In terms of outcomes, the findings support the strand of theory that emphasises assertive and 
militant agency as a key factor in improving the position of labour in general and wages in 
particular. The agency of workers, while embedded in the broader political economy, has shown 
to be a powerful factor in reproducing and altering it. In the literature reviewed, militant practices 
have been taken to have a key role in doing so. Cohn, for example, posited that frequent striking 
is usually an optimal strategy for extracting concessions, and van der Linden viewed the credible 
strike threat as a defining attribute of unions. Those views are largely supported by the Ethiopian 
example. The findings also corroborate the view that while organisation is an essential factor for 
workers to successfully engage in contestation, it is not a sufficient factor. It is the prevalence of 
militant practices and an assertive outlook that is decisive – the willingness to strike in particular. 
In the Ethiopian case the premium of militant practice – rather than unionisation alone – does not 
only appear to have been high, but has been manifested in both material and political gains. 
Cohn, however, has suggested that striking is irrational when a movement is too weak. This may 
very well be the case, but it is unclear wherein such weakness resides. As discussed with regards 
to Killion's account of the structurally poor position of Ethiopian wage labour – in terms of a 
relatively small numerical size and in terms of prevailing mass unemployment – such weakness 
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did not stop the labour movement from extracting extensive concessions at different times. If this 
weakness explain why no major concessions could be extracted in 1995, why, one has to ask, could 
then such concessions be extracted in 1965? There is no conclusive evidence to be presented here, 
but it is difficult to accept that defeat was the destined outcome of a relatively poor position of the 
movement in the 1990s, if this was not the case three decades earlier. 
As follows from to the demonstrated effects of militant agency on wages in Ethiopia, the findings 
have lent credence to the view that real wages cannot credibly be considered the mechanical 
outcome of aggregate economic growth, productivity levels, relative abundance/scarcity of factors 
of production, or any other one economistic factor alone. The notion of an explicitly political 
determination of real wages in African economies may have some bearing on this, but it would 
require some intermediary form of explanation. It appears likely, as Samir Amin's theorisation 
would lead one to expect, that the seemingly complete disconnect between productivity and wages 
exhibited in the Ethiopian case is somewhat related to the underdeveloped nature of the Ethiopian 
economy, and to the relatively small size of its wage labouring population. Certainly, the sharpness 
of the swings in real wage levels appears quite remarkable in the Ethiopian case. More than 
anything, they appear to be outcomes determined by the processes of contestation discussed. 
Several aspects of the findings support Kelly's long wave/mobilisation theory of unrest, and related 
theorisation that emphasises the role of economic cycles on unrest. Indeed, economic upturns and 
downturns at least coincided with some shifts in the level of militancy among Ethiopian workers. 
The 1960s was a time of economic expansion in Ethiopia, and this expansionary cycle peaked in 
the early 1970s. The late 1970s to the early 1990s, on the other hand, largely constituted a period 
of stagnation. The insurgent mood of workers in the mid-1970s and the subsequent decline of both 
the economic conjuncture and militant energies among workers may, to some degree, be related, 
as this strand of theorisation would indicate. Similarly, it has been discussed how the broader 
political economy – and particularly the role of, and ambitions on, different types of surpluses and 
mechanisms of extraction – related with the intensity and outcome of contestation. However, 
economic cycles are not sufficient to explain what took place in Ethiopia, nor did they always tally 
with the ups and downs of militant activity. The phase of rapid expansion from the late 1990s to 
the early 2010s, for example, was not matched by any significant re-emergence of activity, as 
theories emphasising the role of business cycles would predict. 
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What is required to explain the above in a comprehensive manner is a modified version of 
Screpanti's theorisation on proletarian insurgencies: indeed, as he indicated, there appears to be a 
reciprocal relation between advances in the position of labour, on the one hand, and the 
development of militancy and assertiveness, on the other, reinforced by expanding ranks of 
workers attracted to the achievements and inspired by energies released. Equally, the reverse can 
happen, breeding a cycle of defeat, despondency and docility. Both aspect of this dynamic has an 
element of path dependence that has been displayed in the recent history of the Ethiopian labour 
movement. But the Ethiopian example indicates that these reciprocities need not be subjected to 
any overarching business-cyclical logic to operate perfectly well. The inspirational/demonstrative 
factor of advances built on assertiveness and militancy is entirely sufficient in explaining the 
emergence of such virtuous cycles, while successive defeats, associated with the adoption of a 
deferential outlook or a strategic unwillingness to engage in militant practices, and underlined by 
a passive membership, is entirely sufficient in explaining the emergence of the reverse cycle. This 
element effectively unifies the theoretical strands of literature. Because while, on the one hand, 
militancy and assertiveness has been seen leading to advances in the position of labour, on the 
other, it has been demonstrated that indeed ‘there is a positive cumulative effect of past experience 
in relation to actual claims’, as Screpanti stated. In other words, the effects of a certain orientation 
can explain many of its causes, and vice versa. 
When it comes to theorisation on the particularities of African labour and trade union movements, 
the findings of this research has some relevance too. Indeed, it has been found that state 
encroachment on autonomy has generally been severe in Ethiopia, and it has been demonstrated 
that the Ethiopian labour movement, even in its more autonomous phases, has tended to be drawn 
into close engagement with the state. This lends credence to the view that African labour 
movements frequently operate on the explicitly political level. However, since the historical 
context in Ethiopia is different from those in which an alliance between national liberation 
movements and labour movements emerged, this poses the question of what precisely it is that 
generates this condition. This question, however, must remain largely unaddressed for the time 
being, in lack of the necessary comparative data. What is clear from the Ethiopian case is that 
whichever level of autonomy from the state that the labour movement has at different times 
acquired, has had to be won in contestation. Moreover, the Ethiopian example lends support to the 
view that the heavy external dependence of many African labour movements, itself partly an 
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outcome of poor finances, has been a factor severely curtailing autonomy, and the development of 
assertiveness. On the other hand, however, the national-ethnic fragmentation and the relatively 
minor size of the waged workforce has not appeared to have imposed significant limitations on 
neither the development of assertiveness, militancy, nor clout. As suggested in the literature, the 
restraining effect of size has probably to some degree been offset by the centrality of the economic 
and strategic location of the workforce. 
To conclude, it has been demonstrated how militancy, assertiveness and organisation have 
constituted key factors in advancing the position of Ethiopian labour, and how a virtuous cycle of 
increasing assertiveness, force, and positional advances can be created. However, it is probably 
feasible to assume that within a certain mode of production, there must be some outer limits to the 
extent to which this position can be altered. The capitalist enterprise, to take a relevant example, 
cannot remain viable without generating profits, and so its bottom line, as Cohn suggested, will 
always constitute an outer limit to struggles over surplus allocation261. This calls the conception of 
trade unions and workplace struggles as ‘schools of war’ to mind, indicating that they constitute 
the location of learning, and that the proverbial262 ‘war’ – its decisive engagement at the very least 
– is fought out elsewhere. This may be somewhat of an overstatement, since the delimitation of 
economic contestation from political can never be as straightforward. Nevertheless, incremental 
gains in the position of labour are subject to reversals whenever shifting balances of forces permit 
– concessions over the degree of surplus extraction may always be retracted, as long as the wage 
mechanism of extraction remains in place. And so, in the absence of its abolishment, one is left 
with a perpetual string of cycles recurring within substantially unaltered terrain. In light of this it 
can be contended that in the absence of that party of which Perry Anderson wrote – that element 
of ‘historical negativity’, which takes as its task to fundamentally transform the social terrain in 
which the battles are fought out rather than merely advance within it – all advances carry within 
them the seed of eventual reversal. 
  
 
261 Moreover, it cannot remain profitable, in a competitive context, without squeezing costs, which sets another 
limitation to wage formation. On the level of the capitalist state, it is most likely to aim to enhance the exploitative 
competitiveness of the national economy, thereby setting a limit to what overall wage movements is tolerable. 
262 ‘War’, in this context it is to be recalled, refers to the explicitly political struggle over state power. 
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